Lobbying alone A study of political access and lobbying behavior of corporations in Western Europe

Corporations that lobby individually are seen as illegitimate actors within the political process as they do not represent membership constituencies. When corporations lobby alone instead of via a business association, it is difficult to engage in interest representation that moves beyond the interests of the corporation and to focus on interests of the broader business community and society. The involvement of corporations as individual actors in politics therefore poses a serious threat to the functioning of our democracies.
Empirical examples highlight that corporations are widely involved in decision-making processes in both the United States (U.S.) and Europe. Corporations are studied as key players in politics in the context of the U.S. In the European context, these actors are studied to a limited extent. Despite severe normative apprehensions, research on this phenomenon focuses on pluralist contexts. This dissertation speaks to this void and sheds light on this phenomenon in a European and corporatist context.
This study illustrates for the first time that corporations have increased their access to the political system in a corporatist context over the past decades. It also illustrates that economic, political-institutional and issue factors affect corporate lobbying. Moreover, this dissertation indicates that in order to understand the role of organized interests in politics, scholars need to conceptually situate corporations as part of the interest system. It also illustrates that drivers which matter for organized interests with members, matter for corporations and their lobbying behavior as well. Due to the differences in nature between these two actors, the dynamics differ. In order to understand the role of corporations in politics, interest group theory can be fruitful but needs to be adjusted accordingly.