Collective Rationality in Graph Aggregation

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2014
Host editors
  • T. Schaub
  • G. Friedrich
  • B. O'Sullivan
Book title ECAI 2014
Book subtitle 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 18-22 August 2014, Prague, Czech Republic: including Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems (PAIS 2014): proceedings
ISBN
  • 9781614994183
ISBN (electronic)
  • 9781614994190
Series Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Event ECAI 2014: 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Pages (from-to) 291-296
Publisher Amsterdam: IOS Press
Organisations
  • Interfacultary Research - Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
Abstract Suppose a number of agents each provide us with a directed graph over a common set of vertices. Graph aggregation is the problem of computing a single “collective” graph that best represents the information inherent in this profile of individual graphs. We consider this aggregation problem from the point of view of social choice theory and ask what properties shared by the individual graphs will transfer to the graph computed by a given aggregation procedure. Our main result is a general impossibility theorem that applies to a wide range of graph properties.
Document type Conference contribution
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-419-0-291
Downloads
FAIA263-0291 (Final published version)
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