Shadow Banking
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Publication date | 2018 |
| Host editors |
|
| Book title | Encyclopedia of Law and Economics |
| ISBN (electronic) |
|
| Edition | Living |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Publisher | New York: Springer |
| Organisations |
|
| Abstract |
Shadow banking is often defined by reference to what is not, namely official banking. This essay takes a different approach. Focusing on the purpose of shadow banking regulation, namely minimizing systemic risk, shadow banking is defined as leveraging on collateral to support liquidity promises.
This essay discusses the economic case for regulating shadow banking by asking three questions. First, what is shadow banking? Second, why regulate shadow banking? Third, how to regulate shadow banking efficiently? It is argued that shadow banking should be regulated because the social cost of systemic risk is not internalized by the players generating it. Moreover, because systemic risk cannot be accurately measured and priced, this essay argues that the negative externalities of shadow banking should be limited through quantity regulation – restrictions on the size of shadow banking – rather than corrective taxation. |
| Document type | Entry for encyclopedia/dictionary |
| Note | Living reference work entry. - Also published in the 2019 edition of the encyclopedia. |
| Language | English |
| Related publication | Shadow Banking |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_717-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_717 |
| Published at | http://hdl.handle.net/1765/106890 |
| Permalink to this page | |
