Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon?

Open Access
Authors
  • M. Aveyard
  • E.E. Buchtel
  • I. Dar-Nimrod
  • E. Kundtová Klocová
  • J.E. Ramsay
  • T. Riekki
  • A.M. Svedholm-Häkkinen
  • J. Bulbulia
Publication date 05-2018
Journal Judgment and Decision Making
Volume | Issue number 13 | 3
Pages (from-to) 268-274
Organisations
  • Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) - Psychology Research Institute (PsyRes)
Abstract
Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly nly in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results rovide dditional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.
Document type Article
Note With supplementary file
Language English
Published at http://journal.sjdm.org/18/18228/jdm18228.html
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