J. De Houwer
- The Inferential Reasoning Theory of Causal Learning
- Toward a multi-process propositional account
- Book title
- The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning
- Pages (from-to)
- New York, NY: Oxford University Press
- Oxford library of psychology
- Document type
- Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG)
- Psychology Research Institute (PsyRes)
Chapter 4 describes the inferential reasoning theory of causal learning and discusses how thinking about this theory has evolved in at least two important ways. First, the authors argue that it is useful to decouple the debate about different possible types of mental representations involved in causal learning (e.g., propositional or associative) from the debate about processes involved therein (e.g., inferential reasoning or attention). Second, at the process level inferential reasoning is embedded within a broad array of mental processes that are all required to provide a full mechanistic account of causal learning. Based on those insights, the authors evaluate five arguments that are often raised against inferential reasoning theory. They conclude that causal learning is best understood as involving the formation and retrieval of propositional representations, both of which depend on multiple cognitive processes (i.e., the multi-process propositional account).
- go to publisher's site
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library, or send a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.