This dissertation develops a Kantian quality of will account of moral blameworthiness. Part I starts with a discussion of
the Reinhold/Sidgwick Objection. According to this objection, anyone who accepts the Kantian conception of autonomy is forced
to draw the absurd conclusion that no one is ever morally blameworthy for anything. I show that this objection depends on
the implicit premise that freedom is a necessary condition for moral blameworthiness. While rejecting the standard Kantian
replies to the objection, I proceed to investigate which sort of freedom is necessary for blameworthiness. Part II focuses
on the problem of free will. On what I call the Traditional View, agents are morally blameworthy for an action only if that
action is transcendentally free. After showing that Kantian attempts to reconcile this sort of freedom with causal determinism
rely on implausible and ad hoc metaphysical assumptions, I investigate which principles might support the Traditional View.
The natural candidates are the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) and the principle Ought Implies Can (OIC). While
demonstrating that Kant rejects PAP, I argue that Kant’s version of OIC does not support the Traditional View. The view can
thus be rejected. Part III then develops a Kantian quality of will account of excuses and exemptions. This account explains
why physical constraint, unintentional bodily movement, ignorance and coercion often provide an excuse and why schizophrenic
patients suffering from psychotic episodes are often exempted from moral responsibility. If the proposed account is correct,
the Reinhold/Sidgwick Objection does not take hold.
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