According to the CFREU, the EU is founded on the general values such as values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity.
In addition, the TEU refers to a more political set of foundational values, ie respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These references could be understood as purely ornamental, or as irrelevant
in any case for private law. Indeed, it is true that the Court of Justice so far has never made any references to these values
in private law cases. Still, the Court already has shown boldness before in the context of the interpretation and review of
secondary EU law in private law cases, when it discovered general principles of EU law and general principles of civil law.
Therefore, it should not be excluded that the Court may be tempted one day to follow the example of the German constitutional
court that famously understands its national constitution as expressing an objective system of constitutional values.
paper explores what such an understanding of private law as an instrument for furthering common European values would entail
and examines whether such an ethical reading of European private law would be desirable. It argues that the promotion by the
EU of a set of official values through its laws is not compatible we the respect we owe each other in a society characterised
by reasonable pluralism. In addition, it points to further difficulties, both of a moral and a practical nature, of the idea
of advancing ethical values through private law. It concludes that although it is very well thinkable that the values to which
the TEU and the Charter refer will one day be interpreted as an objective value system with (indirect) horizontal effects,
the Court of Justice nevertheless should refrain from going down that road.