- Political actors playing games: Theory and experiments
- Award date
- 28 October 2015
- Number of pages
- Tinbergen Institute
- Document type
- PhD thesis
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Political actors exert enormous influence over our daily lives. Their influence on economic activities cannot be underestimated. Voters determine the distribution of political power, political candidates choose policy platforms that they intend to enact if elected, and legislators bargain to arrive at laws. Understanding political actors’ behavior is therefore essential for explaining economic outcomes. This thesis follows the tradition of the political economy literature and considers the effect of institutional rules on the behavior of three types of political actors: voters, candidates, and negotiators. It does so by combining insights from game-theoretic models and controlled laboratory experiments.
Specifically, this thesis analyzes voter behavior in mandatory and voluntary voting regimes; investigates how candidate behavior differs between plurality voting and proportional representation as well as what role coalition governments play in this context; and explores bargaining behavior in asymmetric environments.
- Research conducted at: Universiteit van Amsterdam
Series: Tinbergen Institute research series 622
Thesis (complete) (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
2. A Simultaneous analysis of turnout and voting under proportional representation: Theory and experiments (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
3. Plurality voting versus proportional representation in the citizen-candidate model: The role of coalitions (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
4. Plurality voting versus proportional representation in the citizen-candidate model: An experiment (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
5. Bargaining in the presence of Condorcet cycles: The role of asymmetries (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
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