Specifically, this thesis analyzes voter behavior in mandatory and voluntary voting regimes; investigates how candidate behavior differs between plurality voting and proportional representation as well as what role coalition governments play in this context; and explores bargaining behavior in asymmetric environments.
Series: Tinbergen Institute research series 622
Thesis (complete) (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
2. A Simultaneous analysis of turnout and voting under proportional representation: Theory and experiments (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
3. Plurality voting versus proportional representation in the citizen-candidate model: The role of coalitions (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
4. Plurality voting versus proportional representation in the citizen-candidate model: An experiment (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
5. Bargaining in the presence of Condorcet cycles: The role of asymmetries (Embargo until 28 October 2017)
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