R. van Rooij
- Pragmatic interpretation of vague expressions: strongest meaning and nonmonotonic consequence
- Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Volume | Issue number
- 44 | 4
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Interfacultary Research Institutes
Faculty of Science (FNWI)
- Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
Recent experiments have shown that naive speakers find borderline contradictions involving vague predicates acceptable. In Cobreros et al. (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41, 347–385, 2012a) we proposed a pragmatic explanation of the acceptability of borderline contradictions, building on a three-valued semantics. In a reply, Alxatib et al. (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42, 619–634, 2013) show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong interpretations for some examples involving disjunction, and propose as a remedy a semantic analysis instead, based on fuzzy logic. In this paper we provide an explicit global pragmatic interpretation rule, based on a somewhat richer semantics, and show that with its help the problem can be overcome in pragmatics after all. Furthermore, we use this pragmatic interpretation rule to define a new (nonmonotonic) consequence-relation and discuss some of its properties.
- go to publisher's site
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library, or send a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.