- How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auction under risk aversion
- Economics Letters
- Volume | Issue number
- 113 | 1
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
- This paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments, the seller’s optimal reserve price
is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first-price auctions when the seller and/or buyers are risk averse.
- go to publisher's site
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library, or send a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.