E.-L. von Thadden
- Strategic transparency and informed trading : will capital market integration force convergence of corporate governance?
- Lausanne: Universite de Lausanne, Departement d'Econometrie et d'Economie Politique (DEEP)
- Cahiers de Recherches Economiques
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
Dominant investors can influence the publicly available information about firms by affecting the cost of information collection. Under strategic competition, transparency results in higher variability of profits and output. Thus lenders prefer less transparency, since this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equityholders prefer more. Market interaction creates strategic complementarity in gathering information on competing firms, thus entry by transparent competitors will affect price informativeness. Moreover, as the return to information gathering increases with liquidity, increasing global trading may undermine the ability of bank control to keep firms opaque.
- First version : February 1998 ("Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency") Second version : October 2001 ("Strategic Transparency and Informed Trading: Will Capital Market Integration Force Convergence of Corporate Governance?") Revised version : September 2002
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