R. van Rooij
- Vagueness, truth and permissive consequence
- Book title
- Unifying the philosophy of truth
- Pages (from-to)
- Dordrecht: Springer
- ISBN (electronic)
- Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science: 2214-9775
- Volume (Serie)
- Document type
- Interfacultary Research Institutes
Faculty of Science (FNWI)
- Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises Γ whenever, if all the premises of Γ hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker standard. In this paper, we focus on a three-valued version of this notion, which we call strict-to-tolerant consequence, and discuss its fruitfulness toward a unified treatment of the paradoxes of vagueness and self-referential truth. For vagueness, st-consequence supports the principle of tolerance; for truth, it supports the requisit of transparency. Permissive consequence is non-transitive, however, but this feature is argued to be an essential component to the understanding of paradoxical reasoning in cases involving vagueness or self-reference.
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