- How to Choose Your Victim
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam
- CREED Working Papers
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
We introduce the experimental mobbing game. Each player in a group has the option to nominate one of the other players or nominate no-one. If the same person is nominated by all other players, he loses his payoff and the bullies gain. We conduct three sets of experiments to study the effects of monetary gains, focality and fear of being bullied. We find that subjects frequently coordinate on a victim, even for only modest gains. Higher gains make mobbing more likely. Richer and poorer players are equally focal. We find no evidence that fear of becoming the victim explains bullying.
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