A. de Zeeuw
- Evolution of reciprocity in asymmetric international environmental negotiations
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam
- CeNDEF Working Paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
We study the evolutionary success of a generalised trigger strategy within an asymmetric, n-player Prisoner's Dilemma environment, with application to the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space - i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction - such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas.
- 24th September 2013
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