- Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam
- CeNDEF Working Paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
In an evolutionary set-up, we append an ecology of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game strategies, consisting of unconditional cooperators (AllC), unconditional defectors (AllD) and reactive players (TFT) with two repeated strategies that have received less attention in the evolutionary IPD game literature: the error-proof, "generous" tit-for-tat (GTFT) which, with a certain probability, re-establishes cooperation after a (possibly by mistake) defection of the opponent and the penitent,
"stimulus-response" (WSLS) strategy that resets cooperation after the opponent punished for defection. An abundance of Rock-Paper-Scissors like patterns is discovered in the 3x3 ecologies comprising Pavlovian and "generous" (GTFT) players.
Interestingly, the evolutionary success of Pavlov seems to depend on the absence of
unconditional (AllC) cooperators in the ecologies investigated.
- 19th December 2012
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