- Strategic communication: theory and experiment
- Award date
- 5 July 2012
- Number of pages
- Document type
- PhD thesis
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Communication plays a central role in many economic decisions. The extent to which information can be meaningfully communicated depends on the interests of the parties involved. In this thesis, several instances where ´strategic communication´ plays an important role are investigated, both theoretically and experimentally. By letting participants play communication games with monetary incentives, insight is gained in the strategic reasoning of participants. The thesis considers the case in which the signaling channel is noisy, the case in which a sender can convey the information in both costless and costly messages, but prefers to come across as credible, and a job market situation where due to imperfect communication of a worker´s productivity, statistical discrimination between different groups of workers may emerge.
- Tinbergen Institute research series 537
Research conducted at: Universiteit van Amsterdam
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