C.M. van Veelen
- In and out of equilibrium II: evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute
- Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- TI 2012-089/I
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. To understand the dynamics, we extend a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. While this result delineates which payoffs can be supported by neutrally stable strategies, the only strategy that is evolutionarily stable, and has a uniform invasion barrier, is All D. However, with sufficiently small complexity costs, indirect invasions - but now through 'almost neutral' mutants - become an important ingredient of the dynamics. These indirect invasions include stepping stone paths out of full defection.
- September 3, 2012
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