- Delegation and firms' ability to collude: a comment
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics
- Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- Document type
- Working paper
- Interfacultary Research Institutes
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
- Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers’ (1985) Cournot model of strategic delegation to an inﬁnitely repeated setting and conclude that delegation does not aﬀect cartel stability if managers collude. This result rests on the assumption that managers are rational, but owners are not. This note shows that if owners behave fully rational, then delegation improves cartel stability if managers collude.
- December 2010
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