- Power and the privilege of clarity: an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
- Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- TI 2011-055/1
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes clarity. In economics, the relation between power and communication is a relatively untouched research area. Here, we analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main result is that the maximum amount of information transmission is increasing in the relative power of the Sender: power reduces the extent to which the Sender can be exploited with the information she provides. In this manner, clarity of speech is a privilege of the
powerful. We discuss some testable implications of our model.
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