- Complementary platforms
- Review of Network Economics
- Pages (from-to)
- Issue number
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
- This article investigates the pricing decisions in two-sided markets when several platforms are needed simultaneously for
the successful completion of a transaction. The results indicate that the anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets.
On the other hand, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights is not monopoly pricing.
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