- Author
- Year
- 2011
- Title
- Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation
- Journal
- Journal of Economics
- Volume | Issue number
- 102 | 3
- Pages (from-to)
- 237-262
- Document type
- Article
- Faculty
- Faculty of Science (FNWI)
- Institute
- Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics (IBED)
- Abstract
-
We develop a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the co-evolution of norm compliance. The multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, is linked to the evolutionary analysis: individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments favors conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others’ cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators.
- URL
- go to publisher's site
- Language
- English
- Permalink
- http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.355622
- Downloads
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