- Bargaining in the shadow of the European settlement procedure for cartels
- The Antitrust Bulletin
- Volume | Issue number
- 56 | 2
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Faculty of Law (FdR)
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
- The article discusses the European Commission's legal settlement procedures regarding cartels, with emphasis given to its denial of plea bargaining bargaining and negotiation. The author argues that such a hard stance on settlements may actually have negative effects on cartelization deterrence measures. The Commission's bargaining power revolved around its adherence to fixed fine reductions.
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