- Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact: Unpublished technical appendices
- Number of pages
- University of Amsterdam and CEPR
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
- Technical appendices not intended for publication. Appendices belonging to: "Contingent Deficit Sanctions and Moral Hazard
with a Stability Pact" (with Henrik Jensen), Journal of International Economics, Vol.61, No.1, 187-208, 2003.
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