A. de Zeeuw
- The size of stable international environmental agreements in the case of stock pollution
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance (CeNDEF)
- CeNDEF working paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Most of the literature on stability of International Environmental Agreements is essen- tially static and can therefore not identify changes in the size of the stable coalition in connection with changes in the stock of pollutants. This is a relevant issue because most global pollution problems are dynamic with stock externalities. This paper shows that the incentives for membership indeed change with changes in the stock of pollutants and that technology choice is an important factor when considering the consequences.
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