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Author
M.A. Haan
B. Los
S. Onderstal
Y.E. Riyanto
Year
2010
Title
Punching above one's weight: The case against election campaigns
Number of pages
24
Publisher
Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute
Serie
Tinbergen Institute discussion paper
Volume | Edition (Serie)
TI 2010-056/1
Document type
Working paper
Faculty
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
Institute
Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
Politicians differ in their ability to implement some policy. In an election, candidates make commitments regarding the plans they will try to implement if elected. These serve as a signal of true ability. In equilibrium, candidates make overambitious promises. The candidate with the highest ability wins. Yet, the electorate may be better off having a random candidate implement her best plan, rather than seeing the winner implementing an overambitious plan. This is more likely if the ability distribution is skewed toward high values, the number of candidates is high, with private benefits from being elected, or if parties select candidates.
Link
Link
Language
English
Permalink
http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.332550

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