- Author
- Year
- 2010
- Title
- Punching above one's weight: The case against election campaigns
- Number of pages
- 24
- Publisher
- Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute
- Serie
- Tinbergen Institute discussion paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- TI 2010-056/1
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Institute
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
- Abstract
-
Politicians differ in their ability to implement some policy. In an election, candidates make commitments regarding the plans they will try to implement if elected. These serve as a signal of true ability. In equilibrium, candidates make overambitious promises. The candidate with the highest ability wins. Yet, the electorate may be better off having a random candidate implement her best plan, rather than seeing the winner implementing an overambitious plan. This is more likely if the ability distribution is skewed toward high values, the number of candidates is high, with private benefits from being elected, or if parties select candidates.
- Link
- Link
- Language
- English
- Permalink
- http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.332550
Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library, or send a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.