- Alice and Bob will fight: the problem of electing a committee in the presence of candidate interdependence
- Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Interfacultary Research Institutes
- Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
The problem of electing a committee which satisfies voters is one for which good solutions are scarce. Extending single-winner voting rules to the multi-winner case works well only when voters have no preferential dependencies among candidates for the committee. (Our motivating example is a voter who believes that Alice and Bob are the best candidates, but also that the worst possible committee is one with both Alice and Bob.) In order to tackle the interdependence problem, we propose a voting rule called the Goalbase Summation Rule (GSR), which uses goalbases (sets of weighted propositional formulas) as ballots. Using goalbases as ballots lets voters express complex preferences in a compact fashion, while the computational complexity of finding winning committees remains reasonable when the number of seats is fixed. Additionally, the GSR is able to simulate and extend many existing voting rules.
- go to publisher's site
- Proceedings title: ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence: including prestigious applications of artificial
intelligence (PAIS-2010): proceedings
Publisher: IOS Press
Place of publication: Amsterdam
Editors: H. Coelho, R. Studer, M. Wooldridge
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library, or send a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.