- How to measure the deterrence effects of merger policy: Frequency or composition?
- International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Volume | Issue number
- 17 | 1
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
- We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency‐based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti‐competitiveness of merger proposals (composition‐based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti‐competitive merger proposals.
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