- Private equity fund compensation contracts and their incentive effects
- European Business Organization Law Review
- Volume | Issue number
- 10 | 3
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
- This article describes compensation contracts in private equity. It shows that they may not align interest between the investors
and fund managers as much as commonly thought. Certain clauses appear as potentially hazardous for investors and others exacerbate
conflicts of interest.
- go to publisher's site
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