- Evolution in games with a continuous action space
- Economic Theory
- Volume | Issue number
- 39 | 3
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
Faculty of Science (FNWI)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Korteweg-de Vries Institute for Mathematics (KdVI)
- Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the existence of a uniform invasion
barrier, local superiority and asymptotic stability relate to each other. This is done without restricting the populations
of which we want to investigate the stability to monomorphic population states or to strategies with finite support.
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