- Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
- Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- TI 2009-095/1
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Keywords: Spatial voting models, electoral competition, winning set, interest groups
Classification-JEL: D71; D72
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