- The unsolvable dilemma of a Paretian policymaker
- Supreme Court Economic Review
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Interfacultary Research Institutes
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
- In this paper, we argue that social decision-making is subject to a fundamental conflict between consistency and completeness. We show that a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the sense that it is incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems. Legal policy consequences are discussed.
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