- Conditional cooperation in public goods experiments and its behavioral foundations
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
With the help of a novel design we explicitly test for the extent of conditional cooperation in a repeated public goods game. Participants in the experiment can decide whether they want to condition their voluntary contribution on the average contribution of other group members or not. About 35% of the participants can be classified as conditional cooperators. Furthermore, we discuss possible behavioral foundations of conditional cooperation and can exclude that conditional cooperation is a consequence of warm glow preferences.
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