- Supervisory arrangements, LOLR and crisis management in a single European banking market
- Working Paper Universiteit van Amsterdam
- Number of pages
- Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
- Document type
- Working paper
- Interfacultary Research Institutes
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
In this paper I discuss some key issues related to supervisory arrangements in the EMU countries, and particularly those relating to the LOLR structure and crisis management. The focus will be on the responsibilities and powers of individual countries (and national central banks) vis-à-vis those at the European level (EU and ECB). In this context various issues will be raised relating to the effectiveness and efficiency of the arrangements, and specifically the role and positioning of the lender of last resort (LOLR) in light of the fragmented supervisory structure.
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