- Are economic agents successful optimizers? An analysis through service strategy in tennis
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
- Tinbergen Institute Discussion paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- TI 06-048/2
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
We consider the question whether top tennis players in a top tournament (Wimbledon) employ an optimal (efficient) service strategy. We show that top players do not, in general, follow an optimal strategy, and we provide a lower bound of the inefficiency. The inefficiency regarding winning a point on service is on average at least 1.1% for men and 2.0% for women, leading to a possible increase of income for the efficient player of 18.7% for men and 32.8% for women. We use these findings to shed some light on the question whether economic agents are successful optimizers.
Keywords: Inefficiency; Frontier; Optimal strategy; Tennis
Classification-JEL: C14; C15; D01; D21
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