- When culture does not matter: Experimental evidence from coalition formation ultimatum games in Austria and Japan
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam/ Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
- Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- TI 1999-043/1
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
This paper reports the results of a cross-country comparison between Austria andJapan for an experimental 3-personcoalition formation ultimatum game. The experimental design allows thecomparison with respect to three decisions. (i)The coalition decision, (ii) proposers' demand behavior in 2- and 3-personultimatum subgames, and (iii) theresponders' behavior in these subgames. In contrast to other cross-culturalstudies in experimental bargainingenvironments we can not find any (significant) difference in behavior betweensubjects in Austria and Japan. Weattribute the behavioral similarities mainly to a subtle focal point andresponder competition effect, which wipe outpossible cultural differences. Our conclusion is that even in environments -like bargaining - where cultural differencesmay play a prominent role the show-up of these differences is highly sensitiveto the exact context in which people act.
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