- Incentive systems in a real effort experiment
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam / Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
- Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
- Volume | Edition (Serie)
- TI 1998-023/1
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
In the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on theirincentive effects. Payment based on individual, team and relative performance are compared. Subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort. The results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels. In team production free-riding occurred, but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay. Effort was higher, but more variable in tournaments, while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others. Finally, attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions.
This discussion paper has led to a publication in the European Economic Review 2001, 45(2), 187-214.
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