- Public good provision and public bad prevention: the effect of framing
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
An experimental analysis of voluntary, binary contributions for step-level public goods (bads) is presented. In the public good presentation of the dilemma the subjects choose between contributing or not. The public good is provided for all group-members if and only if the number of contributors exceeds the threshold. In the public bad presentation the choice is between taking money or not and the public bad is provided if and only if the number of money-takers does not exceed the threshold. From a strategic point of view these presentations are equivalent. Individual value orientation were measured before the step-level public good game was played. During the public good game expectations about the choices of group co-members were measured. The perceived interdependency between subjects was measured by questionnaires. Theories in the spririt of prospect theory and the interdependency hypothesis of Pruitt are developed and investigated.
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