- Competitive Lobbying for a Legislators Vote.
- Social Choice and Welfare
- Volume | Issue number
- 14 | 3
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
This comment deals with some imperfections of the analysis presented by Austen-Smith and Wright . It is argued that in  being informed is incorrectly identified with being informative, yielding an incomplete equilibrium analysis, and leading to bias in the kind of equilibrium behavior predicted. After correcting for this bias, the results obtained corroborate their main conclusion - legislators are often lobbied by just one of two competing groups, typically the a priori disadvantaged group. The comment also strengthens their case for counteractive lobbying; the a priori favored group typically only lobbies to counteract the influence of an opposing group. Another conclusion, however, is qualified; an increase in the groups' stakes can make it less, rather than more, likely that the legislator makes the correct decision.
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