- Using Simon's Algorithm to Attack Symmetric-Key Cryptographic Primitives
- Quantum Information and Computation
- Volume | Issue number
- 17 | 1&2
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Interfacultary Research Institutes
Faculty of Science (FNWI)
- Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
We present new connections between quantum information and the field of classical cryptography. In particular, we provide examples where Simon's algorithm can be used to show insecurity of commonly used cryptographic symmetric-key primitives. Specifically, these examples consist of a quantum distinguisher for the 3-round Feistel network and a forgery attack on CBC-MAC which forges a tag for a chosen-prefix message querying only other messages (of the same length). We assume that an adversary has quantum-oracle access to the respective classical primitives. Similar results have been achieved recently in independent work by Kaplan et al. KLLN16. Our findings shed new light on the post-quantum security of cryptographic schemes and underline that classical security proofs of cryptographic constructions need to be revisited in light of quantum attackers.
- Accepted author manuscript
Final publisher version
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