- In defense of correspondence truth
- A reply to Markus
- Theory and Psychology
- Volume | Issue number
- 23 | 6
- Pages (from-to)
- Document type
- Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG)
- Psychology Research Institute (PsyRes)
In his response to our article, Keith Markus argues that our recommendation that psychologists adopt correspondence truth is not supported by sound argument. In our rejoinder, we show that Markus's critique only has force against a minor part of our article. Additionally, we show that he does not accurately reconstruct our argument in favor of correspondence truth. Moreover, we rebut two of his arguments for taking up alternative theories of truth. We maintain that the ability of correspondence truth to explain important features of scientific practice is yet to be demonstrated for rival theories of truth.
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