- Nonmonotonicity and Knowability: As Knowable as Possible
- Book title
- Rohit Parikh on Logic, Language and Society
- Pages (from-to)
- Cham: Springer
- ISBN (electronic)
- Outstanding Contributions to Logic: 2211-2758
- Volume (Serie)
- Document type
- Interfacultary Research Institutes
Faculty of Science (FNWI)
- Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
According to the anti-realistic theory of meaning, everything that is true is knowable. Fitch’s (1963) paradox—based on very standard assumptions made in modal logic—is seen as a challenge to this theory. In this paper I argue that there is something wrong with Fitch’s derivation of the absurdity. Assuming—for the sake of argument— the thesis of anti-realism, I argue with Beall (2000) that this doesn’t lead to disaster in case we allow some contradictions to be true. By making use of a nonmonotonic consequence relation, I show that for all of Tennant’s (1997) so-called ‘Cartesian propositions’ that are true, we can derive that it is true and not false that they are knowable.
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