Authors
J. Vyrakstekova
A.M. Onderstal
P. Koning
Date (dd-mm-yyyy)
2007
Title
Team Incentives in Public Organizations: An experimental study
Publication Year
2007
Publisher
AmsterdamFaculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
Document type
Working paper
Faculty
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
Institute
Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
Using a simple production game, we investigate whether public firms perform better when they increase the power of their workers’ incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, subjects choose between a ‘public firm’ and a ‘private firm’ with team and individual incentives, respectively. When exposed to individual incentives, workers in the public firm increase effort in one parametrisation, but show a decrease in another. One reason for the latter observation is that reciprocators self-select in the public firm, rendering cooperation profitable.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.287000