Authors
Date (dd-mm-yyyy)
2005
Title
The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences
Publication Year
2005
Number of pages
14
Publisher
AmsterdamFaculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
Document type
Working paper
Faculty
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
Institute
Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
We analyse gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on averge, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are slightly more "trustworthy". However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate tranfers. Moreover, if a man [woman] exhibits low trust, he [she] is likely to be a money-maximizer [a risk or betrayal averse reciprocator].
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.254044