The UvA-LINKER will give you a range of other options to find the full text of a publication (including a direct link to the full-text if it is located on another database on the internet).
De UvA-LINKER biedt mogelijkheden om een publicatie elders te vinden (inclusief een directe link naar de publicatie online als deze beschikbaar is in een database op het internet).

Search results

Record: oai:ARNO:280575

AuthorsK. Abbink, J. Brandts
TitlePolitical autonomy and independence: theory and experimental evidence
PublisherFaculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
PlaceAmsterdam
Year2007
Pages26
Title seriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
Series number689.07
FacultyFaculty of Economics and Business
Institute/dept.FEB: Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
AbstractWe study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.
Document typeReport
Document finderUvA-Linker