

MIGRAZIONE: UNA SFIDA PER LA CITTÀ INTEGRAZIONE, SICUREZZA E QUALITÀ DELLA VITA NELL'AREA MEDITERRANEA.

INTERVENTI (in ordine cronologico di presentazione durante il convegno):

- [Giorgio Giudici, Sindaco di Lugano.](#)
- [Christina Rougheri, Città di Atene.](#)
- [Ramo Sanahuja, Director Technical Cabinet on Immigration, Città di Barcellona.](#)
- [Marta Torrado de Castro, Vicesindaco, Delegata area progresso umano, Città di Valencia.](#)
- [Remo Gautschi, Ambasciatore, Direttore Supplente Direzione dello Sviluppo e della Cooperazione \(DSC\).](#)
- [Peter Schatzer, Responsabile regione Mediterraneo, IOM, Roma.](#)
- [Nilüfer Narli, Vice Rettore Bahcesehir University, Istanbul.](#)
- [Ivan Stancioff.](#)
- [Giovanni Gozzini, Università di Siena.](#)
- [Luigi Pedrazzini, Direttore del Dipartimento delle Istituzioni del Cantone Ticino.](#)
- [Marko Hajdinjak, IMIR \(Internation Centerfor Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations\), Sofia.](#)
- [Guita Hourani, Associate Director and Researcher, Lebanese Emigration Research Center \(LERC\), Beirut.](#)
- [Sanford Lakoff, Università della California, San Diego.](#)

Intervento di Giorgio Giudici

Discorso di benvenuta dell'Onorevole Giorgio Giudici, Sindaco di Lugano, al Convegno "Migrazione: una sfida per la città – Integrazione, sicurezza e qualità della vita nell'area mediterranea".

Molti sono i motivi per cui ritengo queste due giornate di studio veramente importanti. Prima di tutto considero l'onore e il gesto di stima che il Sindaco di Milano Gabriele Albertini, oggi rappresentato dall'Assessore Guido Manca, ha voluto riconoscere alla Città di Lugano, e all'istituto di Studi Mediterranei, proponendo che questa conferenza si tenesse qui a Lugano, in questo spazio dell'Aula Magna dell'Università della Svizzera Italiana. (Ringrazio il Presidente Marco Baggiolini per la sua ospitalità). A questa realizzazione hanno dato un contributo sostanziale due istituzioni accademiche di primo piano di Milano: l'Università Bocconi e l'Università Cattolica. Questo è dunque un nuovo elemento costruttivo nello sviluppo di una sempre più concreta collaborazione tra le nostre Città e in senso più ampio tra la Regione Lombardia e il Cantone Ticino.

Un rapporto che affonda le sue radici lontane, dai Visconti, durante il corso dell'Ottocento quando Lugano diventò luogo di rifugio e di incontro di numerosi esuli, un luogo di produzione e di diffusione delle idee del Risorgimento italiano, che aveva in Milano uno dei suoi centri propulsori. Non meno importante è poi stata l'ospitalità che diversi cittadini italiani, e di Milano, trovarono in un momento difficile come quello delle persecuzioni razziali durante la seconda guerra mondiale. Un'ospitalità spesso assicurata e garantita direttamente da famiglie luganesi. Così come Milano è stata, ed è, la città di molti nostri concittadini che vi trovarono opportunità e occasioni di intraprendere in molti campi dall'economia all'industria, dalla cultura e all'arte. Una città che ha formato, grazie alle sue alte scuole, molti nostri cittadini ieri e oggi. Il legame tra Lugano e Milano è un legame inscindibile, una sorta di storia "intima", in cui i ricordi si intrecciano nello spazio e nel tempo attraverso le memorie collettive e individuali. E questo è stato il significato dell'incontro avvenuto Palazzo Marini il novembre 2001, in cui alla presenza del Presidente Carlo Azeglio Ciampi abbiamo celebrato il secondo centenario di Carlo Cattaneo, il grande riformatore di istituzioni, cittadino condiviso da Milano e Lugano, chiamato anche il *Riformatore Lombardo Svizzero*.

Lugano guarda dunque a Milano e alla Lombardia con molto interesse per vocazione e tradizione, ma anche perché condividiamo uno stesso territorio, e quindi tutti i problemi e le crisi che in esso prendono forma e si sviluppano. Il tema dei trasporti delle merci, della viabilità o il tema di questo convegno, delle migrazioni e della sicurezza, ne sono un chiaro esempio. Naturalmente si tratta di temi che vanno ben oltre la dimensione locale, essendo oggi la scala dei problemi globale o meglio planetaria, ma pur sempre di temi ai quali le città sono chiamate a rispondere, e tanto meglio se lo possono fare scambiando e collaborando.

Lugano ha voluto offrire il suo contributo e pieno sostegno a questa iniziativa che intendo come un inizio di una continua e costante collaborazione e scambio di informazioni a livello delle Città e delle loro amministrazioni, così come al livello della ricerca sociale ed economica, come avverrà in queste giornate di studio e di confronto attorno a problemi concreti e urgenti che riguardano la genesi e la trasformazione dell'identità delle comunità urbane.

Qui è d'obbligo sottolineare lo straordinario lavoro compiuto dall'Istituto di Studi Mediterranei, istituito grazie alla lungimiranza del prof. Dan Segre che lo ha diretto per diversi anni e dal suo attuale Direttore prof. Moulakis che ha dato vita a questo incontro di grande ascolto pubblico e di richiamo per i rappresentanti politici delle diverse Città : si tratta in effetti di una forma di

comunicazione essenziale al fine di definire le strategie d'azione e per compiere precise scelte in un settore della vita civica e sociale molto critico e delicato.

Per Lugano è poi un grande onore ospitare personalità e rappresentanti di alcune tra le più importanti Città del Mediterraneo, un'area di grande interesse economico e con un enorme potenziale di sviluppo:

La Città di Atene, culla della civiltà occidentale, città olimpica per eccellenza qui rappresentata dalla Consigliera del Sindaco Christina Rouggeri;

la Città di Bucarest, "la piccola Parigi" come i rumeni la chiamano, città da sempre aperta e sensibile alla tradizione europea, e qui saluto il suo Sindaco Adrian Videnau;

la Città di Valencia, rappresentata dal Vicesindaco Marta Torrado de Castro, Città che ospiterà l'America's Cup nel 2007 e che sta vivendo un nuovo rinascimento urbano ed economico;

la Città di Barcellona, altra città Olimpica e di grande vitalità culturale e sede di uno dei più importanti porti del Mediterraneo, qui rappresentata da Ramon Sanahuja Direttore del Settore immigrazione;

la Città di Casablanca, qui rappresentata dal Vice Presidente della Regione del Gran Casablanca Abterrahm Beneyaha;

Saluto anche la rappresentante della Francia, Blandine Kriegel, Presidente dell'Alto Consiglio dell'integrazione della Presidenza della Repubblica Francese e l'Ambasciatore Remo Gautschi della Direzione dello Sviluppo e della Cooperazione (DSC).

A questo mio ringraziamento desidero anche unire tutti i relatori, di queste due giornate di Lugano per avere accettato l'invito mettendo a nostra disposizione le loro competenze scientifiche e le esperienze pratiche.

Le città sono luoghi nevralgici, sono i luoghi verso i quali e dai quali le persone si spostano, esse sono nate per offrire sicurezza, per generare opportunità ai loro cittadini, vecchi e nuovi. Oggi i sistemi urbani attraversano, in generale, una profonda crisi, sotto il peso di fenomeni complessi e articolati che si legano allo sviluppo dell'economia globale e della società dell'informazione.

Comprendere questi processi è il primo passo per dominarli e per governarli. Questa possibilità passa attraverso la capacità delle Città, grandi o piccole, di offrire delle risposte costruttive e dinamiche, di disporre degli strumenti per comprendere il senso, i flussi e la direzione delle comunità in formazione.

Questo richiede che le comunità locali, le Città e le loro istituzioni diventino dinamiche e propositive utilizzando le risorse disponibili e soprattutto imparando a comunicare tra loro. Questo convegno è un'opportunità straordinaria per dare avvio ad una piattaforma di lavoro in questa direzione e Lugano è pronta, se si verificheranno le necessarie confluenze, ad offrire il suo costante impegno e contributo.

Giorgio Giudici
Sindaco di Lugano

Intervento di Christina Rougheri

The City of Athens Migration Policy

My name is Christina Rougheri and I am working as an advisor to the Mayor of Athens, Mrs. Dora Bakoyannis.

The topics I am following up in the City of Athens are of social character. Immigration policy is one of them.

Before starting my presentation I would like to thank and felicitate the City of Lugano and the Institute for Mediterranean Studies for taking the initiative of organising this international, intercultural and interdisciplinary event.

I sincerely wish every success and I strongly believe that it will be, for all of us here, an experience with real added value to our work.

The City of Athens treats immigration not as a “problem” but as an asset.

Immigration is a reality very much connected to globalisation, related to Greece’s economic development and participation in the EU’s monetary zone, the higher levels of literacy among the population (creating a surplus of “scientific” workforce and a deficit of workers) and Greece’s immediate neighbouring with many former communist countries.

According to the 2001 census, the latest census in Greece, migrants amount up to 22% of the City of Athens total population.

The City of Athens, similarly to many other Cities in Greece and in Europe, has to face the following paradox; migration policies are being adopted at the European Union or the national level.

Yet, it is the cities that are called upon to implement these policies on a micro-scale. Very often it is the case that funds for necessary actions are only available centrally and allocated on the basis of a top-down philosophy.

Athens has accepted this challenge and has adopted a strategic framework for implementing integration policies for the immigrants who chose Athens as a safe environment for them and their families.

This strategic framework is based on two principles:

- First migration is not a problem, if properly managed.
- Second, integration means more than just social inclusion.

Integration relates to residence rights, equal opportunities, equal treatment, the possibility and qualifications for municipal citizenship and even state citizenship.

In the framework of this policy, the City of Athens:

- Is in direct line of communication with agencies implementing relevant programmes, migrant associations and non-governmental organisations assisting immigrant and refugee populations.
- Encourages the participation of immigrants in events and activities in the city, such as the Athens’ Volunteering Programme during the 2004 Olympics and Paralympics.
- Offers space and, assists in the communication to the public, of activities, promoting xenophilia and organized by immigrant communities.

The following are some indicative examples of actions, programs and institutions of the City, aiming at promoting the immigrant’s integration into the Athenian Society.

(The Immigration Office)

The City of Athens upgraded the services, which, by law, Cities provide to the immigrants. Please note that all requests for the issuing of residence permits in Greece are primarily addressed to the Cities. In most cases, residence permits are issued for two years.

During 2004, the City of Athens processed 83.053 applications.

Since 2003, the number of applications processed is estimated to have exceeded 160.000.

Athens is one of the 157 Cities in –what we call- greater Athens or Attica. Yet, the number of applications processed in other Cities is very low compared to this.

While the City of Athens has processed 160.000 applications the next City in row numbers 17.000.

Given the number of applications in need to be processed,

the wish to provide high quality services combined with a nice, creative working environment for the employees, the City of Athens' Immigration Department moved in 2004 into a newly renovated building, covering an area of approximately 400 square meters.

The new services are fully computerised. Data are kept in an electronic form; protocol numbers are processed electronically and there is direct line with the other competent authorities.

To adequately staff this Department, the City employed additional qualified personnel. Some of the officials are able to communicate in the migrants' native language in order to facilitate dialogue and increase their understanding of law.

The City's Immigration Office is a service that we run as a result of law.

The following are programmes, which the City runs because the Municipal Authority feels strongly that the Cities have and should play a protagonist's role in facilitating immigrants' integration into societies.

(Intercultural Center)

In this frame the City of Athens established an Intercultural Center offering classes in Greek to asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants.

Last year's beneficiaries amounted to 93 people out of which 39 were men and 54 were women.

Main countries of origin of the beneficiaries were Egypt, Ukraine, Russia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Syria.

The Intercultural Center also hosted a programme for women called "EVA".

The targeted groups are refugee and migrant women or women who live under humanitarian status in Greece. Emphasis is given on women with children, women abandoned by the husband or divorced.

The countries of origin are primarily Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Congo, Nigeria and Ethiopia.

Women attend in groups the following programmes:

Embroidery and Art Crafts,

Aesthetics,

Batik –painting in textiles and

Self-defence / self-assistance techniques

Next Tuesday, we are proud to tell you that we start application procedures for computer classes for immigrants. There will be 60 beneficiaries who will be offered basic computer knowledge provided in the City's Intercultural Center.

Classes will be in groups of twelve and of 100 hours' duration each.

Another important initiative of the City of Athens is the establishment of a multilingual municipal radio programme called "Athens International Radio 104.4", airing programmes in 12 languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Arabic, Albanian, Bulgarian, Polish, Romanian, Russian and Philippino).

In the frame of EQUAL 2 Programme, the City of Athens is granted a project providing for the pilot establishment of community media in Athens and in Thessaloniki. The Project's name is COMMEDIA (that is, Community Media). The City of Athens will make use of the resources, facilities and expertise of the City Radio Programme "Air 104.4" so as to train immigrants in operating community media and running their own pilot emissions.

Maybe you will ask yourself, after listening to me, how exactly "integrationist" is a model of policy with separate programs and institutions. Well, special programs are necessary in some areas and, basically, in the first steps, while a City is still in the process of managing and regularising flows of immigration.

For us, the most important aspect of our work is a mainstreaming process we have initiated regarding immigrants' equal chances to employment and social care.

The City of Athens is currently operating a programme, very much focussed on specific districts with social problems, aiming at facilitating access to work. Immigrant populations are among the targeted groups. The name of the programme is "Network for the Support of the Unemployed in the Capital." The latter is a partnership of the City together with many other social agencies, with the aim to combating unemployment and social prejudice through:

- Skill building
- Information Campaign combating stereotypes about several groups of people
- Sensitisation of employers
- Active Involvement of local communities and local authorities in combating unemployment

The total number of beneficiaries, who should be residents in the 1st, 2nd or 3rd Municipal Districts, rises to 215 people belonging to the following groups:

- People with disabilities
- Single mothers
- Unemployed in the age spectrum between 45-65 years old and unemployed for a long period of time.
- Immigrants, Roma and Greek Muslims

Currently, the Programme is at the stage of being expanded to the 4th Municipal District.

Besides programmes combating discrimination and unemployment, the City of Athens follows an integrationist policy also when it comes to other types of social support:

Immigrant families with children have access to the City's kindergarden services. The percentage of immigrant children has risen from 5% to 25% over the last two years.

Immigrant and refugee women with children, victims of domestic violence, can find shelter in a special City Hostel that treats equally Greek women and children facing similar problems.

In addition and with respect to immigrants' encouragement to participate in City Events, it is worthy noting that the City's Volunteers' Programme is open to immigrants who, by the way, have responded very positively. This programme is basically a continuation of the Volunteers' programme that the City launched during the 2004 Olympic Games with great success and immigrant participation.

On several occasions, the City of Athens has also assisted immigrant communities to organise their own festivals (by providing a free open space or rooms) and has also included immigrant associations to participate in the City's activities.

This is just an overview of our work. If you feel there are questions to ask or remarks to make, I would be glad to answer and make comments at the end.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Intervento di Ramon Sanahuja

The perspective of city governments on migration

Spanish context:

- Spain, has been historically a country of emigrants.
- 1986 when Spain entered the European Union there was a transition clause that forbade Spanish citizens to work freely in other countries of the EU during a few years.
- Even before the arrival of immigrants, Spain was already a multicultural society, where Catalan, Basque and Galician were spoken and recognized as official languages and where the Rom people was a very important community
- Immigration is caused exclusively by economical reasons. Political and assail immigration is practically not existing

Immigration Global Impact

- Great increase of number of employed people - nationals and non nationals - in the last 5 years (1,6 Million immigrant workers, they are basic for Tourist Industry or Construction)
- Positive impact in growth GDP (5% since 2000 according Ministry of Economy)
- Immigrants are young and healthy (only 2,6% over 65 years)
- Increase cultural diversity in Barcelona
- Immigrants go and settle where there are economic and work opportunities: Barcelona is an attractive city.

Barcelona context


- Foreign immigration is a quite recent social phenomena since late 90s: Importance of Hosting policies
- Barcelona has been historically a city of immigration. The growth of the city since the industrial revolution has been thanks to great arrival of immigrants
- In the 50's and 60's of the XXth century Catalonia received over a 1,5 million immigrants from the south of Spain
- Basic challenges are still the same:
 - 1 Housing challenge
 - 2 Immigrants want to work and improve and progress
 - 3. Social insertion challenge
- Main difference is that 60's and 70's immigrants and the rest of the population had the same rights and legal status they came from the same country. Now a days immigrants do not have the same rights (E.g. right to vote in local elections).
- Now, we have democratic institutions, then no.
- But the question is the same: How do we face the challenge of integration?

Demographic description

- January 2005, the number of resident immigrants registered (anagrafe) is 230.942. That is 14,6% of the total resident populations of Barcelona.
- On January 2004, immigrant population was 12,8%.
- The main impact of arrivals of immigrant population took place between 2001 and 2003. During 2003 there was a net arrival of 49.237 new residents.

- By continents, 52% of the immigrants residents in Barcelona come from the American continent, while there is a 23% from Europe, basically from European Union. In less proportion from Asia (16%) and Africa, basically from North Africa (9%).

Evolució nombre d'estrangers a Barcelona i increment anual. Període 2000 a 2005



Immigration by nationality

- By nationalities, the first country in the ranking is Ecuador, with 31.000 residents (14%), followed by Peru, Morocco, Colombia, Argentina, Pakistan, Italy and China.
- During 2005 the ranking of nationalities that most increased were Bolivia (an increase of 3.504 people) and China with 2.329 new residents.
- In January 2005 there are 34 nationalities with more than 1.000 residents in Barcelona

Immigration profile

- Rate of feminization is 48%.
- Immigration from central Asia (Pakistan) is the more masculine population. Au contraire, Central America immigration is the more feminine one.
- El 20,4% of the births in the city have a mother born abroad.
- Immigration contribute to make Barcelona a younger city. Only 2,6% of the foreigner are older than 65 years. 21,9% of the residents of Barcelona are 65 or older.
- Positive impact in the human capital of the city: 27,3% of the immigrants have University education.
- Immigrant Women have higher level of education than immigrant men.

Municipal Immigration Plan

- Municipal immigration Plan: Main Political Tool
- Previous condition: POLITICAL CONSENSUS
- Main Objective:
 - “ Real integration in all levels of the city life in Barcelona”

Municipal Immigration Plan: guiding principles

1. Equality (of rights, obligation and opportunities)
2. Social Cohesion (bonding community)
3. Cohabitation (Convivència) (Front a future scenario of a mixture of religions, beliefs and cultures is necessary dialogue and create bonding values) No to parallel worlds.
4. Cultural Diversity (recognition of cultural diversity, if it does not attempt against individual rights)
5. Normalization (Not a parallel structure for immigrants, except for hosting policies)
6. Participation (Citizenry participation)
7. Temporality
8. Obliquity (Transversality) All ambits of the municipal administration and the city need a coordinated work)
9. Consensus. (Political agreement)

Municipal Immigration Plan: Main Objectives

1. Favoring the acquisition of the official languages
Boosting language courses (Spanish and Catalan)
 2. Guarantying access to people attention resources
Active municipal registering (Active anagrafe).
Immigrants information service (SAIER 17.000 persons per year)
- #### Hosting Plan
- 3 Adapting and taking city services accessible.
(Mediation, translation..)
 4. Guarantying access and right to education as the most efficient integrative tool
 5. Guarantying the right to health and social care access.
 6. Guarantying municipal social service attention.
 7. Facilitating immigrants access to the working market
 8. Facilitating home access intermediation for immigrants
 9. Guarantying immigrants access to hosting culture
 10. Guarantying the improvement of immigrant women situation
 11. Studying migration and implantation phenomenon in the city.
 12. Actions to recognize civic rights of hosting society and new comers
 13. Giving visibility to cultural diversity
 14. Promoting cohabitation in public spaces and communitarian mediation
 15. Reinforcing citizen society and and guarantying institutional coordination with this finality. (Acting more firmly and efficiently against crime)
 16. Promoting social normalization and integration of locals devoted to religious worshiping.
(NIMBY)

Intervento di Marta Torrado de Castro

THE CITY OF VALENCIA AND THE EMIGRATION

INTRODUCTION


Statistical information

Statistic report: foreigners citizens in Valencia. municipal register, January of 2004
Statistic Office. Council of Valencia

EVOLUTION OF THE FOREIGN POPULATION IN VALENCIA

Year	Total Population	Total Foreign citizens	%
1991	752.909	5.363	0,7%
1996	746.683	6.821	0,9%
2000	739.297	11.251	1,5%
2001	750.476	22.863	3,0%
2002	764.010	39.563	5,2%
2003	782.846	58.805	7,5%
2004	790.754	71.746	9,1%

Graph of foreign population in Valencia evolution:



Foreign population come from

Country	1996	2001	2002	2003	2004
Ecuador	----	4524	9695	15395	18603
Colombia	170	2554	6327	8584	8936
Argentina	365	602	1243	2934	3596
Rumania	99	465	994	1959	3139
Bolivia	----	255	526	1391	2830
Marruecos	381	1135	1689	2201	2580
China	325	1246	1667	1980	2406
Bulgaria	----	318	759	1502	2069
Ucrania	----	457	923	1371	1619
Argelia	159	628	1003	1332	1602
Nigeria	----	343	797	1162	1595

First Municipal Plan for the integration of foreign citizens

Council of Valencia

Councillor of Social well-being and Integration

Preparation process of the Plan

- First draft of the Plan: September 2001-January of 2002. Councillor of Social welfare and Solidarity.
- To collecte different municipal areas contributions: January to May of 2002.
- Presentation to Social Action Council.
- Approval in Advice of Social Action: 15/07/2002.
- Approved by the local government: 27/09/2002.

Orientation rules of the Municipal Plan for the Integration of Foreign Citizens.

- Normalization and universality.
- Integrality.
- Coordination and public transversality.
- Responsibility and coresponsibility of agents.
- Participation.
- Sensibilization.

Plan performance's areas.

- Information, Orientation and Advice.
- Housing.
- Education and Culture.
- Health.
- Employment.
- Woman.
- Sports and Physical Activity.
- Participation and to promote associations.

Support to foreign citizens's Center

Council of Valencia

Councillor of Social Well-being and Integration

Social Attention and Immigration's Section

General Goals:

- ⇒ TO GIVE SPECIALIZED ATTENTION TO FOREIGN CITIZENS IN VALENCIA, COMPLEMENTING SOCIAL GENERAL SERVICES'S TEAMS INTERVENTION.
- ⇒ TO PROMOTE AND TO COORDINATE THE PERFORMANCES OF THE DIFFERENT MUNICIPAL AREAS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN.
- ⇒ TO FACILITATE THE COORDINATION OF DIFFERENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS AND ENTITIES OF SOCIAL INITIATIVE'S INTERVENTION, IN THE CITY OF VALENCY.

Areas of Performance:

- ⇒ AREA OF DETECTION AND FOLLOW-UP OF MIGRATORY PHENOMENON.
- ⇒ AREA OF INFORMATION, ORIENTATION AND ADVICE.
- ⇒ AREA OF SOCIAL CULTURE MEDIATION.
- ⇒ AREA OF SOCIAL LABOUR MEDIATION.

Area of Detection and Follow-up of Migratory Phenomenon.

- ↳ Municipal observatory of Immigration's Phenomenon.
- ↳ Accomplishment of study and investigations on needs and demands of foreign citizens.
- ↳ Detection, analysis and follow-up of migratory phenomenon in the city.
- ↳ Elaboration, interchange and diffusion of information.

Area of Information, Orientation and Advice.

- ⇒ Juridical Advice.
- ⇒ Elaboration, summary and diffusion:
 - ⇒ Practical manual for technical personnel of Social Municipal Teams
 - ⇒ Immigration's dossier.

Area of Information, Orientation and Advice.

- ⇒ Coordination rules:
 - ⇒ Municipal areas: Technical Commission Interareas.
 - ⇒ CAI Social Municipal Teams.
 - ⇒ Institutions of Socials Initiative.

Area of Information, Orientation and Advice.

- ⇒ Technical Personnel Formation:
 - ⇒ Plan of Permanent training.
 - ⇒ Formative joint actions: Technical Municipal Personnel and Social Initiative's Institutions.

Area of Social Culture Mediation

- ⇒ Intervention from the mediation:
 - ↳ Mediation's activities for students of primary school: Together for the diversity.
 - ↳ Mediation's activities for general population.
 - ↳ Intervention's Programme in conflict situations.
 - ↳ Translation and Interpretation's service.

Area of Social Culture Mediation

- ⇒ Sensitization and Promotion of different many-culture's performance:
 - ⇒ Program of Intercultural Living together: : "*Valencia Mosaic of Cultures*".
- ⇒ To coordinate with Social Initiative's Institutions:
 - ⇒ Knowledge of associative reality in the city.
 - ⇒ Colaboration and support to institutions.

Area of Social Labour Mediation

- ⇒ To compile, structure and distribution of information relative to general and specific resources of formation and employment.
- ⇒ To coordinate with Public and Private Institutions that develop actions of formation, orientation and labour intermediation.
- ⇒ To collaborate with Social Initiative's Institutions to impulse specific Formation and Employment's programs.

Area of Social Labour Mediation

- ⇒ To promote Positive Action Initiatives in Formation and Employment's Municipal Programs.
- ⇒ To incorporate additional measures to facilitate the access to formative actions.

Additional projects to CAI Programme.

- ⇒ Performance Coordinated Project with Municipal Teams of Social Services.
- ⇒ Immigrants' Housing Homeless Project.
- ⇒ Technical commission Interareas for the follow-up of the Operative Development of the Plan.

Intervento di Remo Gautschi

National policies on migration flow Migration and the Cities -a Development Perspective

Introduction

The migration story of Mr. Nguyen

- a farmer from rural Northern Viet Nam
- flight to HongKong
- long-stayer in a refugee camp in Hong Kong (quick adaption to urban context)
- transfer to Switzerland as quota refugee
- integration problems with rural Switzerland
- transfer to Geneva (back in the city)

Migration in Switzerland

19th Century

- until 1890 Switzerland was an emigration country
- In the 19th century over 100'000 Swiss emigrated
- Money for poor Swiss was collected in Russia
- Swiss municipalities paid the travel costs to America for their poorest citizens

Early 20th Century

- Industrialisation in Swiss cities attracts ten thousands of people
- Many remote mountain areas (Bergtäler) become depopulated
- Foreign workers build the Swiss railways
- Many poor parents have to give away their children (Verdingkinder)


Late 20th Century

- The growing economy attracts hundreds of thousands of foreign workers
- Swiss enterprises recruit seasonal workers in Italy, Spain, Portugal and on the Balcans
- Large communities of foreigners are created
- Pizza und Spaghetti become part of Swiss eating habits
- "Secondos" grow up in Swiss society
- The migrant working class still intends to return to their country of origin one day

What did the Swiss migrants look for?

- poverty alleviation
- income (→ remittances)
- perspectives for the children
- → human security

International Migration



Migration – from a Swiss perspective


National migration policy

- Key department (BFM)
- Labour migration (highly qualified persons)
- Asylum regime

Contribution to the international discussion

- Berne Initiative
- Global Commission on International Migration

Migration – from City to City ...



Cities and Migration – A Powerful Combination

- innovation
- working power
- new concepts
- development
- cultural diversity and exchange
- low salaries
- social tensions

Migration – in Search of Human Security

Human security – in search of

- Legal work and income
- Respect of human rights
- Individual and social freedom = **Integration**
- Access to information
- Education and perspectives for the children
- A non-violent society
- Access to resources and goods
- Possibility of supporting one's family in one's country of origin

MD and MDG -

MD

a culture of prevention, good governance and gender equity

MGDs

mutual responsibility to reduce poverty



13

M+5

Extracts from the Millennium Development Goals Report 2005:

- violent conflicts producing more than 37 Mio refugees and internally displaced persons
- education (...)
- diseases: HIV/AIDS caused 2.3 Mio deaths in 2004 only in Sub-Sahara Africa, Malaria affects 300 to 500 Mio people a year and causes 1 Mio deaths a year, Tuberculosis kills 1.7 Mio people a year;)
- destruction of the environment, deforestation to harvest firewood, pollution of water (1.1 billion people have no access to clean water), the percentage of carbon dioxide in the air is still growing;

Development, Security and Human Rights for all

- the world is inter-linked
- cybernetic thinking
- Development needs security
- Security needs development
- → security needs to be developed

Development of Security

key players

- governments
- security forces
- cities and municipalities

key concepts

- Participation
 - Integration
 - Empowerment
 - Good governance
- the attitude to prevent violence

Migration at the benefit to the society

What needs to be done to make migration benefit society?

- Better management of Migration
- Capacity building
- Legal migration opportunities
- Transparency and information about migration (no more myths)
- Integration

Migration Security Integration in the Mediterranean Area

- Near East
- Maghreb (Transit migration)
- Balkan
- EU

Intervento di Blandine Kriegel

L'IMMIGRATION ET L'INTEGRATION EN FRANCE

Depuis la réélection du Président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac, la politique d'immigration et d'intégration est devenue l'une des priorités du Gouvernement français. Le discours de Jacques Chirac à Troyes en octobre 2002, le discours de Jean-Pierre Raffarin d'installation du Haut Conseil à l'intégration en octobre 2002, en ont donné les signaux de départ et les orientations politiques. C'est sur les deux piliers de la générosité : l'accueil et la mobilisation positive, et de la fermeté : la sécurité et le retour aux principes de la République française : le droit des personnes, le contrat social, la cohésion sociale, l'égalité des chances, que cette politique a été installée, en plein accord avec les programmes de l'union européenne.

Elle s'est déployée dans deux domaines : une politique à l'égard de l'immigration, une politique de refondation de la politique d'intégration.

1- la politique d'immigration

Le commencement disait le philosophe Aristote est la moitié du tout. La politique d'intégration commence par la politique d'immigration. Or comme l'a fait justement remarqué la Cour des Comptes dans un rapport de décembre 2004, consacré à l'immigration et à l'intégration, aucune réflexion aboutissant à une politique délibérée en matière d'immigration n'avait été véritablement élaborée dans les trois décennies qui nous précèdent. Les immigrés arrivaient sur notre sol, mais ils étaient reçus sans être accueillis, contrôlés sans être formés et les flux migratoires eux-mêmes n'étaient pas appréciés que de manière dispersée par des administrations différentes. La société française a cru longtemps qu'elle avait affaire à une immigration de travail quand était déjà installé une immigration de peuplement. C'est cette situation qui a changé. Désormais, l'immigration est accueillie, elle est encadrée, elle est connue. La politique d'immigration s'est traduite jusqu'à présent par deux lois : 1- la loi sur l'immigration (27.11.2003) et 2- la loi sur l'asile (23.12.2003.). A partir de ces deux lois, on a réorganisé les instruments administratifs de l'intégration. Une agence de l'accueil a été créée qui a regroupé d'anciennes administrations séparées (l'OMI et le SSAE) et qui a mis en place de nouvelles plateformes d'accueil. Elles ont vocation de proposer au 210 000 personnes qui arrivent régulièrement en France la signature d'un contrat d'accueil et d'intégration. L'INSEE a fait paraître une étude sur le stock des migrants. Depuis 1975, la part des immigrés dans la population est restée stable, mais l'immigration a beaucoup changé : les entrées pour motif familial ont augmenté, la population immigrée s'est féminisée et les immigrés proviennent de pays de plus en plus lointains. En 1999, ils représentent 7,4% de l'ensemble de la Population résidant en France métropolitaine, les femmes composent la moitié des immigrés vivants en France contre 45% en 1946. Les premières analyses montrent qu'en 2004, 4,5 millions de personnes immigrées âgées de 18 ans ou plus résident en France métropolitaine, soit 9,6% de la population du même âge. En 2004, les femmes représentent 50,3% des immigrés. La diversification des origines géographiques se poursuit : la part des immigrés venus des pays d'Europe est en baisse (41% en 2004, 46% en 1999). A l'inverse, l'immigration venue d'Asie s'accroît (14% des immigrés majeurs viennent de ce continent, contre 12% en 1999) ; celle en provenance d'Afrique également (42% en 2004 contre 39% en 1999). Mais les immigrés sont davantage affectés par le chômage. Ils occupent plus souvent des postes d'ouvriers ou d'employés, notamment non qualifiés. Leur sur-représentation dans l'industrie et la construction s'atténue. Les personnes nées en France ayant deux parents immigrés représentent 5% des moins de 66 ans. Les immigrés sont davantage présents dans les zones frontalières et les régions urbanisées ou industrielles, soit l'Ile de France, la façade Est et les

régions méridionales. En 1999, ils sont deux fois plus nombreux que le reste de la population à vivre dans l'agglomération parisienne (35% contre 15%). Entre 1990 et 1999, la part des immigrés s'est renforcée en Ile de France et en Alsace, mais aussi dans les régions de l'Ouest où ils étaient peu présents. A l'inverse, elle a reculé dans les anciennes régions. Plus souvent locataires, notamment du secteur social.

Mais la même étude ne cache pas non plus l'existence de points lumineux. 63% des hommes actifs âgés de 30 à 59 ans nés en France et dont les deux parents sont nés à l'étranger ont un père ouvrier, contre 37% pour ceux dont les deux parents sont nés en France. Cependant l'origine sociale donnée, les descendants de migrants ont un destin social meilleur à celui des autres personnes nées en France, la mobilité sociale étant plus forte en bas de l'échelle sociale. En particulier la part d'ouvrier a nettement reculé parmi les enfants de migrants alors qu'elle est restée constante chez les personnes dont les deux parents sont nés en France.

La seconde nouveauté est la formation qui permet un encadrement. Ce contrat d'accueil et d'intégration lancé par François Fillon repose sur un engagement réciproque est une grande innovation. L'Etat s'engage à donner 1- une formation linguistique, 2- une formation civique, 3- un suivi social mais en retour, les immigrés s'engagent à respecter des lois de la République.

La troisième nouveauté tient à la dimension des droits fondamentaux. Ceux-ci sont visés de trois manières :

1°) le contrat est proposé individuellement à chaque personnes immigrée (ceci est très important pour les femmes et tous les assujettis)

2°) la formation civique fait une place particulière à l'apprentissage des droits humains, des droits civiques, des droits sociaux.

3°) un accent particulier est mis sur l'égalité des hommes et des femmes notamment dans le guide préparatoire à la naturalisation. Le Haut Conseil à l'Intégration a directement participé à la mise en place de la formation civique en rédigeant le cahier des charges de cette formation ainsi qu'un livret civique.

Au sein du Haut Conseil à l'Intégration a été mis en place un Observatoire des Statistiques de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration qui a permis 1° : de répondre au questionnaire annuel de la Commission Européenne sur les flux migratoires, 2° : de publier en 2003, pour la première fois un rapport sur les flux migratoires de l'immigration légale qui n'a plus été discuté par personne, 3° : de participer au rapport rédigé par le Ministère de l'Intérieur adressé au Parlement sur les flux migratoires annuels. Dans cet Observatoire des statistiques, toutes les administrations qui collectent les chiffres des flux migratoires ainsi que tous les grands instituts démographiques sont représentés dans un Conseil scientifique présidée par Madame Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, secrétaire perpétuelle de l'Académie Française.

Cet Observatoire a donné une estimation tout à fait fiable de l'immigration légale qui se montait en 2003, à 173 000 immigrés et on a délivré en 2004, 217 000 titres de séjour. Ces chiffres certains concernant l'immigration légale permettaient de cerner mieux des chiffres plus délicats de l'immigration dû à l'asile avec 50 000 demandes par an, 65 000 en 2002, et de l'immigration illégale ou clandestine pour lequel le Ministre de l'intérieur, M. Dominique de Villepin vient de présenter récemment un projet sur l'immigration clandestine et irrégulière.

Le projet du Ministre de l'Intérieur

Très récemment, dans une communication au Conseil des Ministres, le Ministre de l'Intérieur a proposé des mesures pour mettre en place une police de l'immigration irrégulière et le pilotage par un comité

interministériel du contrôle de l'immigration sous toutes ses formes (regroupement familial, travail, études universitaires, asile, clandestins). Le Ministre de l'intérieur a proposé de combiner plusieurs actions :

1. D'orchestrer avec vigueur une série de moyens déjà engagés ou de propositions déjà annoncées (reconduites à la frontière en partenariat avec l'Europe, rationalisation de l'action interministérielle, études statistiques). Son principal mérite, ici, est de communiquer fortement et clairement sur les mesures prises.
2. De mettre en place des coordinations interministérielles nouvelles (conférences préfectorales et consulaires, séminaires de formation continue, expérimentation d'un guichet unique pour le visa et la carte de séjour).
3. Il propose un nouveau concept : passer d'une immigration subie à une immigration choisie dont le double but avoué est :
 - a) de réguler les flux migratoires
 - b) de redonner à l'immigration de travail une place prépondérante par rapport à l'immigration de peuplement.

Grâce à cet effort important, l'immigration est aujourd'hui, connue accueillie et contrôlée.

2- La politique d'intégration

Plusieurs volets de la politique d'intégration ont été abordés chronologiquement à travers des questions de société, des questions institutionnelles, des questions symboliques.

1- La question religieuse et la question du droit des femmes

Elles sont apparues comme indissolublement nouées avec le double mouvement de la montée du fondamentalisme et l'apparition de la marche des femmes des cités.

La question religieuse

La mise en place du Conseil français du culte musulman en 2002 et la nécessité de lutter contre le fondamentalisme ont posé à l'opinion publique française et à son gouvernement, la question de savoir comment accorder la liberté de conscience et de culte avec les droits de la personne au premier rang desquels l'égalité entre hommes et femmes. Un grand débat national en France a surgi à l'occasion de réflexion sur la laïcité instituée par le Président de la République et dont la présidence a été confiée au médiateur de la République, M. Bernard Stasi. Le rapport de la commission Stasi fortement marqué la volonté de refuser le communautarisme a dégagé une voie qui a trouvé l'approbation de la majorité en France. Le point de départ de la réflexion de la commission a été la marche des femmes des cités et la redécouverte de la laïcité française. L'examen de conscience national engagée par la commission Stasi a conduit à un retour sur notre histoire. Comment dans le passé avons-nous surmonté les conflits religieux notamment ceux des guerres de religion qui ont dévasté l'Europe ? Nos voisins en Hollande et en Angleterre ont trouvé une issue aux guerres de religion en proclamant à la fois le droit des personnes, et notamment la liberté de conscience et la reconnaissance du droit des minorités. Cette voie très importante qui a permis l'élaboration des doctrines de la liberté des individus en Europe et qui a fait de l'Angleterre la terre d'élection de la liberté notamment aux yeux des philosophes français des Lumières n'a pas été exactement la voie suivie par la France. Avec Henri IV, c'est par la déclaration de la

neutralité de l'Etat dans l'accès aux charges publiques voulu par l'Edit de Nantes que nous sommes sortis grâce à l'appui du parti des politiques, le parti des modérés de toutes les factions religieuses, catholiques et protestantes des guerres de religions. Cette voie a permis à des personnalités appartenant à la minorité religieuse de Sully à Necker d'accéder aux charges publiques des plus éminents.

La réflexion de la commission Stasi a eu un certain nombre de conséquences. Elle a ouvert la voie à la loi sur l'interdiction des signes religieux ostensibles à l'école, loi qui n'a pas toujours été bien comprise à l'étranger mais a permis de réaffirmer cette neutralité de l'espace public qui est propre à la France. La loi a évidemment une portée doctrinale en exposant que la communauté nationale publique est un lieu de coexistence pacifique neutre de toutes les religions, mais elle a eu aussi une portée pratique car elle a éteint l'incendie. Il faut rappeler que 386 députés ont voté la loi contre 36 opposants. Il y avait en 94-95. 3000 affaires officiellement recensées. Il n'y en a en 2005 que 47 jeunes filles qui ont été exclues après leur refus de respecter la loi.

Une deuxième question abordée à travers un avis demandé au Haut Conseil à l'Intégration a porté sur le droit des femmes issues de l'immigration. Dans son avis, le Haut Conseil à l'Intégration a dénoncé les conventions bilatérales que nous avons passé avec des pays qui étaient moins exigeants en matière de droits des femmes que nous ne le sommes pour demander que soit appliqué la loi du domicile la plus favorable aux femmes, que soit sanctionné les mariages forcés, la polygamie et toutes les atteintes aux droits des femmes. La politique a été à l'origine de relations de codéveloppement en particulier avec le Maroc, mais aussi de plusieurs lois et projets de loi pour transformer la situation des droits des femmes issues de l'immigration.

2- La politique sociale

La dimension sociale de la politique d'intégration a été fortement prise en main par le plan de cohésion sociale proposé par Jean Louis Borloo qui permet avec des moyens budgétaires très importants de réinvestir sur le plan du logement, de l'équipement, de l'emploi, de l'éducation, les cités qui avaient été abandonnées. Cette politique d'égalité des chances a été relayée par une conférence de l'égalité des chances organisée par le Premier Ministre qui a mis en place des modalités nouvelles d'accès aux emplois publics et aux emplois privés en encourageant notamment les entreprises à mettre en place des chartes de la diversité culturelle.

Le troisième volet concerne à la fois la dimension symbolique et la mise en place de nouveaux instruments administratifs et institutionnels. Conformément à la directive européenne, le Président de la République a mis en place la Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et d'Egalité des chances (HALDE). Dotée de moyens budgétaires importants et d'une large autonomie la nouvelle Autorité s'est donnée pour but de poursuivre toutes les discriminations de tous ordres, quelque soit l'origine, de l'âge, de la santé, du sexe ou de l'orientation sexuelle. Installée en Avril dernier par le Président de la République, elle a déjà reçu 600 plaintes et estime qu'elle traitera plus de 3000 plaintes l'année prochaine.

Après avoir refondé le HCI qui a été élargi dans sa composition et diversifié dans ses missions il a créé une Cité Nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration, il a mis en place un comité interministériel de l'intégration et aujourd'hui un comité interministériel de l'immigration.

De même un certain nombre d'actions visant à mettre en valeur la réussite des Français venus de loin ont été engagées ou soutenues par les pouvoirs publics comme les talents des cités, les trophées de la réussite, le forum des Français venus de loin. Car les Français issus de l'immigration souffrent souvent d'une image insuffisante qui les assimile trop volontiers à la violence, à la délinquance ou au

fondamentalisme alors que leur parcours d'intégration est également marqué par des réussites très importantes.

A ce point, un débat a surgi en France qui a divisé tous les partis politiques sur le plan des principes de la politique d'intégration. Ces principes devaient-ils reposer sur l'idée de la discrimination positive ou sur celle de l'action positive. La discrimination positive trouvait ses partisans chez les zélés de la politique des quotas pratiqués dans les pays de ségrégation et d'apartheid qui avaient connu la discrimination des groupes sur une base ethnique et qui avaient estimé que le seul moyen de réparer ces discriminations était de réparer des groupes.

Les partisans de l'action positive remarquaient que cela n'avait jamais été le cas de la France qui dans son droit politique métropolitain n'avait jamais inscrit une quelconque inégalité et qu'il ne fallait pas remplacer la promotion par le mérite par la promotion des quotas ethniques, les partisans de l'action positive soutenue par le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre préféraient établir l'égalité des chances, c'est à dire mettre en place des avantages compensateurs sur une base territoriale associées une véritable volonté d'insertion.

C'est donc un effort très intense qui n'est ni totalement achevé, ni totalement explicité qui a contribué à mettre en place les éléments de la politique française d'intégration qui peut être aussi utile à d'autres pays européens.

Intervento di Peter Schatzer

Managing migration: Issues, challenges and the role of international cooperation

International mobility of people is unlikely to decrease in the foreseeable future; people will most likely continue to look for better living conditions – if they cannot find them at home they will try to do so elsewhere. Conflict and political instability in some areas of the world will continue to provoke flows of involuntary migrants.¹

Efforts to seek viable and sustainable mechanisms of cooperation for better managing international migration are not new. What has changed in recent years, however, is that more migrants from more countries reach or try to reach more destinations in practically all the States of the world. According to our and the UN's calculations, in 2005 there are 185 million persons who can be considered migrants – approximately 2,9 % of the world population.

Obviously the phenomenon of international migration that involves at least two (origin and destination) but increasingly also one or more transit countries, not only lends itself to but requires cooperation among concerned States. Cooperation on migration management is a necessity, and in many instances it is already a reality. Where States try to manage the phenomenon on their own, they often fail.

So what does it require to manage migration in a win-win format? I shall list what my organization considers key elements

First, we need to **get the facts right**, to understand the nature of migration, its causes and consequences, its benefits and its challenges.

By 2050, the EU's population will drop by 20%, if current population and migration trends and policies continue. The serious concerns about the impact of aging on economic growth, recently again voiced in Dutch former Prime Minister Wim Kok's report are slowly sinking in. While migration can in no way prevent this process (migrants too become older) let alone preserve the current ratio between productive and dependent age groups, it can cushion the effects of aging.

Europe's economic growth requires labour migration. While most EU Member States tend to want and select mainly highly-skilled workers, the European economy in reality also depends heavily on unskilled migrant labour. The growing involvement of women in professional life, for example, is frequently possible only because an immigrant takes on the job to care for her family. Aging creates a market for a new type of services mostly provided by migrants: Another example: about half of the 641 638 regularized in Italy's latest process help in households and take care of elderly.

In the economic realm, migration is a prime driver of the international economy. A sizeable portion of the estimated 200 billion dollars sent home in remittances last year by migrants came from European countries, and they help sustain the economies of many developing countries. While we must insist that this money belongs first of all to those who have worked for it, we should also keep a focus on good practices developing both in the areas of reducing transfer costs and public sector support to provide incentives for development-related spending of remittances. Bringing the banking system and its potential new migrant clients together is in itself a major goal.

¹ UNDESA, World Economic and Social Survey, 2004, Part II.

Contributions of migrants to the economies of the societies in which they work are very relevant but the brain drain phenomenon deprives some developing countries of potentially critical contributions of their best and brightest to their long-term development, at a high cost. New thinking away from stereotypes such as compensation or trying to halt flows of qualified without offering job opportunities at home needs to be part of a dialogue between interested States.

As we meet here on academic territory, I want to mention a specific phenomenon that connects migration policy research and brain drain: in many developing countries this field of research is not yet well developed. Due to a lack of structures and funding back home, some outstanding scientists in the area of migration research originating from the South have moved to Europe or America. They are sadly missed where migration research capacity needs strengthening. In the South too, policy makers need such capacity to base their decisions on knowledge and facts.

Initiatives such as the recently started EU-funded European University Institute network can only help bridge the knowledge gap, but in order to have a robust presence of qualified researchers, investment in this field needs to focus on building the capacity for research and training in a systematic manner.

In the social realm, migration can bring challenges in the form of social tension, conflicted identity, and the alienation caused by inadequate integration. Within the EU, the establishment of National Contact Points facilitates the exchange of best practice between EU Member States. The EU Handbook on Integration can serve as a tool for local, regional and national levels to fine-tune their integration strategies to their given situations.

Second, we need to **identify, define and address the fundamental policy issues**. While at the EU level this is already quite advanced, the challenges for States bordering Europe are evident, and there is a risk of the dichotomy growing rather than decreasing.

Here are some of the major questions involved in this chapter of the migration debate.

Issues of sovereignty:

- It is the fundamental right of each country to determine who enters and remains in its territory and under what conditions. Open societies face the question of how to regulate and facilitate movement without overly intrusive surveillance and control mechanisms or turning away the new arrivals on whom their future prosperity may depend.
- Much migration today occurs outside of governmental awareness or control. What are the implications of wide-spread irregular migration for the domestic labour market, for public health or security? Indeed, in the wake of heightened global security concerns, it has become more important than ever for governments to know who enters their territories and for what purposes. We need to explore these issues in an open, honest and constructive way, to reduce the risks to individual migrants and to the societies they enter. This too is an area for increased cooperation among States. In this context the addressing of security concerns - without stifling legitimate and needed movement and without serious constraints on personal rights and liberties - must remain a priority.

To respond to these challenges, States undertake different measures. Some see regularization processes as pragmatic response to massive inflows of undocumented migrants, some as charitable gesture, others as a failure to control criminal networks.

Regularization programmes may take several forms.² In some cases, they are one-off, extraordinary processes aiming at the legalization of a large number of irregularly residing migrants, normally in conjunction with the introduction of new migration and asylum laws. Sometimes, Governments envisage continuous mechanisms for regularization, which are therefore based on a case by case basis.

Those in favour, see regularization as the means for allowing groups of marginalized migrants to be included in the host society. By acquiring a legal status people officially enter social and economic life, gain new rights but also obligations and can participate in the formal economy, in social insurance schemes etc.

Regularization programmes also represent a key source of information on the migrant population in a given country; including, nature of irregular employment, migrant living and working conditions, or estimates of numbers of third country workers residing irregularly.

On the other hand, public opinion and the leadership of other States are against regularization: it presents a reward for illegal behaviour; regularization could be a pull factor for illegal entry, as third country nationals may seek to enter in order to take advantage of the procedure. In addition, not all migrants will be able to benefit from such a process.

Issues of economic integration in a global labour market:

- Businesses want to recruit and move their personnel globally and yet must work through often complicated and time-consuming governmental administrative structures to do so.
- Many current structures are inadequate to the task of rapid recruitment and movement of workers and professionals. As a consequence, businesses and communities, but also groups in need of services (families, hospitality industry) suffer. Indeed, while legal opportunities for migration for work are limited, demand for migrant workers is high and supply is even higher. How can we align these factors in safer, more flexible and more equitable ways? How can we ensure that it is not smuggling networks that do the matching?

Issues of national identity:

- Once relatively homogenous and cohesive societies are giving way to multiethnic, multicultural societies, whether by design or default. How can core values be identified and adhered to in the midst of growing diversity?
- How can social structures established on the basis of national identity adjust to cope with temporary and permanent migrants from vastly different cultural backgrounds and with varying legal and social status?
- What is the social and political impact of trans-nationalism and growing multiple citizenship?
- How does the attitude of countries of origin towards their diasporas hamper or encourage change? Are nationals abroad just seen as potential dissidents that are only useful as a source of remittances, or can they also serve as agents for positive change – economic but also political - back home?
- How does the presence of a growing number of immigrants in Europe with a religious background that is quite diverse from that of most of the population of host countries influence national identity? What can be done to isolate extremists and ensure that immigrants accept the

² Aspasia Papadopoulou: Regularization programmes: an effective instrument of migration policy?", Global Migration perspectives, no. 33 – May 2005. Global Commission on International Migration.

basic consensus on which European societies are based – a consensus that these days is being severely tested in many places?

Issues of social change:

- What are the implications for social welfare states established on the basis of a social compact between a state and its citizens? What are the implications of newcomers from different cultures and societies -- temporary and permanent, authorized and not?
- How can we ensure the cohesion and stability of societies while protecting the rights of growing minorities?
- While nearly fifty percent of all migrants today are women, most migration-related policies and regulations have not adapted to this new reality. What are the implications for migrant women, for governments, for international and non-governmental organizations? How can gender issues be factored into migration policy making?
- How do we educate our children to grow up in the context of dynamic social change?

Issues of rights and responsibilities:

- How do we ensure that individual rights are respected -- regardless of the legal status of the migrant?
- For societies and for individuals -- how do we balance and reconcile universal rights with citizenship rights? In an era of increasing temporary migration for work, are we faced with the necessity of creating multi-tiered systems of rights and responsibilities?

Third, we need to **pursue comprehensive approaches**.

Governments over the past decades have tended to focus on isolated elements of migration. For some, labour migration needs have predominated, for others, asylum has been the main concern. Irregular migration and efforts to staunch it have occupied the attention of many governments.

On **content**, it is essential to address each of the **main challenges** of managing migration, including the cross cutting issues that link them as they are:

- migration and development;
- facilitated migration;
- migration control; and
- forced migration, including asylum.

On **participation**, as shown earlier, there is a need to include all significant players.

At the national level, all relevant governmental ministries - such as labour, trade, development, justice and home affairs - need to be involved. The business community, local government, trade unions and civil society are key voices which need to be heard down to grassroots level.

At the international level, organizations dealing with issues such as development, labour, human rights, trade, health, and crime prevention have valuable contributions to make. They too have to coordinate their approaches, and the Geneva Migration Group with ILO, IOM, UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNCTAD and UNODC as participants represents a significant effort.

On **perspective**, the full migration life-cycle needs to be considered, from pre-departure, to en route facilitation, to integration options, to eventual return.

Fourth, we need to take stock of **existing international norms** and promote their implementation.

While there is no comprehensive international legal instrument governing migration, many norms do exist -- in the fields of human rights, refugees, humanitarian action, migrant work and crime control. Many of these are not well-known and most are even less well implemented.

There is a need to consolidate and disseminate existing international norms on migration. Over recent years, the Swiss-led Bern Initiative has made a major effort to determine what exists and where there are gaps. To support and institutionalize this, IOM has recently set up a Migration Law Department.

Fifth, we need to promote **dialogue and consultation**, especially at the regional level.

Cooperation on migration may cover different levels, ranging from the local, regional, national and international.

Bilateral agreements have traditionally been useful means to manage international migratory flows regarding two specific countries. These agreements are helpful for responding rapidly to changing migration trends or features and usually refer to origin and destination countries – a distinction that however does get increasingly blurred by growing circular migration.

Today some 142 States around the globe participate in various regional consultative processes on migration. Whether in the field of labour migration, irregular migration, counter-trafficking or data sharing, this new spirit of regional cooperation merits encouragement.

One such an instrument is the “**5+5 dialogue**”; it is a migration forum among five Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and five Southern EU member states (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain). This process has been steadily consolidating and has led to the first ministerial conference on migration that took place in Tunis in October 2002. In that occasion participating states adopted by consensus the “Tunis Declaration” which is a tangible demonstration of their willingness to consider multilateral approaches on common migration issues in an organized and coordinated manner.

Information exchange, joint management of international borders, agreed models of labour migration, migration for development and protection of migrants’ rights are all the same important for setting up successful migration management patterns. But as much as its content, reflecting the growing understanding of linkages and providing a framework for international cooperation, it is important the fact that the “5+5” process provides a venue for contacts between officials of the 10 participating countries and requires them to also coordinate their approaches in-country, this way contributing to some of the bi- and multilateral actions that we are witnessing in slow but steady progress in the region.

This is even more important at a time when requests for help with migration management from Maghreb countries no longer refer only to maximising the benefits and safeguarding the rights of the migrants abroad, but to addressing South-South migration flows.

From cooperation under the “5+5” in the Western Mediterranean or the Budapest group, to the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa, to the Colombo Group of Asian labour-sending countries, governments are increasingly coming together at the regional level to share their migration interests and experiences and to search for common approaches to address them.

Practically all states have to face up to the challenge of dealing with migrants. The European Union has come half way to a Common European Immigration and Asylum Policy and through the recent creation of the border control agency to a more coordinated approach toward managing its external borders.

Priorities among the 25 are nevertheless quite diverse, and this dichotomy is reflected at EU level. Immigration and asylum issues were included in the EU agenda with the Treaty of Maastricht to be dealt with under the intergovernmental procedure. “*Comunitarization*” has slowly taken place; as a matter of fact, starting from 1 January 2006, issues related to irregular migration will be adopted by the co-decision procedure (Council and European Parliament) and qualified majority voting will be applicable, whereas issues pertaining to regular migration will continue being decided upon by unanimity.

The EU, while focusing on defining adequate policies and measures to manage migration, also tries to address the issue of irregular flows through increased cooperation and partnership with origin and transit countries. To this end, ad hoc Action Plans on illegal immigration, external borders and return policies have been developed and are in their implementation phase.

The objective of the European Union to set up an area of freedom, security and justice is increasingly gaining importance. In this respect, after the completion on May 2004 of the first work programme (at Tampere in 1999) a new programme has been adopted. On 4 November 2004, the European Council adopted the Hague programme, for the period 2005- 2010. This new agenda includes suggestions and recommendations from the EC and comments as emerged from the citizens’ online consultation process. On 2 June 2005 its relevant Action Plan was approved by the Council setting up the benchmarks to be aimed at for the next five years.

European objectives in the fields of migration and asylum would, however, be doomed to fail if Europe's neighbours did not feel the benefits, especially in view of the major challenges of the new century: respect for human rights and democracy, dialogue between cultures and civilisations, fighting poverty, instability, terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration.

A true single area of security, freedom and justice for all residents of Europe needs to be constructed taking also into consideration the security, freedom and justice of the neighbours – near and far - who will increasingly have to share the burden of migration pressures from all those less fortunate.

This is why my organization, together with the Austrian government, planning for its EU Presidency in 2006, has launched an initiative to link the themes of New Neighborhood, Security and Migration.

Since the late 1990s, the EU has also sought to develop the so-called “external dimension” of cooperation on immigration and asylum: attempts have been made to manage migration through cooperation with migration sending or transit countries. There are two rather distinct concepts of the “external dimension”. The first involves attempts to externalize traditional tools of domestic or EU migration control; the second seeks to prevent the causes of migration and refugee flows, through development assistance and foreign policy tools.

Both are based on different assumptions about how best to influence and regulate migration flows, and will have divergent impacts on migration flows, refugee protection and relations with third countries.

Global dialogue on migration too has experienced some progress. IOM's International Dialogue on Migration brings together more than 130 states and partner organizations to share experiences and perspectives and create better understanding and cooperation in the management of migration. The UN has decided to make International Migration and Development a yearly agenda item, and a High-Level dialogue in New York will discuss it in detail next year.

Sixth, we need to **engage and manage the public debate**.

We only have to look at the discussion of migration topics in recent referenda here in Switzerland to see how this debate feeds - and too often is fed by - misperceptions, ignorance and fear. We all need to work hard to ensure that the debate is better informed, more rational and less prone to superficial analysis. More effective efforts are needed to combat xenophobia and racism. Besides the media, the role of our schools is key at a time when many of them are under a lot of strain, in particular in urban areas with high percentages of migrant children.

The benefits of a more open and transparent policy on migratory movements, together with the coordination of policies to reduce push factors in countries of origin and greater efforts to enforce labour migration rules in the countries of destination, could also help reduce illegal immigration and in particular smuggling and trafficking.

At the global level, the report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization contains a useful chapter on migration. The Global Commission on International Migration will present its report next week. This too should help to raise awareness of migration and of its positive potential.

The realization of win-win approaches to migration management will only open up once we recognize migration as a natural and potentially beneficial phenomenon - both for migrants and societies. Once we have seized on the idea that migration is here to stay, we can move ahead with the long, difficult but rewarding job of managing migration for the benefit of all.

Urban Policies on migration

“Illegal Forms of Human Mobility and Turkey: Irregular Migration, Human Trafficking, Smuggling and Illegal Labour Force.”

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1. Introduction

One of the challenges of the millennium is illegal human mobility -- including irregular migration, illegal migration of labour, human smuggling, trafficking and women trafficking. It causes human-right abuses and poses threat to human security. The smuggling and trafficking of human beings has increased throughout the world, owing to globalisation process and other factors such as civil-wars, conflicts and economic crisis. The problem is exacerbated in size and seriousness by the growing involvement of organised crime groups. The smuggling of migrants by these organised crime groups disrupts established immigration policies of destination countries and often involves human rights abuses. The exploitative nature of the treatment of the victims of trafficking often amounts to new forms of slavery.

There is a relationship between organised crime and illegal human mobility, since the organised crime organises human trafficking and illegal employment. Illegal human mobility, in the forms described above, threatens security in the region and in the European Union. Smuggling networks coexist with criminal organisations, exerting a crime multiplier for them and for militias, guerrillas and terrorists.³ They survive better in cities where informal globalisation creates fertile ground for illegal transactions and undocumented labour. Illegal migration and labour create threat to social stability in the *Mediterranean* region and to international security.

How the illegal human mobility is organised? Who are the actors and the victims? What are the strategies and tactics of the human smuggling and trafficking networks? What is the role of informal globalisation that affects metropolitan cities in the region in the direction of growing informal sector and irregular migration?

The paper looks at irregular migration to Turkey and through Turkey where Istanbul is a key zone. In more specific terms, it focuses on refugees, human smuggling and trafficking and illegal migration of labour. In doing so, the paper takes account of the global distribution of the demand for labour, and the impact of informal globalisation in shaping the undocumented and illegal labour market. It examines the processes and actors at work.

³ For the connection between terrorist organisations and human smuggling networks see, James H. Anderson, *International Terrorism and Crime: Trends and Linkages* Anderson wrote: All terrorist groups traffic in violence. Though some engage in ordinary criminal behavior as well, it is not their driving motivation, but a means to an end. Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighella, author of the *Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, encouraged bank robberies as a means to fund terrorist activity. Groups as diverse as the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Kurdish Workers' Party in the Middle East, and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka, have raised money for terrorist ends with diverse criminal activities. At <http://www.jmu.edu/orgs/wrni/it3.html>. For the information on the PKK and human smuggling see Metin Dalman and Ismail Tabak, 1995. *Avrupa'da İnsan Ticareti ve PKK* ("Human Smuggling in Europe and the PKK"), Istanbul: DTPA Türk-Alman Basın Ajansı.

Conceptual Considerations

A definition of human smuggling, including its social organisation and its political and economic significance, is still very much a work in progress. People smuggling is procuring the illegal entry of a person into a state, of which the person is not a national or permanent resident, in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit.⁴ It is important to differentiate human smuggling from human trafficking that is the recruiting, transporting, transferring, harbouring or receiving persons for the purpose of exploitation; by using threatening force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, or abuse of power against them; or by giving or receiving a payment or a benefit to those who control them.⁵ Trafficking is the cross-border sale of a person, against his or her will, for the purpose of sexual or other exploitation; it leaves victims in a condition of slavery because they are forced into prostitution or other activities and deprived of the freedom to change. The profile of the victims shows that they are disadvantaged and vulnerable in terms of age groups and socio-economic status. For Example, the age groups of illegal sex-workers ranges from 13 to the mid-40s.

Human smuggling, trafficking and illegal migrant work force are inter-related because smuggled and trafficked people work illegally in the destination and sometimes in the transit country, depending on how much time they spent in the transit country. A more specific analysis of irregular migration requires an extensive study on human smuggling and various movements of illegal human mobility in the region. Recognising this, the paper aims to present a mix of descriptive empirical evidence from the field work in Istanbul and a conceptual analysis providing a perspective of human smuggling to and via Turkey. It covers irregular migration to Turkey from the Balkans, the Caucasus, Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia, Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, Black Africa and South Asia. It first attempts to understand this phenomenon in the larger context of the processes of globalisation. The globalisation of economic activities and technological advances have increased the mobility of people in various forms ranging from the migration of documented labour to the illegal flow of labour including illegal migrant smuggling and expanded transitional crime.

The excessive supply of labour in the economically disadvantaged countries, where the size of the unemployed young population has expanded, is an important factor in the increased number of illegal migrant workers attempting to enter Western European countries and the USA. In the 1960s and 1970s the surplus labour supply in the Middle Eastern, Asian and Mediterranean countries was largely absorbed by the Western Europe through documented migration of labour. There was a sizeable proportion of illegal entry in the 1980s and its volume expanded throughout the 1990s. It has not been decreasing in the early 21st century. Its geography has changed too, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of the capitalist economic systems throughout the so-called Second and Third Worlds. The need for employment and economic discomfort appear to be the main reasons of irregular migration movement. Migrants, however, are often driven to professional smugglers by blocked social mobility, pre-existing corruption, uneven development (not necessarily poverty), persecution, racism and sexism. Studies show that many illegal migrants who choose a clandestine route to work abroad feel compelled to leave their home communities because of unemployment, the risk of hunger (cited by more than 50 per cent of the African migrants in Turkey⁶), economic crisis, political conflict, ethnic persecution, and the "fear of rape at home in the case of many ethnic minority women".⁷

⁴ Article 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime).

⁵ Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*. Study Completed in December 1995. Migration Information Programme. P. 17.

⁷ See David Kyle and Rey Koslowski (eds). 2001. *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, "Introduction", pp. 1-25. P. 9.

Therefore, political, sociological, and psychological factors are likely to be as important as economic factors that affect the causes of irregular migration movements, human smuggling and trafficking. One of the factors is the perception of economic well being rather than real poverty. The liberalisation of international markets and investment in developing countries has not decreased migration, as predicted by neo-classical theory.⁸ Increased investment and increased trade in developing countries (e.g. large scale direct US investment in Mexico and China, see below) are associated with an expansion in the illegal migration of labour from these countries to the advanced countries in the form of human smuggling. Although increase in investment may increase the number of available jobs and decrease the wage differentials among the developed and the developing countries, surplus disposable income often becomes "migration capital" used to pay for international travel and to pay for smugglers.⁹ Economic development would raise the expectations of people who compare their income with the income of those in the same country or more advanced countries. A study on China¹⁰ shows that a large proportion of the Chinese who are smuggled to the United States are from Fujian Province, a coastal province with one of China's fastest-growing regional economies. Smuggled Chinese are often from the middle class families that can afford cash down payments (approximately US \$ 1500 required by smugglers before embarkation).¹¹ Likewise, the IOM's study¹² revealed that Kurds from Northern Iraq paid smugglers a generous amount of money, US \$ 2000 to US \$ 8000, for passage to Italy by boat between July 1997 and January 1998.

In the analysis of irregular migration, the conceptual framework needs to consider the impact of informal globalisation, and its resulting informal sectors. Informal capital and labour movements are parts of informal globalisation that creates global informal sectors including market for undocumented labour. There is a two-way connection between the informal sector and irregular migration. Economies with an already existing informal sector act as incentives for irregular migration, which, in turn, helps fuel the informal sector. The main economic causes for irregular migration are large differences of income between the developed and developing economies and the mismatch between demand and supply of labour markets, which is further accentuated by restrictions to the free movement of persons. This opens opportunities for illegal activities such as trafficking and smuggling of human beings as well as employing illegal and undocumented labour.

Informal sector is significant in attracting irregular migration through smuggling and trafficking in human beings. It is important to differentiate between three sub-sectors of the informal sector: the informal (but legal) economy, the grey (semi-legal) economy and the black (criminal) economy.

In the analysis of irregular migration, a number of socio-economic factors need to be taken into consideration too. Differences in socio-economic status, age and gender bring differences in the choice of a destination country for undocumented labour. The field work in Istanbul showed that Romanian illegal male workers were in construction sectors throughout the 1990s, but the women were in the prostitution. A Romanian musician, however, moved to a western European country to work.

⁸For the discussion on foreign investment in developing countries and migration see, Richard Layard, Oliver Blanchard, Rudiger Dornbusch and Paul Krugman. 1992. *East-West Migration: The Alternative*. Cambridge: MIT Press, chap. 1.

⁹See David Kyle. 1996. "The Transnational Peasant: The Social Construction of Transnational Migration from the Ecuadorian Andes." Ph.D. diss., John Hopkins University; and David Spener. 2001. "Smuggling Migrants through South Texas: Challenges Posed by Operation Rio Grande" in *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspective*, David Kyle and Rey Koslowski (eds). Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. pp. 129-165.

¹⁰Zai Liang and Wenzhen Ye. 2001. "From Fujian to New York: Understanding the New Chinese Immigration" in *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspective*, David Kyle and Rey Koslowski (eds). Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. pp. 187-215.

¹¹For the amount of money given to smugglers see, Peter Hessler. 2002. "It's the Rich Chinese Who Flee to US", *Seattle Post Intelligence*, February 10, 2000.

¹²The IOM. 1998. *Trafficking in Migrants, Quarterly Bulletin*, no. 17 (January).

Informal Globalisation and Irregular Migration to Istanbul

Istanbul was under global influences, even if it is not (yet) a global city, and that global flows distributed both opportunities and threats with huge inequalities. Its high concentration in terms of the service economy and the finance sector, the media, opportunities of speculative profit, incoming immigration (although internal), and the informal economy emerge as common points between Istanbul and other so-called global cities. Especially after the end of the cold war, the city has been configured as a gate to the Balkans, the Middle East, the Black Sea region and Caucasia. However, country's economic weaknesses and the lack of information and communication infrastructure hinder Istanbul's possibility of becoming a global city.¹³

In Istanbul, informal mobility of labour and capital has played an important role in the social, cultural and economic survival of the foreign labour force arriving in the city. Sub-contracting in the textile, manufacturing and construction sector, which grown in the late 1980s and early 1990s with economic boom¹⁵, paved the way for huge size of undocumented labour in the 1990s when there was a progressive increase in the number of the illegal foreign workers from the Balkans, Middle East and Asia (documented below).¹⁶

The Field Work

The field work in 1994 and in 2002-2003 provided data for the research. The field work was conducted in various sections of Istanbul (Tarlabaşı; Koca Mustafa Paşa, Vefa, Süleymaniye, Zeytinburnu, Aksaray and Laleli) where the smugglers used to lodge the irregular migrants and where illegal foreign workers live. Narlı interviewed illegal foreign workers who were smuggled or who entered with legal documents in 1994 and 2002-2003. In 1994, the field work took six months. In the years of 2002-2003, it took 12 months. Prof. Narlı and research assistants visited the places referred to above at different intervals to make observations and to interview illegal foreign workers as well as shop-keepers and some people living in the neighbourhood. They interviewed those who rent rooms for illegal migrant workers and smuggled migrants transiting Turkey, and people running shops, laundries in the region. Narlı also interviewed someone who was involved in smuggling and a lawyer who defended human smugglers at the court.

The data on women trafficking and migration of illegal sex workers was obtained from press reports, interviews with the Turkish male customers and from the observations done in various sections of Istanbul in 2002-2004.

In addition to field work data, research data was collected from various sources: security departments in Istanbul and Ankara; local and international daily and weekly publications and reports from major TV channels.

¹³ Global cities are internationalised cities are centres where money, commodity and symbolic flows are intensified; as such they facilitate the transfer of these flows to subordinate areas. Global cities, on the other hand, are centres, which control and command global flows. Global cities are spaces, which enable the development of different identities, and which can create wealth out of this variety. See Çağlar Keyder. .2000. "Arka Plan" in Çağlar Keyder (ed.) *Istanbul: Küresel ile Yerel Arasında*, İstanbul. Metis Yayınları.

¹⁴ Çağlar Keyder,. 2005. Globalisation and social exclusion in Istanbul. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29 (1), 124-134.

¹⁵ The economy's boom in the 1990s was the result of the changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Turkey. The change was from the centralized government-run economy to a market that emphasized privatized companies. Major strides were taken to revamp conditions for entry, operations and exit for national and international business by completely dismantling bureaucratic barriers and streamlining procedures during a deregulation effort. In 1995, in cooperation with European Union conditions, the legal reforms were completed with the passing of a Privatization Bill by the Turkish Parliament.

¹⁶ For the profile of the illegal foreign labour force and their profile, see Nilüfer Narlı, 2004. "Illegal Migrant Labour Force in Turkey", *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies*. 2003-4; Vol 14: 27-43.

2. Irregular Migration to Turkey in the Form of Transit Migration: Flows of Migrants Arriving in Turkey in the Years of 1980-2004

Until the 1980s, Turkey had been recognised as a "country of origin" in terms of international migratory flows. Turkey did not define itself as a country of migration until the late 1990s. The absence of effective immigration controls until the year of 2000, made the country vulnerable for various types of easy entries and stays. Until the end of 1980, it did not receive many foreigners for visit or for settling. The number of foreigners visited Turkey was around one million and until 1987 the number of foreigners entering each year was not more than three million. It went up to 4 million in 1988 and to 6 million in 1990.¹⁷ The number of settlers arriving in Turkey jumped from 390 in 1985 to 226, 434 in 1989.¹⁸ In the late 1980s, Turkey changed to become both a "country of origin" and a "transit" country, and a major country for asylum. More than two millions of people¹⁹ have sought refuge in Turkey in one form or another in the mid-1990s.

As irregular migration continued, Turkey became a major hub for various kind of irregular migratory movement and employment due to its geography and poorly enforced immigration laws that have been improved since the early 2000s. The improvement in the legislation and policy (elaborated in section 3.8) was a response to the problems caused by the growing irregular migration to Turkey and to the pressure from the European Union to take measures to prevent human smuggling illegal migratory movements (as explained below). Turkey not only shares borders with many of the countries in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, but also has cultural and ethnic ties with many of them. These ties generate human channels for illegal migrants who already have geographical access to Turkey. Second, Turkey's geographical location between the East and West, and the South and North has made the country a transit zone for many migrants intending to reach western and northern countries. Consequently, Turkey has become a destination and transit country for irregular migration from the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, and Africa.

There are two factors explaining the reasons why Turkey has increasingly become a transit zone for large numbers of people entering Turkey legally or illegally, from the South and East since the beginning of 1980s. First, political turmoil and the change of regimes (e.g., the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979), wars and civil wars, and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East (e.g., the Gulf War), the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts) and the Caucasus (e.g., armed conflict in Chechnya) have forced refugees²⁰, transients and all types of migrants into the country in the hope of security, protection from persecution, hope for employment and a better life. Thirdly, the collapse of Soviet Union, which resulted in a huge number of unemployment, pushed many people to travel to Turkey to work illegally.

Irregular migrants enter the country with or without legal documents seeking shelter on a temporary basis and then moving to another country. For example, in the mid-1990s, a survey by IMO showed that 40 percent of the irregular migrants entered Turkey without any legal document such as passport or refugee document, suggesting that they were smuggled.²¹ Among them almost half of the Iraqis but 70 percent of the Iranians entered Turkey with legal document. In addition to

¹⁷ For the information on the number of foreigners entering Turkey between 1972 and 1990s, see the Chart 1: Number of Foreigners Arriving in Turkey, p. 4. Available at http://www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/MIP_Turkey_transit_eng.pdf,

¹⁸ For the information on the number of foreigners entering Turkey between 1972 and 1990s, see the Chart 2: Number of Settlers Arriving in Turkey, p. 7. Available at http://www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/MIP_Turkey_transit_eng.pdf

¹⁹ The International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*. Study Completed in December 1995. Migration Information Programme.

²⁰ For detailed information on the refugee flows into Turkey since 1979, see Kemal Kirisci. 1994. *Refugees and Turkey Since 1945*. Bogazici Research Papers, 155/AOLS 94-3, Istanbul.

²¹ For the information on the number of foreigners entering Turkey between 1972 and 1990s, see the Chart13 How Did the Enter Turkey, p. 20. Available at http://www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/MIP_Turkey_transit_eng.pdf,

the refugees and asylum seekers, there was a huge number of irregular migrants who enter with or without legal document for earning living in Turkey throughout the 1990s.²²

Irregular migration and undocumented labour intersect in the case of migrants who choose Turkey as transit zone but have to work for survival. During the field work in 1994-1995, we met such irregular migrants. Among them, the Sudanese and Algerians fled the country because of the civil war; the Afghans abandoned the country which had been in turmoil since the beginning of 1980s; a large number of Iranians who had been in Turkey without any legal status for many years; and the Iraqis who left home at different intervals since the early 1990s. They were illegal transit migrants who had to work to earn living during their stay in Istanbul. Some of them applied to UNHCR for asylum but faced difficulties partly due to Turkey's asylum policy. For asylum seekers, Turkey applied the 1951 Geneva Convention with a geographical limitation. Accordingly, legal obligations applied only to persons who are seeking asylum as a result of the events in Europe, so there is no obligation regarding non-European refugees. Partly as a consequence of anti-Communist policy during the Cold War, Turkey could grant refugee status only to people coming from Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. Iranians were non-European asylum seekers. Therefore they were not recognised as asylum seekers under the terms of the Geneva Convention, but were allowed to remain as tourists for a certain period of time subject to regular extension. Many Iranians who entered Turkey without any legal documentation frequently transited Turkey, but some of them stayed and continued to live without any legal documents and status.

In response to becoming a *de facto* country of first asylum and to the mass influxes of people from the Middle East during and after the Gulf War, Turkey defined itself as a country migration. Accordingly, it implemented a new regulation on asylum seekers effective since 30 November 1994. It is entitled, "Regulations on the Procedures and the Principles Related to Mass Influx and the Foreigners Arriving in Turkey or Requesting Residence Permits with Intention of Seeking Asylum from A Third Country".²³

Several nationals have crossed Turkey with leaving a residual population. Turkey hosted around 3,000,000 Iranians who left Iran after the Revolution in 1979. Some of them entered Turkey illegally by the assistance of human smugglers. The majority of them left Turkey after obtaining a visa for the Western Europe, the USA, Australia, and Canada. However, there are still a large number of Iranians (the estimation ranges from 200.000 - 500.000) living in Turkey.²⁴ Legal and illegal entries from Iran have continued; with many Iranians who feel persecuted by the regime continue to leave their country. Among them we met Bahais in 2002, who were staying with their relatives in Istanbul. We learned that there were also many of them staying in the Anatolian town of Kayseri and waiting for a visa to leave for the US and Canada. A few of them were planning to go to France and Belgium. The field-work and interviews with 50 Bahais in Kayseri showed that the majority of them are in the age group of 26-40, the age of economically active population. Their level of education was higher, majority of them with a high school diploma, but a few reached the

²²My former research on the migration of illegal labour to Turkey in 1994-1995 revealed that there were around 3.5- 4 million people (including the Iranians with children who were waiting for valid document to transit Turkey) who lived and worked illegally in Turkey. See Nilufer Narli.1995. *Migration of Labour and Capital to Turkey*, a research report submitted to Centre for Turkish Studies at Essen University, Germany). According to the estimates by TURKIS in 2001, the number of illegal workers was around 4.5 million. However, the then Ministry of Work, Yasar Okuyan gave a different figure: 1 million. Speaking at a meeting in Konya, Okuyan underlined the treat posed by illegal foreign workers to Turkish labour force by saying: "Ivan is stealing the bread of a Turkish worker, Mehmet" (quoted in *Medyakronik* on July 25, 2001, at www.medyakronik.com).

²³ Refer to 1994 Asylum Regulation by Cabinet decree 6169 30 November 1994. Karar Sayisi: 94/6169: Ekli "Türkiye'ye İltica Eden veya Baska Bir Ülkeye İltica Etmek Üzere Türkiye'den İkamet İzni Talep Eden Münferit Yabancılar ile Topluca Sığınma Amacıyla Sinirlarimize Gelen Yabancılar ve Olabilecek Nüfus Hareketlerine Uygulanacak Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetim elik" in yürürlüğe konulması; İçişleri Bakanlığı'nin 1/7/1994 tarihli ve 173475 sayılı yazısı üzerine, Bakanlar Kurulu'nca 14/9/1994 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.

²⁴ See Nilufer Narli.1995. *Migration of Labour and Capital to Turkey*, a research report submitted to Centre for Turkish Studies at Essen University, Germany).

level of tertiary education. They mentioned blocked social mobility and limited freedom of religion for Bahais in Iran as pushing reasons.²⁵

Following the Iranians, in the years of 1988-1991, approximately 600,000 Iraqis, mostly the Kurds, poured into Turkey. Despite the fact that a large number of them returned home, as explained below, they left a residual population in Turkey. They also caused a chain reaction in which many more left Iraq for Turkey with the aim of settling there or transiting Turkey to reach the West. As the social and economic situation deteriorated in Iraq, numerous Iraqis have entered Turkey with valid documents and obtained residence permits. Many more were also brought by human smugglers who benefited from this illicit trade, which continued until 2000.

The first flow arrived in 1988 when the Iran-Iraq War ended. Due to the allegations of betraying the state, the Iraqi army pushed more than "50,000 Kurdish guerrillas and their families" who poured into Turkey during the last week of August 1988.²⁶ Like the situation of many Iranians fleeing from the country, due to Turkey's geographical reservation on the Geneva Convention, the arriving Iraqis were considered 'temporary guests' rather than asylum seekers.²⁷ Consequently, they were expected to leave. According to the IMO study completed in 1995, a large number of these people had returned to the zone of Northern Iraq outside Baghdad's control between 1991-1995; nearly 2,500 had left for Iran and Syria, and approximately 3,000 were accepted as refugees in the West.²⁸ The second flow of people who arrived between August 1990 and April 1991 were foreign workers who had been in Iraq or Kuwait and who had wanted to leave during the Gulf Crisis. Nearly 60,000 foreign workers from Iraq and Kuwait and their dependants were temporarily housed at a camp near the Iraqi-Turkish border. They left Turkey soon after their arrival once transport arrangements had been made by their governments or by international agencies (e.g., The IOM).²⁹

The third mass flow of people from Iraq to Turkey took place in early April 1991 when half a million Kurds, escaping the Iraqi military, poured into the mountainous region separating Turkey and Iraq. As a response, Turkey advocated the idea of creating a safe zone in Northern Iraq and initiated a voluntary and safe repatriation programme. The close co-operation of the Turkish authorities with the IOM and UN agencies, and Allied Forces present at the time generated a solution to the unprecedented influx of nearly half a million Kurdish men, women and children stranded on the mountainous sides at the Turkish/Iraqi border. They returned either to their home villages, to camp shelters in Zakho, or to a tent camp set up in the Turkish towns of Silopi located near the border with Iraq.³⁰ However, the illegal migration from Iraq did not end. It continued throughout 2002-2003 in response to the crisis situation created by pre-emptive strike against Iraq in 2003.

In addition to the flows of Iraqis, there were three waves of migration from the Balkans. Approximately 350,000 (or, according to Nurcan Özgür 250,000)³¹ ethnic Turks of Bulgarian citizenship entered Turkey as a result of deportation under President Todor Jivkov and Jivkov's policy of changing Turkish names to Bulgarian ones in 1989. In this group, 100,000 of them returned home, but the rest are still living and working in Turkey (mainly in Bursa and Istanbul). The majority of them have obtained residence permits and they have been neutralised. In addition to the 1989 migration flow, around 150,000 Bulgarians, the majority of whom were ethnic Turks, have

²⁵ Mr. Turan Avsar, a graduate student in the Institute of Middle East Studies, was writing his thesis on the Bahai Refugees in Kayseri in 2002, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Nilufer Narli.

²⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*. Study Completed in December 1995. Migration Information Programme. P.6.

²⁷ The International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*...p.6.

²⁸ The International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*...p.6.

²⁹ The International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*...p.6.

³⁰ The International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*...p.6.

³¹ Nurcan Özgür. 2002. "Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye Göçlerin Yarattıkları Mülkiyet, Vatandaşlık ve Sosyal Güvenlik Sorunları" paper presented at Panel *Bulgaristan Türklerinin Dünü ve Bugünü*, June 16, 2002. Also find Nurcan Özgür's paper published at www.deliormanturkleri.com on June 21, 2002.

entered Turkey to work in the early and mid-1990s.³² While some of them work here legally, others stay here as tourists³³ and work illegally. Among them, there are hundreds of non-Turkish Bulgarians who have found a job and a place to stay with the help of the ethnic Turkish Bulgarians living in Turkey. The field-work data shows that the illegal migrant Bulgarians in Istanbul work in Ataturk Sanayi Sitesi (Ataturk Industrial Site) and in other workshops. Some of them reside in Gaziosmanpasa.

Secondly, approximately 25,000 Bosnians sought refuge in Turkey from 1992 to 1994³⁴, while majority of them considered Turkey as a transit country, some of them stayed here and started business. During the field work in April and May 2002, we encountered Bosnians running shops in Laleli, where people from Russia and the Balkan countries visit and buy huge quantities of textile and leather products to sell them in their countries. Some of them arrived as tourists with a former Yugoslavian passport³⁵, but many of them entered without legal documents.

The other flow of migration from the Balkans was the migration of Albanians caused by the Kosovo Crisis in 1999. They entered Turkey with valid passports and visa. It was not hard for them to find lodging and jobs since they had many relatives and primordial networks in Istanbul and the Marmara regions.

There has been another flow of illegal migrants from the Black Africa, North Africa and Asia. They arrived from African and Asian countries such as Ghana, Gambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. In Istanbul, Tarlabasi, Kasimpasa, Taksim, Laleli, Aksaray, Suleymaniye, Vefa, Koca Mustafa Pasa, Kumkapi and the areas in the vicinity of the Manifaturacilar Bazaar and Eminonu are the places to encounter transit migrants coming from these countries. Some left home due to political problems; many were pushed by economic hardship; numerous of them believed in ease passage to Europe from Turkey. Since 2001, Black Africans and South Asians have been less visible due to the increased measures taken by the police to prevent irregular migration. A sizeable portion of the Black Africans from Senegal, Gambia, and Ghana left Turkey for Bosnia-Herzegovina from there they plan to reach a western European country.³⁶

3. Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking

3.1 Introduction

People smuggling has become the preferred trade of a growing number of criminal networks world-wide. Trans-national human smuggling, hardly a global issue in the 1980s, is a continuously growing phenomenon and is now a multibillion-dollar trade world-wide. Hard facts about human smuggling and trafficking are difficult to obtain because of the illicit nature of the trade. The International Organisation of Migration makes some estimates. The number of people trafficked or smuggled across borders on an annual basis is four million people. More than 50 percent of irregular immigrants are now being assisted globally by smugglers.³⁷ The IOM statistics indicate that an estimated 700,000 to 2 million women and children are trafficked globally each year. The IOM (2001) estimates that the world-wide proceeds of people trafficking to be US \$ 10 billion a year. The annual revenue generated by smuggling is US\$ 5-7 billion. The IOM estimated total global revenues in 1997 to be up to US \$ 7 billion.³⁸ According to the U.S. State Department

³² Nurcan Özgür. 2002. "Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye Göçlerin....."

³³ As seen in Table 2, every year there is a visible difference between the numbers of the foreigners entering Turkey and exiting Turkey.

³⁴ The International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*...p.7.

³⁵ As seen in Table 2, every year there is a visible difference between the numbers of the foreigners entering Turkey and exiting Turkey.

³⁶ This information was obtained from an African informant, who lives in Istanbul. He was interviewed in April 2003.

³⁷ See CNN "Human Smuggling Definition and Statistics. At

<http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/03/01/smuggling.stats/>

³⁸ The IOM. 1997. "Trafficking in Migrants: IOM Policy and Activities" At

http://www.iom.ch/IOM/Trafficking/IOM_Policy.html. Also see BBC News. 2001. *The Road to Refuge*. "The Journey: A

figures, the largest number of trafficked people is from Asia, with 225,000 victims each year from the Southeast Asia and over 150,000 from the South Asia.³⁹

Smuggling and trafficking are crimes that are organised⁴⁰ and linked to other criminal activities.⁴¹ It is an issue of global nature, not only as a "transnational crime,"⁴² but also as an enormous violation of human rights,⁴³ and a contemporary form of slavery. After their arrival in the country of destination, the illegal status of the smuggled and trafficked migrants puts them into the mercy of their smugglers, often forcing them for years to work in the illegal labour market to pay off the debts incurred as a result of their transportation.

This highly profitable trade poses a relatively low risk compared with trades in drugs or arms. Unlike drug trafficking, the principal investors do not have to accompany the commodity (the smuggled people) physically across the border. The low risk and high profit do not explain why the volume of human smuggling has increased since the early 1990s. The causes, social organisation, and proposed solutions are much more historically and politically complex than they may at first seem. As human smuggling has a global nature, it requires us to consider the wider social and economic context, in which it is flourishing, rather than to simply demonise the smugglers and to ask the transit countries to tighten border control.

Economic development, rapidly advancing information, communication and transportation technologies raise the expectations of new middle classes whose members have recently gained social mobility. This is more likely to motivate people to look for higher living standards and "better future" for their children in the advanced countries. The smuggled people from Iraq detained in Turkey on August 9, 2002 said: "We left our country because we desire a bright future for our children and it is important to guarantee it."⁴⁴ Political instability and a constant worry about one's own and family's future also drive people to migrate through legal or clandestine routes to search for security.

3.2 Turkey as a Transit and Destination Country in Human Smuggling

Turkey has become an international centre and a staging area for human smuggling because of its porous eastern borders and its geographical position on the edge of the Western Europe. It has not only become a transit country, but also a destination country for numbers of Iraqi, Iranian and Afghani migrants, who have entered with legal documents or smuggled. Secondly, Turkey is a destination country for trafficking in women and children. For many illegal sex workers from Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Bellarus, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Turkey is the destination country. Some of them are brought by the organised crime groups and forced to work in

Smuggler's Story" in *BBC News*, 2001 at http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/english/statistic/in-depth/world/2001/road_to_refuge/journey/default.stm.

³⁹ The IOM. 2001. *Trafficking in Migrants, Quarterly Bulletin*, no. 23 (April).

⁴⁰ See James Finckenauer and Elin Waring. 1996. "Russian Émigré Crime in the United States: Organised Crime or Crime That is Organised?" *Transnational Organised Crime* 2 (2/3):139-55.

⁴¹ The connection between human smuggling and other types of organised crime was mentioned in a draft statement issued by participants at an international conference on illegal immigration. It warned that people smuggling is increasingly linked to other criminal activities. "Many smuggling activities are being organized by criminal networks also involved in trafficking of narcotics, document fraud, money laundering, arms smuggling and other transnational crimes," a draft statement said. The statement was drawn up by Australia and Indonesia, who are co-hosting the conference being held in Bali, Indonesia. See "Ministers from Asian and Pacific Nations Confer on Ways to End People Smuggling" By Slobodan Lekic, *The Associated Press*, February 27, 2002.

⁴² Transnational Organized Crime is crime committed by an organized criminal group, which is planned or committed in more than one state, or has substantial effects on more than one state, or is committed by a group which commits crimes in more than one state. An organized criminal group is a structured group existing for a period of time and acting in concert, with the aim of committing one or more crimes for financial or other material benefit. (UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000)

⁴³ For the cases of human rights' violation of the illegal transit migrants and the smuggled migrants detained in Turkey, see Bülent Peker (ed). 2001. *Sığınma Hakki ve Mülteciler: İltica ve Mülteçilik Atelyesi. Ankara 24-26 March 2001*. Ankara: İnsan Hakları Derneği, Chapters 5, 6 and 8.

⁴⁴ It was reported by SKYTURK TV on August 9, 2002.

prostitution; but many of them had the knowledge of being illegal sex worker in Turkey. (This is discussed in details below in the section 3.7 titled, “Women Trafficking”).

A large number of illegal migrants have transited Turkey. The IOM report of 1995 showed that 40 percent of the transit migrants interviewed entered Turkey without valid document such as passport or a refugee document⁴⁵; and more than two-thirds of those, who entered Turkey without valid documents were, Iraqis.⁴⁶ Smugglers transited a large number of Iraqis with ethnic identities, e.g., Kurd, Chaldean/Assyrian and Turkomans, Iranians, Afghanis, Pakistanis and Bengalis to Europe via Turkey through 1990s. They did not often reach in the destination country but they were caught on the half way. Migrant smuggling from Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, and Pakistan has continued in the 2000s. The most recent incident, a lorry accident in Erzurum on 23 September 2005⁴⁷, showed that irregular migrants from south Asia are gathered in Iran from where they enter Turkey via Dogu Beyazit gate. The truck loaded the irregular migrants in Dogu Beyazit and it was travelling to Istanbul in order to take them to Europe through the most convenient route.

Despite its growing size, there was no huge effort to prevent irregular migration until 200. Turkey received a warning from the European Union leaders who placed illegal immigration a top on the agenda for the EU Council summit in Seville, Spain on June 24, 2002. One of the reasons for this was the recent upsurge in right-wing electoral support across Europe in the early 200s. The perceived inability of the EU leaders to manage the complex mix of migrants and asylum seekers converging on their borders was causing them major political headaches and making daily headlines across Europe. Voters were expressing the people's frustration over what they perceived to be weak and ineffective government policies. They wanted action and governments appear to be listening. The public anger was complicated by the anxiety that the population increase in the EU countries was mainly generated by two non-European population sources: the higher rate of birth among the Middle Eastern and Asian migrants who have either become citizens of the EU countries or who are staying in the country with a residence and work permit, and, secondly, the ever increasing number of illegal migrant workers.⁴⁸

Before the Seville Summit, Turkey (2002), a southeast European country connecting Europe to Asia, received warnings from the EU countries to tighten its border control and to prevent human trafficking and the flow of illegal migrant workers via Turkey to Europe. For example, in early 2002 Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi called upon Turkey to intensify its measures to prevent illegal human smuggling via Turkey to Europe. Meeting with the Turkish Ambassador to Italy, Necati Utkan (on February 1, 2002), Berlusconi conveyed Italy's "serious uneasiness" over the Turkish ship *Engin* that came to Italy's Gallipoli port three days earlier carrying illegal immigrants.⁴⁹ This was not the first time that Ankara received a warning from Italy. In the year 2000, the Italian authorities accused Turkey of doing too little to prevent illegal migrants reaching Europe.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*. Study Completed in December 1995. Migration Information Programme. P.20.

⁴⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. p.20.

⁴⁷ For the information, see *Milliyet*, September 24, 2005. The article titled “**Yabancı kaçak tasiyan kamyon, uçuruma yuvarlandi: 7 ölü 56 yaralı**”.

⁴⁸ According to EUROSTATD data, the EU population is 379,4 million. In 2000, the number of people increased had been 1,070,000 and, in 2001, the same figure was 1.050,00. In 2002, it was 1,460,000, which meant 3.9 percent increase. According to the same source, 70 percent of the population increase was generated by the migration, both legal and illegal and the relatively higher birth rate of the "foreigners" residing in the EU countries.

⁴⁹ "Italian Premier Tells Turkish Envoy of Concern Over Immigrant Ship", *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, February 2, 2002, from text of report in English by Turkish news agency Anatolia.

⁵⁰ See Christ Morris. 2000. "Turkey Detains illegal Migrants", *BBC News*, August 6, 2000; at <http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/world/from/europe/868687.stm>. Morris also reporting of the police operations to detain smugglers following the week that the Italian authorities accused Turkey of failing to take measures to prevent illegal migration via Turkey to Europe. Morris wrote: "A ship carrying more than 4000 Kurds arrived in southern Italy just over a week ago (July 30, 2000), prompting the Italian Government protest to Ankara." (parenthesis is added). As a response, the police tightened the border control. In early August, the Turkish police in the city of Erzurum detained 109 Afghans and Iraqis who were hoping to be smuggled into Europe. They were discovered on August 5 in the back of a lorry, and the driver was also taken into custody. The-would-be migrants had paid him US\$ 2,000 each to deliver them to Istanbul. For the

What are the routes and networks of human smuggling? What are the causes of human smuggling? Is there anti human smuggling legislation? How is the situation and daily life of smuggled migrants in Turkey? How do Turkish people react to "shadow" society of smuggled migrants? Does ethnicity and religion make a difference in responding to them? The sections below will answer these question and identify the types of human smuggling ranging from profit-oriented operations to politically-humanistic ally motivated smuggling.

3.3 Routes, Destination, Networks and Methods of Human Smuggling

A large number of migrants from the Middle East, Asia and Africa use the route via Turkey and from there via the Balkans to Western Europe. Human smuggling is executed via a number of land, water and air routes described below. Destination countries of the human smugglers who use the route via Turkey are Germany, England and other European Union countries. The following origin countries supply the human stock for the smugglers: from the Middle East, Iraq, Iran and Palestine; from Black African, Ethiopia, Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria and Senegal; and from Asia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. They first transit Turkey from where they move to transit Southeast European and Eastern European countries to reach the final destination in Western Europe.

The major land routes of human smuggling via Turkey are as follows:

1. Iran, Iraq or Syria-Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria-Check Republic or Slovakia-Germany;
2. Iran, Iraq or Syria-Turkey-Bulgaria or Greece-Macedonia-Albania-Italy-Western European countries; and
3. Iran, Iraq or Syria-Turkey-Southeast Europe countries-Western Europe countries.⁵¹

According to the report (titled "human smuggling") released by the Security Department Directorate's Smuggling and Organised Crime Unit in 2000, there are 13 points of entry or official and illegal crossings along the country's border with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Georgia and Armenia. And there are 10 points of exit on the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea coasts.

❖ Points of unauthorised entry to Turkey:

Armenia-Georgia Border

Igdir/Diluca, Kars/Digor-Tuzluca, Ardahan/Posof, Artvin/Sarp

Iran Border

Küçük Agri Dagi/Dogubeyazit, Van⁵²/Özalp-Baskale⁵³, Hakkari/Yüksekova

Iraq Border

Hakkari/Semdilli-Cukurca, Sirnak/Uludere

Syria Border

Sanliurfa/Suruç-Mert Village-Akçakale Village Hatay/Yayladagi-Güveççi Köyü, Altunözü-Turfanda-Avuttepe villages, Hatay/Karbeyaz Village, Hatay/Reyhanli, Hatay/Samandagi, Hatay/Iskenderun-Arsus section, Adana/Karatas section-the zone where Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers merge with the Mediterranean Sea, Gaziantep/Islahiye-Karababa area.

❖ Zones from which to exit Turkey, located in the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea regions:

information on the migrant detained on July 30, 2000 in Italy, also see the BBC story: "Italians Halt Migrant Boat" in *BBC News*, July 31, 2000; at <http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/world/europe/858946.stm>. This story reports: Italian coastguards detained 418 people on July 30 for illegally entering the country on a ship. The ship, named Kalsit, carrying mostly men from Northern Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, "was believed to have begun its journey at a Turkish port four days ago, stopping at a Greek port to pick up food, officials said".

⁵¹ See Tolga Sardan, "Satilik Hayat Var" ("Life for Sale"), *Milliyet*, July 17, 2000.

⁵² In Van, there were around 40,000 transit migrants, 16,000 were identified asylum seekers and the rest were not considered in this category. This was observed by Umit Bayazoglu in 2000. Asylum seekers had to line up everyday and sign in the police station. Sometimes they have to arrive at six AM in the morning and wait to sign until 12 PM.

⁵³ Baskale is district on the Iran-Turkey border. Many refugees from Iran, Iraq and Pakistan arrive in Baskale. They are transferred to Van by cars and horses alternatively in through a circuitous route to avoid the check points. From Baskale to Van each person pays 500 \$US.

Antalya/Kas-Meis Island; Mugla/Datça-Simi Island; Bodrum-Kos Island; Aydın/Didim-Kusadasi coast, Sisam Island; Edirne/Pazarkule-Karaagaç; Trakya/Meriç-Sufli; Trakya/Kumdere-Pasaköy-Karpuzlu-Ipsala Enez sector; Istanbul Airport.⁵⁴

The Balkan routes, which are connected to Turkey, are well utilized in reaching Western Europe. Along with the land routes, air route is also utilized in the Balkans. The most commonly used air route from Black Africa and North Africa to Southeast Europe via Turkey is: Dakar -Tunis-Istanbul- Sarajevo. An interview with an African informant living in Istanbul revealed that young men from Ghana, Gambia, Senegal and Nigeria travel to Dakar from where they reach Tunis and then to Istanbul. They stay in Istanbul a few days and proceed to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo airport is a key point in transiting to Western Europe, as Amra Kebo reports: "Minutes after a flight from Tehran or Istanbul touches down, an exotic mix of Turkish, Arabic and Farsi reverberates around Sarajevo airport's arrival terminal. Once some of these arrivals pass customs control, they will simply disappear, hooking up with criminals who will attempt to smuggle them into Western Europe."⁵⁵ The force is pitifully inadequate given that there are 426 different official and illegal crossings along the country's 1616 km border.

There are four basic Balkan routes according to the UN and the IOM. Three involve smuggling the immigrants across the Croatian border - at Bihac, Srebrenik and Brcko. The fourth ferries them from the Adriatic coast to Italy. The head of the UN mission in Bosnia, Jacques Klein said that immigrants paid smugglers between 2,000 and 10,000 German marks in 200-2001, depending on their country of origin.⁵⁶ In Klein's opinion, as a part of the deal, there's an unwritten rule that, if captured, the smugglers will help immigrants twice more. Those who fail on the third attempt are left to try and make it across the frontier by themselves. The smuggling operation is fraught with danger. The immigrants are often duped by the smugglers and many are supposed to drown while they are trying to cross the Sava River into Croatia. The UN figures show that over the last year (2000-2001), 35,793 Iranians, Tunisians, Iraqis, Turks and Chinese entered Bosnia through Sarajevo airport alone - well over half of that are thought to have subsequently tried to sneak across the Croatian border. The lack of visa requirements means that most immigrants in possession of a valid passport can enter the country without having any problem. In an attempt to address the irregular migration problem, the authorities introduced visa restrictions for Iranians, the largest number of immigrants entering the country. As a result, their number dropped dramatically. But just as this hole was plugged, another has opened up. The UN says there has been a growth of migrants from China and Tunisia.⁵⁷

Smugglers change their routes and methods in response to the changing security measures. The increased security measures, taken by the police and gendarmaria in Turkey in the years of 2000-2002, have affected the smugglers' choice of routes. According to Ankara Security Chief Feyzullah Arslan (speaking in June 2002), there has been decrease in the usage of Turkish routes in the four regions identified above. Now the most frequently used routes by the human smugglers are the South Route-- Iraq-Syria-Lebanon, and the North Route --Iran-Caucasus-Ukraine.⁵⁸

The changing of routes and of the methods of the people smuggling networks as a response to legislative and law enforcement activities is necessary for the survival of this network. Flexibility is one of main characteristics of transportation and choice of routes. While, the routes used by people may sometimes be simple and direct, at other times it may be circuitous. The times between departure and arrival may vary from a few days to several months or even years. For example, the smuggled Iraqis were observed (by the people interviewed in Istanbul) spending several weeks in

⁵⁴ For the data on unauthorized entry to Turkey, See Tolga Sardan, "Satilik Hayat Var" (Life for Sale), *Milliyet*, July 17, 2000. Some illegal migrants depart Turkey from Istanbul airport by fraud documents.

⁵⁵ See article "Illegal immigrants flock to Bosnia in the hope of being smuggled into Western Europe". By Amra Kebo in Sarajevo (BCR No. 213, 29-Jan-2001).

⁵⁶ See article "Illegal immigrants flock to Bosnia in the hope of being smuggled into Western Europe". By Amra Kebo in Sarajevo (BCR No. 213, 29-Jan-2001).

⁵⁷ See article "Illegal immigrants flock to Bosnia in the hope of being smuggled into Western Europe". By Amra Kebo in Sarajevo (BCR No. 213, 29-Jan-2001).

⁵⁸ *Hurriyet* 28 June, 2002

the Vefa area (of Istanbul) where they stayed in "rooms rent to singles" (*bekar odasi*) before they left for Greece by ship. These rooms are utilized as transitional shelters for the smuggled people and the smugglers wait to form a complete crossing group. One of the informants told us (in July 2002): "several groups of Iraqis used to arrive at different time intervals and to stay in the rooms for a short period of time. Then, they disappeared overnight. I observed many of them having been loaded into minibuses before they disappeared. Since the last six months, I have not been seeing illegal Iraqis and Iranians. As far as I have heard, the Police collected and expelled them."

How do they arrive in Turkey and depart from the country? Various methods are utilized by the smuggling networks. The Turkish authorities identified five methods:⁵⁹

- Land-to harbor crossing:

Illegal migrants are first loaded into buses or minibuses and driven to cities or districts with harbors where they are put on small boats carrying them to ships to Greece or Italy. The next stage is their transfer to small boats again and their transportation to the coast in the destination country.

- River crossing. Crossing Meriç by small boats⁶⁰;
- Crossing the borders in hiding in lorries and trucks as well as in cars⁶¹;
- Crossing the borders with freight documents⁶²;
- Crossing the borders on foot or riding donkey and horse.

Human smuggling in the region is executed by the organized crime networks operating in Turkey and in the Balkan countries, and secondly by the terrorist groups who need money to finance their activities. The human smuggling networks are not hierarchy organised and centralized. They are loose and flexible networks in the form of spider-web. They can accommodate individuals and groups who would get involve in human smuggling only once in their life time or those who are planning to stay in the "business" for a long period of time. Family and kinship networks are instrumental in organizing the business. In the recruitment strategy, sometimes they prefer to recruit individuals without any criminal record as well as those linked to terrorist organizations

In analyzing the methods and strategies it is important to understand that organized crime and drug trafficking co-exist and exert a crime multiplier for militias, guerrillas and terrorists. There is a relationship between the organized crime and the illegal migration of labor since the organized crime organizes human trafficking and illegal employment in Turkey and the Balkans.

3.4 Causes of Human Smuggling

Causes of human smuggling from the angle of those, who are smuggled, vary from one to another. Economic discomfort and political persecution are the most important reasons. Holding higher aspirations for social mobility and a perception of blocked social mobility in the home communities are important push factors driving people to move to developed countries through the use of clandestine routes and illegal methods when legal means and entries are unavailable. Political persecution and escape from real or potential disaster are also significant factors that compel people to flee their home country.

⁵⁹ For the information on the methods, see *Cumhuriyet*, July 1, 2002 article titled "Goc, Umut Yolu" ("Immigration, Way of Hope").

⁶⁰ Smuggled people often cross Meric with the assistance of the villagers in Western Thrace. Then they are transferred to a spot where they meet someone who takes them to Athens in car or in minibus. This information was obtained from an interview with Nihat, who was engaged in human smuggling and imprisoned in Greece in 2002. He was interviewed in September 2003 to collect information on networks, actors and routes of human smuggling.

⁶¹ The information on smuggling people in private car was provided by Nihat. The interviewed data shows that crossing borders in private cars is well utilised by Turkish people who live in Germany, France and Belgium. It is well-known fact that a Turkish worker smuggle one of his relatives from Turkey to Europe in his car when he returns from Turkey to their home country in Europe. Nihat told the stories the Turkish prisoners in Greece who were charged smuggling people. Nihat was interviewed in September 2003 three times.

⁶² Fraud documents are obtained from various sources. One of them is Turkish people living abroad who might sell their passports containing residence permit in a European Union Country to human smugglers. They changed photos in the passports and give to Iraqis, Iranians and Turkish people who plan to enter the European Union countries. It is also observed preparation of such documents at central bus stations in Turkey.

The IOM study showed that more than half (56 percent) of the migrants referred to political or politically motivated push factors as being their motive for departure. The most often stated push factors were armed conflicts, ethnic intolerance, religious fundamentalism, and political tension. The proportion of the migrants who cited political push factors was the highest for the Iraqis: 75 percent of the Iraqi transit migrants interviewed in 1995 mentioned political problems as the major motive for migration.⁶³ In addition to political motives, as the IOM survey on transit migrants in Turkey showed,⁶⁴ the transients from Iran and Iraq gave a number of the reasons for their migration: education, family, social/cultural/religious considerations, war and military service. Transients from Bosnia also mentioned political problems as push factors, but Africans and other Asians gave mainly economically-oriented reasons.

A large number of Iranians left home through clandestine routes to avoid persecution under the new regime established after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Similarly, numerous Iraqis left home because of political persecution and problems generated by the political turmoil in Iraq. The Chaldean/Assyrian Iraqis, who were smuggled to Turkey with the help of *kacakci* (smugglers), mentioned political persecution and military service as the most important reasons for leaving Iraq in the interview in 1994. I met one of them through a friend⁶⁵ after gaining his confidence. We met at night, as he was afraid of going out during the day time. For him, the constant fear of getting arrested and killed in Iraq made life unbearable and he left the country. He was not free of dread in Turkey, as he was afraid of being detained by the Turkish police and getting deported.

From the smugglers perspective, despite being a highly profitable trade, there are humanistically-motivated reasons for organising human smuggling. For example a former-Iranian people-smuggler, who called himself Hamid, explained his reason: "I was very young and believed that people should have the right to leave their country if they wanted to".⁶⁶ Then he told his story: "It was three years after the 1979 Iranian revolution, the country was at war with Iraq, and the borders were closed." Hamid said "I began smuggling people over the border to fund his own passage to the West". Despite having started this business for money, Hamid "saw himself as a Robin Hood character who, far from harming anyone, allowed peoples a safe passage to opportunities they would never otherwise have been able to enjoy". He launched this business with the aim of helping friends who could not afford what he described as an "expensive deal" through existing smugglers. Then using some of the connections he had made in his own journey, Hamid developed a system for smuggling people to Pakistan, and from there to Europe. He provided his clients with "European Passports stolen from tourists, and would bribe the passport control officials not to raise any objection."⁶⁷

3.5 Human Smuggling Statistics in Turkish Sources

Who are the smuggled people and smugglers? What is the number of the smuggled people and smugglers? The Ankara Chief of Security provides hard data on human smuggling at press conferences on regular intervals. The Human Rights Association and Foundation, which obtains information from the police and gendarmery, also publishes reports offering hard data on the number of illegal migrants and those charged with human smuggling and their nationalities. According to the Ankara Security Chief Feyzullah Arslan, in the years of 1995-2002, 346,940

⁶³ International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*. Study Completed in December 1995. Migration Information Programme.

⁶⁴ International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*. Study Completed in December 1995. Migration Information Programme. pp. 17-19.

⁶⁵ When I was doing field work to collect data on illegal migrant workforce, I learned about the presence of Iraqis who were smuggled to Turkey. A friend whose neighbour was hosting such persons helped me to meet one of them at a café in Taksim and we talked about their journey and their life in Turkey.

⁶⁶ This was reported by John Tincey, the spokesman for British immigration officers, talking about the smuggling scheme. BBC News. 2001. *The Road to Refuge*. "The Journey: A Smuggler's Story" in *BBC News*, 2001 at http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/english/statistic/in-depth/world/2001/road_to_refuge/journey/default.stm

⁶⁷ BBC News. 2001. *The Road to Refuge*. "The Journey: A Smuggler's"

illegal migrants were detained. The figure reached 418, 977 in May 2003.⁶⁸ In addition to this, in May 2003, 2,663 people who were suspected of entering Turkey with false documents were identified and expelled. The same figure was 11,044 in 2002; 15,208 in 2001; 24,504 in 2000; 6,069 in 1999.⁶⁹ In the years of 1999 and 2002, 45,779 illegal migrants' transits were precluded and 2,520 smugglers were arrested.⁷⁰

Table 1 (below) shows the figures on the number of illegal migrants captured each year. The origin countries are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Bangladesh.

Table 1: Number of illegal migrants captured by years

1995	11,362,
1996	18,804,
1997	28,439,
1998	29,426,
1999	47,529
2000	94,514.
2001	92,362
2002	82, 825 ⁷¹
2003	56,219 ⁷²
2004	61,228 ⁷³
Total:	522, 708

Source: Report 2002 by the General Directorate on Security, Unit of Foreigners, Refugees Department (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Yabancılar Subesi İltica Dairesi Başkanlığı).

⁶⁸ *Milli Gazete*, June 14, 2003). "İnsan Kaçakçılığına Geçit Yok).

⁶⁹ *Milli Gazete*, June 14, 2003 "İnsan Kaçakçılığına Geçit Yok.


⁷⁰ *Hurriyet* 28 June, 2002.

⁷¹ For example, security forces in south-western Turkey detained about 400 would-be illegal immigrants based on a word to the paramilitary police in the province of Mugla. Asian and African illegal migrants hoping to reach Europe are apprehended daily in Turkey. "Turkey Stops Some 400 Would-Be Immigrants", *Agence France Presse*, quoting the *Anatolia News Agency*, February 3, 2002. In August (2002) the Coast Guards in the province of Izmir's Cesme district detained 1300 would-be illegal immigrants and nine human smugglers (two of whom are Turkish citizens) in the ship carrying Moroccan flag. The captain was Ukrainian, who indicated taking the illegal immigrants to Italy. See "1300 Kisiyi Kaciracaklardi" (They were near to Smuggle 1,300 persons"), in *Milliyet*, August 15, 2002, p.13.

⁷² The figure for the year of 2003 was obtained from Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu Report 2005. *The Ministry of Interior Report (2005)*, See *Grafik 1: 1995-2003 Number of illegal migrants captured by years* at www.icisleri.gov.tr/strateji/arastirma/gocmen.htm - 13k.

⁷³ This figure was obtained from a representative of Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu in 2005 in Istanbul.

**Table-2: Foreigners entering and leaving Turkey
(1990-2004)**



Source: Compiled from State Institute of Statistics (DIE) figures (for the data of 1990-2002) and from *Turkey's Statistical Book 2004* (for the data of 2000-2004).

The irregular migrants detained came from the following countries: in 2000, out of a total number of 94,514 "illegal migrants" who entered Turkey without valid documents through "illegal means and ways", 17,280 were from Iraq; 8,746 from Afghanistan; 8,290 from Moldavia; 6,825 from Iran; 5,027 from Pakistan; 4,554 Russia; 4,527 from Ukraine; 4,500 from Romania; and 3,300 from Georgia. There was not any information on the number of those who were permitted to make legitimate claims to apply for political asylum, but it was certain that all of them were expelled.⁷⁴

The number of human smugglers arrested through the operations of the police and the gendarmaria has systematically increased since 1998 as a result of measures taken by the Ministry of Interior in response to the warnings received from the EU countries to prevent illegal migration to Europe via Turkey. In 1998, only 98 organizers of trafficking in migrants were detained; in 2000 the number of detained human smugglers was 850; and in 2001, it was 1,115.⁷⁵ In 2002, 1,157 and in the year of 2003, 937 human smugglers were detained.⁷⁶ Similarly, the number of the ship passages, allegedly by the European Union countries, carrying smuggled migrants has decreased. Accordingly, in 2000 a total number of 19 ships were reported to be going to Italy and Greece by

⁷⁴ TÜRKİYE İNSAN HAKLARI VAKFI. Report Published in 2001.

⁷⁵ The Ministry of Interior Report (2002) shows that Turkey is a transit and destination country, and an origin country supplying migrants. It provides information on both the number of illegal migrants and smugglers detained. See Adnan Gerger NTV/Ankara. At <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/161081.asp#BODY>. Also see Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Yabancılar Subesi İltica Dairesi Başkanlığı Report 2002, p.6.

⁷⁶ The figures for the year of 2002 and 2003 were obtained from Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Report 2005. The Ministry of Interior Report (2005) See *Grafik 5: 1998-2003 Number of the Human Trafficking organizers captured by years* at www.icisleri.gov.tr/strateji/arastirma/gocmen.htm - 13k.

passing Turkish water territories; the same figure was nine in 2001, and it was only two in 2002.⁷⁷ Moreover, the number of ships carrying smuggled migrants stopped by the Turkish authorities since 2000 has increased: while 17 ships were halted in 2000, in 2001 that number was nineteen; in the year 2002 by April merely 9 ships were prevented to transit Turkish waters.⁷⁸

The field work data also showed that the number of smuggled migrants has decreased and dropped dramatically since the beginning of 2002. All the interviewed people renting rooms to the smuggled Iraqis and Iranians in 2002 and those running laundry shops in the Vefa area mentioned a decrease in the number of smuggled Iranians and Iraqis residing in the area during different time arrival intervals. They underlined the increased police control and operations in the area. They observed the police collecting the illegal Iranian and Iraqi migrants, and believed that these illegal migrants were deported. One of the room-renters (interviewed in July, 2002) said: "the illegal migrants who were smuggled and loaded in the area diminished six months ago" (referring to January 2002).

The nationalities of the smuggled people are diverse. According to the information of the police, out of the total number of 850 smugglers arrested in 2000, the nationalities were as follows: 701 Turks, 48 Iraqis, 19 Iranians, 14 Afghanis, 11 Bengalis, 10 Greeks, 9 Moroccans, and 8 Pakistanis; and 30 of them were classified as from "other nationalities".⁷⁹

According to the Ministry of Interior, irregular migrants create huge burden on the state. In the years of 1999-2002, the total cost for their lodging and deportation was 1,014 Trillion TL. A significant proportion of this money, 600 billion TL was spent for deporting the irregular sex workers.⁸⁰

3.6 The Shadow Society of Transit Migrants and Smuggled People in Turkey

Transit migrants, who use Turkey as a transit zone to enter the West, constitute a dynamic but also an isolated group of people living in metropolitan areas such as Istanbul and Ankara. There were also many irregular migrants in other cities located near borders such as Van.⁸¹ They struggle for the dynamics of a migratory process by getting involved in a very costly, long and uncertain mobility process. Several Iranians, interviewed in 1994, emphasized their feeling of isolation. The major problems they mentioned were the lack of communication means (e.g. a newsletter), network and solidarity. Like Iranians, many other irregular immigrants mentioned poor network among them and the problem of relying on informal, and often illegal, networks for support, money transactions and information. They had difficulties with living at income levels much below those which they used to have in their homeland. Some of them, who entered Turkey with false papers with the help of the smugglers got stuck, were forced to eke out a life outside the system in grinding poverty.

Nashmi Rashidi (interviewed by Christ Morris)⁸² entered Turkey with her husband and two children. They paid thousands of pounds to buy false Iranian passports and to bribe their way across international borders via Iraq and Syria.⁸³ When interviewed in 2001, they were living in a rented room with no source of income and no means of escape. They were afraid to go back Iran. Nashmi Rashidi explained the reason for their fear: "My husband could face the death penalty." There are many other Iranians who have also gone through the same experience since the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Some of them have managed to leave with refugee documents, some have succeeded with the assistance of smugglers, and numerous have stayed in Turkey and become immobilized.

Ethnic and religious identities are factors that affect the response of the Turkish society to the irregular migrants. Being ethnically a Turk, referring to those from Northern Iraq (Turkomans)

⁷⁷ Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Yabancılar Subesi İltica Dairesi Başkanlığı Report 2002. P.6

⁷⁸ Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Yabancılar Subesi İltica Dairesi Başkanlığı Report 2002. P.6.

⁷⁹ TÜRKİYE İNSAN HAKLARI VAKFI. Report Published in 2001.

⁸⁰ See Adnan Gerger NTV/ Ankara. At <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/161081.asp#BODY>.

⁸¹ This was observed by Umit Bayazoglu who visited Van province in 2000.

⁸² See Christ Morris. 2001. "Turkey's Human Traffic" *BBC News*, January 6, 2001; at http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/world/from_our_correspondent/1100986.stm.

⁸³ Quoted in Christ Morris. 2001. "Turkey's Human Traffic".....

and Afghanistan (Uzbeks), is important in being well received by the society and it provides an easy access to "Turkish networks" including associations. It seems to be much easier for them to obtain residence permits and jobs if they need to work. Likewise, a Muslim identity brings many advantages in receiving a warm welcome by the society and in having access to solidarity networks. In general the Turkish society tends to be tolerant and helpful to the Turkic and Muslim irregular migrants and transit migrants who have entered with valid documents.⁸⁴ The IOM survey on transients in Turkey shows that Arabs and Turkomans received help from their Turkish homeland friends.⁸⁵ A Muslim identity is also important in finding a spouse and making family in Turkey, that in turn, function as a catalysts for integration into Turkish society. Observations in Van⁸⁶ showed that some Iranian and Iraqi transit migrants, who live and work in Turkey illegally, were married to Turkish women, via religious marriage that is not legally valid but religiously legitimate. They form families and have children, no matter some children have no identity card.

Balkan Muslims including Bulgarians, Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians, who have religious and ethnic ties with many people in Turkey, received much attention and support from the Turkish society. The Muslims from the Middle East, Asia and Africa easily contact "pious" Turkish Muslims in the mosques, who do not hesitate to host them on a temporary basis and to find jobs. An Algerian interviewed explained how he broke into the culture by using his Islamic identity. "The day after my arrival in Turkey, I went to a mosque in a non-tourist area. There, I met Muslim brothers who made inquires about my situation and well-being. When they learned that I had just arrived and needed a work and lodging, they invited me to their house. They hosted me and my family for a few weeks until I began to work as a translator in a company whose owner was contacted with my host. Later, I found a place to stay, and still we live in Istanbul." There are many foreign men from Muslim countries who benefit from Muslim solidarity and hospitality in Turkey.

Likewise, many Christians irregular migrant who work illegally are reached by Church organizations when they need humanitarian and legal assistance in Istanbul. This is not a formally organized assistance, but it is informal and spontaneous.

3.7 Women Trafficking

Migration linked to trafficking in women and prostitution is one of the darkest features of the lack of equality between women and men. This form of migration has developed into a gigantic, highly organized criminal trade linked to the exploitation of women. The main reasons for female emigration are poverty, discrimination against women, unemployment, under-education, lack of resources, and political and economic instability. Some women are also motivated to leave their country in order to have the opportunity to work abroad and see something of the world. Another reason is that the situation of prostitutes in other countries is sometimes even worse in the countries of origin than in the destination countries due to their illegal status.⁸⁷

In numerous OSCE States, prices paid for women in this state of bondage range from hundreds to thousands of dollars. In many cases, legal systems and local authorities offer no protection or redress to these victims. Although no statistics are available, research by the International Humanitarian Fund (IHF) shows that many thousands of women live under such circumstances.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Similar observation was done by Sema Erder. See Sema Erder. 2000. "Uluslararası Göçte Yeni Eğilimler: Türkiye "Göç Alan" Ülke mi? in *Mübeccel Kiray için Yazılar*. Fulya Atacan, et al. Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari. pp. 235-359.

⁸⁵ International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. *Transit Migration in Turkey*. Study Completed in December 1995. Migration Information Programme.

⁸⁶ These observations were made by Umit Bayazoglu in 2000.

⁸⁷ D.M. Hughes, *The "Natasha" Trade: Transnational Sex Trafficking*, 246 National Institute of Justice Journal 9-15, (January 2001), at http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/natasha_nij.pdf.

⁸⁸ See The IHF Report of 2000, titled "A Form of Slavery: Trafficking in Women in OSCE Member States," prepared for the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Trafficking in Human Beings. On 19 June 2000, the HF published this 84-page report that deals, among other things, with national legislation and government policies – or, as is often the case, the lack of them – against trafficking in women; factors that contribute to and determine the reality of trafficking; and available support services. It covers 29 post-communist countries and is based on a survey carried out

"Trafficking in women is a new terminology for an old practice that most often represents a form of slavery," said Renate Weber, head of the IHF women's rights project. "Intergovernmental institutions, and most of their member states, are embarrassed and concerned that it is one of the world's most profitable businesses decades after respect for human dignity was declared one of the main objectives of the United Nations."⁸⁹

The main factors that lead women to fall victim to trafficking include: poverty, unemployment, weakening social security networks following the fall of communism, the decline of traditional family life and networks, and hopes for better work and a better life abroad.

The principal recruiting methods include promises of marriage, well-paid jobs and better living conditions. Many women, however, become victims through physical and psychological violence or pressure by criminal groups that keep the victims in bondage abroad, removing their passports and other documents. In some cases, corrupt policemen and other authorities facilitate this process.

In Turkey, there are numerous illegal female sex workers from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Bulgaria and Romania and Central Asian republics.⁹⁰ Frequently, they come and work here out of their own choice. However, there are many trafficked women, some of whom are below 18 years old (See Tables 4a-4d).

Turkey is a destination country for many women trafficking groups. According to the UN reports, 48 percent of the trafficked women work in Istanbul, 33 percent in Antalya and 16 percent in Ankara (see Table 4d).⁹¹ As mentioned above many of the trafficked women from Russia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Romania, Belarus, and Ukraine and Georgia work in prostitution out of their will to earn money. However, there are cases showing them they are given false promise of employment as a nanny or domestic helper, and then they are forced into prostitution. The Ministry of Interior Report on human trafficking shows that out of a total number of 4,495 deported persons from Russia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Romania and Ukraine and Georgia 1,066 were in prostitution in the years of 2001-2003.⁹² None of them was forced to do this. In the year of 2002, 22 cases of women trafficking from the countries referred to above were reported through IOM. The investigation by the Ministry showed that only seven of them were trafficked and forced to work in prostitution.⁹³

In order to prevent women trafficking, Turkey has taken strong measures and provides direct assistance, including establishing SOS telephone line (ALO 157) and shelters to help the trafficked women. ALO 157 has started in May 2005 and it has saved more than hundred women from Russia, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan by July 2005 (See below Tables 3a-3c).

within the framework of the IHF "Project to Investigate the Status of Women's Human Rights" carried out in cooperation with Helsinki Committees and other local non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

⁸⁹The IHF Report of 2000, titled "A Form of Slavery: Trafficking in Women in OSCE Member States," prepared for the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Trafficking in Human Beings



⁹⁰ See APPENDIX 1 for the cases of women trafficking victims from Uzbekistan. There are victims from other countries like Kyrgyzstan. In the year of 2005, the Turkish police arrested women traffickers in Faith of Istanbul, who were accused of forcing four Kyrgyz women to work in prostitution. See *Sabah* daily, March 16, 2005, at www.sabah.com.tr/2005/03/16/gnd116.html.

⁹¹ See *Milliyet*, July 29, 2005, article titled 'Kadin Ticaretinde Ibre Turkiye:ye Dondu'.



⁹² For this figure see, *Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu Report 2005. The Ministry of Interior Report (2005)*, Table 3: Kaynak Ülkelerle ilgili Durum ('The data on the origin countries') at www.icisleri.gov.tr/strateji/arastirma/gocmen.htm - 13k.

⁹³ See *Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu Report 2005. The Ministry of Interior Report (2005)* at www.icisleri.gov.tr/strateji/arastirma/gocmen.htm - 13k.

Tables 3a-3c: **157 Helpline Statistics**⁹⁴




⁹⁴ These tables are available at <http://www.countertrafficking.org>.




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Tables 4a-4d: Victims of trafficking identified and assisted as of September 2005.⁹⁵







Breakdown of VoTs` Countries of Origin that IOM assisted by 31 August 2005.



The age profile of 139 cases that IOM assisted in 2005.

⁹⁵ These tables are available at <http://www.countertrafficking.org>.





*Victim Profile*⁹⁶

A total of 108 victims have been accommodated at the Human Resource Development Foundation run shelter in Istanbul in 10 months (2005). Their profile is as follows:

38% from Ukraine; 29% from Moldova; and 9 % from Russia and the remaining is from other countries in the region.

The age distribution of the victims:

55% btw the ages 18-24

27% btw the ages 25-29

14% above 29 and

4% below 18

3.8 Anti-Human Trafficking Legislation

There were no specific pieces of legislation concerning human trafficking and there was no definition of trafficking in human beings in the Penal Code or any other legal acts until the year of 2002. In the year of 2002, Turkish Parliament passed new laws to prevent human smuggling and trafficking as well as a new law outlawing organ trafficking when the Parliament adopted a major reform package to harmonize Turkish laws with those of the EU. The new law passed on August 3, 2002 does not depart fundamentally from this approach, although it does reflect an increased awareness of the human trafficking phenomenon, particularly that of women trafficking. The new laws and changes in legislation is summarised below

- **Turkey signed the UN Convention on transnational organized crime and its two Protocols regulating migrant smuggling and human trafficking (Palermo Documents) in 2000 and ratified them in TGNA in 2003**
- **67 security cooperation agreements in combat against organized crime and terrorism**
- **Readmission agreements with the EU and other source and destination countries Greece, Syria, Romania, Kyrgyzstan.**

⁹⁶ The source of the information is Human Resource Development Foundation that has a program to protect and rehabilitate trafficked victims in Istanbul.

- **NAP states the system related to victims of human trafficking is in harmony with the EU acquis -----European Council Parliamentary Assembly calls for alignment with Schengen Agreement**
- **Citizenship Act amended in 2003 to avoid arranged marriages**
- **Law on Work permits of the Aliens in 2003 in order to avoid illegal employment and regulation of the labour market with work permits**
- **TGNA amended Turkish Penal Code and human trafficking is defined as a crime in 2002 which brought the punishment of heavy imprisonment to the perpetrators 5 to 10 years**
- **New Turkish Penal Code is accepted in 2005, 8 to 12 years**

3.9 Policies at National and Local Level

Human trafficking is addressed as a component of organized crime activities, while little attention is given to the victims exposed (if they are foreigners) to expedite deportation procedures, and there is no specific legal provision or measure addressing their human rights. This is why Turkey adopted a policy of direct assistance to the victims.

Turkey has developed new policies:

- Temporary residence permits without immediate deportation of the victims (6 months and this may be extended for up to 6 more months if trial periods require to do so)
- A circular issued to identify the victims of trafficking to law enforcement officers
- Circular issued to provide health care, psychological rehabilitation support
- No ban of entry to Turkey for the victims
- Victim protection programs
- Providing safe voluntary return
- 157 Help Line
- A guide is prepared “Combat Human Trafficking” involving the approach to victimized women
- Female personnel with civilian clothing
- Protection of children
- Shelter By HRDF & MIO working very effectively but limited capacity
- Twinning project for strengthening the Institutional capacity for Combating Human trafficking
- Implementation of the Schengen visa regime
- Stricter border controls and checks with visa requirements
-

At the local level, Istanbul Grand Municipality cooperates with the Ministry of Interior and the IOM to provide direct assistance to the victims. Moreover, district municipalities are involved in social and action-oriented research projects designed to investigate the situation of the irregular migrants: the profile, networks and the difficulties they faced in Istanbul.

International cooperation is important to support policies at local and national levels. The policies should recognise the need for improving legal labour migration channels. Sound migration policy is to reflect the economic needs of a given country and its effective implementation requires good governance based on transparent legislation, trained staff and functioning institutions. Bilateral agreements between countries of origin and destination in particular on short term labour migration reduce the risk of smuggling and trafficking, and benefit countries of origin through remittances and reduced brain drain. OSCE can contribute to developing a common understanding

of the risks of irregular migration and can help to reorient it towards legal migration through international co-operation and information exchange.

4. Conclusion

Economic globalisation fosters both migration and transnational crime. These two aspects of globalisation intersect in the phenomenon of irregular migration, human smuggling and trafficking, which has in turn, drawn the attention of immigration, law enforcement, and foreign ministry officials. Turkey is a major transit and destination zone for the smugglers and their customers. Turkey received migrant workforce from the Southeast European countries, Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus region as well as from the Middle East and sub-continent in the 1990s. Insufficient inspection staff, inadequate penalties for violations, weak labour law, flexibility on the part of the authorities and the failure of trade unions to bring the issue of immigrant labour force sustained the illegal migrant workforce despite the complains of the local workers throughout the 1990s. In responding to the growing size of irregular migration, human smuggling, and trafficking, the state has taken measures to prevent the human smuggling and illegal migratory work force from the year of 2000 onwards. There were legal arrangements in August 2002 to increase the penalty given to human smugglers. There were also new legal arrangements to prevent the migration of illegal labour workforce and the recruitment of illegal foreign labourers. In September 2003, the Justice and Development Party government passed a new bill that brings severe penalties to those who employ illegal migrant workforce.

The European Union countries and North America have initiated campaigns to combat human smuggling and trafficking and various forms of illegal labour movements. In finding a solution to human trafficking and the smuggling of migrant workers, two inter-related security problems, it is essential to make studies on the definition of human smuggling, its social organisation, political and economic significance, and the political ramification of human smuggling across the national borders. One should also understand that smugglers and traffickers in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union are deeply integrated into the social fabric of indigenous settings, though not uniformly, and are facilitated by a loose network of recruiters, middlemen, actual smugglers, local and foreign financiers, and government officials and police on the take.

Key to prevent various forms irregular migration and illegal employment is multi-level co-operation: at local, regional and international levels. South-eastern states need to reach consensus on the type of the common measures to be taken to combat human-smuggling and women trafficking. Of particular relevance to the civil society and the state is to increase the knowledge of the general public on the issues of human trafficking and smuggling.

Diversified methods of managing the various sub-sectors were needed. Generally, in order to reduce incentives for irregular migration, states should aim at legalising the informal sector through the simplification of registration and accounting procedures, provision of training and credit opportunities, and legal support. At the same time semi-legal and illegal sub-sectors should face prosecution. The OSCE should be involved in awareness raising leading to a common understanding of the risks of irregular migration linked to the informal sector. The OSCE should encourage the

development of SMEs both in countries of origin and destination. Finally, the OSCE should foster co-operation and exchange of information, including on a regional level and through bilateral agreements.

There is a need to give an overview of internal national measures and interstate co-operation mechanisms aimed at reducing the incidence of irregular **migration** linked to the **informal** sector and promoting legal avenues. Key to the success of both national and international measures is governmental investment in, and commitment to, migration management. National measures to improve migration management include capacity building and the development of appropriate legislative and administrative mechanisms to facilitate orderly movement. Of particular relevance to the OSCE are interstate co-operation mechanisms fostering dialogue, and the sharing of experiences

and effective practices. IOM, ICMPD and other organisations provide capacity building assistance to governments. Bilateral agreements are an effective way of opening legal migration channels and, more generally, addressing a comprehensive range of migration management issues, including incentives to reduce irregular migration. For example, Italy has recently concluded bilateral agreements with Albania, Tunisia and Morocco, and Spain signed bilateral agreements with Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Romania and Morocco. Similarly, regional co-operation on migration is increasing and improving prospects for more beneficial migration.

Main points and recommendations concerning the link between informal sector and irregular migration:

- There is a two-way connection between the informal sector and irregular **migration**. The informal sector draws irregular migrants both for employment and for **illegal** activities such as trafficking and smuggling. In the other direction, irregular migration fuels the development of the informal sector.
- The informal sector and irregular migration linked to it have a direct impact on security and stability as well as on human rights and economic development. This makes them relevant for the international organisations like the OSCE, which has an important role to play as a forum for dialogue and exchange of information.
- Minimising the negative consequences of the informal sector and of irregular migration is a matter of governance. It requires developing and implementing effective policies in the economic and migration spheres, both in countries of origin and destination, in order to encourage regular migration, discourage irregular **migration** and promote sustainable economic development.

APPENDIX 1: VICTIMS IN UZBEKISTAN RAISE AWARENESS ABOUT FEMALE TRAFFICKING DANGERS

Alfred Kueppers:8/19/03 Artur Samari Mansura Begbayeva is an attractive young woman with shoulder length brown hair and a grim smile. She has a dark story to tell. Begbayeva is one of hundreds of Uzbek women who have been duped into working in the global sex industry. Now she seeks to prevent other young women from making the same mistake. Begbayeva's ordeal began in 2002. Following a divorce, she found herself homeless -- living on the streets with her two young sons. After two weeks of uncertainty, an acquaintance told her about job possibilities in the sex industry in the United Arab Emirates. Such work would prove a source of easy money, assured the acquaintance, who put her in touch with an Uzbek couple that arranged such trips. The 28-year-old flew from Uzbekistan to the United Arab Emirates with the couple. Upon arrival, they took her passport and told her she owed them \$5,000. "Of course, they told me I would get rich and that I would be able to send money to my children," she said later. "Now I can only say that I don't want this to happen to other girls." A US State Department report issued in June documented the practice of "trafficking in persons," most of whom are forced to work in the global sex industry. In the report, the State Department named Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkey as countries where trafficking has gone on with virtual impunity. Begbayeva sought to escape her situation almost immediately. Her initial attempt to flee failed, and she suffered a severe beating when caught. Ultimately, she managed to return to her native Samarkand roughly seven months after her departure for Dubai. According to local anti-trafficking activists, it is relatively easy and cheap for traffickers to ship young Central Asian women to rich nations as human cargo. Activists say that Israel, Malaysia, and Western Europe are major centers of sex slavery, and that women like Begbayeva often find themselves held hostage within hours of their arrival at their destination. A few small non-governmental organizations are beginning to warn young women of the dangers of the sex industry, and assist others trapped abroad. Victoria Ashirova, director of Samarkand's Ayol

Resource Center for Women and Family, offers programs to raise awareness among at-risk Uzbeks, especially orphans and the rural poor. Many Uzbeks still consider the topic of female trafficking too shameful to discuss openly. “We don’t keep statistics, but we know it is increasing,” Ashirova says. Ashirova ties female trafficking to Uzbekistan’s steep poverty rate. Between 40 and 80 percent of Uzbekistan’s citizens get by on less than a dollar a day, the State Department says. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive.] Ashirova claims that many rural mothers are so desperate that they are willing to consign their children to traffickers without understanding the consequences of their actions. “I spoke to one of the pimps, who told me that mothers offered her their daughters,” Ashirova said. “But when they receive \$100, they don’t think of it as selling their daughters.” According to Ashirova, mothers rationalize the exchange as a way to make ends meet until a daughter marries or finds work abroad. The government denies exit visas to unaccompanied young women, but this does not prevent them from leaving. “Most of them use a false passport.” Ashirova added. Nodira Karimova runs the Future Generation Center, which offers a trafficking hotline in an unmarked office one block from Katortol, Tashkent’s red-light district. Her staff sniffs out possible trafficking operations advertising in newspapers with names like “White Dream Co. LTD” and seeks to repatriate young women caught in sex slavery. “All the girls we talk to from Katortol say that they know girls who have come back with a lot of money,” she said, holding a White Dream contract. “But I’ve never met one.” Begbayeva, who grew up in a Samarkand orphanage, estimated that she had sex with 25 men per day, mostly migrant laborers from South Asia. Most of her earnings were confiscated by pimps. She eventually earned back the \$5,000 she “owed” the traffickers, she says, “and maybe that’s why they didn’t try to catch me.” These days, Begbayeva finds life to be a constant struggle. She has found occasional work as a housepainter, but she says that after a month’s work, she has received no pay. Editor’s Note: Alfred Kueppers is a freelance journalist based in Central Asia. Artur Samari is a freelance journalist based in Samarkand.

Source: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav081903.shtml> ,

Intervento di Ivan Stancioff

MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN NORTH-EAST BULGARIA

Thank you for this invitation!

I believe that good integration should create greater security.

I also maintain that immigration can not be stopped.

We have examples:

- ✓ The Great wall of China
- ✓ The Berlin wall
- ✓ The US Mexican Border
- ✓ The Channel
- ✓ Our Mediterranean
- ✓ Even Shengen!

They don't work!

The reasons are simple:

- ✓ The hungry and the hunted: Seek food and protection!
- ✓ The host nation is seeking cheap labor!

I have two questions:

1) What should be the rules?

The host state must respect the immigrant and the immigrant must respect the host state. This does not mean eliminating the newcomer's linguistic and cultural heritage, which should become a bonus for the host state.

2) How quickly can one integrate the immigrant?

Recently I found a research paper dated 1979 giving a historical – cultural perspective slightly different from that given brilliantly by Prof. Narli on the very up to date situation in our part of Europe.

(Show map of ethnic distribution in the Balkans, dated 1917)

Maps like this gave a fruit salad the name "Macedonia" (not FYROM)

The title is:

"Ethnic cultural and linguistic integration of the Turkic tribes in Bulgaria during the Middle Ages." This research was not published 26 years ago due to then Governments theory on the ethnic purity of the Bulgarian population in the region.

I will summarize:

It is a historical fact, that from the 4th century to the arrival of the Ottomans Turks, NE Bulgaria was repeatedly crisscrossed, laid bare, settled by numerous Turkic tribes. During the 4th century Huns crossed through North-East Bulgaria, then the Avars; in the 7th century the Proto – Bulgarians settled between the Danube and in Balkan range, creating the Slav – Bulgarian state.

In 1048 the Pechenegs flowed into North-East Bulgaria. In 1053 the Byzantine Emperor Constantine IX, having fought them unsuccessfully for five years, signed a 30 year peace treaty settling them in the North-East Balkans. Later another large Turkic tribe, the Uz, invade the Bulgarian lands. A large part of this huge mass of people recrossed the Danube, others died of illness, hunger and war with the Byzantine, but the remainder were christianized and remained in the area. A third Turkic tribe, the Koumanians, played an important part during Middle-ages.

During the period of the Ottoman rule, the various Turkic tribes (mentioned above) accept a new ethnic element – The Asia Minor Turks. The islamization of this population and the “osmanising” of its language, completely change the character of the Turkic Bulgarian population, this mix of Uz, Pechenegs, Koumanians and Proto-Bulgarians created a Christian Turkic ethnic group: the Turkic language population in the lands on the Black Sea, known as Gagauzi, the Gajali in Deliorman.

Under Sultan Murad II, Shoumen in North-East Bulgaria becomes a Moslem spiritual center (The City still has the largest Mosque in Bulgaria) as well as a military base resulting in a strong Ottoman influence on the language.

It is interesting to note that these early immigrants to North-East Bulgaria, the Turkish speaking, Christian Gagauz have conserved elements of their ancient Turkic culture throughout 15 centuries!

The question remains:

Can we speed up integration so that we may have security?

Can we do this whilst protecting the cultural heritage of the immigrant?

The question remains: How?

Thank you!

Intervento di Giovanni Gozzini

Social cohesion in receiving countries : questions and opportunities

The Global System of International Migrations, 1900 and 2000: A Comparative Approach.

Paper prepared for the session TS07 «Economic Globalisation: Historical Perspective and State of Research» at the 20th International Congress of Historical Sciences (Sydney, 3-5 July 2005).

Summary

This paper proposes a comparison of international migrations in two different historic phases, both marked by a rapid increase of the phenomenon: the period between 1870 and 1914 and that between 1965 and 2000. The first section analyses the most striking differences at macro level. The comparison of the geography of the migratory flows reveals a multiplication of the sending and receiving countries. In comparison to the past, the force of attraction exerted by much higher salaries appears today as a decisive pull factor but these greater wage differentials are now accompanied by much lesser equalising effects resulting from the international migrations. The departure of the migrants does not bring about an alleviation of the labour market in the sending countries comparable to that of one hundred years ago. The second section examines several significant analogies that emerge at the micro level (individual, family and community) of the migratory dynamics. The historic great emigration developed in clusters and the decision to leave spread like a contagious fever through local areas, generating in its turn migration chains between the local communities of departure of the emigrants and the local communities for the welcome and integration of the immigrants. Even today the most important variable influencing the choice of destination is the presence in the host country of a consolidated, known and related settlement of other migrants belonging to the same ethnic groups. The older-established immigrants' communities are distinguished by the presence of women and by processes of family reunion, while the more recently formed immigrant nuclei now encounter greater obstacles on the path to full social integration, seeming less capable of obtaining legitimisation as compared to a hundred years ago. Today, as in the past, the remittances play an important role in the developing economies but this capital is largely destined to consumption rather than investment. The third section highlights several fundamental novelties of the current scene: the problem of refugees, the impact of criminal organisations in the smuggling and trafficking of immigrants and the restrictive policies increasingly adopted by the receiving countries.

1. The geography of the migrations

A hundred years ago the fulcrum of the international migration system was the movement of peoples who crossed the Atlantic in the direction of the American continent (approximately 60 million immigrants in the hundred-year period between 1815 and 1914, four fifths of whom left after 1880). Alongside this, there were four other inter-continental migratory currents: from Russia to Siberia and central Asia (estimated as 10 million persons), from southern Europe to North Africa (1 million), and the indentured labor migrants from China and Japan to southern and eastern Asia (12 and 6 million respectively) and from India to south-eastern Asia and southern and eastern Africa (1.5-5 million) (Ferenczi-Willcox; Gould 1979; Mitchell; Baines; Segal; Latham; Potts; Castles-Miller; Eltis; Hoerder 2000; Northrup)

As regards the recent period, instead, scholars have mapped out four major migratory systems, considered stable even though projected over a considerably shorter timespan, corresponding to the last thirty years of the twentieth century: from Mexico to the United States, towards Europe via the Mediterranean, between Asia and the Persian Gulf, and between the shores of the Pacific Ocean. The comparison of these migratory maps reveals a multiplication in the lands of origin and destination of the migrants. In 1990 there were no less than 55 major sending countries, while in

1914 there were 22, and 67 receiving (27 in 1914). In 1995 the major countries of origin of immigrants to the USA (accounting together for 75% of the total) were 26, while in 1914 they were only 11 (Stalker; Zlotnik).

It's clear that what lies behind this complication of the migratory map is the great development in the networks of communication and transport. But today, as in the past, the least developed countries remain excluded from the circuits of international migration, and are constrained to short-range population movements – especially in central Africa – provoked by dramatic extraordinary emergencies, such as civil wars and famines, rather than by the “normal” economic factors of push and pull. The historic migrations can be temporally located in the initial phases of a cycle of industrialisation which gradually extended to a good part of the European countries from which the migratory flows originated. Italy, Sweden, Austria and Hungary were all countries that, at the turn of the century, registered a marked acceleration in the rhythm of growth of the GDP pro capita and, albeit to a considerably lesser degree, the same was true of other countries from which the migrants departed in this period, such as Russia, India, China and Japan. What set the working classes of these countries on the move was undoubtedly the push of specific demographic increases, but also the pull of the positive wage differentials in the receiving countries, added to which was the leverage at local level of non-economic factors (family or community migration chains, circulation of information, agents of shipping companies). In many cases, the first step of population movement is that from the country towards the city, following processes of industrialisation which appear to guarantee better earning and social conditions: where and when such aspirations do not appear to be fully satisfied, the movement then continues to more distant destinations. Consequently, between emigration and development there developed a relation in the form of an upturned U: migratory flows and salaries grow hand in hand to the point at which the migration option no longer appears as attractive as at the beginning, and the expectations of employment *in loco* once more come to outweigh the human cost of departure, the severing of roots and the breaking of ties with family and friends (Lewis; Easterlin; Green-Urquhart; Massey; Hatton-Williamson; O'Rourke-Williamson).

In the sending countries of one hundred years ago, the poorest social classes were generally excluded from the migratory circuits, and only a minimum increase in income enabled them to take part. Marginalisation and ignorance contributed to perpetuate a risk adverse frame of mind, nourished by passivity and resignation: privation was experienced as a natural, absolute and unavoidable condition rather than as a relative condition emerging from the comparison (factual, mediated or mythical) with others in better conditions. Even today, the processes of urbanisation (which in the developing countries of the twentieth century are considerably more marked than those of the previous century) in many cases represent the anteroom to international migration. In many poor countries such processes are an effect of the agricultural crisis, hard hit by the fall in prices, by the protection granted to the primary sector by the rich countries, and by a flight from the countryside. But once again, the case of central Africa reveals an urban growth which is frequently parasitic, triggering neither economic development nor entry into the global migratory circuits (Gilbert-Guglar).

2. International Migrations and Convergence

The Europe of 1914 cannot be considered on a par with one of today's “developing countries”: it had a GDP pro capita lower than that of the United States and Canada (1:1.5) but higher than that of Argentina and Brazil, and even the poorest areas of Europe (1:3.5) were not separated by a divide such as now separates poor countries from rich countries (1:9 between Western Offshoots and Asia without Japan) (Bairoch; Maddison). Today's wealth differential translates into major wage gaps between sending and receiving countries: between the countries of eastern Europe and the rest of the West these differentials can reach a ratio of 1:5, between Mexico and the United States they arrive at a level of 1:30 for agriculture and 1:4 for industry, and between Indonesia and Malaysia of 1:7. In 1913, Italian wages were on average a third of those of the US and slightly less than two-thirds of those in Argentina and Germany. In comparison to the past,

therefore (even to the more recent past of the inter-European migrations following the Second World War, when wage differentials oscillated between 35% and 50%), the force of attraction exerted by much higher salaries appears today as a decisive pull factor in the attraction of the labour force and major pressure in favour of the migration option. Paradoxically, however, these greater differences between sending and receiving countries are now accompanied by much lesser equalising effects resulting from the international migrations.

The Atlantic migrations of a hundred years ago provoked a demographic earthquake. Immigration accounted for more than a third of the demographic increase in the United States and Australia, and for more than half of that of Argentina. In the American continent the active population increased by one third, while in Europe it was reduced by an eighth. Between 1881 and 1911, in a classic sending country such as Italy, the dependency ratio – which calculates the proportion of inactive population (aged under 15 and over 64) to active (aged between 15 and 64) – rose from 55% to 78%. In the same span of time, the dependency ratio of a classic receiving country, such as the United States, mirrored an almost perfect correspondence (falling from 71% to 57%) due largely to the arrival of the immigrants.

According to the United Nations statistics, today the dependency ratio is falling in all developing countries, even in those characterised by a high emigration rate. In the case of Mexico, for example, we have one of the highest migration rates (3.3 per thousand between 1995 and 2000), which nevertheless does not manage to invert the trend towards a constant fall in the dependency ratio (from 74% in 1990 to 63% in 1998). This means that in such countries the relative impoverishment of the active population caused by the departure of the migrants is amply compensated by natural demographic dynamics. More specifically, from the 1970s on, developing countries have recorded a very slight increase in the percentage of the population over 65 years of age, along with a pronounced and constant drop in the number of minors under 15, which can in its turn be traced to the fall in the birth rate; between 1970 and 2000 the average number of children per woman in Mexico (as in other poor countries) fell from six to three. The combination of these factors has led to a tendential re-balancing of the active and inactive population. In the OECD countries, on the contrary, the dependency ratio has been stationary since at least the mid 1980s; the constant drop in the number of minors and the equally constant increase in the number of old people are compensated by the arrival of immigrants, who thus exert a tangible impact on the age classification pyramid of the receiving countries.

Econometric investigations conducted on the historic “great migration” have recorded its decisive contribution to a convergence of wages and prices on either side of the Atlantic (O’Rourke-Williamson). Exemplifying a theoretical model formalised in the 1930s by Heckscher and Ohlin (economists who lived in one of the major emigration countries, Sweden), mass emigration alleviates the demographic pressure on the labour market of the sending countries and provokes a rise in real wages; this is the opposite of what happens in the receiving countries, where the arrival of the migrants provokes congestion in the labour market and a drop in wages. As in a hydraulic system of communicating vessels, the international migrations thus tend to equalise the productive factors (land, labour, capital), but an essential condition for this to take place is a substantial similarity of qualification, and hence the possibility of mutual replacement between the immigrant workers and the native workers. Considerably more than the international movements of goods and capital, considerably more than the spread of new technologies, between 1870 and 1910 it was the great migration that exerted a decisive impact (which could be estimated at around 60% of the total) on reducing the differences between the real wages in Italy and Argentina (-45%) and between Italy and the United States (-102%): in the counterfactual hypothesis of O’Rourke and Williamson, without the international migrations these differences would have risen in a very considerable manner (+75% and +32% respectively).

Today, however, in parallel with the developments at the level of demographic structures, the departure of the migrants does not bring about an alleviation of the labour market in the sending countries comparable to that of one hundred years ago. Between 1995 and 2001 all the major

emigration countries (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines, Turkey) recorded unemployment rates that were stable or rising, with the sole exception of Mexico where there emerged instead a positive correlation between emigration and the increase of those employed in the *maquiladoras* (the tax-exempt industrial assembly plants located on the frontier with the USA) which between 1995 and 2000 rose from 470 thousand to over a million. Nor was there any sign of a clear correlation between the immigration flows and the increase in unemployment in any of the major receiving countries: between 1990 and 95 and between 1995 and 2000 the average annual immigration rate into the United States rose from 4.0 to 4.5 and the unemployment rate dropped from 6.4 to 4.8; in Germany the immigration rate dropped from 6.6 to 2.3 and that of unemployment rose from 8.1 to 9.2. The entry of developing countries into the global migratory circuits lowered the level of qualification of the migrant labour force: between 1970 and 1990 the average income pro capita of the sending countries of immigrants to the United States fell by one third. The immigrant workers thus find themselves competing with the less qualified native workers, but prove to be complementary to those with greater specialisation whom they cannot substitute, and who are on the increase in all developed countries thanks to the processes of tertiarisation of the economy (Borjas 1990 and 1999; Wood).

Nevertheless if today, at a merely demographic level, the departures of migrants exercise a relative impact on their populations of origin, the same cannot be said from a qualitative point of view. Unlike what happened a hundred years ago, in fact, today the immigrants into the United States (with the exception of those of Mexican origin) boast a level of schooling considerably higher than the average of their home countries: the average educational level of the Egyptian immigrants, for example, is equivalent to the second year of University (while average schooling in Egypt is at the level of completion of primary school), that of the Chinese immigrants is equivalent to 13 years of school (as against the average of 8 years' schooling in China). Already at the start of the 1990s the departure from Sub-Saharan Africa of a third of the qualified labour force was recorded, and by now there are various scholars who speak of "brain drain" in relation to this non-secondary aspect of modern international migration: a recent estimate calculated this for India in the region of 2 billion dollars a year (equivalent to 0.1 of the GDP) (Appleyard; Teitelbaum-Russell).

Within the context of the historic great migration, the immigrant workers came to be defined as "birds of passage", a term which has recently been reutilised by scholars as indicative not only of the precarious situation of such workers, but also of the existence of a *dual* labour market: that is, a market subdivided into a primary, regular bracket of trades and wages principally destined to native workers, and a secondary, irregular bracket of jobs reserved for immigrants and often described by the acronym "3-D" (dirty, dangerous, demanding) (Bailey; Piore, Harris-Todaro). In the historic great migration, this distinction frequently coincided with the rural origins of the migrants (prevalent among various protagonists of the "new immigration" into the USA, such as Austrians, Russians, Poles), which produced downgrading and maladjustment in the social contexts of the host country. In the modern international population movements, instead, it is reinforced by the new and serious incidence of organised criminality on the transit and illegal introduction of the migrants into the country of destination.

The relative independence of the professional circuits, and therefore of the wage levels between immigrants and natives, in the past as today, helps to explain the slight influence of the migratory flows on occupational and wage trends in the countries of destination. A hundred years ago, almost half the immigrants regularly employed in the United States were concentrated in the industrial sector (then in full expansion), their illiteracy rate was more than three times that of the native whites (13% as against 4%) and despite the fact that their level of professional qualification was not significantly lower (specialist workers representing 40% as against the 46% of the natives) their average wages were almost a tenth less. Several macroeconomic estimates evaluate between 11% and 27% the fall of real wages in the United States caused by immigration up to 1910, and similarly at about a third the rise in the same in Italy and in Ireland (Hanes; Eichengreen-Gemery; Goldin).

Today, over half the immigrants to the United States are absorbed into the less qualified tertiary sector (more specifically the sectors of personal care and assistance, seasonal agricultural work, cleaning firms and urban commercial enterprises). Their level of schooling is in constant growth, with a share of graduates (28%) very close to that of the natives (30%), which contributes to the brain drain of the sending countries. However, the negative differential of the average wage appears to be on the rise (from 9% in 1980 to 23% in 1998), particularly as an effect of Mexican immigration, where the average family income corresponds to 66% of that of the natives. Despite the fact that in the course of the 1990s the major emigration countries (with the exception of the Philippines) register increases in the average of the real wages that are at times even greater than those of the developed countries, the wages gap between the north and south of the world continues to be enormous, and migratory flows do not appear to be able to trigger dynamics of wage equalisation between the sending and receiving countries comparable to those of one hundred years ago (Ghosh). Nevertheless, the rhythm of growth of the GDP pro capita in the major emigration countries – excluding those marked by flows of refugees – appears to be on average better. With the exception of the Philippines (the less brilliant result of which is accompanied by the non-growth of wages) and Albania (involved in the difficult political shift to the post-Communist world) all the others are proceeding at a speed that is the same or greater than those of the west. But this growth is also the fruit of many different variables (in the first place the degree of integration in the international movements of goods and capital), the performative capacity of which appears to be greater than that comprised in the movement of persons. More specifically, the exportation of artefacts with a high labour content and a low technology content – the chosen sphere for many developing countries – does not appear to substitute or at least significantly reduce the departures of the emigrants, with a doubly negative result for the downgraded labour force of the developed countries. In other words, it would appear that today trade and emigration are not interchangeable but complementary (Faini et al.).

At least at present, therefore, it appears that the present-day immigrations are not capable of triggering processes of convergence of productive factors similar to those which took place between the Old and New Worlds at the end of the nineteenth century.

3. The immigrant communities

The historic great emigration developed in “clusters”: a third of the Finnish emigrants originated from a single province, all the Chinese from two provinces, and half of the Austro-Hungarians from Galicia. The decision to leave spread like a contagious fever through local areas, generating in its turn migration chains between the local communities of departure of the emigrants and the local communities for the welcome and integration of the immigrants. Between Stromboli and Wellington (New Zealand) as between Caserta and Providence (Rhode Island) or Zuid (Holland) and Patterson (New Jersey), or between the Alpine foothills of Piedmont and San Gustavo (Argentina). In each of these cases (and in many others investigated by the scholars) between the sending and receiving sites of the migrants there persisted over time a two-way flow of persons, made up of repatriates and new departures, but also a constant flow of epistolary information and of money. Between 1908 and 1914 the New York Bureau of Immigration recorded a large majority of immigrants going to visit relatives (79%) and friends (15%), and in 1913 the Report of the United States Immigration Commissariat set in first place among the reasons for the migratory flows the letters from the migrants already settled in the new homeland and the visits of temporary or definitive repatriates. In the United States the *Gemeinschaft* of the immigrants took place predominantly in urban environments: in 1910 54% of the USA immigrants lived in the large cities, as against 28% of the natives and only 17% worked in agriculture as against 37% of the natives. The protection offered by the community of fellow countrymen was a greater guarantee than the individual opportunities of ownership and success potentially offered by access to the lands of the West. The identity of the historic migrants was a “local” more than national identity; the local cohesion of the village of origin strengthened the cohesion of the community of immigrants,

displaying a surprising capacity to withstand on global scale (MacDonald-MacDonald; Wyman; Morawska; Hoerder 1996 and 2000; Gould 1980).

Even today, as far as the choice of destination is concerned, the most important variable influencing the behaviour of the migrants is the presence in the host country of a consolidated, known and related settlement of other migrants: “the stock of immigrants already present in the United States is the most important factor in predicting the level of emigration from the country of origin” (United Nations, 1998). There are a number of cases, even in our own times, of transplanted communities, such as the Chinese village of Houyu, four-fifths of which was transferred to New York; almost all Chinese emigration originates in three areas of the eastern coast (Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang). Indian emigration originates predominantly from the State of Kerala, that of Pakistan from the district of Mirpur, in the zone of Kashmir, where the migrants account for 90% of the population. In 2000, more than a third of the immigrants present in the United States are concentrated in the two cities of New York and Los Angeles (which together account for 13% of the population) and no less than 95% live in metropolitan areas (as against 79% of the natives).

Through the generations, the “transplantation” of such communities constructs new and specific hyphenated ethnic identities (“Italo-American”, “Hispano-American”) – a sort of transnational identity of the “diaspora” – that maintain a lively relation with the homeland, in its turn interwoven in a more or less conflictual manner with national loyalty towards the receiving country. Residential segregation reinforces the migration chains but can also prove to be a double-edged weapon, transforming itself into the creation of ghettos destined to reproduce situations of self-marginalisation and to provoke further difficulties of integration in the new homeland. Modern investigations reveal a composite picture of different “yields” (in terms of material welfare and social ascent) of the immigrant communities distinguished by marked spatial crowding, depending on the ethnic groups that are protagonists: in the United States, for example, averagely positive for the Chinese and instead averagely negative for the Mexicans (Massey et al.; Cohen; Hollinger; Glick Schiller et al.).

In the academic debate, concepts such as “diaspora” and “transnational” tend to replace the traditional opposition between assimilationism and multiculturalism (Handlin; Bodnar). On the eve of the Great War, only a third of the immigrants into the United States were naturalised, and in 1911 the Report of the Immigration Commission of the United States Congress revealed through sample surveys that over half the immigrants did not speak English, and that a negligible percentage were members of the Trade Unions; frequently the relation with countrymen entrepreneurs replaced the relation with co-workers. Nevertheless, the reunion of the family unit in the new homeland - which for example in the first generation of Italians in the United States took place in 10-20% of cases – set in motion a dynamic that opened up the original identities to processes of the acquisition of rights of citizenship and acculturation and interaction with the surrounding environment, in which the women played a crucial role. For example, in the modification of the fertility rates, which gradually became increasingly similar to those of the population of the host country, or in the propensity to marry outside the original ethnic group, which between the second and third generations of immigrants grew on average from half to over two-thirds (Nelli; Alba; Gabaccia). With each generation the gap of schooling and professional training between natives and immigrants was reduced; in the case of the United States, this closing of the gap was considerably more consistent than that with the black Afro-American component, distinguished by a residential segregation still greater than that of the immigrant communities (Portes-Rumbaut).

The historic picture of the reception of the immigrants proves to be considerably diversified. The Italians headed for the Americas could, for example, count on the support of the diplomatic representatives of their own country and on religious and missionary associations which made a frequently decisive contribution to the process of social integration in the new country. The influx of immigrants to New York – at the end of the nineteenth century they represented 80% of the inhabitants of the city – set the background for a turning-point in the history of journalism: Joseph Pulitzer’s *World* was in fact the first daily paper expressly aimed at this new public. There were

moreover numerous other publications printed directly by the immigrant circles both in the United States and in Argentina and in Brazil (Tomasi; Higham 1984).

In our own times it is difficult to find evidence of a similar level of organised integration of the immigrants. A significant factor in this difference is the objective fact that a hundred years ago the density of the population was much lower, and there was a very strong idea of the wide spaces open to colonisation, in which the new arrivals could make their own contribution without detriment to the natives, and often actually to their advantage. It was in this period that various images emerged in the States (the “Frontier” and the “Melting Pot”) that were destined to survive at length as the positive symbols of an open society. And yet it was precisely in the United States of the end of the century that the poor and Catholic “new immigration”, originating from southern and eastern Europe, came up against the emerging “nativist” movement, which radiated from a religion-based ethnocentric and nationalist hub to embrace xenophobic sentiment of various kinds. In Latin America too, the initial positive reception rapidly made way for a diffused climate of violence and abuse in the plantations where the immigrants found employment (Higham 1981; Curran). On the instigation of union organisations such as the American Federation of Labor, which presented the immigrants as a threat to the jobs and wages of the native workers, there took shape in the United States a pressure movement in favour of the introduction of the literacy test as qualification for the entry of new immigrants. Between 1895 and 1917 (when it was effectively introduced) it was countered by the Presidential veto no less than 4 times, with the backing of the influential industrial powers who had vested interests in exploiting the cheaper and less unionised immigrant manpower.

But it is interesting to observe how, in the United States and in Australia in the late nineteenth century (in the latter the legislation came into force in 1901 that restricted entry not only for the Chinese, but also for the blacks, and the southern and eastern Europeans) the waves of xenophobic resentment were closely synchronised with economic depressions rather than with peaks in the influx of foreigners (Timmer-Williamson). Similarly, the restrictive orientation of the United States politicians appears to be clearly correlated to the less numerous presence in their constituencies of immigrants, whose votes were the focus of constant attention on the part of both the Democratic and the Republican parties (Goldin). We can thus observe significant similarities and differences in comparison to the present-day dynamics. With the exception of the older-established ethnic communities, historically distinguished by the presence of women and by processes of family reunion, the more recently formed immigrant nuclei now appear destined to encounter greater obstacles on the path to full social integration, while at the same time being less capable of seeking and obtaining legitimisation as compared to a hundred years ago. But even today, the xenophobic sentiments appear to be a function of the insecurity triggered by economic slumps. In many western countries the restrictive immigration policies were launched at the beginning of the 1970s (in Switzerland in 1970, in Sweden in 1972, in Germany in 1973, in France and Benelux in 1974) and were intensified in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973, when migration flows had yet to reach their highest levels.

4. The categories of migrants

A hundred years ago, among the European migrants headed for the Americas, the males of working age prevailed greatly over the females, in proportions which – depending on the ethnic groups – ranged from two-thirds to three-quarters, and almost half of the migrant flow was made up of isolated individuals; among the Asian emigrants the male preponderance was even higher. A significant part of this first immigration wave (oscillating between approximately a third of the total in North America, about half in Latin America, little more than 10% in Australia and up to 80% in Asia) returned to their homeland after a sojourn which on average did not exceed five years. The historians who study this phenomenon emphasise the plurality of reasons, even radically contradictory, which could underlie the decisions of the “remigrants”: the successful accumulation of a capital to be invested in the homeland on return; the failure of the process of social integration in the new land; homesickness; political, religious or ideological opposition to the social system of the new country; negative economic situations. On the contrary, the emigrants who remained in the

new homeland gave rise to a cycle of familial reunion which had its fulcrum in an increase of the female presence, structurally distinguished by a rate of “remigration” to the homeland considerably lower than that of the male component (Gould 1980,1; Wyman; Cinel; Klein).

The factor which emerges most clearly from the research into modern-day migration flows is instead that of a growing feminilisation starting from the mid 1980s. In the world stock of immigrants, as in that of refugees, women today account for almost half of the total, without any great variations between continents: there are approximately 20 million in Asia, 12 in North America, 12 in Europe and 7 in Africa. Exactly like a hundred years ago, this female presence is linked over time to a lowering of the fertility rate in the immigrant communities and a tendential assimilation of their rhythms of natural increment to those of the host society. In both the historic and the more recent experience, the presence of women proves to be an important factor of integration. Not unlike a hundred years ago, the female component acts as a relational and financial baricentre in the migration chain: its location in the country of departure or of arrival corresponds to the fulcrum of the economy of the migrants, and frequently it is the eventual transfer of the same that determines the transformation of what was up to then a temporary sojourn into a permanent emigration. Today, immigration related to family reunion accounts for two-thirds of the entire immigration movement in the United States and a quarter of that towards Australia and Canada. Even among the migrants of Asiatic origin (historically more refractory to the mobility of women) the feminine component is on the increase, well beyond the 50% mark. For many developing countries this is a novelty among novelties: the entry into the global circuit of migrations upsets even domestic equilibriums, profoundly modifying the roles and hierarchies of family and clan. In many such cases (Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand) the choice of emigration is related to employment in domestic service in the rich countries, and appears to be a symptom of a process of emancipation evolving within the societies of origin, within the framework of an economically rational management and substantial legality in the migratory movement. In other cases (Nigeria, Eastern Europe), instead, the female migration flows are frequently controlled by organised crime and largely go to supply the prostitution racket.

5. Remittances.

The stabilising role of women is thus a long-standing feature of the migratory phenomenon, but this historic constancy is also shared by another dimension of the migration chain: the remittances of the immigrants. The sporadic data which we possess in relation to the historic great migration give us a fairly articulated picture. The remittances of the Italians from Argentina (a land of success and investments *in loco*) were practically nil, while those from the United States were vast: in 1906 they reached a ceiling of over 800 million lire, amounting to almost a third of the total level of exports, making a decisive contribution to the stabilisation of the balance of payments of the Italian State. The postal orders – via which 70% of these movements of capital towards the homeland took place – represented a decisive mechanism of consolidation of the migration chain and illustrated the capacity of the family and community connections to withstand over time, despite the traumatic separations and the spatial distances.

To a large extent, this capital did not serve to trigger a virtuous economic circle of productive investments and industrial development in the sending country of the emigrants. The most widespread use in Italy and in eastern Europe was for travel tickets for new migrants, the purchase of houses, and forms of conspicuous consumption (meat, clothes, furniture), and the purchase of land. In Italy, Sweden, Hungary and Poland, the first decade of the century witnessed a pronounced expansion in minor rural ownership. Remittances and repatriates played a special role in this, with the experience of the migrants being configured as that of “conservative adventurers” who – despite the fact that the majority of them had experimented training and work of an industrial kind in the receiving country – once they returned home failed to follow this up, or were prevented from doing so, and chose to remain true to the atavistic dream of the land.

In 2002 the remittances from emigrants (the so-called “migradollars”) amounted on a global scale to over 88 billion dollars (in 1989 45 billion); but this estimate soars to over 160 billion

dollars if we also take into consideration the non-official flows, transferred through channels other than banks and post offices (Nyberg Sørensen et al.). Over the last decade the global volume of the remittances has grown at an average annual rhythm (+3.2%) higher than that of the migrant persons, but lower than both that of world trade and of the international movement of capital. However, unlike this latter dynamic – which is concentrated in the rich countries of the planet – the remittances of the emigrants are increasingly localised in the developing countries, reaching a scale dimension which by now vastly outweighs (by about 44%) that of the official aid provided by the developed countries: in Nigeria the ratio of the former to the latter is 7:1 and in India 6:1.

Today, as in the past, this capital is largely destined to consumption rather than investment: despite the novelties of national legislations which offer special interest rates as an incentive for bank deposits in foreign currency, (as in Pakistan, South Korea, the Philippines, India) there are numerous case studies that illustrate the incapacity of the remittances to generate positive and lasting socio-economic transformations. In Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh the predominant utilisation of the remittances appears to be for the purchase of durable consumer goods, and above all that of the home. In some cases (Philippines) with positive repercussions – albeit market-related – on employment in the construction sector, and in others (Thailand) producing greater effects on levels of schooling and of the purchase and working of the land (Martin; Adams; Nishat-Bilghami; Gardner; Adams-Page). The fact nevertheless remains, that the order of magnitude of the remittances (and therefore the impact which they can exercise on the economies of the poor countries) is equal to little more than a quarter of the current volume of foreign investments in developing countries; in many cases (China South Korea), it is the latter that have made a decisive contribution to industrial and economic growth.

6. The refugees

The current list of the major emigration nations (by order of absolute number of emigrants between 1995 and 2000: China, Congo, Mexico, India, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Indonesia, Burundi, Egypt, Sudan) reveals a dual category of migrant: the economic, connected with push and pull factors not very different from those of a century ago, but also the substantially new category of war refugees generated by armed conflicts. The exoduses from the Congo and Burundi effectively correspond to the repatriation in Ruanda of people fleeing from the civil wars which broke out in the mid 1990s. Between 1965 and 2000 this particular type of forced, contingent and short-range migrant (because they always hope to return home as soon as the political and civil conditions have improved) rose from 2 to 16 million – after having reached a peak of 18 million in 1992 at the time of the war in the Balkans – coming to play a significant role in international migrations. According to the statistics of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Unhcr), the agency created for this purpose in 1951, at the end of 2000 the persons recognised as refugees according to the terms of the international conventions, and therefore under the protection of the United Nations, accounted for 9% of the global stock of migrants. In the course of the 1990s, over half this population came to be concentrated in Asia (above all in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam) and a quarter in Africa (Burundi, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Angola and Eritrea): the vast majority of the refugees move from developing country to developing country. In Sub-Saharan Africa this link between civil wars and nutritional emergencies has become the primary cause of migration. But if we add to the refugees proper the internally displaced persons and the asylum seekers, then the total of persons entrusted to the responsibility of the United Nations comes to over 22 million, and no less than 15% of the total migrations (Weiner).

Particularly in Europe (where we find 15% of the refugees, almost of third of these being in the Balkans) the request for asylum proves to be a practice widely used to get round immigration restrictions. The result is a generalised tendency to more restrictive regulations in relation to the acceptance of refugees –for example making an indispensable condition the certainty of the country of origin and the exclusive identification of the persecuting agent in State bodies (and not “private” paramilitary bands) – as well as the favouring of policies of assistance *in loco* (as illustrated by the

Unhcr figures relating to internally displaced persons) or of shelter in “safe third countries” (Chimni).

7. Undocumented migrants

A hundred years ago, many micro-local contexts of the emigrant communities featured the active propaganda of the agents of the shipping companies (paid on the basis of the number of embarkations) carried out through brochures, special offers, meetings and assemblies. Their activity was performed within the confines of legality, in close collaboration with legitimate private companies, and sometimes even with public institutions (such as the governments of Brazil and Argentina) and in many countries was rapidly recognised and disciplined by law.

Here there emerges one of the greatest differences between past and present. Effectively, today the criminal organisations control approximately half of the entire migratory movement in the world: between one and two million persons per year, who are prevalently headed towards 15-country Europe (at an estimated average of 650 thousand per year) and the United States (700 thousand) (Passel). Apropos this, the United Nations distinguishes between “smuggling” and “trafficking” signifying by the first term the smuggling of persons, and by the second the actual trade in human beings for purposes of exploitation: the first figures as a crime of frontier violation, the second as an offence against fundamental human rights.

One of the effects of such novelties in relation to the past is the growing perception of the immigration phenomenon in terms of a threat to security. Inquiries and surveys regularly confirm this trend in public opinion in developed countries (and also in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and in certain central African nations such as Nigeria) without great variations over space and time, and not necessarily linked (on the contrary, sometimes in inverse proportion) to direct contact with the immigrants and often connected with low levels of education (O’Rourke-Sinnott). The historical comparison reveals that we are not dealing with a recent shift connected with the growth of the phenomenon. Already as far back as 1888 the Congress of the United States set up various commissions to investigate the suspicion of an “exportation” of criminals on the part of European countries that were the source of migratory flows: however, the inquiries repeatedly verified the presence of less criminality among the immigrants than among the American citizens themselves (Abbott). The same result emerged from the investigations carried out in Europe in the 1950s and 60s, but the picture changed radically with the launch of legislation restricting immigration. It was starting from the 1970s, with the birth of the phenomenon of clandestine migration, that the inquiries performed in various European countries documented a growing over-representation of foreigners who had committed crimes, and consequently a link between immigration and criminality. This was minimal or non-existent for certain communities of immigrants (Chinese, Vietnamese, Philipinos) and in increasing order of gravity for others (Latin Americans, Eastern Europeans, North Africans). Without exceptions in time and space, these same inquiries confirm that the link between immigration and criminality concerns only a small minority – frequently opposed by and outlawed from the respective immigrant communities – whose presence, however, appears to be closely linked not only to the illegal channels of clandestine immigration, but also to the absence of the conditions or active policies for the reunion of the families of the migrants (Tomry; Haene Marshall).

There also derive several further significant differences between the historic migrations and those of today. On the one hand, the loss of centrality of Fordist factory labour today causes, at least partially, an occupational dispersion of the immigrants in the indented archipelago of the service sector which makes both control and integration more difficult. On the other hand, the crisis of the welfare systems renders problematic the provision of social and health services, which a hundred years ago were simply and prejudicially excluded from the range of opportunities offered to the immigrants, while fifty years ago they were comprised without too many problems within the contributive scheme that more or less throughout Europe regulated the triangular relationship between workers, employers and the welfare state. It’s true that in many receiving countries, the propensity towards the use of the social services is on average higher among the immigrants (and

in particular among the refugees) than among the natives. Nevertheless, most recent research tends to exclude a causal link between the crisis of the welfare state and immigration: contrary to popular belief there is no correlation between a greater presence of immigrants and an increase in taxes (Razin-Sadka-Swagel).

8. Government policies

The French Revolution proclaimed the freedom to migrate, opening up a cycle of national laws which, starting from the British pathfinder in 1827, spread the juridical recognition of this right over most of the European states. However, between 1880 and 1914 all the major countries of destination of migratory flows – with the exception of Great Britain and Brazil – modified their legislation regarding the acceptance of migrants in a restrictive sense. In 1885 Canada excluded the Chinese, in 1901 Australia raised to 200 pounds the disembarkation tax for the new immigrants coming from southern Europe (as against 5 pounds for those from the north); in 1882 the United States banned entry to prisoners, the mentally ill, the indigent and the Chinese, in 1891 to those suffering from contagious diseases, in 1903 to anarchists and revolutionaries, and in 1907 they limited entry for the Japanese and imposed a disembarkation tax of 4 dollars. The First World War, and the more general process of crisis of exchange and international relations which it opened up, drove the United States to introduce the literacy test in 1917, and in 1924 to impose a rigid quota system on the immigration flows, based on national origin.

On the other hand, the capitalist “golden age” which emerged after the Second World War led to a relative liberalisation of the trans-frontier movements of persons, as exemplified in the migratory dynamics which took place in Europe in the 1950s and 60s. However, the periodising turning-point that in the early 1970s took place in the economic performance of the more developed countries did not fail to have repercussions at the specific level of international migrations, making a distinct turn-about in immigration policies in a restrictive sense. Between 1976 and 1986 the rich countries with laws aimed at reducing the volume of the immigration flows rose from 6 to 13 (today there are 21), and even among the poor countries the number with anti-immigration barriers on their borders grew (from 4 to 20). On the contrary, several oil-producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, Nigeria) opened their frontiers to the immigrants, only to close them again in the early 80s when the oil price fell. In 1983 Nigeria expelled over 2 million illegal immigrants originating above all from Ghana, attracted by the oil boom in the country: a unique case in the multi-secular history of international migrations in terms of dimensions, which nevertheless became a model that was promptly followed by many countries in central Africa, albeit on a smaller scale. Unlike what happened a century ago, even within the emigration countries themselves not dissimilar trends can be observed: today there exist policies which actively encourage emigration in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, but between 1976 and 1986 the number of countries with policies designed to restrict it rose from 19 to 36 (now 41), including many of the newly industrialised Asiatic countries.

The present panorama also comprises signals of a contradictory kind. In the course of the 1990s the annual number of acquired citizenships rose in Germany, Canada, Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, France and Spain, while it fell in Australia, Japan, Holland and Norway. The United States recorded a see-sawing trend, albeit contained within a general tendency to growth: the number of naturalised citizens rose from 270 thousand in 1990 to a million in 1996, falling again to 880 thousand in 2000 and to 570 thousand in 2002. In the United States, therefore, the process of naturalisation – with growing difficulty in view of the increase in illegal entry – manages to involve more or less half of the total flow of legal immigrants. This is a notable percentage compared to the scant third of naturalised immigrants recorded on the eve of the Great War, which becomes still more significant when related to the considerably higher level of social rights which, compared to a century ago, is guaranteed even by a “lightweight” welfare state such as that of the United States. The data recorded in the USA highlight the many positive valencies of naturalisation, which is significantly related to the ratio of involvement of immigrant women in the workforce, to the

reduction of differences in the jobs of immigrants and natives, to the rise in the average income, to the reduction of the poverty rate and to home ownership (Schmidley).

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Intervento di Luigi Pedrazzini

La vera meta dell'emigrante non è il nostro paese, ma il suo !

Permettetemi in primo luogo di esprimere un plauso agli organizzatori di questo convegno. E' molto importante discutere, in modo razionale e scientifico, sul tema delle migrazioni, ben sapendo che con questo tema, con i suoi rischi e, spero anche, con le sue opportunità, saremo confrontati a lungo.

Il Ticino ha conosciuto il fenomeno della migrazione, soprattutto nella seconda parte del 19° secolo e nei primi decenni del 20°. Non si è trattato soltanto di migrazione stagionale verso la Lombardia o la Francia, ma anche di partenza definitiva.

Le condizioni di miseria spingevano allora intere famiglie a cercare la fortuna in altri Paesi, principalmente in California e in Australia.

Il prof. Giorgio Cheda, con le sue ricerche, ci ha dato un resoconto storico straordinario delle circostanze sociali e delle vicende umane che hanno caratterizzato l'emigrazione ticinese.

Rileggendo recentemente alcune pagine del suo studio sull'emigrazione ticinese in Australia, ho ritrovato, specchiata, parte dell'attualità di questi anni.

Si potrebbe pensare che un popolo che ha vissuto sulle sue spalle il dramma (perché di questo quasi sempre si tratta) dell'emigrazione, dovrebbe avere comprensione per gli emigranti, anche se il suo paese diventa meta e non più punto di partenza del fenomeno migratorio.

Così non sembra essere, per molte ragioni sulle quali non intendo oggi indagare (anche perché non ne avrei la competenza storica e sociologica). Osservo soltanto che anche la nostra piccola società ticinese reagisce spesso in modo emozionale di fronte all'afflusso di persone alla ricerca di migliori condizioni economiche, lasciandosi facilmente guidare, nelle sue reazioni sul piano politico, da coloro che fanno leva sulle ansie e sulle preoccupazioni (atteggiamento emozionale che, stando alle recenti decisioni del Consiglio Nazionale sulla recentissima riforma della legge sull'asilo, pare ormai guidare anche le scelte al massimo livello politico svizzero. Fra le decisioni recentemente adottate, che attestano di una visione sempre più restrittiva in materia di asilo, meritano di essere ricordate il rifiuto della proposta tendente ad introdurre l'ammissione per motivi umanitari, l'esclusione dalla procedura di asilo per richiedenti privi di documenti di identità e l'estromissione dalle prestazioni assistenziali per coloro la cui domanda sia stata definitivamente rigettata).

Sia perciò benvenuta, anche per questo, una riflessione seria e impegnata, che ci permetta di considerare il fenomeno delle migrazioni sotto differenti prospettive, di scambiare esperienze, di migliorare le nostre strategie.

Il mio compito è oggi quello di offrirvi un contributo sul tema "migrazioni e sicurezza" dal punto di vista regionale – cantonale.

Parlare senza pudori del problema sicurezza.

E' inutile fingere di non vedere come stanno le cose: il fenomeno delle migrazioni può costituire una minaccia per la nostra sicurezza. E' giusto parlarne in modo razionale, prendendo conoscenza delle cifre. E' sbagliato nascondere la realtà, come qualche volta si è fatto nel passato, perché così facendo l'autorità perde la credibilità necessaria agli occhi dell'opinione pubblica, e diviene poi di fatto incapace di proporre un approccio costruttivo e disponibile sui problemi della migrazione.

Le statistiche di Polizia ci dicono che gli stranieri, pur essendo una minoranza, sono proporzionalmente responsabili di un numero di reati superiore a quello degli indigeni. Nel 2004 la popolazione carceraria era costituita nella misura del 68,1% da popolazione straniera (con un aumento spettacolare in pochi anni, se si pensa che la percentuale era “solo” del 47,6% nel 2001). La frequenza dei reati appare statisticamente più elevata presso gli stranieri venuti nel nostro Paese con l'intenzione di richiedere l'asilo. Uno studio di qualche anno fa stimava che una percentuale fra il 10 e il 15% dei cosiddetti asilanti tendeva a comportarsi illegalmente.

Va però immediatamente aggiunto e precisato che gli stranieri che commettono reati rimangono una forte minoranza sull'insieme degli stranieri, e questo vale anche per i richiedenti l'asilo. Va perciò con forza respinta l'equazione: straniero = potenziale delinquente.

Lascio a altri di indagare sulle ragioni di questa situazione, anche se penso che non siano necessarie delle conoscenze specialistiche per capire che due sembrano le cause principali degli atteggiamenti illegali: le condizioni di povertà e la provenienza da paesi dove la popolazione ha una percezione diversa, culturalmente e giuridicamente, della legalità e dell'illegalità.

A conferma di quest'ultima supposizione, il fatto che la predisposizione al comportamento illegale non è egualmente ripartita fra le popolazioni straniere che vivono in condizioni di povertà e che vengono da noi per migliorare le loro condizioni economiche. Il Ticino ha conosciuto per tutta la seconda metà del secolo scorso una forte immigrazione europea (in particolare italiana, spagnola e portoghese) senza conoscere particolari problemi di sicurezza; negli anni scorsi abbiamo avuto un afflusso relativamente importante di poverissimi ecuadoriani che hanno dato pochissimi problemi dal profilo dell'ordine pubblico (e di questo parlerò ancora successivamente).

L'impressione è che la questione diventa invece più acuta per le persone provenienti da Paesi dove in tempi recenti si è combinato lo sfascio delle istituzioni con una forte trasformazione di valori e di tradizioni acquisite.

A conclusione di questa prima parte, sottolineo la necessità, per l'autorità politica, di guardare in faccia alla realtà e di adottare adeguate strategie per evitare che il fenomeno delle migrazioni diventi una costante minaccia alla nostra sicurezza.

Esperienze vissute durante i sei anni di appartenenza al Governo cantonale, mi hanno convinto che la nostra popolazione non è contraria per principio a accogliere gli stranieri in difficoltà, a offrire loro una seconda patria.

Questa accoglienza non deve però minacciare la sicurezza delle persone, delle città e dei Paesi. E' verosimile ritenere che talune espressioni di chiusura si sono prodotte anche per una gestione del fenomeno migratorio che dava un'impressione di debolezza e di mancanza di chiarezza da parte dell'autorità competente.

Le limitate competenze cantonali

Cosa può fare un'autorità cantonale per migliorare le condizioni di sicurezza in relazione al fenomeno delle migrazioni?

Per rispondere è opportuno conoscere il quadro giuridico federale da cui derivano gli spazi di manovra cantonale. Ecco, in breve, la situazione.

L'ordinamento giuridico svizzero in materia di stranieri e di asilo non riflette la struttura federalista con la quale lo Stato elvetico è costituzionalmente organizzato: la sovranità e l'azione dei Cantoni in questo campo è ammessa nella misura in cui esse non siano limitate da quelle della Confederazione. Nel contesto dell'asilo la Costituzione federale conferisce a quest'ultima esclusiva competenza a legiferare (art. 121 Cost. fed).

In questo ambito il legislatore federale ha voluto circoscrivere l'intervento dei cantoni nei settori concernenti l'approntamento delle condizioni di accoglienza dei richiedenti l'asilo (art. 80 LAsi), l'erogazione delle prestazioni assistenziali a favore di questi ultimi (art. 81 LAsi) nonché l'esecuzione delle decisioni di allontanamento di richiedenti la cui domanda è stata definitivamente respinta (art. 46 LAsi).

Ne discende che la trattazione degli aspetti essenziali afferenti alla politica delle migrazioni è curata dall'autorità federale, la quale è soprattutto competente per l'applicazione della procedura e per la pronuncia della decisione sulla concessione dell'asilo (art. 25 LAsi).

Nella politica migratoria le facoltà d'intervento lasciate a disposizione dei cantoni sono pertanto estremamente ristrette, per non dire praticamente inesistenti. Questi ultimi devono limitarsi al ruolo di esecutore di quanto stabilito dall'autorità federale.

Il discorso è differente per quanto concerne la gestione dei problemi di sicurezza, che sono di competenza cantonale, anche se il quadro giuridico delle norme applicabili è federale. Oltre alle norme del Codice Penale, per la problematica specifica degli stranieri dal comportamento socialmente deviante, sono previste le cosiddette misure coercitive che consentono di trarre in detenzione in un apposito stabilimento carcerario coloro la cui attività rappresenta un serio pericolo per la vita o la salute altrui.

Questo provvedimento investe concretamente soprattutto quei richiedenti l'asilo dediti allo smercio al dettaglio di sostanze stupefacenti (nei confronti dei quali il più delle volte la comminazione di precedenti condanne penali si è rivelata scarsamente dissuasiva). La limitazione della libertà di movimento, nella forma di perimetri territoriali di attribuzione o di esclusione, costituisce un'ulteriore misura coercitiva che può essere ordinata avverso stranieri recalcitranti che attentano alla pubblica sicurezza in modo meno grave a quello precedentemente descritto.

La “politica” cantonale

Come avrete dedotto dalle mie precedenti considerazioni, lo spazio di manovra cantonale per gestire il fenomeno delle migrazioni è assai limitato e lo diventerà ancora maggiormente se andrà in porto la nuova legge federale sull'asilo.

Se nel passato, infatti, vi è stato spazio per far emergere sensibilità differenti dei Cantoni di fronte alla presenza di stranieri richiedenti l'asilo (o di stranieri “clandestini”), la più recente politica della Confederazione tende a diventare sempre più restrittiva. Ciò vale in particolare per la trattazione di casi umanitari, che spesso si pongono all'attenzione delle autorità cantonali.

Per quanto concerne la sicurezza, anche l'autorità cantonale ticinese non è sfuggita alla critica, espressa soprattutto dagli schieramenti politici di destra, di essere eccessivamente morbida nei confronti degli stranieri che commettono reati.

Respingo questa critica, poiché ritengo che le condizioni di sicurezza offerte nel nostro Paese rimangono elevate e non sono al momento seriamente minacciate dal fenomeno migratorio. Ciò

dicendo non voglio negare, né misconoscere che abbiamo avuto e avremo dei problemi sul fronte della sicurezza e che pertanto dovremo continuare a mantenere alta la guardia.

La Polizia ha comunque registrato in tempi recenti significativi successi, anche grazie a strategie mirate. Non si tratta, come potete facilmente immaginare, di un'azione semplice, anche perché gli attori di attività illegali operano sempre più frequentemente da una posizione di clandestinità (anche per effetto della nuova politica federale in materia di richiesta d'asilo) e tendono a sfruttare, se mi si passa il termine, i "vantaggi competitivi" della fascia di frontiera (soprattutto nell'ambito dei furti operano bande che di fatto risiedono nella vicina repubblica, dove rientrano dopo aver agito e spesso dopo essersi liberate della refurtiva).

E' sotto questo punto di vista necessario perseguire due obiettivi: organizzare le risposte di Polizia in modo rapido e flessibile e poter sviluppare una stretta collaborazione non soltanto a livello internazionale, ma anche, sul piano regionale, a livello transfrontaliero.

Per quanto concerne il Canton Ticino, ricordo che proprio uno degli obiettivi principali perseguiti dalla riforma della Polizia cantonale, e in particolare dalla recente creazione della Polizia mobile, è quello di aumentare la rapidità degli interventi e l'intensificazione dei controlli sul territorio, al fine di costituire un filtro credibile capace di compensare l'abbandono progressivo dei controlli alla frontiera (sempre meno efficaci per risolvere i problemi di sicurezza dati dalla mobilità delle persone).

Per quanto attiene alla collaborazione con le autorità della vicina repubblica italiana, ricordo che oltre all'entrata della Svizzera nello spazio di Schengen e la sottoscrizione degli accordi di Dublino, è operativo da alcuni anni il centro di cooperazione di Chiasso: uno strumento importante proprio nell'ottica di meglio gestire i problemi di sicurezza in un contesto di grande mobilità delle persone.

Ricordo ancora che la stragrande maggioranza dei reati imputabili a persone toccate dal fenomeno delle migrazioni rientrano nella cosiddetta criminalità minore (furti, spaccio di piccoli quantitativi di droga).

L'autorità amministrativa, dal canto suo, ha fatto a più riprese ricorso alle citate misure coercitive, in particolare al fermo amministrativo, per cercare di neutralizzare persone con tendenza a comportamenti problematici.

Per valutare correttamente la situazione occorre tenere conto che le misure di Polizia, così come le sanzioni penali non producono sempre l'effetto sperato, anche perché vengono percepite in misura diversa da persone che, in primo luogo, non hanno molto da perdere (si pensi all'aumentato numero di persone che sono da noi in attesa di un rimpatrio problematico per assenza di documenti, rispettivamente per il rifiuto del presunto paese di origine di accettare il rientro) e, in secondo, provengono da paesi che hanno da tempo perso, se mai lo hanno recentemente avuto, uno "Stato di diritto".

Proprio per queste ragioni è importante che il problema della sicurezza riferito alle migrazioni non venga affrontato con la sola arma della Polizia e della repressione penale. Risultati importanti, a medio e lungo termine, si possono ottenere attraverso un corretto processo di integrazione che permetta a tutte le comunità di stranieri di identificarsi e perciò di meglio rispettare i fondamenti insostituibili del nostro Stato di diritto, i diritti fondamentali costituzionali (io do per scontato, ma spero che così la pensino i più, che una politica d'integrazione, per quanto aperta e dinamica, non possa prescindere dal pretendere assoluto rispetto dei principi fondamentali della nostra Carta

costituzionale: su questi principi e sui fondamenti dello stato di diritto, non può esservi, secondo me, spazio per compromessi d'ordine politico o religioso).

Forte di questa convinzione, e cioè che la risposta di Polizia non possa essere l'unica, e strategicamente la più importante, per salvaguardare un elevato livello di sicurezza in un contesto migratorio, anche il Canton Ticino, così come numerosi suoi Comuni (fra cui la città che ci ospita) stanno adoperandosi per concretizzare un'efficace politica d'integrazione (condivisa, per quanto concerne le responsabilità di realizzare numerose iniziative, dalle comunità straniere stesse).

Vorrei in questo ambito in particolare menzionare

- l'esistenza di una commissione cantonale consultiva per l'integrazione e la lotta al razzismo, presieduta dall'avv. Fulvio Pezzati;

- la creazione di un delegato all'integrazione e alla lotta al razzismo nella persona del signor Ermete Gauro;

- il sostegno, rispettivamente la promozione di alcuni progetti fra cui giornate di informazione, incontri fra la popolazione indigena e le comunità straniere, pubblicazioni, sostegno alla nascita del FIMM (forum dei migranti); abbiamo inoltre in previsione, dall'ottobre prossimo, l'apertura di un sito dal nome "rivista interculturale".

Un ruolo importante, per quanto concerne l'integrazione, è svolto dalla scuola ticinese: per decisione del Consiglio di Stato le porte della nostra scuola sono sempre aperte ai bambini e ai giovani, indipendentemente dallo statuto della famiglia. Questa precisa volontà del Consiglio di Stato coincide peraltro con l'attuazione del diritto all'istruzione scolastica di base sancito dalla Costituzione federale, che garantisce a chiunque risieda sul territorio nazionale la facoltà di frequentare le scuole dell'obbligo (art. 19 Cost. fed.).

L'esperienza ci ha indicato che la scuola è fattore fondamentale per l'integrazione degli stranieri.

In questo ambito giova pure ricordare l'importante funzione integrativa offerta dalla possibilità di svolgere un'attività di pubblica utilità da parte di coloro che sono in attesa di conoscere l'esito della loro domanda di asilo. La possibilità di svolgere tali attività oltre ad rafforzare il senso di autostima ed il rispetto della loro dignità personale contribuisce a prevenire la pratica e la diffusione di attività illecite. Penso che sotto questo specifico aspetto vi sia ancora lavoro da fare, e guardo personalmente con simpatia alla possibilità di offrire un lavoro ai richiedenti l'asilo che avranno ricevuto una decisione positiva di entrata in materia della loro richiesta.

Consentitemi ancora una breve considerazione per ricordare un progetto che mi sta molto a cuore. Vi ho parlato della presenza in Ticino di una comunità di ecuadoriani. Secondo le nostre leggi questi stranieri non potevano rimanere e esercitare attività economica, anche se appariva evidente che da noi cercavano soprattutto mezzi di sostentamento economico. Personalmente ho riscontrato in questo tipo di emigrazione alcune significative affinità con la nostra emigrazione. Anche per questo, ma anche perché gli ecuadoriani presenti da noi provenivano tutti dalla medesima regione, abbiamo valutato se non esistevano le condizioni per attuare un progetto di aiuto a questa popolazione nella sua patria. Abbiamo interpellato la ditta CONSONO di Lugano e ne è nato un progetto concreto e finora vincente. Premesso il loro ritorno in patria, abbiamo predisposto le condizioni per permettere loro di vivere dignitosamente in Ecuador. Non ho il tempo materiale per entrare nel dettaglio, ma credo di poter dire che questo progetto promosso dal mio dipartimento può diventare esemplare di una risposta concreta e corretta al fenomeno delle migrazioni.

Perché una cosa penso si possa dire in conclusione di questo mio intervento: non dimentichiamo che la vera meta nel cuore dell'emigrante non è il nostro Paese, ma il suo !

Vi ringrazio per l'attenzione.

Intervento di Marko Hajdinjak

DON'T WANT TO LIVE WITH THEM, CAN'T AFFORD TO LIVE WITHOUT THEM: ALBANIAN LABOR MIGRATION IN GREECE

When speaking about emigration in Europe, Albania makes a striking example. According to reliable estimates, around 900,000 people have left the country in the last 15 years, which represents over one quarter of the population and over 35% of the active work force.⁹⁷ In terms of the share of the population, which has left the country, only Moldova can compare with Albania in the whole of Europe. The main difference between the two countries is that a very significant part of the people who left Moldova emigrated to Russia and, in case of women, trafficked for employment in sex industry, also to Turkey and Middle East. In contrast, the emigration flow from Albania has been directed almost exclusively to the EU countries. A smaller number of Albanian emigrants, especially after 1995, went also overseas to the USA and Canada and in these cases, we can speak about almost 100% legal emigration of people winning the Green Card lottery program or being accepted as students to various North American universities. Popular destinations for Albanian emigrants in Europe include Germany and Switzerland, although they are much more common for Albanians from former Yugoslavia, and less so for Albanians from Albania proper. The two top destinations for them are undoubtedly Italy and Greece, the obvious reasons being the cultural and geographical proximity.

The following paper will analyze the case of Albanian emigration to Greece, as the Albanian immigrants in Greece make for another striking example. Rarely immigrants from one country represent such a high percent of all immigrants in another country as do Albanians in Greece. According to the 2001 census, there were 762,191 foreign nationals residing legally in Greece. Of this number, 57.5% (438,036) were Albanians.⁹⁸ When the estimation about illegal immigration is added to this number, we get an approximation of over a million immigrants in Greece, of which over 600,000 are Albanians. The paper will present the reasons for Albanian mass emigration to Greece, analyze the positive and negative effects of this emigration on Greece and Albania, and discuss the attitudes of Greek society towards the Albanian immigrants.

Waves of Albanian emigration

Ever since achieving its independence in 1912, Albania has been the poorest and most underdeveloped European country. It therefore comes as no surprise that emigration has always been very strong. During the inter-war period, most of the emigrants left for Italy, which was virtually running Albania as its protectorate even before invading and occupying it in 1939. In the first years of the communist rule, following the WWII, the emigration from Albania was mostly political, as many of those associated with the anti-Communist elites, which governed Albania during the war in collaboration with Italy and Germany, fled the country.

When the communist party consolidated its rule over the country, and especially after the 1948 break of all ties with the neighboring Yugoslavia, immigration was forbidden. The iron control of the borders and threat of severe punishment not only for immigrants, but also for their

⁹⁷ Barjaba Kosta. "Albania: Looking Beyond Borders." Migration Policy Institute. August 1, 2004. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=239>

⁹⁸ See "Census 2001: Table 3 (NATIONAL LEVEL): Usual resident population by sex, country of citizenship and age group," General Secretariat of the National Statistical Service of Greece, http://www.statistics.gr/eng_tables/S1100_SAP_5_euro03.htm

relatives staying behind, virtually cut the emigration flows from Albania. The tide has actually turned and Albania accepted up to 20,000 Chams (one of the ethnic groups, forming the Albanian nation), who were expelled from Greece after WWII.⁹⁹

The third and by far the largest wave of Albanian emigration begun in 1990, when the communist rule started to crumble. In that year, after four decades of self-imposed isolation, the communist government finally granted the Albanian citizens the right to receive a passport and to travel abroad. In July 1990, around 4,500 Albanians broke into various foreign embassies in Tirana, demanding asylum. Before the first democratic elections held in March 1991, more than 50,000 people have left the country.¹⁰⁰ By the end of 1992, another 250,000 have followed them. Television pictures of thousands of Albanians, crossing the Adriatic Sea on their way to Italy in rusty boats, barely able to stay afloat, perhaps illustrated best this period of uncontrolled, and perhaps uncontrollable emigration. This initial explosion of emigration somewhat reduced in the following years due to a slight economic improvement and better border control, but despite that, between 1992 and 1997, another 300,000 Albanians left their country.¹⁰¹

The crisis of 1997, triggered by the collapse of the pyramid financial schemes, resulted in another mass migration of around 70,000 people in a period of just few months. Gradual stabilization after 1998 again reduced the strength of the emigration flow. This last period from 1998 until today has been characterized by a gradual decrease of the illegal emigration and increase of the legal one.¹⁰²

Given the widespread poverty in the communist and post-communist Albania, it comes as no surprise that most of the emigrants headed towards the two nearest EU countries – Italy and Greece. The proximity was not the only reason, however. In 1980s Albania finally entered “the television age” and by 1985, there were about 200,000 TV sets in the country. These TV sets brought Italian TV programs into many Albanian homes, turning Italy into a true dreamland in the minds of numerous Albanians.¹⁰³ By the early 1990s, Italian was the most common foreign language in Albania, and the Italian arts, culture and lifestyle were highly appreciated. Although Greece could not compete with this perception of Italy as a promised land, it had other “advantages.” Very long green border between the two counties is “appropriate” for illegal crossing, and unlike emigration to Italy, which requires the payment of boat transportation, the costs are relatively low. Greeks and Albanians also share a number of cultural and historic characteristics, and the Greek economy, as will be discussed below, to a very large extent relies on the work of illegal immigrants. For these reasons, Greece became the most popular destination country for hundreds of thousands of Albanians.

Migration policies

During the 1990s, Albania had virtually no migration regulation. The 1995 Migration Act was hardly more than a paper, especially after the 1997 crisis. In 2003, the Albanian government adopted the Labor Migration Act, which defined the government’s responsibilities towards emigrants, providing them with information and assistance for the employment possibilities in the destination counties and promoting the emigrants’ return to Albania. The government tried to

⁹⁹ Since the fall of communism, Chams have been returning to the villages of northern Greece, where once they have lived. In order to legalize their status, many have been presenting themselves as Greeks from northern Epirus and adopting Greek names. Many have started legal proceedings to be given back the land and property of their ancestors. Antonina Zhelyazkova. *Urgent Anthropology. Vol. 2: Albanian Prospects*. IMIR, Sofia, 2003, pp. 205-207.

¹⁰⁰ Nicholas C. Pano. “Albania” in *The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Edited by Joseph Held. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 59-60.

¹⁰¹ Kosta. “Albania: Looking Beyond Borders.”

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Pano. “Albania,” p. 48.

decrease the emigration flow by creating employment possibilities at home, or by signing a number of bilateral seasonal employment agreements with various EU countries.¹⁰⁴

Huge influx of immigrants into Greece, which was until recently predominantly an emigration country, caught the Greek government unprepared. Despite the awareness that a concrete and comprehensive policy and legal framework were needed for dealing with hundreds of thousands of immigrants, little was done until 1997. In November of that year, two presidential decrees were issued, allowing illegal immigrants to legalize their status by applying for temporary residence permits. However, both the Greek administration and the immigrant community itself were quite unprepared for this change in the legislation, and as a result, less than half of immigrants were actually legalized in this first cycle of regulation (371,000 received a temporary residence permits, but only 212,000 received a work permit also).¹⁰⁵ The main reasons for the limited success were the difficulties in obtaining the necessary documentation, the lack of desire among bureaucrats to assist the applicants and the fear among the immigrants that they might be expelled when stepping out of the illegality.¹⁰⁶

The second period of regulation started with the adoption of the new immigration and citizenship law in June 2001. The law enabled a huge step towards legalization of illegal immigrants in Greece, with about 350,000 of them submitting documents. However, it failed to go all the way, with around one third of the immigrant community remaining illegal and consequently vulnerable to exploitation on the labor market.¹⁰⁷ The slow bureaucracy and the lack of necessary infrastructure caused enormous delays in the processing of applications, which lasted for over two years.¹⁰⁸ In some cases, after waiting more than one year, immigrants received residence permits, which have already expired. This and a number of other problems pushed the Greek government to adopt amendments to the immigration law.¹⁰⁹

The amendments of 2002 and 2003 changed the immigration law, seriously easing the bureaucratic hassle migrants had to go through in order to obtain residence permits. In December 2003, the Parliament passed the law “On election expenditures,” where special amendments to the immigration law were introduced in order to facilitate the employment and residence for migrants in Greece.¹¹⁰ The new legislation, facilitating the third period of regulation, was due to enter in force in October 2005.

According to official data, 700,000 resident permits (almost all of them temporary, for the period of one to two years) were issued between July 2003 and October 2004. Of this number, Albanians who received residence permits in this period were 432,120 (or 61.8%). The reason for a vast majority of permits (80%) was employment. Other more common reasons were family reunion, study, business (company executives) and marriage to an EU national. Family reunion is dominated by Albanians at 80% of the total – well above their recorded presence in the immigrant population of Greece. Albanians are the leading nationality also when given residence for study purposes, although with only 17%.¹¹¹

Around 40% of the Albanians, who were included in the census, declared that they have lived in Greece for more than 5 years. Apart from immigrants from the Philippines, Albanians have

¹⁰⁴ Kosta. “Albania: Looking Beyond Borders.”

¹⁰⁵ Charalambos Kasimis and Kassimi, Chryssa. “Greece: A History of Migration.” Migration Policy Institute. June 2004. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=228>

¹⁰⁶ Kalliopi Lykovardi and Petroula, Eleni. “Greece” in *EU and US Approaches to the Management of Immigration*. Brussels/Athens: Migration Policy Group, May 2003, p.1. <http://www.kemo.gr/archive/papers/M.P.G.htm>

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

¹⁰⁸ Kasimis and Kassimi. “Greece: A History of Migration.”

¹⁰⁹ Vsevolod Samokhvalov. “Greece and Migrants: The Process of Integration.” International Center for Black Sea Studies. 2004. http://www.picum.org/BASIC_SOCIAL_RIGHTS/Greece_and_migrants.doc

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ “Statistical Data on Immigrants in Greece: An Analytical Study of Available Data and Recommendations for Conformity with European Union Standards.” Mediterranean Migration Observatory, 2004. http://www.mmo.gr/pdf/general/IMEPO_Final_Report_English.pdf

the largest share of people residing in Greece for such a long period of time.¹¹² Despite the campaigns for legalization of illegal immigrants, it seems that the Greek government is somewhat reluctant to try to terminate the informal labor market completely. The most obvious indication is that work permits issued to immigrants are mostly short term, giving the authorities the possibility of pushing a given immigrant back into the gray zone anytime they consider it appropriate.¹¹³

Influence of migration on the country of origin

Probably the most negative effect emigration has on Albania is brain drain, or as one author described it, “brain waste.”¹¹⁴ Studies have shown that 74 percent of immigrants in Greece do not work in the areas and positions, which correspond to their level of education. A large number of well educated and high skilled Albanian immigrants work in Greece as construction or agricultural manual laborers. In the period from 1990 to 2003, around 45% of university professors and researchers emigrated, as did a substantial majority of university graduates. This significantly decreased the level of quality of university education and it is not uncommon for young and relatively inexperienced holders of MA degrees from various western European or US universities to be employed as lecturers at the Tirana University.

Among the positive influences, remittances are the most obvious one. The estimated \$780 million have been sent to Albania by Albanians working abroad in 2003, which is more than double than in 1994, when \$378 million have been sent. Most of these remittances enter the country through informal channels, most often carried by a trusted person, due to a widespread distrust in the Albanian banking system.¹¹⁵ However, while remittances have a definitely positive effect on the life of many Albanians, who would otherwise live in absolute poverty, their effect on the Albanian economy and Albanian society as a whole is limited. Most of the funds sent back home are spent on improving the quality of life of one’s family and on enlarging old or building new family houses. Rarely is the money invested into opening businesses and creating new jobs. The booming construction business that can be observed all over Albania and especially in the big cities and along the coast is very often driven by dirty money, generated through smuggling, and laundered through construction.

Apart from remittances, the technical knowledge and work experience, obtained abroad by immigrants who returned home, has helped to modernize production. However, due to the limited investment, this “capital” has not been explored sufficiently.

Socio-economic effects on the destination country

Measuring the socio-economic effects of the immigrants on Greece is hampered by the lack of official data on the situation of immigrants in the country. As the study of the Mediterranean Migration Observatory has shown, a number of Ministries (Ministries of Interior, Labor, Education, Public Order and Foreign Affairs) and state services (National Statistical Service and the state social insurance foundation, IKA) have their own partial databases on immigrants, but the communication between them is very poor and so far no attempt has been made to unify this information into one comprehensive database. The most useful and reliable source of information remains the 2001 census. The census data for example show that the highest concentration of immigrants can be found in the Attica region, south-western Greece, some tourist islands and along the border with Albania. The municipality of Athens has the largest share of immigrants among the population – 17

¹¹² Martin Baldwin-Edwards. "Immigration into Greece, 1990-2003: A Southern European Paradigm?". Presentation made at the European Population forum, Geneva, January 12-14, 2004, p. 8. http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00001078/02/UNECE_paperV3-1.pdf

¹¹³ Martin Baldwin-Edwards. “Southern European Labour Markets and Immigration: A Structural and Functional Analysis” in *The Greek Labour Yearbook*. Athens: Panteion University Press, 2001. http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00001079/01/MMO_WP5.pdf

¹¹⁴ Kosta. “Albania: Looking Beyond Borders.”

¹¹⁵ Kosta. “Albania: Looking Beyond Borders.”

percent (over 130,000 immigrants). The second largest cluster of immigrants lives in Thessaloniki – 27,000, which represents 7% of the city’s population.¹¹⁶

Like most other European countries, Greece has a negative demographic balance, with only 1.3 children born per every woman in 2001. Despite that, the population increased for about 704,000 people between 1991 and 2001. This increase can be almost fully attributed to immigrants. Almost 80% of these immigrants are in the active working age (between 15 and 64), compared to 67.7% of the native population. Within the immigrant community, Albanians are on average the youngest population, and as such, they are of exceptional importance for keeping the Greek social and pension systems above the water.¹¹⁷

The census data show that a large majority of Albanian immigrants work in the construction sector, but they are present in almost all employment sectors, the other most popular being agriculture, industry and tourism. In construction, Albanians represent around 27% of all construction workers, and about 75% of all immigrant workers, employed in construction. Regarding the Albanian female immigrants, which constitute 41% of the Albanian immigrant community, a large majority has declared to be employed in the “other” category, which presumably means housework and cleaning. Albanian women are also often employed in agriculture and tourism, the latter again presumably meaning mostly as cleaners in hotels and restaurants.¹¹⁸

Albanians, like majority of other immigrants, work in poorly regulated, difficult and underpaid jobs, where often no EU standards for healthy and safe working environment are respected. For these reasons, they rarely find themselves in a direct competition with the native Greeks on the job market. Majority of young Greeks, similarly to their peers in other southern European countries, tend to delay their entry on the labor market by prolonging their studies. Highly educated, they often prefer unemployment and “waiting on an appropriate position” to accepting a “lower status” job. Thus, despite the relatively high unemployment rate in Greece (nine percent), the labor market is hungry for immigrants, willing to accept badly paid difficult work the native population rejects.¹¹⁹

In some cases, entire sections of Greek economy depend on immigrant work force. This is especially true for agricultural sector and for a large number of small family businesses, which require cheap, often illegal labor. By paying the lower than realistic wages and paying no social security contributions and taxes for the illegal immigrant workers, numerous businesses manage to stay competitive on the demanding market. The low cost of unskilled or semi-skilled labor compensates for the low productivity and some economists estimate that a large share of Greek economic growth has been achieved through the underpaid work of illegal immigrants.¹²⁰

Illegal workers can be dismissed instantly when the employer no longer needs them, and even if the employer fails to pay them what was agreed upon, they have no formal channels through which they could protect their rights.¹²¹ Many thus turn to informal or illegal channels. Albanians are especially well known for their inter-communal solidarity and organization. In 2002, International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations conducted a field study on Albanian immigrants in Greece. Immigrants of other nationalities IMIR’s team spoke with expressed both envy and admiration about Albanians, whom they described as exceptionally united and resolute. Albanians upheld their interests before the employers, bargained for their wages, and did not tolerate insults and humiliation. One of the Albanian respondents told the team that no employer would dare to cheat an Albanian because he would gather a number of his fellow-countrymen and “the employer would get his due punishment.”¹²²

¹¹⁶ “Statistical Data on Immigrants in Greece”

¹¹⁷ Kasimis and Kassimi. “Greece: A History of Migration.”

¹¹⁸ Baldwin-Edwards. “Immigration into Greece, 1990-2003,” pp. 8-9.

¹¹⁹ Baldwin-Edwards. “Southern European Labour Markets and Immigration.”

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Zhelyazkova. *Albanian Prospects*, pp. 220-221.

In strictly economic terms, the large number of Albanian immigrant workers had an undoubtedly positive effect on the Greek economy, though the morality of these effects is more than questionable. However, there have been negative consequences as well. The low salaries Albanians are prepared to work for have pushed away the native workers, especially from certain industrial sectors and construction. The abundance of cheap labor force has also seriously weakened the strength of trade unions, as Albanian workers are rarely involved in them.¹²³

Attitudes of the Greek society towards Albanian immigrants

A number of studies show that Albanians are by far the most disliked non-Greek community in the country and a number of negative stereotypes, fueled by sensationalist media reporting, are directed towards Albanians. Many Greeks are both hostile towards and afraid of Albanians, who are perceived as being deeply involved in the organized crime and are often accused of being the main reason for the raising crime rates in the country. On a number of occasions, politicians or representatives of public institutions like police, made statements, which contributed to public perception of Albanians as criminals. Media, despite also giving attention in recent years to the issues like immigration management, economic aspects of immigration and human rights of the immigrants, still in most cases prefer sensationalist and biased approach, stressing the immigrants' criminality.¹²⁴ Yet, in fact studies show that Albanians are involved in only 4.5% of the crimes, which roughly corresponds to their share of the population.¹²⁵

Negative attitudes towards Albanians are not something new in Greece – they existed even before the huge influx of Albanian immigrants to the country. A sociological survey, conducted in 1993, was measuring sympathies and antipathies of Greeks towards various nationalities and ethnic groups. According to the survey, the most disliked nation for Greeks were Turks, named by 79.5 percent of the respondents. Albanians came as the close second, with a disapproval rate of 75.5%.¹²⁶

Majority of Greek respondents, which were interviewed during IMIR's field research stated that the "Albanian immigrants alarmed them, and that the Greek government was responsible for their vast number and their pervasive criminality."¹²⁷ Respondents in another study expressed their concerns that Albanians might break into their house, robbing or killing them, as well as the fears that Albanians were threatening the cultural and blood purity of the Greek population.¹²⁸

The widespread opinion among Greeks that "all Albanians are criminals" and that they represent a danger has been fueled by several incidents. Among them, three cases of armed Albanians hijacking buses, full of passengers, and demanding ransom and free passage to Albania drew most attention. The incidents occurred in May and July of 1999 and in December 2004. In the first two cases, the hijackers were killed by the police (in one case it was the Albanian police, as the bus was allowed to cross the border into Albania), and in the most recent case, the drama ended through negotiations.¹²⁹

The public perception of Albanians as criminals has been on numerous occasions exploited by the Greek government as a bargaining chip in the relations with Albania. Periodically, the Greek side has used forced repatriations of large numbers of Albanian illegal workers to put pressure on Tirana. Such massive deportations of Albanians have occurred in December 1991, June 1993, autumn 1994, August 1996 and July 1999. Deportations of June 1993 occurred as an instant response to the expulsion of a Greek priest from Albania, accused of stirring up the Greek minority in the town of Gjirokaster and advocating the annexation of Southern Albania to Greece. The crisis

¹²³ Maria Vidali. "Living in a Policy Vacuum: The Plight of Albanian Immigrants in Greece." *Central Europe Review*, Vol 1, No 21, November 15, 1999. <http://www.ce-review.org/99/21/vidali21.html>

¹²⁴ Lykovardi and Petroula. "Greece."

¹²⁵ Vidali. "Living in a Policy Vacuum."

¹²⁶ Quoted in Zhelyazkova. *Albanian Prospects*, p. 198.

¹²⁷ Zhelyazkova. *Albanian Prospects*, p. 212.

¹²⁸ Vidali. "Living in a Policy Vacuum."

¹²⁹ "Greek Albanians' Woes Fester." *BBC News*. December 16, 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4101469.stm>

deteriorated to the point when Albanian ambassador was recalled from Athens. In April 1994, two Albanian soldiers, patrolling the border, were killed, allegedly by Greek soldiers. Tirana and Athens expelled each other's diplomats, and in Albania, five leaders of OMONOIA, political organization of Greek minority in Albania, were arrested on suspicion of being involved in the incident. They were convicted for espionage and illegal arms possession. Athens reacted instantly by expelling more than 100,000 Albanians from Greece in August 1994.

Mass expulsion of Albanians occurred also after the bus hijacking in July 1999 and was obviously aimed both at satisfying the outrage of the Greek public and at demonstrating to Tirana that Greece will use hard policy measures unless Tirana does something to decrease the criminal activity of its citizens.¹³⁰

Despite the fact that the stereotypes about Albanians as criminals is often a result of the generally exceptionally strong nationalism among Greeks, they are not entirely baseless. The exceptionally weak and ineffective state of Albania, which came on the edge of collapsing in 1991 and 1997, was a natural habitat for overwhelming growth of organized crime. As trans-border crime, including smuggling of arms and illegal drugs, and human trafficking, is among the most prosperous branches of the criminal industry, tentacles of the Albanian "octopus" could not fail to engulf Greece as well. Greece has been one of the major destinations for Albanian human traffickers, with girls as young as ten bought or kidnapped from their families and forced to prostitute in Greece. There have been also cases of Albanian babies being trafficked to Greece for illegal adoptions.¹³¹ Of course, it would be inaccurate to blame the rising crime rate in Greece in the recent years solely on Albanians. Greek and Albanian mafias have formed so-called "Brotherhoods" and as elsewhere in the Balkans, general ethnic distrust or even hatred is contrasted with a perfect inter-ethnic cooperation between various criminal organizations. The very profitable business of producing fake visas and passports or selling stolen visas and passports is also largely dominated by the native Greek mafia.¹³²

The two communities, the Albanian and the Greek, live virtually in two separate worlds. Albanians work for Greeks and this is practically the only interaction between the two groups. When members of one community do cross the line separating them, the result is usually confrontation, sometimes with fatal consequences. Such was the case in 2004 when groups of Albanian immigrants were attacked after coming out on the streets to celebrate the victory of the Albanian national football team over Greece in the World Cup qualifications. One man was stabbed to death and several others were injured.¹³³ Less violent, but equally telling example of Greek attitude towards Albanians was the occurrence in the village of Lapa on the Peloponnese. Each year, the day when Greece entered the WWII is marked by a parade, in which the brightest pupil from the local school carries the national flag. In the village of Lapa, the brightest pupil was an Albanian girl. Statistically, this is hardly surprising, since in some schools, immigrant children represent already 40% of the enrolled children. The reaction to the event was, nevertheless, extremely negative. The girl was forced to step down as a flag-bearer after protest from parents and other pupils, who claimed that "this was a Greek celebration and only a Greek could be carrying the flag."¹³⁴

What is striking is that IMIR's team encountered exceptionally negative attitude towards the Albanians even among those Greeks, who are of Albanian origin. Arvanitis are ethnic group of Albanian descent. According to Greek historians, they were an Albanian speaking Christian population, which was hired by Venetians as sailors in the 14th century to fight against the Ottomans. Arvanitis have long since abandoned Albanian language for Greek and integrated fully

¹³⁰ Vidali. "Living in a Policy Vacuum."

¹³¹ For more on organized crime in Albania, see Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis between the Security Sector and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2004, pp. 87-94. <http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=525>

¹³² Vidali. "Living in a Policy Vacuum."

¹³³ "Greek Albanians' Woes Fester."

¹³⁴ "Greek Albanians' Woes Fester."; Baldwin-Edwards. "Immigration into Greece, 1990-2003," p. 11.

into the Greek ethnos. Arvanitis respondents IMIR's team spoke with talked about Albanians with disgust, saying that "they have flooded Greece," that "they were not good people" and that they "steal, beat and kill." Some were afraid that Greeks might start to identify them, Arvanitis, with Albanians and their condemnable behavior, and as a result start to reject them.¹³⁵

The one thing Arvanitis, who are devout Christians, cannot forgive Albanians, is their apparent lack of respect for religion. In order to facilitate their integration, a large number of immigrants from Albania has been changing their names with Greek ones and adopting Orthodox Christianity, but only nominally, as a façade. Albanian immigrant respondents admitted that most of them are religiously indifferent and that they convert to Orthodoxy – an act regularly welcomed by the Orthodox clergy – for strictly pragmatic reasons. This makes their adaptation and legalization easier, and for their children, this is a path leading to equal position with the natives on the labor market in the future. The Greek authorities, which have been following the policy of complete Hellenization of the population of Greece since regaining independence, are naturally supportive of this phenomenon. One of the Albanian respondents, who crossed the border in the first wave of emigration in 1991 shared that when they were caught crossing the border, the Greek soldiers wanted them to make the sign of the cross to see who in the group was Orthodox (and therefore "Greek") and who was not. When the word of this incident spread in Albania, pragmatic Albanians begun instructing each other how to make the sign of the cross in the Orthodox way before attempting to cross the border.¹³⁶

Conclusion

From what has been said above, one can easily conclude that most of the Albanian immigrants in Greece have no plans of returning to Albania, but plan to stay in Greece. As one of the respondents described it, "we will always feel nostalgia for Albania, but we plan it like this: permanent residence for our families outside Albania, in a well-organized country, but we will build villas in our native places where we can go back for the holidays."¹³⁷ Some of the Greek scholars IMIR's team interviewed were well aware of the fact that in a few decades, Albanians might constitute 10 percent of the population of Greece. Sooner or later, they will start claiming political, cultural and educational rights, and they will probably set up a political party, which will represent their interests.¹³⁸ The Greek society, formed and consolidated under the "one nation – one state" slogan, is anything but prepared for this moment. The Greek governments, despite the three regulation campaigns, are reluctant to adopt appropriate and much needed protection and integration policies.

In fact, as Baldwin-Edwards points out, the Greek policy towards immigrants has been highly contradicting. The Greek society is in favor of legalized migration, but at the same time it needs and depends upon illegal workers, which can be manipulated, exploited and expelled if necessary. Both the society and the government fear permanent migration and want to limit it, yet few steps have been taken to enable and legalize seasonal migration. Albanian presence in the Greek economy is strongest in the northern border regions, which are also hotbeds of Greek nationalism and anti-Albanian sentiments. The issue of remittances taken to Albania is another contradiction: most Greeks are displeased with this and view it as "Greek money taken out of the country," but at the same time, these remittances might one day improve the situation in Albania to the extent that the Albanian immigrant pressure on Greece would be decreased.¹³⁹ As elsewhere in the peninsula, pragmatism in Greece is no match for nationalism.

¹³⁵ Zhelyazkova. *Albanian Prospects*, pp. 209-213.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

¹³⁹ Martin Baldwin-Edwards. "Albanian Emigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbiosis and Social Ambiguity" *South-East Europe Review*, I/2004, pp. 51-66.

http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/South_East_Europe_Review_2004_01_baldwin2.pdf

And yet, clear as it is that Greeks do not want Albanians in their country, Greece currently cannot afford economically to do without them. And as far as Albanians themselves are concerned, they are in Greece to stay. Greece is just another Balkan territory they are slowly, gradually, “taking over.” From the 17th century onwards, when they have moved into Kosovo, from which Serbs started to leave, there has not been a single case of Albanians retreating and giving up certain territory on which they have settled. On the contrary, the last four to five centuries have witnessed a gradual, but persistent enlargement of the territory, populated by Albanians. The old Ottoman documents from 17th century wonderfully illustrate the Albanian “territory takeovers.” The documents show how a certain village, in which few Albanians settled, during the lifetime of just two generations turned into an exclusively Albanian populated settlement. Being the oldest nation in the Balkans, as they claim, Albanians have loads of patience. They might seemingly integrate and assimilate perfectly (as the above-mentioned examples of adopting Orthodox religion and Greek names illustrate), but when the time comes, everyone around them is either Albanian or gone.

Of course, to presume that Albanian territorial and national expansion into Greece might have the same success as against the international pariah like Milosevic’s Serbia, or as in a weak and collapsing state of Macedonia, is illusionary. However, it is quite safe to presume that in a few decades, a question whether an Albanian pupil can carry a Greek flag on a Greek national holiday will no longer be an issue. In a few decades, the issue will be whether an Albanian pupil in Greece can carry an Albanian flag.

Intervento di Guita Hourani

***Emigration, Transnational Family Networks, and Remittances:
Overview of the Situation in Lebanon***

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Emigration, Transnational Family Networks, and Remittances: Overview of the Situation in Lebanon

A. INTRODUCTION

This paper¹⁴⁰ presents an overview of the current migration outflow and remittances inflow in Lebanon. It attempts to draw as realistic a picture as possible of the situation, with the hope that this information will lead to an increase in the body of research on both emigration and remittances to better understand the correlation between them and the impact of the one on the other for effective development policies. The paper will use data collected from significant, reliable, and accessible local and international sources.

Despite the fact that statistics available are based on sample studies because Lebanon has not had a census since 1932, and even though the data available on remittances is neither sufficient nor detailed, what exists suggests a pattern of an elevated outflow of young and educated Lebanese males, an increase in female migrants with a similar profile, an increase in the number of emigrants in the Muslim communities, and a sizable inflow of remittances that is significantly higher than both Foreign Directed Investment (FDI) and tourism receipts. Furthermore, what exists also suggests that transnational family network is a major factor in both processes -- emigration outflow and remittances inflow.

Most of what has been published about Lebanese emigration has been written from the perspective of the receiving countries.¹⁴¹ Emigration did not receive appropriate attention from the perspective of Lebanon until the end of the armed conflict (1975-1991), even though emigration had been an important Lebanese population dynamic since the second part of the nineteenth century. Emigration increased dramatically in the post-war era (1991-2001).¹⁴² A recent survey showed that of these 900,000 emigrants, 54.4% left between 1975 and 1990, while 18.4% left between 1991 and 1995, and 26.6% left between 1996 and 2001, 0.7% were undetermined, making the total percentage of those left after the end of the war (18.4% + 26.6% = 47.0%) almost equal to those who left during the war, or 54.4%.¹⁴³ The majority of these emigrants, or 63.7%, were

140 This paper is a summary of work in progress undertaken by the author. There will be future papers building on the groundwork presented herein. The views expressed in the paper are only those of its independent author. The author wishes to thank Mr. Nassib Ghobril for permission to use his lecture, 'Expatriates' Remittances & the Lebanese Economy: Brain Drain or Economic Gain?' which he presented at the Lebanese Emigration Research Center, NDU, April 21, 2004, and Dr. Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous for his comments and insights.

141 R. Khatlab, *Mahgar: Saga Libanesa no Brasil: Sociologia Iconografica*, Lebanon: Mokhtar, 2002; G. Lafleur, *Les Libanais et les Syriens de Guadeloupe*, Paris, France: Éditions Karthala, Saint-Claude, Guadeloupe: Phénicien, 1999; M. Diaz De Kuri and L. Macluf, *De Líbano a Mexico: Crónica de un Pueblo Emigrante*, México, 1999; I. Klich and J. Lesser, *Arab and Jewish Immigrants in Latin America*, London: Frank Cass, 1998; A. Abdulkarim, *La Diaspora Libanaise en France: Processus Migratoire et Économie*, L'Harmattan: Comprendre le Moyen-Orient, 1996; *The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration*, edited by A. Hourani and N. Shehadi, London: Center for Lebanese Studies and Tauris, 1992; J. Obeid, *Siriolibanesa en la Republica Argentina*, Buenos Aires, 1987; P. Blatt, P. and T. Batrouney, *Settlement Problems of Lebanese in Melbourne: Migrant Settlement Council of Victoria*, Australia, 1982; D. Misra, 'The Lebanese in Nigeria 1890-1960,' Ph.D. thesis, University of Calabar, Nigeria, 1985; H. L. van der Laan, *The Lebanese Traders in Sierra Leone*, The Hague, 1975; 'The Antiochian Orthodox Syrians of Montreal, 1905-1980: An Historical Study of Cultural and Social Change Over Three Generations,' by Marino, Norman Joseph, M.A. thesis, Concordia University, 1994.

142 There are no published studies measuring emigration from Lebanon after 2001.

143 Ch. Kasparian, *L'Entrée des Jeunes Libanais dans la Vie Active et l'Émigration des Libanais depuis 1975*, Vol. III, Presses de l'Université Saint Joseph, 2003, p. 14.

between the ages of 25 and 44. Of the 63.7%, 22.1% were female and 41.6% were male¹⁴⁴ and the greater number of these migrants were either university graduates (25.4%) or high school graduates (23.6%).¹⁴⁵

Most emigrants from Lebanon were, until recently, from the Christian communities; however, the number of Muslim emigrants has been increasing, which indicates that the country's 'push' and the regional and international 'pull' factors are affecting all the communities in Lebanon regardless of creed¹⁴⁶ or geographic origin.¹⁴⁷ It should be noted here that very little information is available on the emigration of the Jewish community in Lebanon. Although, Judaism is a recognized religion in Lebanon, one of the 18 officially recognized confessions; very few Jews have remained in the country and of those even fewer publicly reveal their faith. In the 1950s Jews living in Beirut were "approximately 7,000 (...). As Jews in an Arab country, however, their position was never secure, and the majority left in 1967."¹⁴⁸ When the 1975 war erupted in Lebanon, the Jewish Quarter in Beirut, as it was and still is known, was severely damaged, this, and the fact that in April of 1985 Hizbollah kidnapped and killed four prominent Jews from Beirut, led to the final exodus of the remaining Jews from Lebanon to the United States, Canada, and Europe.¹⁴⁹ In 2004, during the municipal elections in Beirut, only one Jew voted out of the 5,000 registered Jewish citizens.¹⁵⁰ Due to this reality, Lebanese Jewish emigrants have very little if any networks (including remittances) with the country as a whole. They however may be sending money to elderly relatives who have been left behind.¹⁵¹

144 Kasparian 2003, p. 45.

145 Kasparian 2003, p. 57. See also 'The Migration of Lebanese Professionals to the US: Why They Left Lebanon and Why They Are Staying in the US,' by M. Fatfat, Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1998.

146 21% and 22.2% of the total 938,000 emigrants who emigrated between 1975 and 2001 were Shiite and Sunnis respectively in comparison to Armenian Orthodox and Greek Orthodox who formed 23.1% and 23.2% respectively, Anis Abi Farah, 'Al Mughtaribun bayna 1975 wa 2001' (The Lebanese Emigrants Between 1975 and 2001), *AsSafir* Newspaper, December 3, 2001, p. 6. For further information about the emigration of each of the religious groups in Lebanon see Information International, *Facts about Lebanese Emigration (1991-2000)*, Part II, November 2001, [http://www.information-international.com/pdf/emigration_report_english-2.pdf], Internet consulted on September 1, 2005. For information about the Armenians see H. Takooshian, 'Armenian Immigration to the United States from the Middle East', *Journal of Armenian Studies*, Special Issue on Identity and Assimilation: The Armenian Experience in America, Vol.3, Nos.1-2, 1986-87, pp.133-155; D. Papazian, 'Armenians In America' [<http://www.umd.umich.edu/dept/armenian/papazian/america.html>], Internet consulted January 9, 2006, this article appeared in the *Het Christelijk Oosten* 52, No. 3-4 (2000), pp. 311-347; V. Talai, 'Social Boundaries Within and Between Ethnic Groups: Armenians in London', *Man*, Vol. 21, No.2, June 1986, pp. 251-270. For information about the Shi'a see 'Constructing Lebanese Shi'ite Nationalism: Transnationalism, Shi'ism, and the Lebanese State,' by R. Shaery-Eisenlohr, Ph.D. thesis, The University of Chicago, 2005; Ch. Bierwirth, 'The Lebanese Communities of Côte d'Ivoire,' *African Affairs*, Vol. 98, No. 390, January 1999, pp. 79-99; B. Winder, 'The Lebanese in West Africa,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 1962, pp. 296-333; D. Georgakas, 'Arab Workers in Detroit', *MERIP Reports*, No. 34, January 1975, pp. 1317. For information about the Druze migration see N. Richani, 'The Druze of Mount Lebanon: Class Formation in A Civil War,' *Middle East Report*, No. 162, Lebanon's War, January 1990, pp. 26-30; K. Firro, *A History of the Druzes*, Leiden, Brill, 1992. For information on the Christian Lebanese communities see: G. Labaki, *The Maronites in the United States*, NDU Press, 1993; *St. George Cathedral and its People: Past, Present, and Future*, edited by Emil Dan and Nicolas Mansour, Publication Double Bay, N.S.W.: Longueville Media, 2004.

147 Abi Farah, 2001, p. 6.

148 M. Bard, 'The Jews of Lebanon,' *Jewish Virtual Library*, 2005,

[<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/lebjews.html>]. See also A. Aharoni, 'The Forced Migration of Jews From Arab Countries', [<http://www.iflac.com/ada/The%20Forced%20Migration%20of%20Jews%20from%20Arab%20Countries.htm>], Internet consulted on September 10, 2005.

149 *Ibid.*

150 M. Hatoum, 'Of 5,000 Jewish Lebanese, only 1 Voted,' *The Daily Star*, May 10, 2004,

[http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=3408&categ_id=2], Internet consulted on September 10, 2005.

151 *Ibid.*

Lebanese emigrants are culturally prone to assist their fellow family members and kin. This cultural value has helped create transnational family networks. The extended family, including parents, siblings, maternal and paternal grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins, is the basic institution of Lebanese society and the main support to which family members and kin turn for assistance. It is the main source of networks for social, economic, and political survival of the individual and the clan.

These networks were and continue to be vital in linking Lebanese residents with their transnational emigrants and *vice versa*. These networks help in sponsoring new emigrants and in facilitating their lives in the receiving countries. They are also responsible, in the case of Lebanon, for much of the prosperity of the tourist industry through their repetitive visits. However, the most valuable output of these networks is the immense monetary transfer that the emigrants send to their families in Lebanon.

Remittances not only play a vital role in the lives of the recipients' household members, but also play an indispensable role in keeping the economy of the country afloat. Remittance inflow from Lebanese expatriates was estimated to have been \$1.2 billion in 1998, \$1.6 billion in 2000, \$2.5 billion in 2002, and \$2.7 billion in 2004.¹⁵² Lebanon's main hard currency income earner is from tourism; however in 2001; remittances were 275 times the tourism and 924 times the FDI receipts.¹⁵³ The tourism industry continued its impressive growth in revenue terms, with 33 percent growth in tourist arrivals and the highest average per tourist expenditures (US\$ 1,500) in the Middle East. Tourism revenues represent the second largest source of foreign exchange earnings, coming after workers' remittances.¹⁵⁴

Information on emigration from Lebanon for the period extending between 1975 and 2001 is drawn from several surveys based on sample studies conducted by St. Joseph's University in 2001,¹⁵⁵ by Anis Abi Farah, professor of Statistics at the Lebanese University in 2001,¹⁵⁶ by Information International in 2001,¹⁵⁷ by the Central Administration for Statistics in 1997,¹⁵⁸ and by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1996.¹⁵⁹

Information on transnational Lebanese emigrants' family networks is mainly drawn from the works of F. Khuri 'Kinship, Emigration, and Partnership among the Lebanese of West Africa',¹⁶⁰ A. Peleikis, *Lebanese in Motion: Gender and the Making of a Transnational Village*,¹⁶¹ N. Jabbara and

152 The World Bank, 'Annex: Recent Trends in Workers' Remittances to Developing Countries,' in *Global Development Finance: Mobilizing Finance and Managing Vulnerability*, 2005, p. 28. Figures for 2004 are estimated.

153 'Expatriates' Remittances Have Become Key to the Lebanese Economy, Averaging \$1.63bn Yearly, Reaching Nearly 14% of GDP in 2001 and Growing Faster than other Sources of Foreign Currency', *Saradar Weekly Monitor*, Issue 15, March 31-April 5, 2003, p. 9.

154 *World Investment News (WinNe)*, Expanding Economic Opportunities in Lebanon, November 2004, [<http://www.winne.com/mena/lebanon/report/2004/cprofiles/sri.php>], Internet consulted on December 20, 2005.

155 Kasparian, 2003.

156 Abi Farah, 2001, p. 6.

157 Information International, 2001,

[http://www.information-international.com/pdf/emigration_report_english-1.pdf] and [http://www.information-international.com/pdf/emigration_report_english-2.pdf], Internet consulted on September 1, 2005.

158 Administration Centrale de la Statistique, *Les Conditions de Vie des Ménages*, Liban, 1997.

159 Ministère des Affaires Sociales, *Les Logements et la Population*, Liban, 1996.

160 F. Khuri, 'Kinship, Emigration, and Partnership among the Lebanese of West Africa', *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 35, No. 4, October 1965, 385-395.

161 A. Peleikis, *Lebanese in Motion: Gender and the Making of a Translocal Village*, New Brunswick, USA and London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 2003.

J. Jabbra, 'Kinship and Transnational Links in the Lebanese Diaspora,'¹⁶² and T. Batrouney, 'Australian-Lebanese: Return Visits to Lebanon and Issues of Identity'.¹⁶³

Information on inflow of Lebanese expatriates' remittances is assembled from several sources, among them *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook*,¹⁶⁴ World Bank *Global Development Finance 2005*,¹⁶⁵ "Remittances and Microfinance in MENA..." by Carlos Silva-Jauregui,¹⁶⁶ "Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance" by Dilip Ratha,¹⁶⁷ "Expatriates' Remittances & the Lebanese Economy: Brain Drain or Economic Gain?" by Nassib Ghobril,¹⁶⁸ "Why Should We Care About Worker's Remittances?..." by Dilip Ratha.¹⁶⁹

This paper draws on secondary material on emigration and amasses data on remittances buried in rich but fragmentary reports and studies. It looks at the profile of the Lebanese emigration from 1975 to 2001 by education, destination, gender, age, profession, etc. It also presents information about transnational Lebanese migrant families, as well as data pertaining to the volume of remittances received through formal channels and their macro and micro impact on Lebanon.

B. LEBANESE TRANSNATIONAL EMIGRATION

Emigration from Lebanon is not a recent phenomenon; it ebbs and flows depending on the socio-political and economic environment in the country and the MENA region. In the late decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, Lebanese emigration was part of a global movement of people.¹⁷⁰ Between the two World Wars, it was a consequence of the calamities that devastated Lebanon in the form of famine, epidemics, and economic disasters, and after the Second War it was caused by the layoffs resulting from the retreat of the British and French troops from Lebanon.¹⁷¹ Emigration then ceased when Lebanon enjoyed a fair level of political stability and impressive economic prosperity from the late fifties until the beginning of the 1975 war. However, during this era, i.e., 1950s-1975, a temporary emigration was set in motion, lured by the

162 N. Jabbra and J. Jabbra, 'Kinship and Transnational Links in the Lebanese Diaspora,' in *Lebanese Diaspora: History Racism and Belonging*, edited by P. Tabar, Lebanese American University, 2005, pp. 275-290.

163 T. Batrouney, 'Australian-Lebanese: Return Visits to Lebanon and Issues of Identity', in *Lebanese Diaspora: History Racism and Belonging*, edited by P. Tabar, Lebanese American University, 2005, pp. 291-318.

164 International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook*, Washington, D.C., 2002.

165 The World Bank, *Global Development Finance*, 2005.

166 C. Silva-Jauregui 'Remittances and Microfinance in MENA: Second Largest Source of External Funding in the World as Development Tool', *Microfinance Matters*, July 2005,

[http://www.uncdf.org/english/microfinance/newsletter/pages/2005_07/news_remittances.php], Internet consulted on September 15, 2005.

167 D. Ratha, 'Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance', in *Global Development Finance*, Chapter 7, 2003, [<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGDF/Resources/GDF2003-Chapter7.pdf>], Internet consulted on September 15, 2005.

168 N. Ghobril, 'Expatriates' Remittances & the Lebanese Economy: Brain Drain or Economic Gain?' lecture presented at the Lebanese Emigration Research Center, NDU, April 21, 2004.

169 D. Ratha, 'Why Should We Care About Worker's Remittances? And What Should We Do', Note presented by Ratha, a senior economist with the World Bank in Washington, DC and an expert on migrant remittances at the Expert Meeting of the Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva, January 20-21, 2004, [<http://www.adb.org/PrivateSector/Finance/worker-remittances.pdf>], Internet consulted January 20, 2006.

170 R. Owen, 'Lebanese Migration in the Context of World Population Movements', *The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration*, edited by A. Hourani and N. Shehadi, London: Center for Lebanese Studies and Tauris, 1992, pp 33-39.

171 E. Safa, *L'émigration Libanaise*, Université St.-Joseph, Beyrouth, 1960.

booming economies of the oil-exporting Gulf countries and their increased need for skills in all sectors.¹⁷²

Lebanese emigration was rekindled with the succession of wars between the years 1975 and 1991 and has picked up momentum with the instability of the country following the cessation of the armed conflict in 1991. The total number of emigrants for the whole period is estimated to have been over nine hundred thousand.¹⁷³ It should be noted here that Lebanon does not have any restriction on individual mobility except for young man who have not done their military service. Lebanon also permits dual nationality.

In 1975 Lebanon was plunged into a war that lasted till 1991, when it ended with a new reconciliation accord known as the Taëf Agreement. Two years after the agreement, a reconstruction plan was ushered in led by a Lebanese-Saudi business tycoon, the late Rafick Hariri, as Prime Minister with special prerogatives. Hariri embarked on an extensive and costly reconstruction plan mainly of Beirut Central Business District. Lebanon's economy and infrastructure were devastated by the war; however its gold reserve (9 million ounces), its banking structure, and its freedom of exchange and trade were almost intact. Dollar cartels, among other factors, caused the severe fall of the Lebanese pound's purchasing power, leading to economic hardship of the middle and lower income classes of Lebanese.¹⁷⁴ Following the inauguration of the reconstruction plan, despite the fact that Lebanon experienced a 7% and 8% growth rate for 1993 and 1994 respectively, the country's growth continued to decline plummeting to 0.0% in 2000.¹⁷⁵

With this grim economic and security situation, Lebanese were opting to leave. The number of Lebanese migrants who fled the country between 1975 and 2001 is estimated to have been over 900,000. Their profiles, origins, destinations, etc. differed from Lebanese migration of the 1800s and early 1900s, as well as from the migration of the oil-boom during the fifties and sixties.

The destination of the Lebanese emigrants has not changed much. Kasparian found that North America absorbed 29.5% of those who left between 1975 and 1990, Western Europe 24.4%, the Arab countries 20.4%, Australia 13.1%, Africa 6.3%, Central and South America 4.3%, Eastern Europe 1.4%, Asia 0.4%, and undetermined 0.1%.¹⁷⁶

In the early periods, Lebanese emigrants were in their majority artisans, skilled laborers, peasants, and small landowners.¹⁷⁷ In the fifties, sixties and seventies of the 20th century, they were mainly teachers, technicians, craftsman, and building contractors heading mainly to the oil economies of the Gulf countries. At the beginning of the 1975 war they were primarily engineers, businessmen, medical specialists, bankers, craftsmen, and qualified manpower,¹⁷⁸ and since the 1990s have been increasingly the young and educated.¹⁷⁹

172 B. Labaki, 'Lebanese Emigration During the War (1975-1989), The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration', edited by A. Hourani and N. Shehadi, London: Center for Lebanese Studies and Tauris, 1992, pp. 505-526.

173 Abi Farah 2001, p. 6.

174 Georges Corm, 'La Situation Économique du Liban et ses Perspectives de Développement dans la Région', *Quaderns de la Meditteranea*, Barcelone, [<http://georgescorm.com/fr/articles/articledetail/article10.shtml>], Internet consulted on September 8, 2005.

175 Adib Nehmeh, 'The Disappointing 'Growth' Decade', *Social Watch*, pp. 12-127, [<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN003491.pdf>], Internet consulted on September 12, 2005.

176 Kasparian, 2003, p. 14.

177 A. Naff, *Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience*, Southern Illinois University Press, 1985, pp. 112-113.

178 Labaki 1992, p. 613.

179 Abi Farah 2001, p. 6.

Most of the Lebanese emigrants are educated. Abi Farah's survey showed that 29.2% of the total emigrants were university graduates (273,694), 3.4% (31,887) were technicians and 18.4% (172,720) were high school graduates, of whom 42.7%, 33.3%, and 52.3% respectively were women. Kasparian's survey revealed that most of the migrants were either university graduates (25.4%) or high school graduates (23.6%).¹⁸⁰

The overwhelming majority of these migrants, according to Abi Farah, were between the ages of 20-34 (28.4% or 265,722) and 35-49 (28.1% or 263,065),¹⁸¹ while Kasparian's study showed that the majority, or 63.7% of the total number of emigrants, were between the ages of 25 and 44.¹⁸²

The representation of the sexes in the Lebanese emigration is changing as well; while the majority of early emigrants were male, Abi Farah showed that increasingly the proportion of women emigrants is now not much behind that of their male counterparts, counting for 51% of the age group 20-34 and 42.4% of those aged 35-49.¹⁸³

Today more than ever, Lebanese emigration reflects the sectarian and ethnic composition of the population in Lebanon.¹⁸⁴ While at the onset of the 1975 war Lebanese emigration was overwhelmingly Christian, as the war progressed migration from the Muslim communities was increasing.¹⁸⁵ Between 1975 and 2001, 23.2% of the total number of the Greek Orthodox community emigrated, making this community the largest exporter of emigrants, followed by the Armenian Orthodox and the Greek Catholics 23.1% each, the Sunnis 22.2%, the Shiites 21%, and the Maronites 20.9%. The Druze were the community to have emigrated least during this period, with 14.7%.¹⁸⁶

Emigration also affected all of the geographical parts of Lebanon. Abi Farah found that 22.2% of the Lebanese living in the North emigrated between 1975 and 2001, compared to 19.6% of those dwelling in Beirut, 19.3% of those inhabiting the South, 17.3% of those living in Mount Lebanon and 16.0% of those residing in the Bekaa.¹⁸⁷

In her 2003 survey, Kasparian uncovered that, of the 900,000 emigrants who left between 1975 and 2001, 41.3% cited unemployment as the main reason for emigrating and 21.1% claimed family reunion as the reason, while 17.1% attributed their exodus to the general situation and 10.9% to the economic situation, while only 5.3% said it was the war.¹⁸⁸

The exodus has not decreased since the end of the war; in fact, in its survey, Information International showed that in 2001 Lebanese continued to seek to emigrate: 6.7% or 232,000 persons have applied for visas "60.7% as emigrants, 18.9% as workers, 11.3% as tourists and 9.1% as students."¹⁸⁹ Of the 232,000 applicants 16.7% were between the ages of 20-24, 43.2% between the

180 Kasparian 2003, p. 57.

181 Abi Farah 2001, p. 6.

182 Kasparian 2003, p. 45.

183 Abi Farah 2001, p. 6.

184 Lebanon is a small country with a current resident population estimated at 4,005,000 in 1997. Ch. Kasparian, 'Liban: Démographie et Économie des Migrations', in *Migrations Méditerranéennes Rapport 2005*, edited by Philippe Fargues, CARIM, Robert Shuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2005, p.176.

185 Labaki, 1992, p. 623.

186 Abi Farah 2001, p. 6.

187 *Ibid.*, 2001, p. 6.

188 Kasparian, 2003, p. 19.

189 Information International, Part II, 2001, p. 16.

ages of 25-29, 12% of the age group 30-34, 6% of the age group 35-39, and 8% of those of the age group 40-44.¹⁹⁰

The survey also revealed that those who are emigrating are the highly educated or skilled: “21.7% of the applicants are professionals (other than lawyers, engineers, and physicians) and 13.3% are in business management and marketing, while 12.8% are engineers, 9.9% administrators, 8.9% computer scientists, 7.9% students, 5.9% merchants, 4.9% lawyers, 3% self-employed, 2.5% physicians and pharmacists and 9.2% other professions.”¹⁹¹

C. TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY NETWORKS AND REMITTANCES

Family is the basic institution in Lebanese society and the main refuge for its members. Lebanese turn first to their family for assistance in almost every aspect of their lives including that of emigration. Parents as family are important in Lebanese society both at home and abroad; however “what is of real significance is the joint family, a larger family group consisting of the parents, their children, the paternal grandparents, the paternal uncles and their families, and unmarried paternal aunts, and the kinship group, the largest family group, consisting of all those that claim descent from the same paternal ancestor. The individual learns to identify himself with this family group from the moment of birth (...)”¹⁹²

Even in urban settings, kinship has remained strong, for “local Arab culture in Camp Trad,¹⁹³ reinforced by political and economic realities, valorized the patriarchal family, the primacy of the family over the person, the family of origin over the family of procreation.”¹⁹⁴ This kinship is nurtured “to produce persons linked to, responsible to, and prioritizing families. Connectivity reinforced family solidarity where solidarity was necessary for social, economic, and political survival.”¹⁹⁵

These networks have played and continue to play a significant role in linking Lebanese residents with their transnational emigrants and *vice versa*. Lebanese transnational family networks do not differ in their logic and structure from that of the Lebanese family national networks, which are mainly built and developed in the family realm and in the home village, or town or metropolitan neighbourhood. These networks are developed locally and then transferred transnationally at need and under specific conditions.¹⁹⁶

The first Lebanese emigrants who migrated and then settled in the host countries initiated these networks and were instrumental in creating the families’ transnational fields. Lebanese emigrants “continued to cherish family honour and solidarity. In return for loyalty, the family provided its members with protection and a sense of identity. Lebanese values centered on pride in

190 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

191 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

192 A. Tannous, ‘Group behavior in the Village Community of Lebanon’, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 48, No. 2, September 1942, pp. 232.

193 Camp Trad is an urban working class neighborhood in Greater Beirut in Lebanon. S. Joseph, ‘Connectivity and Patriarchy Among Urban Working Class Families in Lebanon’, *Ethos*, 1993, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 452.

194 Joseph, 1993, p. 478-479. See also N. Jabbara and J. Jabbara, ‘Kinship and Transnational Links in the Lebanese Diaspora’, in *Lebanese Diaspora: History Racism and Belonging*, edited by P. Tabar, Lebanese American University, 2005, 275-290.

195 *Ibid.*, 1993, p. 479. See also M. Dorai, ‘Palestinian Emigration from Lebanon to Northern Europe: Refugees, Networks, and Transnational Practices’, *Refuge*, Vol. 21, No. 2, February 2003, pp.23-31.

196 F. Khuri, ‘Kinship, Emigration, and Partnership among the Lebanese of West Africa’, *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 35, No. 4, October 1965, 385-395; Patricia Nabti, ‘International Emigration from a Lebanese Village: Bishmizzinis on Six Continents’, Ph.D. thesis, Berkeley: University of Californian, 1989.

one's family name and ancestry (...)."¹⁹⁷ These networks take different forms, economic, socio-cultural, religious, political, etc.¹⁹⁸ They are manifested not only through sending remittances to their families and kin left behind, which is the form we are dealing with in this paper, but also in the migrants' involvement in visiting their homeland, in national, and international associations, etc. Transnational migrants in the twenty-first century have the opportunity to organize themselves to enhance their lives in their host countries, while continuing to address social and political issues related to their countries of origin. As Peggy Levitt put it, "transnational migrants work, pray, and express their political interests in several contexts rather than in a single nation-state. Some will put down roots in a host country, maintain strong homeland ties, and belong to religious and political movements that span the globe."¹⁹⁹

Although, very little has been done to study family networks among Lebanese emigrants, the information scattered in different available publications and gathered from personal observations allows us to note that immigrant-resident networks can be seen through the emigrants' investments made in the village's spatial development and improvement, in the inflow of remittances and in charity contributions,²⁰⁰ in seeking the home village to conduct religious services and ceremonies,²⁰¹ in returning to the home country for visits,²⁰² in communicating using the telephone, Internet and electronic mail,²⁰³ and in becoming subscribers to satellite and TV channels and various media vehicles.²⁰⁴

197 A. Naff, 'Lebanese Immigration to the United States: 1880- to the Present', in *The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration*, edited by A. Hourani and N. Shehadi, London: Center for Lebanese Studies and Tauris, 1992, p.149. See also M. Humphrey, 'Lebanese Identities: Between Cities, Nations and Trans-nations', in *Lebanese Diaspora: History, Racism, and Belonging*, edited by P. Tabar, Lebanese American University, 2005, pp. 31-54; A. Fuller, *Buairij: Portrait of a Lebanese Muslim Village*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966; Jabbara and Jabbara, 2005.

198 G. Hourani and E. Sensenig-Dabbous, 'Transnational Lebanese Communities Network: Using Traditional, Alternative and ICT -Based Methodologies to Study Middle Eastern Migration Networks', Sixth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Montecatini Terme, 16 – 20 Mar. 2005; European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Mediterranean Programme.

199 P. Levitt, 'Transnational Migrants: When "Home" Means More Than One Country', Migration Information Source, October 1, 2004 [<http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=261>], Internet consulted on January 26, 2005.

200 M. Leichtman, 'Reexamining the Transnational Migrant: The Afro -Libanais of Senegal', in *Lebanese Diaspora: History Racism and Belonging*, edited by P. Tabar, Lebanese American University, 2005, pp. 153. See also S. Hanafi, 'Palestinian Diaspora Contribution to Investment and Philanthropy in Palestine', 2000, [www.palesta.net/academic/publication/diaspora.htm], Internet consulted on January 21, 2005 and J. Opiniano, 'The Dynamics of Transnational Philanthropy by Migrant Workers to their Communities of Origin: The Case of Pozorrubio, Philippines', Fifth International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR), International Conference, July 10, 2002, University of Cape Town, South Africa.

201 A. Peleikis, 'the Emergence of Translocal Community the Case of a South Lebanese Village and its Migrant Connections to Ivory Coast', *Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien*, No 30, Juin-Décembre 2000, pp. 313-314; A. Peleikis, *Lebanese in Motion: Gender and the Making of a Translocal Village*, New Brunswick, USA and London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 2003; U. Bacas, 'Cross-Border Marriages and the Formation of Transnational Families: A case Study of Greek-German Couples in Athens', Paper to the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme Seminar, Faculty of Anthropology and Geography, University of Oxford, WTPC October 2002, [<http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/WPTC-02-10%20Bacas.pdf>], Internet consulted January 18, 2005.

202 T. Batrouney, 'Australian-Lebanese: Return Visits to Lebanon And Issues of Identity', in *Lebanese Diaspora: History Racism and Belonging*, edited by P. Tabar, Lebanese American University, 2005, pp. 300-303.

203 Peleikis, 2000, pp. 308-309; Peleikis, 2003, pp. 96-101; D. Diminescu, 'L'Usage du Téléphone Portable par les Migrants en Situation Précaire, Rapport de Recherche', Paris, ACI-Villes, CNRS, 2004, [http://membres.lycos.fr/crisseries/saint-laurent4/Dana_Diminescu.doc], and B. Wellman, and B. Hogan. 'The Internet in Everyday Life', [http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~wellman/publications/inet_everyday/inet_everyday.pdf], Internet consulted on January 22, 2005.

204 Peleikis, 2000, p. 310, 315; H. Amin, and D. Boyd, 'The Development of Direct Broadcast Television to and Within the Middle East', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 18, 2, 1994, pp.37-50; L. Cainkar, 'No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion After September 11,' *MERIP*, No. 224, Fall 2002, [http://www.merip.org/mer/mer224/224_cainkar.html], Internet consulted on December 21, 2005; J. Berger,

Migrants also assist their country and people in times of need during wars, natural calamities and epidemics. Lebanese emigrants did not forsake their countrymen in Lebanon during the First World War, the Second World War and throughout the last war of 1975-1991. Emigrant communities as well as individuals sent relief contributions in both money and kind.²⁰⁵

Furthermore, these transnational family networks also help, among other things, in maintaining the outflow of emigrants, they facilitate their arrival, adjustment, settlement, employment,²⁰⁶ they smooth legal processes in the host country, they provide funds for the migration process, and they provide information about the country of destination.²⁰⁷

Transnational family networks and kinship relations have been instrumental in creating what is known as 'chain migration'.²⁰⁸ Emigrants were sponsored by their immigrant relatives during their emigration process, and were provided not only with money to travel but also with jobs and housing upon arrival in the country of destination.²⁰⁹ Chain migration grew as the immigrants gained knowledge of the host country and as their businesses grew or their financial situation was improved. In this regard, Michael Suleiman noted that "After the feasibility and profitability of immigration to the United States and to America in general were well established, chain migration became the norm, with immigrants making it possible for the ambitious and the disgruntled in the old homeland to seek newer horizons. Those wanting to escape military service in the Ottoman army and those craving freedom from oppression and the liberty to speak and publish without censorship or reprisal left their homeland quickly and stealthily and sought what they thought would be a temporary refuge in America."²¹⁰

Chain migration was rekindled during the 1975-1991 war and in the post-war era. In her 2003 survey, Kasparian found that 21% of those who had migrated between 1975 and 2001 gave family reunion as a reason for their emigration; this was the second highest reason, following employment, with 41.3%.²¹¹

Facilitated by vast technological development, communication between resident and transmigrant members of families and between friends and relatives has increased, hence multiplying the flows of information, of resources (monetary and in-kind), and of migrants.²¹²

'Immigrants get a touch of home on TV', International Herald Tribune, The IHT Online, Monday, February 23, 2004, [<http://www.iht.com/articles/130747.html>], Internet consulted on January 29, 2005.

205 Hourani & Shehadi 1992; R. Karam, *Le Paris Libanais*, n.p., 2004; Ph. Kayal, and J. Kayal, *The Syrian-Lebanese in America A Study in Religion and Assimilation*, T. Wayne Publishers, Boston, 1975.

206 Khuri, 1965; Hourani, 1992.

207 Khuri, 1965; Bierwirth, 1999; Sh. Abu-Laban, 'Arab-Canadian Family Life,' in *An Olive Branch on the Family Tree: The Arabs in Canada*, by Baha Abu-Laban, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980, pp. 158-180.

208 Khuri, 1965; Naff, 1985; Nabti, 1989. See also 'The Effects of International Migration on a Northern Lebanese Village', by L. Dibb Wigle, Ph.D. thesis, Detroit: Wayne State University, 1974; 'Hadchite: A Study of Emigration in a Lebanese Village', by R. K. Lewis, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1967; 'Lebanese Emigrants in West Africa: Their Effect on Lebanon and West Africa', by M. Hanna, Ph.D. University of Oxford, 1959; R. Khatlab, *Lebanese Migrants in Brazil: An Annotated Bibliography*, Lebanese Emigration Research Center, NDU Press, 2005.

209 Humphrey, 2005 and Khuri, 1965. See also R. Tortello, 'Out of Many Cultures The People Who Came: The Arrival Of The Lebanese', (to Jamaica), [<http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/pages/history/story0056.html>], Internet consulted on December 21, 2005.

210 M. Suleiman, 'Introduction: The Arab Immigrant Experience', in *Arabs in America*, Temple University Press, 1999, p. 3.

211 Kasparian, 2003, p. 21; Batrouney, 2005: 303-306.

212 Fatfat, 1998, pp.99-105. See also P. Levitt, 'Toward an understanding of Transnational Community: Forms and Their Impact on Immigrant Incorporation', Harvard University: Paper Presented at 'Comparative Immigration and Integration Program', Winter Workshop University of California at San Diego, 19 February, 1999, [<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/cmpr/feb00/Levitt.html>], January 26, 2005.

Transnational support from immigrants is not limited to remittances; it also includes commodities such as clothes, consumer durables, medicines, etc. In her recent publication, A. Peleikis found that “(...) goods move along with people travelling back and forth between Lebanon and West Africa. When someone plans a visit home to Lebanon or travels to Africa, he or she is expected to inform relatives and friends of the trip. It is anticipated that the traveller will carry letters, tape-recorded messages and photographs to the family abroad as well as gifts of all shapes and sizes. On the return journey, the same traveller will be laden with goods coming from the other direction(...) migrants take back colourful patchwork trousers and African dresses, tropical fruit and cheap Atlantic fish to Lebanon.”²¹³

Transnational migrants also contribute to tourism receipts through their family visits or tourist vacations. Most of the visitors who come to Lebanon are expatriates visiting their families and foreigners who are descendants of Lebanese emigrants. The hundreds of thousands of Lebanese expatriates who return each summer or during religious holidays give an important boost to the local economy, even though many of them stay with family and friends.²¹⁴

Batrouney found that both the Lebanese-born and the Australian-born of Lebanese descent have been returning to Lebanon for visits either for business, or to visit family and/or friends, or for holidays. He further noted, “The proliferation of Lebanese and other Middle Eastern travel agents bears witness to the size and significance of return visits to Lebanon.”²¹⁵

The total number of tourists who visited Lebanon in 2003 reached one million one hundred thousand. Statistics available do not differentiate expatriates from tourists and many Lebanese expatriates hold more than one citizenship and travel using foreign passports, hence it is difficult to identify the total number of visiting expatriates.²¹⁶

Lebanese expatriates living abroad contribute in the provision of housing for their family, relatives, and in some cases also friends. For example, Lebanese may give their immediate family members or relatives or friends the use of their houses/apartments. They sometimes invest in real-estate to help their family members obtain a roof over their heads.²¹⁷

There are other forms of mutual support between families living in Lebanon and those living abroad. One such form can be the care of a child who is going to school or university, of a family member who needs medical treatment, or of an elderly relative who need help.²¹⁸ It is difficult to measure these family networks or to express them in financial terms, yet they are part of these transnational networks between residents and migrants.

Migrants also transfer what has recently been labelled ‘social remittances’, which include the transfer of ideas, practices, and behaviour such as respect for the environment, of human rights, of gender equality, democracy, social equality, and the like.²¹⁹

213 Peleikis, 2000, pp. 305-310; see also Peleikis, 2003, pp.93-96.

214 Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous, 2004, p. 16.

215 Batrouney, 2005, p. 300.

216 Tourism Trends in Mediterranean Countries, European Commission, Theme 4 Industry, Trade and Services, EU, 2001.

217 Peleikis, 2000 and 2003.

218 Peleikis, 2000, p. 304.

219 P. Levitt, ‘Social Remittances: A Conceptual Tool for Understanding Migration and Development’, Working Paper Series, Number 96.04, October 1996 [http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hcpds/wpweb/96_04.pdf], Internet consulted January 10, 2006.

Remittance flows are the most important and influential network between families in the source countries and those in the destinations. Based on a survey carried out to study Arab Canadian attitudes toward Canada and their countries of origin in 1974, Abu-Laban noted that “of the foreign-born, 50% had sent money to relatives in the Old Country. Of the Canadian-born respondents, a total of 22% had sent money to relatives in the Old Country at one time or another...”²²⁰ Abu-Laban goes on to assess that “the fact that one-half of the foreign-born and over one-fifth of the Canadian-born had sent money to kin abroad illustrates not only the reciprocity one might anticipate with the first generation immigrant, but in addition feelings of responsibility beyond the first generation.”²²¹

Assisting family members is not limited to those who live in Lebanon; in his extensive research on transnational Lebanese migrant family, Ghassan Hage found that money transfers in the form of remittances that were transferred formally through banks and money transfer agencies and operators, and informally through friends, or family members, or personally, were significant and were transmitted not necessarily to family members in Lebanon but to other family members, around the world.²²²

Remittances to Lebanon, whether in cash or in kind, are sent in several ways. The volume of the money and the formal way through which it is sent through the banking and financial transfer system is what we are relying on in terms of statistics in this paper. However, informal ways, such as immigrants bringing along money on their visits, or sending it with friends or family members, will not be estimated here.²²³

Lebanese remit enormous amounts because Lebanon allows free flow of capital and hard currency and encourages and facilitates the inflow of migrants’ remittances through formal and informal channels. Emigrants remit because Lebanon has “stable exchange rate, a very developed banking system with one branch per 5,000 inhabitants, with international standards, a tradition of banking secrecy, and competitive interest rates. Furthermore, Lebanon has 557 money transfer outlets, of which 437 are Western Union branches, and 120 Money Gram dealers.”²²⁴

Remittances are becoming a fundamental feature of Lebanon’s economy; they also represent a sizable proportion of Lebanon’s foreign revenue. Lebanese expatriates’ remittances have been keeping the country afloat with inflow increasing every year. In 2003 Lebanon received \$2.7 billion in workers’ remittances, ranking it ninth in absolute terms among the principal recipient developing countries.²²⁵

D. REMITTANCES INFLOW TO LEBANON

Remittances played and continue to play a vital role in the life of Lebanon and its people. It was and is the most stable of financial flows. On the micro level, remittances are considered a safety net for families afflicted by unemployment, underemployment, the burden of children’s education and/or the problem of caring for the sick and elderly. Facilitated by both the sending countries and the receiving countries, remittances “have emerged as a critical insurance mechanism

220 Abu-Laban, 1980, p. 172.

221 *Ibid.*, 1980, p. 172.

222 G. Hage, ‘Issues of Structure and Culture in Researching The Lebanese Transnational Family’, lecture presented at the Lebanese Emigration Research Center, NDU, May 19, 2004.

223 Ghobril, 2004. Any study of household informal receipt of remittances must take into consideration informal family income and informal family expenses.

224 *Ibid.*, 2004.

225 *Ibid.*, 2004.

for residents of countries afflicted by economic and political crisis (Lebanon during its civil war, Haiti), those hit by natural disasters (...).²²⁶ Further, on the macro level, remittances increase the country's stock of foreign currency, and when consumed, remittances generate positive multiplier effect even if they are mostly used for consumption.

Between 1990 and 2003, on average Lebanon ranked seventh among the top 20 main recipient developing countries with respect to remittances, following countries sizeable according to geography and population (India, Morocco, Philippines, Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco). Similarly, Lebanon was positioned third among top recipient developing countries with respect to remittances as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) following Lesotho and Tonga.²²⁷ In 2004, Lebanon ranked fifteenth among the world's top small recipient developing countries with respect to remittances when they are considered as a share of the GDP.²²⁸ Lebanon is also among the top world recipients of remittances, when measured on a per capita basis. In 2001, Lebanon was first among the top ten *per capita* recipient countries in the world with \$575.²²⁹

For several years, Lebanon "was vulnerable to a balance of payments crisis because its foreign debt stood at nearly five times the size of its exports. Yet, such a crisis did not materialize, most likely because of remittances sent by its diaspora are about as big as Lebanon's exports (about \$2.4 billion in 2002). The ratio of Lebanon's debt to exports is halved when remittances are included in the denominator."²³⁰ Remittances from abroad "are a safety net and at times a lifeline for what many families see as a no-growth economy with few opportunities."²³¹

Remittances are vital to the Lebanese economy especially as they feature 13.8% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Lebanon ranked eighth in the top ten recipients of workers' remittances as percentage of GDP in 2001.²³²

Remittances ease the budget constraints of their recipients. They also increase the recipients' consumption of goods and services, investment in education, land purchasing, and financial investments such as government bonds. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Lebanon's *per capita* income from workers' remittances was \$575 for 2001. With this amount Lebanon was at the top of the ten *per capita* recipient countries in the world.²³³

Expatriates' remittances to Lebanon continue to help underpin its economy. Lebanon averaged \$1.63 billion annually. Remittances were 7.4% of the GDP in 1998, but augmented to 8.5% in 1999, to 9.7% in 2000, and to 13.8% in 2001. On an annual basis, these inflows have equaled between 7 to 13% of GDP. For comparative purposes, it should be mentioned here that Lebanon's main hard currency income earner is tourism. However, remittances were 275 times the

226 Devesh Kapur and Center for Global Development, 'Remittances: The New Development Mantra?', August 25, 2003, [http://www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/docs/RemitMantra.pdf], Internet consulted on January 10, 2006.

227 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Globalization and External Imbalances, April 2005, p. 72, [<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/01/pdf/chapter2.pdf>], Internet consulted December 20, 2005.

228 Over 10% of Lebanon's GDP is resulting from remittances. D. Ratha, 'Sending Money Home: Trends in Migrant Remittance', Finance and Development magazine, International Monetary Fund, Volume 24, Number 4, December 2005 [<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/12/picture.htm>], Internet consulted on January 10, 2006.

229 Ghobril, 2004.

230 Ratha, 'Why Should We Care...?', 2004.

231 USAID, 'Lebanon', [<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/ane/lb/>], 2003, Internet consulted on December 20, 2005.

232 Dilip Ratha, 'Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance', in Global Development Finance, Chapter 7, 2003, [<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGDF/Resources/GDF2003-Chapter7.pdf>].

233 Ghobril, 2004.

tourism receipts in 2001.²³⁴ It is evident from these numbers that remittances are becoming indispensable to the Lebanese economy and they are increasing significantly.

Lebanese expatriates' remittance constitutes 22% of household incomes in Lebanon and 88% of their savings.²³⁵ And although there is great lack in information and in analysis on the impact of remittances on local villages and communities, the situation in one of the villages in South Lebanon may give us a glimpse of that impact.

Lala is a village in the Bekaa Valley that seems to rely heavily "on remittances as a source of income for a large number of village residents."²³⁶ In his survey in the summer of 1989, H. Amery found that "some ninety-seven out of 125 sampled households in Lala receive remittances."²³⁷

In Lala, remittances are used in building homes rather than in agriculture land development,²³⁸ "this home-construction activity is having a positive though small impact on the village's economy because a large number of skilled and unskilled workers and contractors are from nearby villages and towns."²³⁹

In the village of Zrarie in the South of Lebanon remittances come mainly from the Ivory Coast: "The most visible impact of remittance income on the village is the large amount of new construction. Whereas before, small flat-roof houses built of clay and yellow stone dominated the whole village, today huge, individually styled villas, some of them still under construction, rise above the village (...)."²⁴⁰

The impact of remittances is multidimensional; in certain cases remittances are changing social status and land ownership. In Zrarie, for example, remittances have "given people of poor origins the opportunity to accumulate wealth and status. By the late 'sixties, the impact of this new Shi'ite wealth was strongly felt in the South, where migrants invested in large agricultural estates that once belonged to the old dominant families of that region..."²⁴¹

In Lala a "sense of dependency on remittances is developing quite strongly as a number of young and able men refuse to do manual labour because they do not have to."²⁴²

In the latest World Bank publication, Lebanon ranked 28th among the top 30 countries with highest emigration percentage; in proportion of its educated labor force, emigration rate in Lebanon exceeded 38 percent.²⁴³

234 'Expatriates' Remittances Have Become Key to the Lebanese Economy, Averaging \$1.63bn Yearly, Reaching Nearly 14% of GDP in 2001 and Growing Faster Than Other Sources of Foreign Currency', *Saradar Weekly Monitor*, Issue 15, March 31-April 5, 2003, p. 9.

235 Ghobril, 2004.

236 H. Amery, 'The Effects of Migration and Remittances on Two Lebanese Villages', Ph.D. Dissertation, McMaster University, Canada, 1992, p.179-181.

237 Ibid., 1992

238 H. Amery, and W. Anderson, 'International Migration and Remittances to A Lebanese Village', *Canadian Geographer*, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 54.

239 Amery, 1992, p.181.

240 Peleikis, 2000, 307.

241 Peleikis, 2000, 307.

242 Amery, 1992, p. 181.

243 Ç. Özden and M. Schiff, *International Migration Remittances, and the Brain Drain*, World Bank and Palgrave, Macmillan, 2006, pp. 173-176

Assem Safieddine, professor of finance at AUB, described how the ‘brain drain affects the prospect of inducing change on the socio-political level, especially on the level of corporate governance [in Lebanon]...’ He also noted “qualified human resources are leaving due to the deteriorating social and political situation...”²⁴⁴

This exodus of educated manpower does not seem to bother either the government or the banking sector in Lebanon. In fact, some banking circles believe that the remittances of the Lebanese expatriates, which amounted to an estimated \$2.7 billion in 2004, compensate for Lebanon’s loss in human capital.²⁴⁵

Nassib Ghobril has proposed that migration should be viewed as an economic gain. He argues that the amount of foreign currency remitted back to Lebanon from its emigrants plays “a key role in the Lebanese economy as compared to other sources of foreign exchange revenues such as exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) and tourism receipts.”²⁴⁶ He further contended: “Remittances have raised the income of individual recipients in Lebanon and increased the country’s foreign exchange deposits and reserves. Therefore, they have offset some of the output losses from the ‘brain drain’ of students and skilled workers and created a positive network effect on trade, investment and business relationships.”²⁴⁷

E. CONCLUSION

Given the lack of studies on the subject, an exhaustive overview and more extensive data collection on transnational Lebanese emigration and remittances are currently unobtainable. It is clear however, that the volume of emigration outflow and remittances inflow have increased in importance as the country’s ‘push’ and the regional and international ‘pull’ factors continue to polarize the Lebanese, especially the young and educated.

Lack of employment opportunities and security in the country continue to encourage emigration as a solution. For a country as small as Lebanon, being one of the 30-top skilled emigration countries in the world is not indicative of the country’s good economic situation. In its most recent publication *International Migration Remittances and the Brain Drain*, the World Bank stated, “in relative terms (in proportion of the educated labor force), small countries are the most affected [by emigration].”²⁴⁸ In Lebanon such emigration exceeds 38.6 percent,²⁴⁹ which means that over one third of the educated labor force is leaving the country.

Emigration from Lebanon is not felt on the local level because the remittances sent back home from the diaspora offset some of the losses, especially in terms of tax revenue. On the household level, emigration is felt particularly in terms of family relations, although the money sent by emigrants to their families alleviates part of the economic burden.

244 A. Safieddine ‘Brain Drain or Brain Gain? A Nation and Its Diaspora: Lebanon’s Future is Bound up with its Relationship with Lebanese Living Abroad, and its Ability to Keep too Many More from Following Them’, The Daily Star, Assem Safieddine, February 24, 2004, [http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_ID=1&article_ID=7256&categ_id=1], Internet consulted on September 23, 2005.

245 Ghobril, 2004.

246 N. Ghobril, ‘Expatriates’ Remittances Key to Lebanese Economy, Averaging 1.63bn annually and reaching 14% of GDP in 2001’, *Saradar Weekly Monitor*, Issue 16-March 31-April 5, 2003, p. 8.

247 Ghobril 2003, p. 9.

248 Ç. Özden and M. Schiff, 2006, 173.

249 *Ibid.*, 175-176.

Although the volume and value of the remittances sent to Lebanese families are sizeable, the effects of these remittances have not been studied, either on the macro economic or on the micro-economic level. What we can sense from the continuous exodus of the young and educated is that these remittances have not been invested to create job opportunities, but rather are spent on household consumption, education, health, and care of the elderly. Remittances may have raised the standard of living of households or stimulated trade and commercial transactions. However, whether or not remittances contribute to structurally enhancing the living conditions of their recipients in Lebanon has yet to be demonstrated, as far as I am aware, through empirical research.

We know that remittances are sent to Lebanon, but we do not know whether the senders are recent temporary emigrants, first-generation emigrants, or second-generation emigrants. We are also ignorant of the geographic source of these transfers and the profile of their senders. The Lebanese emigration of 1975-2001 consisted largely of first-generation emigrants, and although the second and third generations are growing rapidly, remittances might continue for a while. However, the question that the government in Lebanon should ask itself is whether the second- and third-generations will continue to send remittances to the same extent as their parents and grandparents did, or whether the country needs to keep exporting emigrants in order to continue alleviating its economic shortcomings.

We are also uninformed about the impact of emigration on the development, demography, and social life of Lebanon. Discourse on 'brain drain' *versus* 'economic gain' has not yet been taken out of the newspapers and the political rhetoric moved to the academic realm into and serious parliamentary debate in Lebanon.

Emigration research in Lebanon has not developed to accompany that of the field of migration studies. Hence, there is a great and urgent need to increase Lebanon's capacity building in this domain of research and to encourage the government of Lebanon to take into account this vital human capital movement, i.e., emigration of the young and educated, to eliminate obstacles, political and otherwise, to pave the way for real economic growth, and to enhance its laws and to make them more transparent to facilitate investments and the creation of jobs.

For the emigrants in general, the government may seek to increase their political participation through voting in *absentia*;²⁵⁰ it may formulate appropriate policies to allow them to participate in pension plans and health services; and for those whose parents neglected to establish and/or maintain their citizenship, the government should amend existing laws that will facilitate their re-naturalization.

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250 In the summer of 2005, the Lebanese government created a National Committee to draw up a new electoral law for Lebanon; several diasporic groups and other interested non-governmental agencies including LERC are lobbying and have sent proposals in favor of absentee voting.

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I ntervento di Sanford Lakoff

Behind “the Golden Door:” What Europe Can Learn from the American Experience Of Immigration

Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
Glow world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame,
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”

Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus” (1883) inscribed at the base of the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor.

In my small hometown of Selma in the middle of California’s Central Valley, more people now speak Santiago’s language [Spanish] than my own [English]. The city’s schools are more segregated than when I attended them forty years ago and their scholastic achievement is much lower. There are now more signs of wealth among Selmans—new cars, cell phones, CD players, VCRs, color televisions—but also much anger that “aliens,” even if their fortunes have greatly improved in the United States, remain poorer than the native-born. At the corner store there are more signs in Spanish than in English. And the government-subsidized apartment building two miles away is full of small children, baby carriages, and pregnant women—all evidence that someone at least still thinks big families are good in a world where many childless natives think them bad.

Victor Davis Hanson, Mexifornia, A State of Becoming

Large-scale immigration by peoples of different nationality, ethnicity, and culture is a comparatively new experience for Western Europe but has long been a driving force in American life. Like Canada and Australia, the United States is a “country of immigration.” Its history, as one eminent historian famously remarked, is the history of its immigrants. Since the first arrivals were recorded, in 1820, over 66 million legal immigrants have entered via Ellis Island and the other ports of entry, and millions more have managed to get in without benefit of a visa, most subsequently granted amnesty and naturalization. This profound difference calls for caution in comparing the experience of modern Western Europe and the United States on this score. Nevertheless, there are enough similarities to warrant comparison along several important dimensions and at least one overarching generalization. The moral that can be drawn from the American record is that if the will to assimilate is strong among immigrants, and if they are induced and encouraged to fit in, integration can be achieved over several generations, even if they come with very different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. If that will is weak, however, and if the immigrants meet sustained lack

of opportunity and hostility in the host country, immigration will prove extremely troublesome and polarizing. In these respects, the similarities in the contemporary experience of Western Europe and the United States are striking. To put one of the most salient of them simply and bluntly, Western Europe has its Muslim problem and America has its Mexican problem. It is not yet clear whether either group will prove fully assimilable, and in both cases the resulting social tensions run high, especially because much current migration is unauthorized by the host countries.

The uncomfortable truth is that although the United States has a great deal of experience with immigration, the country has so far been unable to deal with its latest manifestations. A quasi-vigilante group calling itself “Minutemen”—a reference to a revered legendary force of farmers formed during the early stages of the American revolution for independence—has deployed to patrol the country’s southern border, presumably to make up for the inadequacies of the official immigration police. Except for achieving publicity, it has had no effect at all in stemming the tide of illegal immigration. A variety of initiatives have been proposed over the years but so far those that have been adopted have fallen far short of meeting the need. If Europe is in a quandary over what to do about immigration, so is the United States. Ironically, the American preoccupation with homeland security, in the wake of 9/11, has lowered legal immigration by making it harder to get a visa and increased the number of illegal migrants who remain in the country because tighter border controls make them fearful that if they return home they may not get in again.

Both Europe and America are currently experiencing relatively high rates of immigration, albeit under different circumstances, for different reasons, and from different regions. Both are experiencing a significant degree of illegal immigration, much of it run by smuggling networks, and are having great difficulty preventing and dealing with it. Mexican immigrants to the United States have their “*coyotes*” who promise to get them across the overland border for a considerable fee, sometimes to leave them to die in the desert; illegal immigrants to Italy have their *scafisti*, who often herd them ashore on *gommoni*, inflatable rafts, also under perilous conditions. Europeans and Americans alike must now confront the threat of terrorism emanating from one fraction of these immigrants. Episodes involving violence by Muslim extremists have led to calls for tighter control of applications for entry and for the deportation of preachers of hate.

On both sides of the Atlantic, this influx of outsiders has caused consternation and policy conflicts. The responses range from the advocacy of multiculturalism (including multi-lingualism) at one extreme, to a nationalist backlash on the other demanding that immigrant minorities either give up their separateness or leave. There is considerable fear that the new immigrants cannot be integrated successfully and will create “internal colonies” within the host countries or at the very least bring about adulterated and divided forms of national identity. This fear sustains nativist calls for restriction on further immigration and for deportation of illegal immigrants. More liberal or pragmatic voices call for a greater effort to regularize conditions by giving foreigners temporary guest worker status but not necessarily citizenship and for more intensive efforts to socialize immigrants into the culture of the host culture and alleviate problems they encounter finding work and housing.

General Dimensions of the Problem

In the world as a whole, more than 175 million people, or three percent of the total global population of six billion, reside in a country other than where they were born—up from 80 million or 1.5 per cent in the mid-1970s. Demographers project that world population will reach nine billion by 2050, and that some 230 million will be migrants. The annual flow of migrants is estimated at between five and ten million. Migration is hardly a new phenomenon, but its character has changed considerably during the millions of years of human evolution. Ever since the origin of the species in Africa, the entire world has been populated by human migration. During the very earliest periods, much of this movement was dictated by the economic and climatic necessities of a nomadic way of

life. When domestication of animals and the development of agriculture permitted a settled form of existence, colonies were created as a way of dealing with overpopulation. These first colonizations did not necessarily cause conflict because the territories in which they were established were often virgin or sparsely populated.

That relatively peaceful period of migration began to be superseded, in Africa, Asia, and Europe, virtually from the beginning of recorded history, when tribes and kingdoms invaded, colonized, and sometimes enslaved, deported, or displaced other settled communities. Europe had already experienced a great deal of such internal migration due to conquest when the first explorers were dispatched to the Americas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The idea that one people could take over territory inhabited by another by force of arms was taken for granted inasmuch as all titles to land were based on acquisition by whatever means were considered necessary. The creation of the nation-state began to challenge that assumption. The settlement of the territories that became the United States of America was in one sense a continuation of an old pattern in which people moved to sparsely settled regions or simply conquered, dispersed, and destroyed indigenous peoples. In another, however, it was an example of a new pattern in which the nation-states of Europe were seeking to establish empires on other continents in competition with each other. Conflicting claims were settled by wars and purchase and the results were sanctioned by treaties. Eventually, every habitable area of the world became either a colony or an independent state. Immigration thereafter became subject to state control.

It bears emphasizing that what is distinctive about modern immigration, of the sort that began in the nineteenth century, is that it involves movement not by communities of settlers to supposedly “virgin lands” but of various groups of individuals, some fleeing persecution, others seeking a better life, to territories subject to regulation by nation-states. Nations tend to be defined by a cultural cohesiveness which grows over time as memories of shared sacrifice and perseverance acquire legendary qualities and confer a sense of identity even beyond that of birthright alone. States are defined by the territorial control they exercise--in Max Weber’s famous phrase, as possessors of a legitimate monopoly of the means of physical coercion. Small wonder that the immigration of groups of individuals dissimilar from the established native population, even when encouraged as a matter of policy but especially when extralegal, should provoke resistance and difficulties of assimilation.

In 2000/2001, approximately 22 million foreign nationals resided in Western Europe, accounting for 5.5% of the total population. If recent immigrants who have been naturalized are included, these figures would be somewhat higher. Many of the newcomers—as many as 500,000 a year—are coming illegally. The others have been allowed in for various reasons: EU rules permit labor mobility from within the 15 members; immigrants from poorer countries, including those formerly behind the Iron Curtain, fill lower-paying jobs that natives are reluctant to take; skilled workers are invited in to help firms compete better; humanitarian considerations have led to the adoption of liberal asylum policies. In the United States, recent immigration has been proceeding at an even higher rate. In 2000, 56 million or 20 per cent of all residents of the United States were either foreign born or had at least one foreign-born parent. One in five children in America is either the son or daughter of an immigrant; by 2015 the figure will be nearly one-third. Of the “foreign stock,” between eight and twelve million are thought to be “undocumented aliens,” in the euphemism that sympathizers prefer to “illegal alien.” Some of this immigration is “selective,” i.e., an effort to encourage immigrants with needed skills, but most of it is the result of a curious combination of interests—the interests of poor villagers, mostly from Mexico, in escaping abysmal poverty, and the interest of businesses in obtaining the labor needed to do a variety of menial jobs Americans are unwilling to take.

Behind the new openness to immigration in Europe is a changing demographic profile, along with a greater willingness to admit people of different backgrounds. Although the population of the EU 15 grew from 349 to 375 million between 1975 and 2000, the population of working age

(20-64) is projected to decrease from 225 million in 1995 to 223 million in 2025, while the share of population over 65 is expected to grow from 15.4 per cent in 1995 to 22 per cent in 2025. The enlargement of the EU likely means further pressure from immigration because gradually allowing labor mobility will encourage workers from poorer accession countries to seek opportunities in the more prosperous western nations.

Absorbing large numbers of immigrants is always difficult, especially because many tend to concentrate in large metropolitan areas already hard to govern—though the pattern of habitation is somewhat different in the United States, because many immigrants settle in rural areas where they harvest crops or in suburbs where they work constructing homes and performing maintenance chores. They usually come with very different cultural baggage and do not integrate easily with the host culture, at least during the first generation. Their cultural differences and economic impact arouse resentment and xenophobia. Their large families impose a significant burden on the welfare systems of modern European states—on education, social services, and health care. When their young people do not find employment, some turn to crime. Others join violent gangs to assert their manhood and achieve a sense of identity. Some young Muslims, even when they find opportunities for secular education and professional careers, are seduced by preachers of religious hatred and pose a serious security threat.

Comparing America and Europe

If immigration is much less of a novelty for the United States than it is for Western Europe, in the past it was less problematic because the immigrants were mainly Europeans and because a single sense of national identity was established by one particular group of Europeans, the British settlers. Apart from the Africans who came involuntarily and were denied the status of citizens until after the Civil War, the first immigrants are more properly thought of as settlers because they eventually created a new nation-state. These settlers were almost all from the British Isles and they were largely of one religious orientation, Protestant Christianity. Even the Africans imported as slaves mostly became Protestant Christians--until recently when a small fraction broke away to adopt a form of Islam. Subsequent immigrants were of more diverse but mainly European nationality, and it was well understood that they were expected to learn English and adapt in other ways to the established standards. In that formative sense, the colonies that came to make up the original thirteen-state federal union composed a “fragment” or offshoot of Europe, defined by a predominantly white, British, and Protestant influence.

The cohesiveness of Americans should not be exaggerated. It would be a mistake to suppose that because the immigrants to the United States were almost all of one faith, they constituted a single culturally or ethnically homogeneous community—“that portion of the English race,” as Tocqueville memorably but prematurely observed, “sent to colonize the new world.” There were already significant cultural differences between the relatively well bred Britons who settled New England and the ruder country folk who flocked to the southern colonies and then westward. After the first wave of British settlers, the Europeans who came to North America and then to the United States were of a variety of nationalities—at first mostly from the British Isles but also from the Netherlands, France, and Spain, and eventually from almost all the northern European countries, especially Germany, which became the largest single source of immigrants until well into the twentieth century. By 1850, Germany and Ireland combined were the source of nearly 70 per cent of Americans of foreign birth. The poet Walt Whitman was to observe proudly that the United States was “a nation of nations.”

Although English became the dominant tongue in the colonial period, many of the first settlers spoke other languages, and their religious organizations reflected their diverse identities. Although some 85 per cent were Protestants of the Calvinist variety, they created churches that reproduced their multi-national origins. Of the 3200 religious congregations in 1780, some 600

either were or had been non-English-speaking. The churches might be Dutch Reformed, (English) Methodist or Baptist, German or Scandinavian Lutheran, Anglican (renamed Episcopalian), Scots Presbyterian, Greek Orthodox, and Russian Orthodox. Small pietistic sects like the Amish and the Mennonites founded communities in the same early period. Even the Roman Catholic churches were apt to be distinguished by the ethnic composition of the various parishes they served.

Most Americans were and are Protestants, but there was considerable competition, if not antagonism, among the Protestant denominations, which have fractured and proliferated to the degree that organized religion in American is sometimes referred to as denominationalism. Early Americans were apt to be too sure of their particular version of Christian faith to be ecumenical. They were ready to tolerate other faiths provided they located elsewhere and did not try to intrude themselves where they were unwelcome. Ironically, the one new authentically American church, Mormonism, aroused the most persecution, mainly because of its advocacy of “plural marriage.” The Mormons found a measure of acceptance only once they reached Utah, which was far enough away from other Christian communities not to give offense. Once the Mormon elders outlawed polygamy, a few decades later, the Latter Day Saints, as they style themselves, were on their way to being considered respectable citizens as well.

From the outset Roman Catholics have comprised a significant minority. They now constitute about a quarter of the American population. Their arrival in large numbers provoked fear, summed up in the slogan “Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion.” The increase of Catholic immigration from the 1840s onward, especially from Ireland, provoked a xenophobic reaction known as “nativism” which found political expression in a secretive anti-immigrant political party, the “Know Nothings” (so called because when asked about their proceedings, members were supposed to answer, “I know nothing”) and later on in vigilante movements like the Ku Klux Klan, which blended hatred of Negroes with hostility toward Catholics and Jews.

While Jews are more prominent in American life than their numbers would suggest, both they and Muslims are small minorities in the United States. The Jewish fraction of the American population is now about two per cent, or under six million, and is thought likely to decline because of a low birth rate and rising rates of intermarriage. The Muslim population is estimated to be less than 1 per cent, or under two million. Although significant numbers of Muslims have only come to the United States in recent times, the large Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe (totaling 1.5 million) around the turn of the twentieth century posed issues not unlike those now associated with Muslim immigrants to Europe. Judaism as a religion was for many first-generation immigrants as much a way of life as Islam has been—complete with restrictions of diet, dress, and appearance—setting them apart and triggering a revival of the historic negative stereotypes of Jews and Judaism strong among Christians. There was considerable doubt in some quarters that the Jewish immigrants could ever be assimilated. A leading sociologist depicted them as inherently criminal and immoral. “The truth seems to be,” he wrote, “that the lower class of Hebrews of eastern Europe reach here moral cripples, their souls warped and dwarfed by iron circumstance.” With the influx of Jews, Slavs, and southern Italians very much in mind, popular writers warned against “mongrelization”—much as racists like Gobineau did in nineteenth century Europe. In fact, the United States has been greatly strengthened by its immigrants and they have repaid the country’s welcome many times over. A quarter of America’s Nobel Laureates and many of its most distinguished professionals and philanthropists, have been the progeny of those supposed “moral cripples.” An Italian-American mayor of New York, who directed the city’s response to the trauma of 9/11, is among the most admired of the nation’s citizens.

Although immigration to the United States has not been consistently encouraged, when it has been allowed it has been in the belief that permanent inhabitants were needed to settle and develop much of a vast continent. In Europe, by contrast, the immigration that has come about was initially the unanticipated consequence of a policy of inviting guest workers to stay temporarily in order to supply labor for the post-World War II expansion of European economies. These workers

brought in spouses and children or started new families and as a result once temporary workers became permanent inhabitants. Flight of refugees added to the influx. Before long, the “temporary” workers had established such long residence that they could not be forced to return home. And the new immigrants gradually became a potent voting bloc supporting the claim for citizenship. There is, however, a similarity between what happened in Europe and the latest wave of immigration to the United States, which also began with a guest-worker program, the so-called *bracero* program in 1942 which had the unanticipated consequence of starting permanent settlement and continued immigration.

Whether the United States needs great numbers of immigrants to sustain its prosperity is debatable. Economists disagree on whether the current wave of immigrants is likely to produce a net economic benefit or not. A 1997 study by the highly respected National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, found that immigration raised the Gross Domestic Product by a substantial percentage. Proponents say that without the immigration of workers willing to take low-paying menial jobs, the cost of produce harvested manually, construction, domestic service, and hotel accommodations would soar. Opponents claim that if wages were to rise, most of the jobs would be filled by natives, others would be replaced by the use of automation, and that the educational and welfare costs (for relief of poverty and health care) of the large, impoverished immigrant families now coming into the country well exceed the economic benefits. Federalism produces a contradictory outcome in one important respect: taxes paid by immigrants exceed the cost of the nationally provided services they consume but the reverse occurs at the state and local level, imposing an especially heavy burden in the regions heavily impacted by immigration. In terms of demography, immigrants are not as much needed economically in America as they are in Europe—except that America like Europe is developing a population profile that includes more and more elderly retirees. The fertility rate of the current U.S. population is 2.0, only slightly below the 2.1 replacement rate. Europe is in a different condition inasmuch as its fertility rate has fallen to 1.4 per cent. Unless Europeans can achieve unprecedented progress in labor productivity, or are willing to accept a reduced standard of living, they must depend on high levels of immigration for the foreseeable future. But the United States has a long border with Mexico which it has so far been unable and/or unwilling to seal against illegal immigration, and the lure of a better life north of the border drives villagers from Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America to come despite barriers and hardships. And because employers with considerable political influence are anxious to have cheap labor, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service has never seriously cracked down on those who hire illegal aliens, except for sporadic token raids on garment trade sweatshops.

Western Europe also differs from the United States in that it is a geographic entity, not a single nation-state, and the political units that compose it have not yet achieved, and may never achieve, the degree of federal union that enabled the United States, after only a decade of confederation, to pursue a single immigration policy once the issue of national sovereignty was settled by the adoption of a constitution. Despite the non-binding unifying policies adopted by the EU and codified in the Maastricht Treaty, member states continue to show considerable variation in the policies they adopt to attract the skilled and unskilled, and in their vulnerability to illegal immigration, the restrictions they impose on naturalization, the procedures they establish for asylum seekers, and the places from which they drew immigrants. Different sending countries target different receiving countries in Europe. Some 90 per cent of Algerian migrants go to France. Moroccans favor Spain and the Netherlands. Turks tend to go to Germany, Pakistanis to England. The United States gets most of its immigrants from Latin American and a smaller number from Asia.

In the recent surge of immigration to Europe, the largest group by religion is Muslim. Arab Muslims comprise the bulk of recent immigrants to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain. For many adherents, Islam is a way of life and not merely a monotheistic belief system. It entails an attitude toward the role and rights of women, for example, which is very different from that of

contemporary Europeans. Some influential Muslim preachers hope they can convert Christians and restore the momentum of Islamic conquest lost when the Moors were expelled from Spain. Some European Christians, including some church spokesmen, consider this a realistic challenge, especially as the higher Muslim birthrate alone threatens to turn Europe into “Eurabia” or at least to make cities like Amsterdam Muslim-majority. This religious difference alone is often said to make the prospects for integration in Europe more problematic than was the case in the United States.

Actually, however, there is more of a parallel with what is happening now in the United States than Europeans may be aware of. The bulk of new American immigrants are Roman Catholic, so they do not pose any great anomaly on the score of religion. But they are also largely Hispanic and poor, and on both these scores many Americans fear they will not be easily assimilated. Unlike previous immigrants, whose lands of departure were distant, their homelands are nearby, and many remain focused on their home villages, their culture and language, and, in the case of Mexico, their claims to territory in the Southwest of the United States ceded in 1848 as a result of what many on both sides of the border consider to have been an unjust war. For some ideological champions of Mexican immigration, this re-settlement represents a form of “reconquest” by stealth.

Hispanics: the New American Dilemma

Many Americans and some analysts view the current Hispanic immigration as fundamentally different from previous patterns and a threat to the undifferentiated sense of American identity symbolized by the image of the melting pot. The sheer size of the immigration, especially from Mexico, dwarfs the previous great waves of immigration experience in the middle of the nineteenth century and around the turn of the twentieth century. As of now, Hispanics comprise 41.3 million of the 293 million inhabitants of the United States. They account for more than half of the foreign-born population and 36 per cent of the total population in the nation’s five largest counties, which include several of the major cities, such as Chicago and Los Angeles. (Five of the major metropolitan areas, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Miami, account for half the country’s “foreign stock.”) In combination with other minorities, they now comprise the majority of the population of two of the largest states, California and Texas. If the current rate of immigration is sustained, along with comparative fertility rates, Hispanics will constitute an even larger share of the American population. The United Census Bureau has estimated that this share is likely to rise from 12 per cent in 2000 to 18 per cent in 2025.

The terms “Hispanic” or “Latino” need to be deconstructed. They are used to include all Spanish-speaking immigrants from throughout Latin America, including groups as different as the mostly middle-class exiles from Cuba who have settled in Florida and the impoverished *campesinos* who have come from rural Mexico, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. The Cuban exiles have formed an enclave in Miami called “Little Havana.” Some have become bi-lingual, others remain Spanish speaking.

Although they are unlikely to want to return to Cuba in the future, the Cuban-Americans remain preoccupied with the fate of their homeland and exert a considerable influence over United States foreign policy on that score. This is little different from the prevailing American pattern: Irish-Americans are especially concerned with Washington’s policies in northern Ireland, Jewish and Arab Americans with the country’s policies in the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. What makes the Mexican presence more alarming to many Americans is first of all that since the 1970s, millions have come and are continuing to come illegally, and secondly that they are proving harder to assimilate than previous immigrants. One reason is that unlike earlier immigrants, they maintain a strong sense of identity with their country of origin and its language and way of life. In 1996, Mexico adopted a law allowing Mexicans to maintain Mexican nationality even if they became citizens of another country.

Liker other immigrants before them, Hispanics tend to come from impoverished backgrounds and to exhibit a disproportionate share of social pathology. Most of the current migrants come from backgrounds of rural poverty, but without the family structure and values of other immigrants who put a high premium on education. Most come with a lower level of education than other migrants and do not make an effort to make up for this deficiency. In 2000, 86.8 percent of native Americans had graduated from high school. Only 38 percent of Mexican-born adults had done so. More Hispanic young people drop out of school than others. As would be expected, few attain professional or managerial positions or become entrepreneurs. In 1998, a third of Hispanic immigrants were dependent on public welfare assistance, more than any other national group except Dominicans. As a rule, illegal immigrants come as single young men, and single young men of all sorts are a cohort most prone to crime and socially irresponsible behavior. The Latino death rate is three times higher than that for non-Hispanic whites. Some with little driving experience cause accidents. The Mexican immigrants are plagued by the diseases of alcohol and unprotected sexual activity. Latinos die from cirrhosis of the liver at a rate higher than for any other American ethnic group, and twice the rate of non-Hispanic white Americans. Venereal diseases are rampant among the young white males and often go untreated. They are thirteen times more likely to suffer from tuberculosis. Many of these immigrants enter the country without the health screening that is given legal applicants. The illegal immigrants often enter the "underground economy" which lowers wages for natives, deprives the government of tax receipts and deductions for welfare programs, and encourages trade in stolen property. Many join criminal gangs which commit violence against each other and against citizens and wind up in jails where they maintain their gangs. Since they have no health insurance, they flood emergency rooms at hospitals, making them overcrowded for citizens and increasing the cost of health care to the insured. In California Hispanics have the highest dropout rates from high school and the lowest percentage of bachelor's degrees of any ethnic group in the state. Those who do go to college sometimes choose indoctrination programs like Chicano Studies which nurture their resentment against earlier mistreatment but do not prepare them for careers. In many areas, only a small fraction of those eligible to vote actually go the polls. Under new arrangements, they remain eligible to vote in Mexican elections, and candidates for office in Mexico campaign in the *barrios* of the United States.

As a result, the influx of Mexicans, especially illegals, has generated heated controversy. On one side are those, like Senators John McCain of Arizona and Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, who have introduced legislation that would make illegal aliens legal workers with the opportunity to become citizens after six years of residence after paying a small but significant fine. The bill would also allow the entry of 400,000 new guest workers a year. Critics charge that this amounts to giving amnesty to those who have broken the law and that the fine would be "a retroactive smuggling fee.") Similarly, a bill introduced by Kennedy and Senator Larry Craig of Idaho would give temporary legal status to farm workers who have worked for at least a hundred days since July 2003 and allow them to apply for permanent residency if they work another 360 days over the next six years. At the other extreme is a proposal introduced by Senators John Cornyn of Texas and Jon Kyl of Arizona that would greatly strengthen border security, discourage employers from hiring illegal aliens, and require any illegal alien who wishes to apply as a guest worker to return to his home country and do so there. In the middle is a proposal from the Bush administration which would allow illegal workers to receive "temporary worker cards" renewable every three years, that would allow them to travel back and forth to their country of origin without being denied re-entry. Any temporary worker wanting to remain permanently would have to apply for legal admission. The complexities are not likely to be easily compromised. For the time being, polls show the American public to be split. By 61 per cent to 36 percent, respondents favored allowing illegal immigrants to keep their jobs and apply for citizenship over deportation. 54 per cent disapproved of the president's handling of the issue.

Racism, Nativism, and Multiculturalism

America's very diversity, exacerbated by tensions over racial integration and by a recent influx of Hispanic and Asian immigrants, has given rise to a cultural and political movement for multiculturalism not unlike that which has lately arisen among Western Europeans. The advocates of multiculturalism contend that the imposition of a hegemonic white, Anglo-Saxon culture on all Americans does violence to the contributions of other groups in the making of the country and prevents members of minorities from feeling themselves fully equal citizens. This point of view is sometimes combined with a feminist critique of patriarchalism and the demand of homosexuals for equal treatment to produce general support for an even broader form of multiculturalism. One upshot is a demand for bi-lingual education. Another is the call for a radical revision of history and civics education to take account of the positive role of minorities and the bad behavior of the dominant group toward minorities, including especially the native population, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. The use of preferential treatment ("affirmative action") to rectify past injustices and promote greater balance (racial, ethnic, and gender) in school enrollment and faculties, in the professions, and in the workplace is another expression of the view that diversity should be regarded as a desirable characteristic, not as divisive or Balkanizing.

This movement, it may safely be said, is doomed to failure insofar as concerns its grander aspirations. The history books have been revised, to some extent quite properly, to tell a fuller story and not gloss over mistakes and wrong-doing for the sake of patriotic indoctrination. Bi-lingualism involving English and Spanish is a fact of everyday life in parts of the country where much of the population is Hispanic and not yet at ease with English. Preferential treatment has had some effect in university admissions and employment, and the Supreme Court has laid down that diversity may properly be considered as a desideratum so long as it does not entail the imposition of quotas. But a strong counter-current has set in against this tendency. English-only referenda have passed in a number of states, and permanent bi-lingual education is in disfavor. The courts have been narrowing the scope of preferential treatment and state referenda have shown majorities in favor of abolishing the practice. Insofar as the aim of the multiculturalists is to transform the American sense of identity from that of the melting pot which produces more or less uniform Americans over several generations, into one that freezes differences and allows for hyphenated identities, it runs against the most powerful current in American history, which is that of assimilation. The United States has always been an insatiable machine for assimilation, grinding up all manner of newcomers and turning them out with the consistency of Barbie dolls or McDonald's hamburgers. Samuel Huntington has put the point bluntly: "There is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans will share in that society only if they dream in English."

Factors Responsible for Successful Assimilation in America

Assimilation in America has been successful until now for several important reasons:

1. *Most of those who came were anxious to burn their bridges to their old habitats and become full Americans.* Until the very recent upsurge in Hispanic immigration, virtually all the immigrants came from distant countries. Some came to escape religious and political persecution, almost all in the hope of making a better life for themselves in "the land of opportunity"—the land Goethe said was one of "*unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*." They have been anxious above all to start life anew; most did not suppose they had come temporarily to make money and then return home. That made them willing to give up many of their old world ways for the sake of blending in. They learned English as best they could, and made sure their children did so well enough to be indistinguishable from older inhabitants. Some changed their surnames to conform to American standards, and many gave their children first names that would disguise their origins. Some used plastic surgery to reshape their noses. The children played baseball, American-style football, and

basketball, rather than the games popular in Europe. Folk culture was preserved in the delicatessen counter and at weddings and other ceremonies, but a general, bland American cuisine derived from the British became the universal standard (until, thankfully, Americans discovered French cooking, pizza, Szechwan Chinese cooking, Sushi, etc.)

2. *Although there was a dominant Anglo-Saxon culture, the constant flow of non-British immigrants created minority enclaves in which newcomers could find comfort before they or their progeny were ready to join the mainstream.* The fact that so many Americans were immigrants made the experience of being different a common one that was less stigmatized than it might otherwise have been especially in the large urban areas to which most immigrants were drawn, but even in some of the farm areas which were heavily mono-ethnic.

3. *The expansion of the American economy, coupled with the availability of empty land, enabled the immigrants to escape confinement in the menial occupations with which many had to start.* Pushcart peddlers became department store magnates. The children of poor farmers became the leaders of agribusiness and the entrepreneurs who built the great railroads, steel mills, and automobile industries. The offspring of Chinese coolies who toiled to build the railroads and iron laundry became restaurateurs and then physicists and engineers. The “American dream” of rags to riches may be a myth in many respects—social mobility has been shown to be far less a reality than is often supposed—but there were enough cases where it was fulfilled to make immigrant groups proud not of their separate identities but of being Americans.

4. *Because the United States was, as G. K. Chesterton put it, the first country to be founded on a creed, it has been relatively easy for immigrants to be “Americanized.”* American identity was forged in a revolution for national independence grounded in the belief in natural rights-social contract theory, especially as expounded by Locke, or what came to be called liberalism. The absence of feudalism to any significant extent meant that Americans were “born equal,” as Tocqueville put it, in the sense that differences of status and condition were much more muted than they were in Europe. Liberalism demanded toleration of religious differences, and the American constitution ruled out the establishment of religion, even though it did not settle exactly where the “line of separation” was to be drawn between church and state, an issue that remains controversial. Most importantly, the liberal belief in the rights of the individual—political, civil and economic—became so enmeshed in the national identity as to be thought not as liberalism, or one creed among many, but to be exalted as Americanism. Blinded by this creed, Americans refused to think in terms of class. When immigrants brought other creeds with them, such as Anarchism, Socialism, and Communism, they found these stigmatized as “un-American” and eventually gave them up. Egalitarian attitudes have produced a mass culture now spreading around the world which further minimizes the sense of class differentiation, and the rising rate of intermarriage blurs distinctions of ancestry, ethnicity, race, and religion.

The Muslim Immigration to Europe

The Islamic immigration to Europe poses special problems, in part because European societies tend to be more ethnically and culturally homogeneous than the United States and in part because many Muslims are resisting integration. In France, the mainly Moroccan and Algerian influx now totals between five and seven million, and the immigrants are often concentrated in *banlieus* where unemployment is high and pressure to conform to Islamic values is intense. The Netherlands’ heavily Moroccan Muslim population is one million, or 6.2 per cent of the total. In Germany the mainly Turkish Muslim population is about 3.7 per cent, in Belgium 3.7 per cent, and the U.K. 2.7 per cent. The values and practices of immigrants from countries like Turkey, Morocco and Algeria are not only ethnic in character but have the character and sanction of religion. A large fraction of the Muslim immigrants are young—of 1.5 million in Britain, 600,000 are under 21—and therefore susceptible to the exhortations of radical preachers who appeal to their idealism and

reinforce their alienation. Islamist fervor, often instilled in the young in religious schools and through broadcast media and over the Internet, leads some to seek martyrdom by attacking Western societies. American experience suggests that despite difficulties, immigrants do assimilate over time, but it is not clear that American experience is fully relevant to Europe, for several reasons. America has been a nation of immigrants, so ethnic and religious heterogeneity is well established. American immigrants have for the most part been Christians of one variety or another. Recent immigration is heavily Hispanic, which poses problems but is not inherently different from previous patterns of immigration. There are some Muslim enclaves in the United States, frequented by recent immigrants, which have been hotbeds of Islamist fervor, but on the whole American Muslims are well integrated—including many who have come as refugees from Iran and Iraq--and do not suffer from unemployment, confinement to ghettos, or difficulties in combining American citizenship with religious and ethnic identity. The situation in Europe is more difficult, despite the fact that most Muslims in Europe are law-abiding.

In addressing Muslim immigrants, contemporary Europeans may want to revive the policy Napoleon adopted when he said to the Jews of France that they would be welcome to live there as full citizens provided they did not keep themselves a people apart. You have a choice, he said in effect, either you remain a separate people or you become Frenchmen of the Jewish faith. Which is it to be? To the Jews as individuals we offer everything, to the Jews as a separate people, nothing. Faced with that choice, the Jews of France overwhelmingly chose French nationality. The French Sanhedrin in 1807 officially declared on behalf of the Jewish community that henceforth all doctrines of Judaism would be subordinated to the civil law of the state and that “Israel no longer forms a nation;” instead the Jews would be “one with the great family of the (French) state.” Otherwise, Europeans may be better advised to make immigration from Muslim countries more difficult or follow the Swiss example of allowing immigrants to come to the country as guest workers on a rotating basis, allowing only restricted naturalization.

Some Concluding Reflections

The common ground for a mutuality of regard between natives and immigrants is likely to be small at first. Newcomers often prefer to live apart, with kindred folk, and to maintain the separate ways with which they are familiar. Even when they try to break out of this isolation, they are apt to meet rejection if only because they are perceived as different but also because they sometimes encounter prejudice and stereotypical phobias. If economic opportunity and mobility of residence and employment are available, however, and various forms of socialization are provided and accepted—notably a common form of education-- integration can be achieved. The eclectic America of hamburgers, pizza, bagels, cabernet sauvignon, and moo shu pork, of a sometimes cloyingly naïve religiosity, albeit expressed in a bewildering variety of sectarian forms, and of nostalgic enclaves of “unmeltable ethnics” (in Chinatown, Little Italy, etc.) may not be an example Europeans will want to copy in all respects, but it does suggest that people of different origins and belief can actually enjoy living together.

European countries are caught on the horns of a dilemma: they need immigration to provide a labor pool, but the immigrants often find it difficult to acclimate themselves. Perhaps even more strongly than in the United States, immigration has produced a hostile backlash in Europe, reflected in the rise of anti-immigrant parties and in expressions of concern by clergymen for the decline of the Christian character of European civilization. Others have argued that immigration is acceptable, provided the immigrants accept the prevailing or hegemonic culture. That has proven to be a problem, for a number of reasons:

1. *Especially in the first generation, many immigrants are reluctant to abandon their own distinctive identities.* They feel more comfortable living with people who share their customs and values and look like themselves. In the United States, this first-generation attitude has generally

been overcome by the second and third generations, when interpenetration and intermarriage lead to Americanization. It could persist in Europe because it is not as easy for immigrants to blend into a hegemonic culture as it is in one like the United States which is more eclectic in character or where national identity is mainly a matter of accepting a political creed that calls for individual liberty and racial and religious tolerance.

2. *Hostility prevents immigrants from integrating readily into their adopted societies.* Insofar as they are confined to ghettos and discriminated against in employment, they are bound to feel a conflict over identity. This is particularly problematic for younger people, who cannot easily determine whether they should think of themselves as nationals of their adopted countries or as members of an ethnic, national, or religious enclave. Such conflicts of identity can lead to anti-social behavior, particularly when the group in question suffers from a high rate of unemployment or poverty and sees no way out.

3. *In the first generation, immigrant communities are more likely than others to produce criminals, criminal gangs, and political subversives.* The once notorious syndicates headed by European immigrants to America (like the Jewish gangster Dutch Schultz and the Italian Mafioso “Lucky” Luciano) have lately been replaced by Latino and Asian gangs. The Irish “Molly Maguires” who were blamed for labor unrest are long gone, replaced by the trade unions, and the Italian Anarchists and Jewish Socialists who bedeviled the American imagination early in the twentieth century faded away when they were replaced by an evanescent American “New Left” at mid-century. To some extent, they are now being replaced by Islamist firebrands.

There is no single answer to these problems. It may be that over time, the barriers between communities will be lowered, as European societies become more multicultural and/or immigrants adopt the ways of the host culture except for religious observances. So far, this blending is proving hard to achieve. Western European societies are becoming free-wheeling to a degree that shocks the sensibilities of immigrants from traditional restrictive cultures. Among Muslims, attitudes toward the emancipation of women are not changing rapidly; on the contrary, women are often under pressure to wear the veil and not to pursue careers. For the time being, mutual dislike and distrust seem to be intensifying rather than diminishing. Nevertheless, the American experience shows that differences of language, ethnicity, religion, and ways of life can be overcome over several generations, though not without considerable strain and strife, provided both immigrants and natives have opportunities to come to know and appreciate each other and share important experiences. If the will for accommodation on both sides is weak, however, the costs of allowing immigration may well outweigh the benefits. Globalization in its economic, cultural, and political forms is rapidly producing a more cosmopolitan mix of people everywhere, with great potential benefits for mutual understanding, but these benefits could be lost or jeopardized if immigration is not carefully controlled.

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