*Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*

G
P
I
R

*Article*

*Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*
15(6) 713–724
© The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1368430212441638
gpir.sagepub.com

# Why hawks fly higher than doves: Intragroup conflict in representative negotiation

**Hillie Aaldering[1] and Carsten K. W. De Dreu[1]**

**Abstract**

Intergroup conflicts are often regulated by negotiating group representatives, who are influenced by constituent pressures. We examined how within-constituent disagreement influences representative negotiations. In a 2 x 2 experiment, the majority of constituents was either hawkish or dovish vis-à-vis the out-group, and the minority had either low or high status. After being exposed to constituent voice, representatives negotiated in a multi-issue task with integrative potential. Results showed that representatives reached more integrative agreements when the constituent majority was dovish rather than hawkish, but only when the hawkish minority had low rather than high status; when the hawkish minority had high status, representatives reached suboptimal agreements equal to those reached when the constituent majority was hawkish. Additional results showed that under these circumstances, representatives perceived the cooperativeness of their constituency as highest and also had the most trust that the constituency would approve of the agreement. Implications are discussed for theory on intergroup relations, (representative) negotiation, and conflict resolution.

**Keywords**

cooperation, intergroup relations, representative negotiation, social conflict, status

Paper received 26 July 2011; revised version accepted 15 February 2012.

Intergroup conflicts are pervasive social phenomena taking place at all levels in society. Examples include ethnic conflicts, labor-management disputes or interstate war. To regulate intergroup conflict, groups often engage representatives who negotiate agreement on real or perceived divergent interests with the (representative of the) rivaling out-group (De Dreu, 2010a).

When intergroup conflicts involve multiple issues, which they often do, representative negotiations may reduce intergroup conflict and promote intergroup relations by creating mutually beneficial, integrative solutions. For example, a typical labor-management dispute (Friedman, 1994; Walton & McKersie, 1965) involves several issues, such as

[1]University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

**Corresponding author:**
Hillie Aaldering, University of Amsterdam, Weesperplein 4, Amsterdam 1018 XA, The Netherlands
Email: H.Aaldering@uva.nl

salary increase, pension plans, vacation days, health insurance, and so on. These issues are not of equal importance to both parties: Whereas labor may highly value social security, the employers may place highest value on reducing vacation days and salary increase. By allowing labor its preference on social security and the employers their preference on vacation days and salary increase, parties would integrate their interests in a mutually beneficial win-win solution. Such integrative agreements allow intergroup relations to thrive and prosper, and yield economic and social benefits that cannot be reached through continuous fight and hostile exchange (De Dreu, 2010a; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996).

Unfortunately, however, there is hitherto little work on integrative negotiation in intergroup conflict and we have limited understanding of the conditions that promote or hinder representatives to settle intergroup conflict through integrative agreements (Trötschel, Hüffmeier, & Loschelder, 2010). Moreover, the majority of the research on representative negotiation explicitly or implicitly assumed constituencies to be monolithic entities that speak with one voice, and largely ignored the case where negotiators represent a divided constituency (Demoulin & De Dreu, 2010). Here we address these issues by examining integrative negotiation by individuals representing constituencies that contain both dovish and hawkish factions varying in status. We report an experiment showing that hawkish compared to dovish minorities within a representative's constituency have disproportionate influence on the quality of the negotiated agreement, except when hawks have relatively low status and can thus be ignored.

## Constituency influences on representative negotiation

There is good evidence that representative negotiations are generally more competitive than negotiations between individuals (Benton & Druckman, 1974; Mosterd & Rutte, 2000; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). This fits the so-called individual-group discontinuity effect: In conflict and negotiation situations, groups are more competitive and less cooperative with each other than individuals are. One explanation is that group members justify their competitiveness in terms of protecting and helping their in-group against the out-group (De Dreu, 2010b; Wildschut & Insko, 2007; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). And indeed, in intergroup conflict, representative negotiators tend to assume that their constituency wants them to be competitive and non-conciliatory with the other side. Only when there is good reason to assume the constituency favors a cooperative, dovish approach do representatives turn towards a more cooperative negotiation strategy (e.g., Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Druckman, 1994; Enzle, Harvey, & Wright, 1992; Gelfand & Realo, 1999). From this it follows that, in general, intergroup negotiations are characterized by relatively high levels of distrust, low levels of open-minded information exchange between representatives, and a relatively strong focus on winning rather than collaborating. Distrust, lack of information exchange, and competitive rather than cooperative goals all undermine the likelihood that between-group negotiations end in integrative agreements that benefit all rather than one side (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993. For a review, see De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).

## Divided constituencies and asymmetrical influences

Whereas most work on representative negotiation has thus far assumed that constituencies consist of members sharing the same preferences, many intergroup conflicts feature within-group disagreements about what the representatives should achieve, and how they should approach the between-group negotiation. Such within-group disagreements may be due to divergent interests within the constituency, with some factions benefiting from certain types of intergroup agreements more than others. This may

have important consequences for between-group negotiation processes and outcomes- a study by Halevy (2008), for example, showed that negotiating groups who experience intragroup conflict reach lower quality outcomes than groups without intragroup conflict.

Within-group disagreements may also emerge because factions within the constituency have opposing views on the ultimate goals of the between-group negotiation, with some factions favoring a cooperative approach resulting in an agreement that benefits both groups (henceforth "doves") and others favoring a more competitive approach resulting in an agreement that benefits one's own group in particular (henceforth "hawks"). Research by Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, and Smith (2007) suggests that in such cases, hawkish factions may have a disproportionate influence on the overall group strategy being pursued or advocated. These authors studied small group negotiation, and found that a minority of competitive group members were more likely to change the orientation of cooperative group members into a distributive value claiming strategy, than that cooperative group members were able to persuade competitive group members into adopting an integrative, value-creating strategy, even when cooperators were in the majority. In a similar vein, Bonner, Okhuysen, and Sondak (2011) investigated how individual preferences of three member groups influenced the aggregated group preference in a subsequent negotiation. They found initial hawkish preferences to have a greater impact on the position subsequently advocated by the group as a whole than initial dovish preferences.

That these within-group disagreements also occur in representative negotiation follows from research by Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, and Ramírez-Marín (2009). These authors investigated the effects of constituencies that consisted of either a hawkish minority within a dovish majority, or vice versa. Constituency members sent messages to the representatives about their preferred negotiation strategy (for example "Don't negotiate too tough, otherwise we'll regret it later" (dovish), and "Negotiate tough, otherwise we pay more than necessary" (hawkish). Across three experiments, Steinel and colleagues found hawkish minorities to have a disproportionate influence on representative's concession making: When the group consisted of a majority of doves and a minority of hawks, representatives were significantly less cooperative than when the group consisted of doves only. The other way around, when the constituency contained a dovish minority, representatives were as tough as they were when the constituency contained hawks only. Clearly, a hawkish minority influenced the negotiated agreement, whereas a dovish minority did not.

## Hawkishness as implicit status cue

An explanation for the disproportionate influence effect of hawkish messages is that compared to dovish messages, hawkish messages receive more weight and thereby more importance. The idea is that a competitive approach can be justified in terms of in-group defense (competitive weighting). Because a hawkish strategy speaks more directly to in-group interests, hawks may be seen as more loyal and committed group members than doves, who apparently are willing to sacrifice in-group interests to settle the intergroup conflict. As a result, hawkish factions within a constituency have a higher status and their messages are thus afforded more weight, which in turn explains their disproportionate influence on the representative's negotiation strategy (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977). If true, it follows that the minority faction's status within the constituency moderates its impact on representative negotiation. Put differently, the disproportionate impact of hawkish minorities on the negotiation process and outcomes emerges especially when the hawkish minority has high rather than low status. When hawkish minorities have low status, they can and will be ignored more easily, and the dovish majority within a constituency will drive the representative towards a more cooperative negotiation strategy that enables integrative agreements with the out-group to come about. Specifically, we predicted that representatives achieve more integrative agreements when

their constituency is predominantly dovish rather than hawkish, but only when the hawkish minority has low rather than high status (Hypothesis 1). In a similar vein, constituency composition should affect representatives' perception of constituencies' cooperativeness. A predominantly dovish constituency, advocating a cooperative negotiation strategy, should be perceived as more cooperative than a predominantly hawkish constituency. Again, we expected the status of the minority member to moderate this effect: Because a hawkish voice receives more weight, unless it has low status, it should also distort representative's perceptions of the constituencies' cooperativeness. Representatives are thus expected to perceive their constituency as more cooperative when their constituency is predominantly dovish rather than hawkish, especially when the hawkish minority has low rather than high status (Hypothesis 2).

Finally, we reasoned that a competitive negotiation style by the representative, who thus follows hawkish constituents more than dovish constituents, can be justified to the entire constituency as an in-group defense strategy (De Dreu, 2010b). While hawkish members would not approve of a cooperative negotiation agreement, dovish members may be less resistant to a negotiated agreement that hurts the out-group but benefits the in-group, doves included. Accordingly, representatives should have more trust that their agreement will be approved when the majority of their constituency is dovish compared to hawkish. In line with the previous reasoning, we expected the hawkish minority to have less effect on representative's negotiation style and behavior when it would have low status. Thus, we predicted that representatives will have more trust that their constituency will approve of their agreement when it is composed of mainly doves rather than hawks, especially if the hawkish minority has low status (Hypothesis 3).

## Method

### *Participants and design*

Eighty-six undergraduate students from the University of Amsterdam (Mean age = 21.66, Sd = 3.87; 30 male) participated for course credit or €7. Participants were randomly assigned to dyads and dyads (N = 43) were randomly assigned to the four conditions of a 2 x 2 factorial with composition of constituency (majority hawkish vs. majority dovish) and minority status (high vs. low) as the between-dyad independent variables. Gender composition of dyads had no effects and is further ignored.

### *Procedure and independent variables: Constituency composition and minority status*

Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in front of a computer. They read that the experiment would consist of two parts: A negotiation part on behalf of their constituency, and a task to measure their visuality, an important personality trait, related to career success, leadership positions and status. They were told that their constituency, consisting of four people, had come to the laboratory earlier and completed this visuality task as well. To manipulate status differences within the constituency, participants were told that they would see the visuality scores of the other four individuals who formed their constituency during the negotiation. Participants were instructed to closely attend to their constituency's visuality scores in order to do well on the visuality task themselves. Then they were shown that constituency member C had a deviant score on visuality: either very high (73) or very low (27) compared to the other members who all scored around the average of 50 (for similar manipulations of status see e.g., Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991).

Following this status manipulation, participants were told that the negotiation task would take place first, and that they would do the visuality task thereafter. They read the instructions for the negotiation task (see below). Constituency composition was manipulated by providing the participants with messages from their constituents that they presumably left upon finishing their laboratory tasks. These messages contained

**Table 1.** The messages used in the experiment

| Group member | Majority hawkish, minority dovish: | Majority dovish, minority hawkish: |
|---|---|---|
| Member A: | Try to get a good deal. The less we pay the better | Try to get an honest deal. It doesn't have to be free |
| Member B: | Don't be too soft, that will benefit us most | Don't be too hard, that will benefit us the most |
| Member C: | Not all issues are equally important, we can give in here and there | We have to win this negotiation, on all issues |
| Member D: | Negotiate tough, otherwise we pay more than necessary | Don't negotiate too tough, otherwise we'll regret it later |

directions on how they wanted the representative to negotiate (See Table 1). In the hawkish majority condition, three members sent a competitive message and one member (C, who also had a deviating visuality score) sent a message suggesting a cooperative approach. In the dovish majority condition, this was reversed, such that member C sent a competitive message while the messages of the other constituency members favored a cooperative approach. As an incentive for the representatives to pay attention to these messages, they were told that they could earn an additional amount of €30. Within dyads, representatives had equal constituencies.

The negotiation task involved a computer-mediated negotiation between the representatives of the management and the union of an international organization about a new collective employment contract (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Participants took the role of the representative of either union or management and had to reach agreement with the other representative on five issues: Salary, start date of the new employment contract, duration of the new employment contract, the upcoming salary increase and the coverage of health insurance. They received a pay-off schedule (see Appendix 1) with possible agreements and the value of those agreements in points. Priorities among these issues differ between the representatives. Four issues have integrative potential: The labor representative values the start of the contract and the health insurance issues most, while the management representative places highest value on the duration of the contract and the salary increase. The fifth issue, salary, is a distributive one, in that both representatives have equally valued but opposed preferences. The maximum individual outcome per representative was 1290 points, the highest possible joint outcome was 810 points for each representative. A 50–50 compromise on each issue would result in 645 points. This value was assigned to the members of two dyads who failed to reach an agreement within time.[1] To ensure that participants understood the instructions, they were provided with several examples of outcomes and with an exercise question about the points they would gain in case of a given agreement.

Participants had 15 minutes to negotiate and were told that in case of no agreement, they would earn nothing. They were also told that they could earn up to €30 extra depending on the number of points they gained in the negotiation, provided that their constituency would accept their agreement. Subsequently, they negotiated for a maximum of 15 minutes using a chat program, and completed a post-negotiation questionnaire that assessed the adequacy of the experimental manipulation, as well as negotiator cognitions and motives (see under dependent variables).

## *Dependent variables*

The main dependent variable was the joint outcome of the negotiation, obtained by summing the points of the representatives on the

negotiation agreement within each dyad.[2] The adequacy of the status manipulation as operationalized in visuality scores was verified by asking participants to recall the visuality scores of their constituency members. To check the constituency composition manipulation, participants were provided with 16 competitive and cooperative messages. They had to indicate whether this was one of the messages they had seen before (0 = no, 1 = yes) and if so, how likely it would be that each of their constituency members had left this message (1 = "very unlikely" to 7 = "very likely").

For the testing of the hypotheses, the following measures were used: Representative's perceptions of their constituent's cooperativeness was assessed with six items, examples being "My constituency wanted me to make concessions"; and "my constituency wanted me to be cooperative" (adapted from Steinel et al., 2009; Cronbach's $\alpha$ = .94). Representative's trust that his constituency would approve of the agreement was assessed with three items (example item "I think my constituency will accept my agreement"). These statements were rated on a 7-point scale, with 1 = "completely disagree" to 7 = "completely agree"; Cronbach's $\alpha$ = .65.)

## Results

### *Treatment of the data, and descriptive statistics*

Dyads were used as the level of analysis because individual answers to the questions could be influenced by the interaction with the negotiation partner (Kenny & LaVoie, 1985). For all the analyses, answers of the two dyad members were aggregated. Table 2 shows the correlations, means and standard deviations of all dependent variables. As can be seen, perceived cooperativeness of the constituency correlated positively with joint outcomes.

**Table 2.** Means, *SD* and correlations of the dependent variables

| Measure | Mean | *SD* | 1. | 2. | 3. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Joint outcome | 1352.79 | 107.38 | | .35* | .25 |
| 2. Perceived Cooperativeness | 3.70 | 1.17 | | | .31 |
| 3. Trust in approval | 4.47 | .84 | | | |

### *Manipulation checks*

To investigate whether participants correctly recalled that constituency member C had a lower or higher (depending on condition) score on visuality than the other constituency members, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed with the recalled visuality score of each of the four group members as dependent variables. In the high status condition, the visuality score of member C was higher than in the low status condition ($M_{high}$= 71.64, $SD_{high}$= 7.26, $M_{low}$= 29.89, $SD_{low}$= 5.38, $F$ (1, 39) = 446.00, $p$< .00, $\eta^2$= .95). The scores of the other members did not differ between the conditions (Member A: $F$ (1, 39) = .02, $p$ = .90, $\eta^2$= .00; member B: $F$ (1, 39) = 1.18, $p$ = .289, $\eta^2$= .05; member D: $F$ (1, 39) = .80, $p$ = .371, $\eta^2$= .03). We thus conclude that participants' correctly recalled that member C had a diverging visuality score, either lower (when status was low) or higher (when status was high) compared to the other constituency members.

To investigate whether participants correctly recalled the composition of their constituency in terms of hawkish and dovish messages, two repeated measure ANOVA's were performed.

Composition of the constituency (majority hawkish vs. majority dovish) and status of the minority member (high or low) acted as independent variables, nature of the messages as dependent variable and group member as within subjects factor. For the cooperative messages, the representatives with a dovish majority in their constituency estimated the likelihood that member A ($F$ (1, 39) = 15.92, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$= .40), B ($F$ (1, 39) = 21.97, $p$ = < .001, $\eta^2$= .48) or D ($F$ (1, 39) = 28.74, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$= .55) left this message as higher than the representatives with a hawkish majority in his constituency, who estimated the likelihood that C ($F$ (1, 39) = 57.05, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$= .70) left this message as higher compared to the representatives with a dovish majority




**Figure 1.** Different likelihood depending on constituency composition that each of the members left a cooperative versus competitive message




**Figure 2.** Only when the constituency consists of a dovish majority and the hawkish minority has low status, high joint outcomes will be reached

(see Figure 1). No effect of status was found ($F$ (1, 39) = .12, *ns*, $\eta^2$= .00). The reversed pattern emerged for the competitive messages: Representatives with a hawkish majority in their constituency estimated the likelihood that member A ($F$ (1, 39) = 38.93, $p$= < .001, $\eta^2$= .62), B ($F$ (1, 39) = 45.13, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$= .65) or D ($F$ (1, 39) = 68.47, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$= .74) would have left this message as higher than representatives with a dovish majority, while representatives with a dovish majority estimated the likelihood that member C (F(1, 39) = 15.68, $p$ = .001, $\eta^2$= .40) would have left this message as higher than participants with a hawkish majority (See Figure 1). Again, status of the minority member did not influence this effect ($F$ (1, 39) = 1.30, *ns*, $\eta^2$= .04). Together, these findings show that participants accurately recalled which members of their constituency had left hawkish versus dovish messages, and that the status of the constituency members did not affect this recall. This suggests that the constituency composition manipulation was successful.

## *Joint outcomes*

Hypothesis 1 predicted higher joint outcomes when the majority of the constituency would be dovish, but only if the hawkish minority would have low status. A 2 (constituency composition: hawkish majority vs. dovish majority) x 2 (minority status: high vs. low) on joint outcome revealed the expected interaction effect ($F$ (1, 39) = 4.43, $p$ = .04, $\eta^2$= .10). Figure 2 shows that dyads reached higher joint outcomes when the majority of the constituency was dovish rather than hawkish and the hawkish minority had low status, $F$ (1, 39) = 4.83, $p$ = .034, $\eta^2$= .11. When the majority was hawkish, minority status did not matter ($F$< 1, *ns*, $\eta^2$= .00). Thus, hypothesis 1 was confirmed.

## *Perceptions and processes*

Hypothesis 2 stated that dyads would perceive their constituency as most cooperative when the majority of the constituency would be dovish, and the hawkish minority would have a low rather than high status. A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed that participants perceived the cooperativeness of their constituency higher when the majority of the constituency consisted of doves ($M$= 4.69, $SD$= .67) rather than hawks ($M$ = 2.76, $SD$= .63; $F$ (1, 39) = 96.16, $p$ < .001, $\eta^2$= .75). This main effect was qualified by an interaction between constituency composition and minority status: When the majority of the constituency was dovish, the constituency was perceived as more cooperative when the hawkish minority had low rather than high status, $F$ (1, 39) = 5.91, $p$ = .021, $\eta^2$= .15. When the majority was hawkish, minority status did not influence perceived cooperativeness of the constituency, $F$< 1, *ns*, $\eta^2$= .02 (see also Table 3). This confirms hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3 stated that dyads with a dovish majority in their constituency would have greater trust that their negotiated agreement would be approved than dyads with a hawkish majority in

**Table 3.** Means and *SD* of perceived cooperativeness and trust

| Measure | Majority competitive | | Majority cooperative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | M high status | M low status | M high status | M low status |
| Perceived Coop. | 2.86 (.59) | 2.64 (.68) | 4.31 (.59) | 5.06 (.63) |
| Trust in approval | 4.63 (.93) | 4.04 (.82) | 4.35 (.60) | 4.85 (.86) |

their constituency, especially when the hawkish minority would have a low rather than high status. This hypothesis was confirmed by a 2 x 2 ANOVA with trust in approval in approval as dependent variable ($F$ (1, 39) = 4.18, $p$ = .049, $\eta^2$= .11). Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 3. Simple effect analysis showed that when the majority of the constituency was dovish and the hawkish minority had low status, representatives had more trust that their constituency would approve of their agreement than representatives with a hawkish majority and a dovish minority with low status in their constituency ($F$ (1, 39) = 4.50, $p$ = .042, $\eta^2$= .12). No difference between the constituencies was found when status of the minority member was high ($F$ < 1, *ns*, $\eta^2$= .02). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported.

## General discussion and conclusions

Whenever intergroup conflict is regulated through representative negotiations, within-group disagreements about the representative's ideal outcome may emerge and influence the representatives' negotiation strategy. Expanding earlier work by Halevy (2008) and Steinel et al. (2009) we created an experimental paradigm in which representatives negotiated on behalf of a divided constituency. In some cases, representatives faced a hawkish minority in an otherwise dovish constituency; in other cases, representatives faced a dovish minority in an otherwise hawkish constituency. In half of the cases the minority had high status, and in the other half its status was low. As predicted, we found that representatives negotiated more integrative agreements that benefited both groups when their constituency was predominantly dovish, but only when the hawkish minority had low status. When the hawkish minority had high status, representatives were as competitive as they were when their constituency was predominantly hawkish.

### *Theoretical contributions*

Our results expand past work in at least two ways. Our first contribution relates to the experimental paradigm developed here. Whereas most intergroup conflicts involve several issues, previous work on representative negotiations, and on intergroup conflict more generally, primarily focused on single-issue conflicts and purely distributive negotiations (e.g., Kamans, Gordijn, Otten, & Spears, 2010). The multi-issue negotiation task used here allowed for mutually beneficial solutions that could be achieved when representative negotiators engaged in cooperative information exchange, built trust, and were willing to tradeoff gains on some issues for losses on other (less valuable) issues. With this multi-issue task, we showed that representatives engage in more or less integrative negotiation which in and of itself provides a host of interesting opportunities for new research on representative negotiation, and the regulation of intergroup competition and conflict (also see Halevy, 2008).

Our second contribution to previous work relates to the effects of minority status on representative negotiation behavior and outcome. Our findings corroborate earlier work by Steinel et al. (2009; Weingart et al., 2007) who also showed that hawkish factions have disproportionate influence. Steinel and colleagues proposed that hawkish messages attract more attention than dovish ones and are processed faster. Our theory and findings suggest that representatives may be motivated to attend to hawkish messages more, because hawks within one's in-group have (implicitly) higher social status, and are assumed to have stronger voice in the ultimate approval of the negotiation agreements. In line with this reasoning, we find robust interactions between numerical and social status on

integrative agreements, and trust of the representative in being accepted by one's constituency. Together, these findings indicate that hawkish minorities have disproportionate influence because representatives are motivated to cater for the needs of hawks, even when they are in the minority. Only when hawkish minorities are explicitly denoted as low status do representatives ignore them, and pursue the more cooperative approach towards the regulation of intergroup conflict as pleaded by the doves.

A potential alternative explanation for the current findings would be that the disproportionate influence of the hawks is due to a basic perceptual phenomenon, with primarily cognitive origins-negative information attracts attention more than positive information, and hence exerts more influence (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Taylor, 1991). If true, representatives should be better able to recall hawkish compared to dovish messages. Although we do not find differences in recall of the messages, this alternative explanation cannot be ruled out completely. Participants in this experiment had a strong incentive (the potential reward of 30 euros) to pay close attention to all messages. It thus remains possible that they would not have paid equal attention to the hawkish and dovish messages without this explicit incentive. Future research should test this alternative explanation using a simple recall or recognition task.

Our study was focused on the disproportionate influence of hawkish minorities in representative negotiation. The current study does relatively little to uncover the interpersonal processes that emerged between the representatives and allowed them to achieve mutually beneficial, integrative agreements. Future research is needed to settle this issue, and such new work would benefit from the extant research on integrative negotiation between opposing individuals, whether or not conducted in an intergroup context (e.g., Halevy, 2008; Trötschel et al., 2010; for reviews of the interpersonal negotiation literatures see e.g., Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu et al., 2000; De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007). It would be particularly interesting to see whether individuals approach multi-issue negotiations differently when negotiating on their own behalf, or on behalf of a (more or less divided) constituency.

Another avenue for future research relates to the fact that in the current design, both representatives had the same type of (divided) constituency—although unknown to each other, each had a dovish (hawkish) minority with high (low) status. Such symmetries are probably exception rather than rule, and future work is needed to disentangle the possible influences of one's own divided constituency, from the possible influences of the partner's divided constituency. Up to now, work has focused on effects of the features of a representative's own constituency; new work may take into consideration the fact that representatives often have information about their partner's constituencies' divisions, desires, and drives. Whether and how such information is used remains an open issue requiring systematic research.

To regulate intergroup conflict, groups often resort to representative negotiation. Here we show that representatives may negotiate mutually beneficial deals that integrate the interests of opposing groups, and allow for economic and social prosperity. We also showed that such integrative negotiation may be jeopardized by hawkish minorities, with disproportionate influence that overrules even a substantial dovish majority. Most likely because hawks receive implicitly high social status and because their messages are more easily construed as reflecting the "loyal" thing to do, it is only when hawks receive low social status that they are ignored by representatives. Only when hawkish minorities have low status, do representatives achieve the mutually beneficial deals between their in-group and the rivaling out-group.

## Notes

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest

1 A commonly used and well-established procedure of treating impasses is to assign dyads the outcome of the lowest reached agreement (e.g., Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Lewis & Fry, 1977). In this case, this value was 1155 point in total.

2 A paired sample *t*-test revealed no difference in total amount of points gained by union or management representative. ($M_{manager}$= 678, *SD*= 116.82; $M_{union}$= 674.63, *SD* = 124.37, *t* (42) = .106, *p* = .916.

## References


Bazerman, M., Curhan, J. R., Moore, D. A., & Valley. K. L. (2000). Negotiation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *51*, 279–314.

Benton, A. A., & Druckman, D. (1974). Constituent's bargaining orientation and intergroup negotiation. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *4*, 141–150.

Ben-Yoav, O., & Pruitt, D. (1984). Resistance to yielding and the expectation of cooperative future interaction in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *34*, 323–335.

Berger, J., Cohen, B. P., & Zelditch, M., Jr. (1972). Status characteristics and social interaction. *American Sociological Review*, *37*, 241–255.

Berger, J., Fisek, M. H., Norman, R. Z., & Zelditch, M. Jr. (1977). *Status characteristics and social interaction: An expectation-states approach*. New York, NY: Elsevier.

Bonner, B. L., Okhuysen, G. A., & Sondak, H. (2011). Intragroup decision making in intergroup negotiation: Majority/minority effects and hawkishness of member preferences. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, *15*, 246–257.

Brewer, M. B., Manzi, J. M., & Shaw, J. S. (1993). In-group identification as a function of depersonalization, distinctiveness, and status. *Psychological Science*, *4*, 88–92.

Carnevale, P. J. D., & Lawler, E. J. (1986). Time pressure and the development of integrative agreements in bilateral negotiations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *30*, 636–659.

Carnevale, P. J., & Pruitt, D. G. (1992). Negotiation and mediation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *43*, 531–582.

Carnevale, P. J. D., Pruitt, D. G., & Seilheimer, S. D. (1981). Looking and competing: Accountability and visual access in integrative bargaining. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *40*, 111–120.

Carnevale, P. J. D., Pruitt, D. G., & Britton, S. D. (1979). Looking tough: The negotiator under constituent surveillance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *5*, 118–121.

De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010a). Social conflict: The emergence and consequences of struggle and negotiation. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds). *Handbook of social psychology*, 5th ed., (pp. 983–1023). New York, NY: Wiley.

De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010b). Social value orientation moderates ingroup love but not outgroup hate in competitive intergroup conflict. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *13*,701–713.

De Dreu, C. K. W., Beersma, B., Stroebe, K., & Euwema, M. C. (2006). The interaction between social motives and epistemic motives in negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *90*, 927–943.

De Dreu, C. K. W., Beersma, B., Steinel, W., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2007). The psychology of negotiation: Principles and basic processes. In A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds). *Handbook of basic principles in social psychology*, 2nd ed. (pp. 608–629). New York, NY: Guilford.

De Dreu, C. K. W., Giebels, E., & Van de Vliert, E. (1998). Social motives and trust in integrative negotiation: The disruptive effects of punitive capability. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *83*, 408–422.

De Dreu, C. K. W., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives in integrative negotiation: A meta-analytical review and test of two theories. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *78*, 889–905.

Demoulin, S., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010). Introduction: Negotiation in intergroup conflict. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *13*, 675–683.

Doosje, B., Ellemers, N., & Spears, R. (1995). Perceived intragroup variability as a function of group status and identification. *Journal of Experimental social psychology*, *31*, 410–436.

Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Validzic, A. (1998). Intergroup bias: Status, differentiation, and a common in-group identity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*, 109–120.

Druckman, D. (1994). Determinants of compromising behavior in negotiation: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *38*, 507–556.

Enzle, M. E., Harvey, N. D., & Wright, E. F. (1992). Implicit role obligations versus social responsibility in constituency representation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *62*, 238–245.

Friedman, J. (1994). *Cultural identity and global process*. London: Sage.

Gelfand, M. J., & Realo, A. (1999). Individualism—collectivism and accountability in intergroup negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *84*, 721–736.

Halevy, N. (2008). Team negotiation: Social, epistemic, economic, and psychological consequences of subgroup conflict. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *34*, 1687–1702.

Kamans, E., Otten, S., Gordijn, E. H., & Spears, R. (2010). How groups contest depends on group

power and the likelihood that power determines victory and defeat. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *13*, 715–724.

Kenny, D. A., & LaVoie, L. (1985). Separating individual and group effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *48*, 339–348.

Kimmel, M. J., Pruitt, D. G., Magenau, J. M., Konar-Golband, E., & Carnevale, P. J. D. (1980). Effects of trust, aspiration, and gender on negotiation tactics. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*, 9–22.

Lewis, S. A., & Fry, W. R. (1977). Effects of visual access and orientation on the discovery of integrative bargaining alternatives. *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, *20*, 75–92.

Mosterd, I., & Rutte, C. G. (2000). Effects of time pressure and accountability to constituents on negotiation. *The International Journal of Conflict Management*, *3*, 227–247.

Peeters, G., & Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive-negative asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction between affective and informational negativity effects. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *1*, 33–60.

Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). *Negotiation and mediation*. London: Open University Press.

Pruitt, D. G., & Lewis, S. A. (1975). Development of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *31*, 621–633.

Rubin, J. Z., Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H. (1994). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate and settlement*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Sachdev, I., & Bourhis, R. Y. (1991). Power and status differentials in minority and majority group relations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *21*, 1–24.

Steinel, W., De Dreu, C. K. W., Ouwehand, E., & Ramírez-Marín, J. Y. (2009). When constituencies speak in multiple tongues: The relative persuasiveness of hawkish minorities in representative negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *109*, 67–78.

Taylor, S. E. (1991). Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: The mobilization-minimization hypothesis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *110*, 67–85.

Thompson, L., & Hrebec, D. (1996). Lose-lose agreements in interdependent decision making. *Psychological Bulletin*, *120*, 396–409.

Trötschel, R., Hüffmeier, J., & Loschelder, D. D. (2010). When yielding pieces of the pie is not a piece of cake: Identity-based intergroup effects in negotiations. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *13*, 741–763.

Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. (1965). *A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: An analysis of a social interaction system*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Weingart, L. R., Bennett, R. J., & Brett, J. M. (1993). The impact of consideration of issues and motivational orientation on group negotiation process and outcome. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *78*, 504–517.

Weingart, L. R., Brett, J. M., Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2007). Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *6*, 994–1010.

Wildschut, T., & Insko, C. A. (2007). Explanations of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: A review of the evidence. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *18*, 175–211.

Wildschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea, J., Insko, C. A., & Schopler, J. (2003). Beyond the group mind: A qualitative review of the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect. *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*, 698–722.

## Appendix 1

**Pay-off schedule of the Union representative**

| Salary | Start contract | Duration contract | Increase | Health Insurance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| € 14000 (00) | 14 weeks (00) | 0,5 year (00) | 1% (00) | 10% (00) |
| € 15000 (90) | 12 weeks (60) | 1,0 year (30) | 2% (15) | 20% (45) |
| € 16000 (180) | 10 weeks (120) | 1,5 year (60) | 3% (30) | 30% (90) |
| € 17000 (270) | 8 weeks (180) | 2,0 year (90) | 4% (45) | 40% (135) |
| € 18000 (360) | 6 weeks (240) | 2,5 year (120) | 5% (60) | 50% (180) |
| € 19000 (450) | 4 weeks (300) | | 6% (75) | |
| € 20000 (540) | 2 weeks (360) | | 7% (90) | |

**Pay-off schedule of the management representative**

| Salary | Start contract | Duration contract | Increase | Health Insurance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| € 14000 (540) | 14 weeks (90) | 0,5 year (180) | 1% (360) | 10% (120) |
| € 15000 (450) | 12 weeks (75) | 1,0 year (135) | 2% (300) | 20% (90) |
| € 16000 (360) | 10 weeks (60) | 1,5 year (90) | 3% (240) | 30% (60) |
| € 17000 (270) | 8 weeks (45) | 2,0 year (45) | 4% (180) | 40% (30) |
| € 18000 (180) | 6 weeks (30) | 2,5 year (00) | 5% (120) | 50% (00) |
| € 19000 (90) | 4 weeks (15) | | 6% (60) | |
| € 20000 (00) | 2 weeks (00) | | 7% (00) | |