

“This need not be so bad.”

How the *Bardo Thodol* sets an example for the west with a more concrete concept of death.

Name: Maud Vis
Stud.Nr: 5631181
Begeleider: E. Peeren
Tweede Lezer: E. van den Hemel
Datum: 04-07-2011

Index

Introduction	p.4
Chapter 1: Death and the Self	p.9
Chapter 2: Death of the Other	p.25
Conclusion	p.36
Bibliography	p.40

Introduction

When browsing through the *Bardo Thodol* for the first time, with its colourful drawings of gods and its very literal and practical outlines that almost portray a sense of dry humour, the book calls up an alienating feeling with its western reader. From a western perspective, the juxtaposition between the exotic nature of the text and its use of direct and practical language at first almost seems to be absurd. After getting used to the text and its “exotic” style, it actually calls attention to a lot more than just the funny guidelines. In contradiction to what is often now considered to be the western attitude to death, the *Bardo Thodol* is all about focusing on the relationality of death and dying. The thing about death in Tibetan culture is that it is always present and overpowering. Because death is the most important aspect of earthly life for a Tibetan Buddhist, it is perhaps useful to compare it to another text that focuses at the all-consuming character of death upon life. It would be the most logical choice here to choose another religious text, only from the western canon, such as the Old or the New Testament or the Talmud. However, these religious texts are too 'scenic' in comparison to the *Bardo Thodol*. Because of its (seemingly) practical outlines, it is more interesting (for the sake of contrast) to put more of a philosophical text in opposition of it. The aspects on which both texts intersect are more complicated (and thus more interesting) when both texts have completely opposite cultural functions (religious versus philosophical).

The bigger the contrast, the clearer the similarities, differences and basic premises of both texts become. Moreover, Heidegger's *Being and Time* is not just any philosophical text. It is often rated amongst the most important works of the western philosophical canon¹, because for one of the first times in history (according to Heidegger himself) it deals with the Being of a human being in itself. This Being, just as the Being in Tibetan Buddhism, is largely overshadowed by the shadow of its impending death. Because of the contrast between the *Bardo Thodol* and *Being and Time*, both texts can alert us to certain weaknesses and strengths. For example, reading through the notions on death and life put forward by the *Bardo*, the sense of Heidegger's nonrelational view on death is put into question. But before continuing to explain the object of this research, I will introduce both texts shortly:

The *Bardo Thodol*, better known in the western world as the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*, is one of the key works on **life** according to Tibetan Buddhism. The word 'life' makes many people frown in

¹ See for example <http://www.amazon.com/Top-25-Philosophy-Books-Historyy/lm/1ATT3WNMZ0WY2> ; <http://www.bpl.org/research/AdultBooklists/influential.html> ; or http://old.nationalreview.com/100best/100_books.html

combination with the (unofficial) title of the book. Is it not a book about death? However, the distinction between life and death is not so easily made in Tibetan Buddhism: they are heavily intertwined and can almost not be seen separate from each other. The official translation of “*Bardo*” is “in between” (Goss 380), which “indicates a number of transitional or liminal conditions between death, birth, meditational stage, dream stage, moment of dying and the process of rebirth” (Goss 380). Because of this meaning, a better translation in English is considered to be *Great Liberation Through Hearing the Bardo* (Goss 380). Simply said, the *Bardo Thodol* is written to accompany the deceased person on his/her journey through death, to rebirth or spiritual enlightenment. The *Bardo* plays a very important role in the perspective that Tibetan Buddhists have on death and dying: it is a text that “provides a kind of psychological and religious picture of the *bardo*, or state of being between the former life and the next incarnation” (Davies 89). The book thus prepares every living human being for the process of dying and paints a very clear religious and practical picture of this process. It can be seen as a “how to”-guide for the deceased and their surviving family. The reciting of the *Bardo* helps the deceased find the right path towards rebirth or spiritual liberation and functions as an aid for the surviving family in their own process of liberation.

The book, therefore, is not just a document of religion but also a very practical death and rebirth-guide. Just as is found in other religions, the book only 'functions' if it is studied thoroughly throughout a person's life. The *Bardo* contains all sorts of mandalas (the Buddhist equivalent of a prayer, which requires a continuous, repetitive recital) that Buddhists still have to learn by heart (from their childhood on) to be able to apply them as life-guidelines. This is what makes the *Bardo* so special: assumed to have been written by Padmasambhava in the 9th century (Goss 380), it is still very readable because of its practical outlines.

In Tibetan Buddhism, Buddhists believe that life does not end after death, but continues until, after an undetermined amount of time, enlightenment is reached. This process of continuing-life is called rebirth, and it is different from the commonly known process of reincarnation. Rebirth “suggests a causal continuity between one birth and the next without requiring that the two be identified as the same person” (Becker 7). Rebirth is a process of continuation and spiritual enrichment, which follows after the path of death has been taken and all obstacles have been navigated. One of the basic principles Tibetans believe in, the notion of Karma, functions as a bridge between the present life and the next life a person will encounter. The concept of Karma means that “thoughts and actions have effects in future lives” (Becker 8). This prospect of a death that is going to be eventful (because of the many transitional stages the deceased has to go through) and that is surrounded by a lot of rules and study, shapes the way the Tibetans live. To die well

(peaceful) and to gain as much spiritual enlightenment as possible is to sign up for a life full of studying. Rebirth thus influences life in a completely different way than “permanent” death or the Christian notion of a heaven (an afterlife that follows the end of earthly life) does. But for all these 'endings' the same applies: the way you perceive death influences the way you shape your life.

The aspect which I find most interesting about the *Bardo Thodol* is the fact that besides anything else, it is a text. This means that close reading the text and comparing it with and applying it to another text will produce new meanings to it. *Being and Time* by Martin Heidegger is a philosophical text about what separates a human being from all other beings. The book is written in search of the answer to one question: 'What does Being mean?' (Mulhall 1). In this research, the focus will lie on Heidegger's theory about being-towards-death and all concepts that are aligned to this state-of-being. What makes this theory so interesting in relation to the *Bardo Thodol*? Although in its cultural and historical context, Heidegger's text seems to lie miles away from the Tibetan *Bardo Thodol*, there are also some convergences: both texts deal with a person's attitude towards death as a central component and in both texts this results in the incorporation of death into life. Because of the generalness of these elements, it is a challenge to bring the two together and search for more specific interfaces and divergences.

To read the *Bardo Thodol* through the theories from *Being and Time* and vice versa, is to enter new territory. So far, the *Bardo* has been a productive object of study, but mostly in sociological and religious contexts. The bulk of books written about the *Bardo* is anthropological and deals with death in Buddhist societies.² The connection between Heidegger and (Indian) Buddhism has been made several times before.³ Each of these comparisons between Heidegger and Buddhism are made on different grounds; whether the reason behind it be psychology, taoism or zen, there seems to be an underlying closeness between Heidegger and Buddhism. Takeshi Umehara writes about this related nature between Heidegger and Buddhism:

It should be noted first of all that, even though the ontology in which being is sought not through thing but through finite human existence might be thought of as unique in the Western world, it is familiar to Orientals, especially to Buddhists. We Japanese are brought up with the following words from Buddhism: “All living beings are mortal and all forms are to disappear.” This is an ontological view which grasps not only human being but all other living beings in terms of death. This might be said, in Heidegger's terms, to be the

² See, for example, Goss; Fabian; Davies; Becker.

³ See, for example, <http://www.beyng.com/hlinks/hasia.html>

ontological view which grasps being through human being which is finite, that is, being unto death. (Umehara 274)

The concept of being that is constructed through the finity of this being is an underlying similarity between Heidegger and Buddhism. This makes the comparison of this study between the two texts more logical: both the *Bardo* and *Being and Time* could be said to have the same 'ontological' starting point. It is thus interesting to see how both texts end up with differences and correspondences in their views on death, coming from the same starting point (but totally different disciplines, backgrounds, cultures and times).

Studying the *Bardo Thodol* through the lens of *Being and Time* provides a new way of looking at this important Buddhist document without confining it to a certain time or place. In turn, fragments from the Bardo will also be used to challenge or supplement notions from *Being and Time*, in order to shed a different light on Heidegger's theories. An important aspect of Heidegger's theory on death that the Bardo calls attention to is, as said, the highly individualistic tendency that Heidegger has in his theory.

Before beginning the first chapter, it is important to give a brief background on Tibetan Buddhism and its history, because of the general unknown history of this religion in our western culture. Tibetan Buddhism is a mix of classic Indian Buddhism and the Bon religion, that was the central religion of Tibet before Buddhism took over. The Bon philosophy was quite occupied with death, an element that was later adopted by Tibetan Buddhism when it became popular. This preoccupation with death is often said to originate in the meteorological and geographical location of the country:

[..]oxygen becomes too thin for the unacclimated visitor. Because of the extreme altitude the daily sun is very strong, but at night temperatures plunge to freezing even in the summertime. [...] Thus, the land has never been particularly hospitable, and this environment early gave rise to its inhabitants' beliefs in malevolent superhuman powers. (Becker 85)

Some of the key Bon ideas have been very important for the development of Tibetan Buddhism. These issues are the control of nature, the central role played by death in human life, the role of funeral rites, and the emphasis on an intermediate state (according to Becker, these issues are very different from Indian Buddhism). Many key issues from Bon thus return in Tibetan Buddhism, which of course positively influenced the embracing of this new religion.

The Buddhist movement mostly practiced in Tibet is called Vajrayāna or Tantrayāna Buddhism. It is concerned with the achievement of the absolute and it is a tradition that has been orally transferred from master to disciple (Becker 88). This form of Buddhism was introduced in Tibet in 747-749 AD by Padma Sambhava. All Buddhist movements in Tibet use the *Bardo Thodol*, but Vajrayāna goes one step beyond the other movements by asserting that “all phenomena and experiences are ultimately no more than the illusory projections of consciousness – the material level being merely a grosser distortion of truth and reality than the spiritual level” (Becker 89). This attitude is clearly reflected in the *Bardo* in the way it stimulates the influence one can have on the dying process by applying spirituality and prayer. This stems from the yoga-tradition (an other Buddhist tradition) which says that in the end, all phenomena are not real. The influence this yoga-tradition has had on Vajrayāna Buddhism can especially be found in the belief that a person is able to have influence over his/her own death.

My method of close reading both texts in relation to each other sets this study apart from other (abovementioned) studies about the *Bardo*. The texts themselves will be the main focus of this research. The most obvious similarity between the two texts is the fact that they are both texts. In both cultures and both times, someone must have chosen to deliver their message through a text and these texts have been given an important (though very different) role within the culture they were created. What role do the texts play regarding the ‘message’ they are trying to put across? Do the texts merely (re-)enact death, or do they do more, such as give instructions on how to die, let the reader have its influence on the death process (etcetera)? Can the western tradition learn from the way the Tibetan tradition handles death in the *Bardo*? These are all questions that will be answered throughout this study. The death concept that can be derived from the *Bardo Thodol* is actually much less abstract than Heidegger's notion of death and dying. *The Bardo* could therefore 'teach' the west in dealing with the notion of an impending death more concretely. The thesis of this research will thus be: “In all its exoticness, the *Bardo* is still less abstract to our culture and more clear than Heidegger's theory on death. If the west could learn from this concreteness, and apply it in its theories on death, the all-encompassing fear of death would perhaps be less present in our society.” This study is divided into two chapters. The first deals with death of the Self. In the second chapter the focus is on death of the other and the (non)-relationality of death.

Chapter 1: Death and the Self

When we look at life and death from a broader perspective, then dying is just like changing our clothes! When this body becomes old and useless, we die and take on a new body, which is fresh, healthy and full of energy! This need not be so bad!

(Dalai Lama, *Bardo* xxxvii)

This quote from the current Dalai Lama reflects the optimistic attitude Tibetans have about death and shows an excitement about the future newness of life after rebirth. Contrary to the views on death that seem most common in contemporary Western society (to which I will return), for Tibetans death is not seen as an end, but rather as the beginning of a new phase, an exciting opportunity for new chances to become (even) more spiritually developed. The most outstanding element of the quote is the level of excitement that is expressed by the Dalai Lama regarding (a coming) death. This chapter will focus on death in relation to the self and will compare the notions of death and dying that stem from the *Bardo Thodol* with the notions of death coming from *Being and Time*. Both texts are concerned with how the self should face its own death, but Heidegger discusses this in a less “hopeful” way than the Dalai Lama, which seems to be coming from the fact that he is only concerned with living-towards-death, and not with any form of an afterlife. In Heidegger’s theory, death is the end. This makes it harder to come to terms with than it is for the Tibetans, who have many new lives and spiritual development to look forward to. Everything about the *Bardo Thodol* and its notions of death, dying and the process of rebirth will be discussed in the first part of this chapter, the second part is concerned with Heidegger's notion of the death of the self, and the third part will compare both notions.

Part I: The Dying Self in the *Bardo Thodol*

In Tibetan Buddhism, death is a recognized, open part of life. Tibetans have “a pervasive sense that everyone is impermanent and destined to die” (Goss 378). It is a daily fact of life that is not hidden. The Tibetan Buddhist notion of death is centred around the assumption that it is “not an instantaneous occurrence, such as when the breath stops or the heart no longer beats. Rather, death is seen as a long process taking hours or even days, during which a variety of sensations and experiences accompany each successive stage of the dissolution of the human personality from its bodily habitation” (Becker 94). A Tibetan death leads either to a rebirth or to a spiritual liberation of the self (a permanent state of enlightenment and at the same time the moment when the

consciousness leaves the human world forever). Death thus has a very different place within Tibetan culture than it has within Western societies. The most obvious contrast between the death-concepts of both cultures is their visions on death as a process (the Tibetan view) or as a short moment (the Heideggerian view). Another obvious difference lies within the moment both cultures can determine physical death. The most common Western medical thoughts on death, are discussed by Benjamin Noys in his book *The Culture of Death*:

The traditional criteria of death were the stopping of the heartbeat and the cessation of breathing, but, because of the life-support machines, the over-comatose patient's heart still beats and they still breathe. By these criteria they are still alive, but because they seem to exist in a state of virtual death, as death in motion, the new criteria of death had to be developed. (Noys 56)

Further on, he adds:

In 1968 a Harvard University medical committee developed the new concept of 'brain death'. [...]. It is the irreversible loss of all the functions of the brain, which is defined by the lack of electrical activity, measured by an EEG, the lack of blood flow to the brain, determined by blood flow studies, and the absence of brain function, assessed by clinical tests. (57)

Noys shows here that in Western societies, death is regarded as a physical demise, merely composed of the cessation of several different bodily functions. Contrary to this, the mere loss of bodily functions is not a conclusive sign of human death in the Tibetan tradition. Death in Tibet is considered a longer process that occurs first in the mind, and only subsequently will show itself through specific bodily symptoms. This indicates that Tibetans consider death to be a mental state to which the body ultimately surrenders itself. It is the disengaging of the consciousness from its "bodily habitation". The fact that death is seen as a conscious process explains why it can be divided into eight different stages of mental declination that are accompanied by eight stages of the loss of specific bodily functions. These signs of dying are drawn from near-death experiences. The existence of these eight stages indicate that for Tibetans there is a fixed sequence of events that precedes a 'natural' death. All eight stages are thoroughly discussed in the *Bardo*. Besides these eight stages preceding death, great importance within the tradition is also given to the "location from which the soul or semi-material consciousness leaves the corpse" (Becker 96).

After physical death, the consciousness stays alive (or conscious at least) and has to travel through different experiences after death, before being able to part from its earthly body, its earthly life and the corresponding (figurative) demons that he/she has encountered on this earth. This journey has to be taken before the consciousness can be given a new start in a new earthly life, and it is the most important aspect of death that Tibetans will face.

Again, this concept of death as a mental state is in complete opposition to the physical event that death is considered to be in the contemporary Western world, which for example is illustrated by the Western issue of euthanasia. In the Netherlands, euthanasia is legal, if certain ethical demands are met. One of these demands is that the suffering has to be hopeless (leading to a certain death) and unbearable. The extensive parliamentary discussions on these demands resulted in the legal explanation that this hopeless suffering in the first place must be **physical** and only as a consequence can entail mental suffering.⁴ This shows that in Western society, death is considered a physical event that only involves the mind in a secondary manner, whereas in Tibetan Buddhism it is a process that sets in when the mind is ready to part with its earthly body.

Apart from this technical notion of death, death in general is a very dominant concept in Tibetan society. It is the directory of everything that exists in the Tibetan world and has its effects on every individual aspect of life. The general outlook that Tibetans have on life and death is illustrated in the following quote:

Alas! This illusory and feeble aggregate of form,
Created from compounded past actions and conditions,
Like [the flame of] a butter lamp blowing in the wind,
cannot last for ever.
Nothing at all exists which is not subject to the conditioning of death,
And indeed, since it is uncertain when death will occur,
One should constantly be cognisant of the signs of [impending] death,
And strive after [the accumulation of] virtue.
(*Bardo Thodol* 155)

Death constantly conditions life. This is not a characteristic of Tibetan Buddhism alone, because it is accepted worldwide as an important assumption. It is, however, elaborated upon differently in different cultures. In Tibet, the dominant influence of death on life is most visible in

⁴ See article 293 and 294 of the Book of Dutch criminal law and article 2 of the Wet Toetsing Levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding+ (the specific Law on euthanasia).

the existence of the *Bardo Thodol* itself, because it functions as a life- and death-guide that is studied by every Tibetan from childhood onwards. About this studying of, or preparing for, the Bardo, the contemporary Dalai Lama writes in his introduction to the Bardo:

Normally in our lives, if we know that we are going to be confronted by a difficult or unfamiliar situation, we prepare and train ourselves for such a circumstance in advance, so that when this event actually happens we are fully prepared. As I have outlined, the rehearsal of the processes of death, and those of the intermediate state, and the emergence into a future existence, lies at the very heart of the path in Highest Yoga Tantra. These practices are part of my daily practice also and because of this I somehow feel a sense of excitement when I think about the experience of death.
(*Bardo Thodol* xxviii)

By studying the *Bardo*, Tibetans prepare themselves for one of the most important processes of their earthly life. Still, the preparation (although very extensively) is not thought of as being of a special kind, which this quote of the Dalai Lama emphasizes. Death is seen as any other difficult or unfamiliar event in life for which people should prepare themselves. The text is their primary aid to do that properly. This constant 'rehearsal' of the future path of death and of the intermediate state conveys the sense of a strong will to be perfectly aware of (the moment of) death. The *Bardo* makes the reader aware of what precisely he/she is to encounter in the stages before and after death. The text enacts the general process of death. Going back to the previous quote from the *Bardo*, it says:

And indeed, **since it is uncertain when death will occur,**
One should constantly be cognisant of the signs of [impending] death,
And strive after [the accumulation of] virtue.

Tibetans should be constantly conscious of and anticipating the signs of death, so as to be able to deal with death appropriately or to avoid death if it should come too early (by reciting mandalas and acting out specific rituals). Avoiding death is only possible if it is a premature death (I will return to this issue later on in this chapter).

This form of consciously and precisely preparing for (the time of) death and creating awareness is quite different to the finding that Philippe Ariès makes in his book *The Hour of Our Death* about the medicalization of death in contemporary Western societies. The difference between

the two attitudes on pre-death preparations lies in the fact that according to Ariès, Western societies try to control (the moment of) death, whereas Tibetan Buddhists are just trying to prepare themselves as much as possible for their own death- and rebirth process. Ariès argues that death has become private, hidden and controlled in Western society by medical science. According to Ariès, death has become a personal insult to science. It is the only thing that still cannot be cured and therefore remains uncontrollable in our highly controlled lives. Ariès links this form of controlled and medicalized death specifically to the 20th century and to Western society, and this attitude indeed seems to be in contradiction to the Tibetans attitude towards 'timely death', which is an attitude of resignation and preparedness.

This sense of anticipation is especially important when recognizing the difference between a timely and an untimely death. The book makes the distinction by stating that a natural death cannot and should not be avoided:

But death due to the [natural] exhaustion of the lifespan
Is like the burning out of a butter lamp,
So there is no way of averting this through 'ritual deception',
And thus, [if this is indicated], one should make preparations to depart.
(Bardo Thodol 156)

And an untimely one, which can be avoided:

There are two [primary] conditions responsible for the death of human beings:
[First] untimely death and [second] death due to the [natural] exhaustion of the lifespan.
Untimely or sudden death may be averted,
By successful application of the *Ritual Deception of Death*,
(Bardo Thodol 156)

It seems that 'untimely deaths' can be avoided through the frequent repetition of the corresponding mandalas from the chapter "Ritual Deception of Death" from the *Bardo Thodol*. But what does this say about an untimely death? What does 'untimely' even mean? Although the grounds on which the distinction between the two deaths is made is not explicitly named in the book itself, it is possible to (deductively) draw conclusions from the text. In general, in the Tibetan tradition a person's life has to be in line with their death, and if someone has not yet learned enough from this life they are not ready for 'their' death yet. Such a death would be an 'untimely' one. In

the conclusion of the “Ritual Deception of Death”-chapter it is mentioned that “if the nature of their appearance has altered, the indications will undoubtedly be averted if the rites are repeated from seven to twenty-one times, or a number of times equalling the subject's age in years” (194). This leaves open the negative possibility that after the application of the rites for averting death (when experiencing one or more signs of death), the dying body does not show any signs of mental or physical improvement. If this occurs, it is safe to say that one's natural time has come. The distinction between a natural death (“when the body grows old and useless”, as noted by the Dalai Lama) and an untimely one is thus made at the moment when specific religious rites do not help to avert the signs of death anymore. It is very interesting that there is no further explanation of the two forms of death in the *Bardo* itself. This suggests that it is not seen as a big problem within the religion, perhaps because for Tibetan Buddhists it is always possible to take the first signs of demise as signs of an untimely death. Only if the corresponding rituals do not stop the dying process, they can conclude that it in fact is a timely death. The distinction between timely and untimely deaths is thus made *a posteriori*, on the basis of the (in)effectiveness of the death-stopping rituals. This distinction does not exist in Western culture, according to Aries, because all death is eventually considered to be (potentially) avoidable.

Sigmund Freud has written about a somewhat similar concept of 'unnatural' death in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. There, he develops his theory about the death drive and claims that “the aim of all life is death” (Freud 38). He discovers “*an urge in organic life to restore an earlier state of thing*” (Freud 36), and he extends this to the calm energy-less state of death. The force within people that constantly moves towards death is called the death drive. The function of the death drive is “to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death” (Freud 36). Freud later on introduces the notion of 'natural death', as the idea that “all living substance is bound to die from internal causes” (Freud 44). By this he means that death, in our society, is usually considered 'natural' when it is not caused by influences from the outside world, and unnatural when it is caused by something outside the body. It would be too complex to explore Freud's argument further, but it is important to note that the *Bardo* is not the only text in which a distinction between different kinds of death is made, and that Freud, just like the *Bardo*, speaks of following one's “own path” towards a death that can be considered one's own and therefore natural.

For the Tibetan Buddhists, awareness of the signs of timely and untimely death could lead to preparations that can be made in time to either provide for an uneventful quiet and smooth death and rebirth process, or for an avoidance of the premature death. To ensure awareness of death and dying, the *Bardo Thodol* has drawn up a list of physical and mental signs that announce two different kinds of deaths, first an untimely one, and second a natural (timely) death. The list of the

signs of death is discussed in the following order: external, internal, secret signs of death, signs of remote death, signs of near death, and miscellaneous signs of death. In dying, the body and its consciousness (or 'soul') are split from each other, according to the Tibetan tradition. The consciousness separates itself from the body, which causes bodily signs that indicate the beginning of this process. When (one of) these signs reveal themselves, the person experiencing them should immediately resort to applying the mandalas from the “Natural Liberation of Fear through the Ritual Deception of Death”, the chapter of the *Bardo* in which 'general and specific' rites for postponing or averting death are included. For each type of sign of death, a specific rite is instructed, such as the following:

For all these rites, which follow, it is best if the subject's own spiritual teacher can be present, or alternatively a sympathetic friend. [...] Then, in cases when the fingernails become lustreless [as described in the previous chapter], a religious feast should be offered to seven monks. Donations should be offered, and one should receive the [Buddhist] vows, wearing yellow clothes. If one has already taken these vows, one should retake them. Thereby, [death] will be averted. (*Bardo Thodol* 189)

Not only does it follow from this quote that through generosity and devotion to the Buddha, death can be avoided, but the text also shows that these rites are supposed to be performed together with someone else, preferably a spiritual teacher or close friend. The text explicitly names relational practices as a requirement for the succeeding of the deception of death. In the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, death is seen as a phenomenon intrinsically connected to relationality.

Besides the avoidance of untimely death, the moment of a “timely death” also asks for corresponding preparations being made by the dying person. Some of these preparations are described in the “Root Verse of the Intermediate State of the time of death”, a chapter which is central to the Tibetan experience of death:

Alas, now as the intermediate state of the time of death arises before me,
Renouncing all attachment, yearning and subjective apprehension in every respect,
I must undistractedly enter the path, on which the oral teachings are clearly understood,
And eject my own awareness into the uncreated expanse of space.
Immediately upon separation from this compounded body of flesh and blood,
I must know [this body] to be like a transient illusion. (*Bardo Thodol* 33)

This mandala shows that to prepare oneself for a coming death means letting go of one's earthly attachments (such as the body, but also all other material causes) and to become aware of the death-process itself is a very important part of this preparation. This letting go of all earthly possessions (material and nonmaterial) has the goal of abandoning all distractions and being able to completely focus upon the upcoming experience of the intermediate state and future rebirth.

A verifiable list of signs of death, like the one made earlier, is practically unknown in the Western literary tradition on death. The *ars moriendi* (The Art of Dying) is a Latin literary tradition stemming from two books from the fifteenth century. Originally these books were written for laymen in case the priest was prevented (due to unforeseen circumstances) from paying his last visit to a dying person, and they contained the specific Christian death rites necessary to ensure a good death. Ariès has written extensively on the *ars moriendi* in *The Hour of Our Death*, and calls it the technique of dying well (107). There are some similarities between the *ars moriendi* and the *Bardo*, because both discuss the physical side of dying (through describing the practices) and focus also on the way death is perceived by others. In the *ars moriendi*, dying a good death means dying a beautiful death, meaning a death that is in tune with the Christian traditions and rituals. The image of death changes through these books and becomes “pathetic and personal, an individual judgment” (Ariès 112). Moreover, a beautiful death is also taken very literally because death became dogmatically beautiful which meant that, over time, the depiction of the state of near-death could no longer be realistic, but had to be palliated by painters, sculptors and even poets (Ariès 127). The most corresponding issue of both the *ars moriendi* and the *Bardo Thodol*, is thus the fact that both list practices and concepts to apply to a person's death to ensure it becomes a 'good death'. But the big differences lie in the notions of death, and the way in which the texts cover the whole of near-death, dying and after-death, or just cover some part of it (the *ars moriendi*). Although both traditions are concerned with a good death, the Tibetan tradition does not equal 'good' with 'beautiful', for it is not interested in any form of outer appearances. In the Tibetan tradition, focusing on the 'outside' instead of the 'inside' would be considered a vanity that distracts from the true object of spiritual development. I will return to the *ars moriendi* in the third part of this chapter, in which the *Bardo* and *Being and Time* will be compared in the way they seek to ensure a 'good death'.

Part II: The Dying Self in Heidegger

Just as in the *Bardo Thodol*, Martin Heidegger constitutes death as a very important part of the life of Dasein. Dasein's life is only possible because of the certain death that ends it. Michael Inwood

writes about Dasein:

Dasein's awareness that it will die, that it may die at any moment, means that 'dying', its attitude to or 'being towards' its own death, pervades, and shapes its whole life. A life without the prospect of death would be a life of perpetual postponement (69).

Death is the event that retrospectively creates life for Dasein. The quote implies that for Dasein a life without a future that involves death would be a life of eternal postponement. Dasein can never experience its own death, but this death does “belong to the being of Dasein” (Gorner 124). Because Dasein is “always ahead of itself [...] its comportment towards death belongs to the being of Dasein” (Gorner 125). Simultaneously, death is the end of Dasein's being. Dying, according to Heidegger, is an experience that Dasein is forced to deal with on its own. Heidegger's theory on Being-towards-death is based on the thesis that dying is a non-relational event, in which all relations to the outside world are being cut off. It is important to explain Heidegger's notion of Being-towards-death, before explaining the two ways in which Dasein can Be-towards-death. Being-towards-death is the 'comportment of Dasein towards death'. Dasein's Being-towards-death is the fact that death is the ultimate possibility. The reason why Being-towards-death is such an important aspect of Heidegger's theory is because death in itself is Dasein's ultimate possibility. Comporting itself towards death is a complicated issue that calls into being all sorts of conflicts within Dasein:

With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no longer being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one. As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost [...].

(Heidegger 294)

Death is the “possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein” (Gorner 127), which brings an end to all of Dasein's possibilities, and thus is the super-possibility for Dasein. Dasein

does not choose its Being-towards-death, but does have options to deal with it in different ways. The most common way of Being-towards-death is dealing with death as “the they” would do, admitting to oneself that 'one dies' (127 Gerner), but not letting it come through to the core of Dasein’s own being. The “they” is the entity of others that define how 'one composes itself' in daily life. The “they” have a big influence on Dasein and the way it comports itself towards its own impending death:

Dying is levelled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to nobody in particular. [...] Dying, which is essentially mine in such a way that no one can be my representative, is perverted into an event of public occurrence which the “they” encounters.

(Heidegger 297)

By dealing with death as the “they” would do, dying becomes a possibility so abstract and distinct that it becomes unimaginable. Because of this abstractness, and because of the difficulty of grasping something that is completely unknowable, Dasein “conceals death from itself” (Gerner 128). In this way, death never becomes a feelable reality and it is thus easy to respond to it with “calm indifference” (Gerner 128). But this is not a good thing, according to Heidegger, because it alienates Dasein from its “ownmost possibility of being” (128), from its ultimate sense of being its authentic self. Dying becomes something that 'happens', but because the “they” talk so 'idly' about it. Because Dasein largely depends on the “they” in everyday life, it “evades” death: “Our everyday falling evasion *in the face of* death is an *inauthentic* Being-towards-death” (Heidegger 303). This means that dealing with death in an inauthentic way would mean exactly not dealing with death at all. Being-inauthentic-towards-death is acknowledging the general assumption that 'one dies', but failing to acknowledge that one's own death is a constant possibility. Dasein’s possible other way of Being-towards-death would be to follow the authentic path, by constantly being aware that dying is a possibility. Inwood writes on this authentic Being-towards-death:

Death separates, especially sharply, the sheep from the goats, the authentic from the inauthentic. [...] The authentic person, by contrast, has a constant awareness of the possibility of his own death; he is anxious, though not fearful, in the face of it. He sees his situation and the possibilities it presents to him, and makes a decision among them, in the light of this awareness. (Inwood 70)

This means that, for Dasein, an authentic way of dealing with dying and its own death is “Being towards this possibility without either fleeing it or covering it up” (Heidegger 305). Authentically Being-towards-death can thus be a stimulation throughout Dasein's life. When living in accordance with Heidegger's concept of authenticity, death would stimulate an 'aware' life for Dasein.

Death is the limit to all of Dasein's possibilities and it is Dasein's own death that forces it to recognize death as an individual experience. Death thus often pushes Dasein to become its authentic Self. Therefore, according to Heidegger, dying makes it easier for Dasein to choose its own authentic path, because Dasein's own death can only be experienced by Dasein itself and can never be experienced through the “they”. The authentic experience that dying can be is created by the individual act that dying is, according to *Being and Time*:

Awareness of one's own death snatches one from the clutches of the 'they': since Dasein must die on its own – **dying is not a joint or communal enterprise** – death 'lays claim to it' as an individual Dasein [...] individualizes Dasein down to itself. This confers on Dasein a peculiar sort of freedom, 'freedom towards death'.
(Heidegger 266)

Because of the individualising powers of death, Dasein is left to itself and is forced to deal with the situation from its own awareness and not from what the 'they' would do in the same situation. This awareness does not influence the physical death process, but it does influence the mental state of Dasein, because it opens up the opportunity to become its (strived for) authentic self. The text does not describe what dying is going to be like, since this is only knowable to the person itself. Heidegger seems to imply that Dasein should strive for living as much of an aware life as possible. According to *Being and Time* the awareness of death leads to decision-making during life, and could lead to a 'successful', authentic way of dealing with Dasein's own death. Becoming the authentic self is a process that is made easier by a conscious recognition of the constant possibility of dying. As Inwood writes:

Dasein's awareness that it will die, that it may die at any moment, meant that 'dying', its attitude to or 'being towards' its own death, pervades, and shapes its whole life. [...] the reason why Dasein [...] cannot give a complete account of itself without death, and it is that death haunts every moment of Dasein's life (69).

Death is thus an omnipresent concept in Dasein's life, that constitutes part of its Being.

Part III: The Dying Self: Comparative Analysis

What role do both texts play for the dying Self? Do they enact the dying process, or try to facilitate it by an exhaustive description of death? In both texts death is a process or moment that truly conditions life. In Tibetan Buddhism this is partly so because of the notion of karma. Karma is the notion that “thoughts and actions have effects in future lives” (Becker 8). It is because of karma that Tibetans have to live life in a spiritual, studious and giving way because it positively influences their process of death and rebirth. Death is seen as a 'mirror-stage', and not the end of everything. Death shows the dying person an “all-seeing mirror [...] in which the consequences of all negative and positive actions are clearly seen and there is a weighing of past actions in the light of their consequences, the balance of which will determine the kind of existence or mental state the dying person is being driven to enter” (xvii Coleman/*Bardo Thodol*). Death thus is a reflective transitory state that holds up a mirror to the dying person and sends him/her on a journey to a rebirth that is in tune with his/her past actions. Death is not the final stage and functions as an elaborate lesson for the Self: it teaches the dying person about spiritual liberation. The *Bardo* thus creates death as a signifier for the lives of Tibetan Buddhists.

In contradiction to what is possible in Heidegger's text, the *Bardo* has an actual influence on the death-process itself. The awareness of the dying process that the *Bardo Thodol* advocates creates the image of dying as an “active process in which the dying person is intimately involved and can positively assist in what happens next” (Davies 89-90). How a person dies is partly responsible for how he experiences his/her rebirth. This is why the death-process is given such an important place within the tradition, and it is also why the dying person is always assisted in this process by as many relatives as possible. Death and dying in itself are seen as knowable and therefore less paralyzing or frightening, but only after an extensive continuing study and the exercising of spiritual practices: dying is not a passive process and not only the dying person itself, but also the family of the dying are actively involved in the whole process that leads the dying person towards rebirth. The travelling from one state-of-being to another emphasizes the general idea that Tibetan Buddhists have of death as a journey (Davies 90). For Tibetan Buddhists, physical death is the completion of one of many human lives and at the same time it is just the beginning of a journey through other mind-states.

Heidegger does not associate death with a journey, nor with completion, and proves this by

making the comparison and explaining the difference between Dasein's "lack-of-totality which finds an end with death" (Heidegger 286) and a ripened ('completed') fruit:

With ripeness, the fruit fulfils itself. [...] With its death, Dasein has indeed 'fulfilled its course'. But in doing so, has it necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities? Rather, are not these precisely what gets taken away from Dasein? Even 'unfulfilled' Dasein ends. [...] Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself. (Heidegger 289)

Heidegger makes clear that death as the end of Dasein is not the same as Dasein's completion (in contradiction to the fruit, which is fulfilled when it is ripened, just because it has exhausted all its possibilities and therefore completed them all). The not-yet-ness of Dasein (that is constituted by its not-yet fulfilled ownmost possibility of death) and Dasein living with this not-yet-ness is not comparable with something like the ripening of a fruit. The difference lies in the fact that by living with this "not-yet" (Heidegger 289), Dasein **is** this "not-yet", and by being this "not-yet", Dasein "is already its end too. The "ending" which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein], but a Being-towards-the-end [Sein zum Ende] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is." (Heidegger 289). Death is a necessary part of Dasein, because by Being, Dasein is always already its own death. However, this does not mean that death is the fulfilment of all of Dasein's possibilities, because as Heidegger writes: "even 'unfulfilled Dasein ends'" (Heidegger 288). Contrary to what is believed in the Tibetan tradition, for Heidegger dying does not equal completion.

The two texts do correspond on the statement that death is the most certain fact of life from the moment one exists in the world. As we have seen, death in the *Bardo Thodol* is considered to be something 'understood', knowable, and a criterion of a spiritually fulfilled life, whereas death for Dasein is something fundamentally unknowable and always impending. For a Tibetan Buddhist, when the signs of a definite death reveal themselves, there is still a chance that it is not yet 'their' time to die, which is enclosed in the distinction made between a 'timely' and an 'untimely' death. It might even be possible to avert this coming death through specific rituals and practices. For Dasein, there is no such distinction (between a natural and an unnatural death) nor is there a death-averting possibility. When death comes, it comes. There is no right or wrong time. Although there is no such distinction in *Being and Time*, the impending-ness of death does come down to a shared set of pre-death attitudes that both texts advocate. Both texts stimulate awareness and emphasize the importance of the lack of distractions (in the case of Dasein these distractions are mostly formed by the "they", for the Tibetan Buddhists these distractions are concentrated on all earthly, material

possessions) as the way to deal with a (coming) death. The actual practices that should help one living towards one's own death are very similar, although a Dasein and a Tibetan Buddhist have a very different image (or no image at all!) of what kind of death they are heading towards.

An interesting aspect of the *Bardo* is that it provides outlines for dying the best death possible. So does Heidegger elaborate on how Dasein can be ensured of a good death? And what does 'a good death' mean in both texts? In the *Bardo*, a good death would be a calm process, where the ones close to the dying person would easily let go of his earthly body, and the dying person himself would also be able to let go of all earthly possessions. This letting go would lead to a relatively easy journey through the intermediate state and would eventually guide the dying person through this intermediate state to a new life (in rebirth or in spiritual enlightenment). In Tibetan Buddhism this kind of death is ensured by making people aware of death and its journey from childhood on. The *Bardo Thodol* is meant to be studied as much as possible, so as to recognize all signs of death and all hells of the intermediate state, when the time has come for someone to die. The *Bardo Thodol* hereby makes itself indispensable in the process of dying and can therefore never be considered a vain distraction from all spiritual matters.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger also implies that there might be a distinction between a good and a bad death. This differentiation within death can again be connected to the notion of the *ars moriendi*, the Art of Dying Well described in part one of this chapter. In *Being and Time* Heidegger clearly states that authenticity should not be equated to a moral judgment: “But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower degree of Being” (Heidegger 68). But Heidegger then goes on to explain the state that every Dasein also has in it: the authentic state (which has already been explained). By juxtaposing these two attitudes, Heidegger seems to imply (even though he claims not to) that an authentic way of Being-towards-death is the 'better' way to live, for example because it brings Dasein 'freedom-towards-death': “a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the “they”, and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious” (Heidegger 311). Even though Heidegger does not obligate Dasein to chose an authentic path, he does emphasize the benefits of living an authentic life, and especially focuses on the fact that making authentic choices would mean being free from the “they”. When writing about his concept of “falling”, Heidegger mentions that Dasein has “fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 'world'. “Fallenness” into the 'world' means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity” (Heidegger 220). Heidegger here associates “inauthenticity”, or Being-with-one-another (even though he also considers this one of Dasein's most common states) with not Being true to the self and with being preoccupied with empty talk. This all taken into account, it is not a

big step to compare Heidegger's inauthentic/authentic death division to the moral judgment that is made in the *ars moriendi*: the prospect of death of Dasein could be considered 'good' when it causes Dasein to become his ownmost authentic self. This means that Dasein be constantly confronted with death to experience that it is always lurking. Heidegger implies that awareness of one's own death would lead to appropriate preparations or accordingly would lead to a more 'efficient' life, such as efficient decision-making (in accordance with the awareness of the constant possibility of one's own death), because he links authentic Dasein to a more free and independent mental state. Living a 'freer' life would entail an authentic way of living (aware of one's impending death), not controlled by the "they" and mostly being able to deal with certain situations in which Dasein is thrown (Dasein cannot control everything he experiences, but if he lives his life as authentically as possible, he is able to choose the way he handles certain situations, such as his dealing with dying). Because Dasein would be making authentic decisions, and would be freed from the "they", its life could be said to be more useful, Dasein would be closer to its Self and thus would be able to make decisions (about how to deal with certain situations) based on his own 'true' Being.

Heidegger encourages an anxious position towards death, rather than a fearful one. Anxiety is an emotion that one feels in the face of one's own Dasein. It confronts a person with its own possibility to die and "makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being" (Heidegger 235). The difference with fear is that fear is a reaction that a person feels when something out in the world threatens him or her. Fear is a form of denial, whereas anxiety comes from within and offers a choice about how to react to and experience the situation that made Dasein anxious about itself. This distinction also implies that Dasein has a choice between two ways of dealing with death, which implies that one of these ways of dealing might be 'better' than the other one.

However, in both texts, there is practically nothing to be found on a 'beautiful death', such as advocated by the *ars moriendi*. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Tibetan tradition is not concerned at all with outer appearances (because the earthly body is not a permanent state), which is clearly demonstrated in their funeral practices (and further explained in the next chapter).

Another difference between the two texts is the way they both enact death, but this difference is overcome by the same result: both traditions make sure that if the rules of the text are closely followed, death could install a feeling of liberation with Dasein or the Tibetan Buddhist. For the Tibetans (as seen in the quote of the Dalai Lama at the beginning of this chapter), death is something exciting, because it opens up new possibilities. Death constitutes the liberation from an old body and old thoughts, whereas for Dasein "freedom-towards-death" points towards the freedom that is felt because of the openness with which Dasein acknowledges its own death. The

constant possibility of death is a very heavy load to bear, but when acknowledged it can also create a sense of liberation: because death is always impending, and because Dasein should always be aware of it, it can create a freedom in its everydayness, in its decision-making, as has already been described.

An interesting similarity between the two texts lies in the notion of “following one's own path”, as Freud wrote. Both the *Bardo*, with its emphasis on a person's own spiritual path and the fact that it considers every death a different one, and Heidegger's notion of authenticity (the German word is “eigentlich”, and thus specifically linked to the Self) emphasizes a certain way in which a person is most true to himself, or to his own path towards death. Authentically being-towards-death can function as a stimulation throughout Dasein's life. This is very similar to the way Tibetans perceive death and their study of the *Bardo Thodol*: because of the notion of karma, they tend to live their lives in a giving, full, altruistic kind of way. In both cases, when living in accordance with the text, it stimulates an 'aware' life.

One of the important facets of death in *Being and Time* is that death is the “ownmost possibility of Dasein” (Gorner 126), which is linked to the fact that Heidegger sees death as a possibility that is only of Dasein, not of the “they”. Death is unknowable and only possible to experience in relation to the death of others, which automatically also means that Dasein can never experience its own death. Because true dying can only be experienced in the moment of death, it cannot be rehearsed as it is in the Tibetan tradition. Dasein can only take death into account as an unavoidable possibility that cannot be known in advance, neither through one's own experiences, nor through the death of the others. This also brings with it the issue of (non)-relationality, since for Dasein death is never linked to others. In the *Bardo* the relational nature of death does play an important role. This issue of (non)-relationality will be one of the main focuses of the next chapter.

Chapter 2: The Death of the Other

The Tibetan rituals by which the grief of the survivors is managed are intimately connected to the progression of the soul of the deceased from this life to its next. Thus, to understand grief, it is necessary to understand the problems and the progress of the dead.
(Goss 387)

Now that the differences and similarities between the two concepts of death have become clearer, it is important to look at the ritual practices that follow after death, because these carry out in practice the ideological notions from both texts that have been discussed in the first chapter. The focus of this chapter will be on the death of the Other, and how both texts deal with it, analysing their attitudes towards the Other's death and death-practices. This chapter is structured in the same way as the last one, divided into three parts: the first treats the death of the Other in the *Bardo Thodol*, the second is about the death of the Other in *Being and Time*, and the third part compares both texts and attitudes towards the death of the Other.

The Death of the Other in the Bardo Thodol.

In the *Bardo Thodol*, the ritual practices that should be carried out when a person is dying or dead are not discussed specifically. This is because the *Bardo* is part of the ritual itself and contains only the spiritual part of the practices. This means that to uncover more of the perception of death through the surrounding ritual practices it is useful to return to some of the anthropological studies on Tibetan Buddhism and death. Robert Goss describes the rituals that surround death in Tibetan Buddhism very precisely. These rituals can take up to 49 days (after the disposal of the corpse the ritual proceeds by using an image of the dead or by the lama mentally imagining the deceased person's consciousness and engaging in a verbal ritual with them), because that is the time-span that the consciousness takes to travel through the intermediate states towards rebirth. The *Bardo* should be read out loud to the dying person and is read by a lama (the spiritual mentor of the dying) to help separate the consciousness of the dying person from his/her earthly body and to help him/her get through the different in-between stages before reaching the rebirthing stage.

Besides continuously reading the *Bardo* out loud, many other rituals are practiced to ensure a safe and comfortable spiritual journey for the deceased. The body stays at home for four to ten days and is “covered, except for the crown of the head” (Goss 380). The body has to be rolled on its

right side (this has to do with the position in which the Buddha died) and “incense is burned as an offering and, more practically, to cover the odor of body decomposition” (380). Death is thus not “sanitized” (Goss 379) as is the case with contemporary Western death, because it occurs at home and the family is made to be an active part of the rites. For the disposal of bodies, Tibetan Buddhism has four different methods. These methods correspond with the four elements of life: air (sky burial), earth (ground burial), fire (cremation) and water (water burial). The method used the most is the sky burial because it is economical and is an excellent way of “instructional teaching on the impermanence of life” (381 Goss). It is a way to teach the families that the body is just a 'vehicle' and is impermanent. In air burial the “corpse is cut up and fed to vultures” (381 Goss). In contradiction to many Western beliefs, ground burial and cremation are seen by Tibetans as dangerous sites full of demons and bad spirits. This, as mentioned in chapter one, also has to do with the geographical setting of Tibet (because of the inaccessible earth for example).

Robert Pogue Harrison explains that the burial or disposal of the mortal remains, across all cultures, has a similar function (besides the hygienic reasons for disposal of the corpse):

Burying is liberating the person from its tenacious embrace. Funeral rites serve to effect a ritual separation between the living and the dead, to be sure, yet first and foremost they serve to separate the image of the deceased from the corpse to which it remains bound up at the moment of demise. Before the living can detach themselves from them the dead must be detached from their remains so that their images might find their place in the afterlife of the imagination. (Harrison 147-148)

We see this liberating function of the funerary rites displayed in the Tibetan tradition specifically in the most dramatic way of disposal of the body that the Tibetan culture knows: the air burial. This form of burial underlines the unimportance of the earthly body. This unimportance has already been underlined throughout life (and in the *Bardo*) by the constant confrontation with the advice to not to attach deeply to anything earthly that would distract the Buddhist from their spiritual path:

Alas, now the intermediate state of the time of death rises before me,

Renouncing all attachment, yearning and subjective apprehension in every respect,

I must **undistractedly enter the path**, on which the oral teachings are clearly understood

[..]

(*Bardo Thodol* 33)

This goes against Harrison's statement that in all cultures the image of the dead and that of their physical bodies are merged until the point of burial. The *Bardo Thodol* urges Buddhists to let go of this assumption and see earthly matter as separate from the consciousness of both the living and the dying. Tibetan Buddhism thus does not use its funeral rite to separate the image of the dead from its corpse but uses it as a confirmation of the little importance earthly attachments have for the consciousness throughout life.

After death, the family members continue to remember the “anniversary of the death with food offerings and rituals” (Goss 396). They celebrate it every year with a feast, because of the great importance death has in the spiritual maturation of the deceased and the mourners. In these rituals “monks or lamas are hired to chant rituals” (396). All in all “Tibetans never forget the dead” (396) and by continuously devoting attention to them they can also never forget their own mortality.

Returning to the issue of the delineation of the letting go of all earthly attachments (including human relations), this instruction has some very important consequences for the process of mourning. Grief is expected to return periodically, but should not limit the living in their spiritual process. “Excessive emotional expressions” (Goss 384) are stimulated not to take place for too long. Because it is also believed to limit the dying in their process of separating their consciousness from their body, these emotions would “provoke strong feelings of attachment in the deceased” (384). As has already been emphasized, according to the *Bardo* this clinging to life is highly undesirable:

Are wasting our human lives, endowed with freedom and opportunity,
on the paths of distraction. [..]

Since we do not recognize that impermanent things are unreliable,
Still, even now, we remain attached, clinging to this cycle of existence.

Wishing for happiness, we pass our human lives in suffering.

(*Bardo Thodol* 10)

The families or survivors are stimulated to transform their emotions into spiritual practices for the dying, instead of retaining them from their spiritual journey by clinging to them. Apart from these instructions, there is not much to be found about the mourning process in the *Bardo Thodol* itself. For more about mourning, we return to Goss, who writes: “Tibetan Buddhist practices for resolving grief start by accepting the reality of grief. Grief does not disappear in a day or in a week. It takes time for grief to dissolve into solace” (383). Grief and mourning are accepted, open facts of life, however, only as long as they are put to 'practical' use for the spiritual development of the dying, the living or the community.

According to Goss, mourning rituals “include wearing hair loose and unbraided, wearing no jewellery and wearing old, black clothes” (383). This seems to be very similar to the Western way of grieving, as for example described by Freud as:

Mourning is commonly the reaction to the loss of a beloved person or an abstraction taking the place of the person, such as fatherland, freedom, an ideal and so on. In some people [...] melancholia appears in place of mourning. (Freud 203)

Even though Tibetans experience mourning, they are encouraged to channel it through 'useful' expression as much as possible. Both concepts of mourning serve distinct purposes: Freudian mourning is designed to make the mourner let go of the attachments to the lost love object, while in the Tibetan tradition mourning serves the purpose of the development of the spirituality of both the deceased and the mourners itself. In Tibet mourning lasts as long as the mourners live, through the anniversary rituals for example. It is also something that happens to the survivors (they do not choose it themselves), but it is given a sense of usefulness. The difference is that in Tibetan Buddhism mourning is seen mostly to help the deceased, while in Freud it is seen as a concept to help the survivor in his or her detaching from the dead person. Through mourning the sub-consciousness has to prove to itself that the love-object no longer exists and has to cut the libido's connection to the love-object. Because of the closeness between the love-object and the libido, this can be an intense and painful process. Freudian mourning seems to match the description Harrison gave of all funerary rites (which in a broader description could also include the mourning period and its rites): that they function to separate the image of the person from their deceased body. Freudian mourning serves to separate the almost physical connection the mourner still has to the dead. Tibetan mourning also has to do with separation of the mourner from the image of the dead person, but has this function because the mourner can not be distracted too long from its own spiritual goal. It is thus in both texts a sort of (spiritual) survival-mechanism for the mourner. In both texts, mourning also serves as a confrontation of the mourner with his or her own mortality. In Freudian mourning this confrontation usually results in a triumphant 'attitude' from the ego because of its realisation it did survive: “[...] the ego is left free and uninhibited once again after the mourning-work is completed”(Freud 205).

The *Bardo* is a document intended only for the dying and for promoting personal spiritual development through an individual's life. Even though the literal description of how to deal with the Other's death is absent in the *Bardo Thodol*, by reading between the lines a picture of how to deal

with it and which role the *Bardo* should play in this process does emerge. When someone dies, as has been discussed, a whole chain reaction of ritual practices follows. For the still-living, the death of the Other is mainly experienced through these practices. The *Bardo* is one of the main components of these practices and offers guidance for the survivors. It “becomes a text of reassurance” (Goss 397). In opposition to Heidegger’s notion that Dasein can never truly experience death through the Other, Tibetan Buddhists can. Death and its processes are known and it is almost 'obligatory' to take the experience of the other's death onboard and learn from it for one's own future death experience:

As the teachers read the Bardo Thodol for the dead and for the living, the mourners learn the art of dying by listening and practicing the death process itself. [...] The mourners participate in the liminal world of the bardo voyager. They discover a new way of interacting with the deceased and practices for dealing with their own deaths. (Goss 398)

Death here is portrayed as the continuation of life, instead of the end point it is made out to be in *Being and Time*. The *Bardo* is not only an instrument for the dying, but also for the survivors. It prepares them thoroughly for their own death, because through the reading of the *Bardo* they become familiar with the intermediate state that they will encounter when their time has come. Dying and the intermediate state are not some distant things that 'someday will happen'; they are accurately described in the *Bardo Thodol* and thence are knowable for Tibetan Buddhists, whereas for Dasein death remains essentially unknowable. Even though every death process is slightly different, overall Tibetan Buddhists become quite well-acquainted with their own future death processes by listening to the *Bardo* being recited at someone else's death. Moreover, through the death of others Tibetans learn that the physical body is not of great importance. They experience this through rituals specifically designed to create an awareness of separation between the body and consciousness of the dead person. The dying Other helps the Tibetan to come to terms with his/her own death process, and teaches the Tibetan to convert emotions into useful spiritual practice. The death of the Other also stimulates doing-good:

In Mahayana-Vajrayana Buddhism, there is a strong belief in transferring merit to another. Death provides an occasion for the living to perform spiritual works to assist the deceased in the bardo journey. Lamas instruct families on their need to generate merit for the deceased before the karmic

judgment of the Lord of Death. The notion of family assistance for the dead relative takes on great importance, for it helps mourning family members to channel personal grief.

(396 Goss)

The Death of the Other in Being and Time.

In his book Harrison states that because of the help that is always needed when Dasein dies, the 'handing over the body to caretakers' (155), Dasein's death is never truly its own. If it is never truly one's own option, it is not possible to consciously take death into account. For Dasein, this would mean, according to Harrison, that Dasein's "potentiality for being would not be consummated in death [...] but in its afterlife" (155). Harrison hereby implies that Dasein can never die in an authentic way in Heidegger's sense (free of the "they"), because even after its death it is still dependent of other people to take care of it. A good point about this is that it emphasizes that death is always, in some form, relational (which goes directly against Heidegger's theory). Even when one is dead, not all relations cease. However the assertion that Dasein does not 'own its human death' and can therefore never consider it its ownmost possibility is based on a problematic assumption. Even though Heidegger never really mentions what death is, it can be assumed that because of the lack of explanation it must mean the most obvious sense of the word: the cessation of the bodily functions (stopping of the heart, the ending of breathing, and the cessation of brain functions). Dasein's Being ends when its body dies. Its ownmost possibility has therefore already been completed before the corpse is disposed of. Because the moment of death is the end of its Being, Dasein can actually die an authentic death: being 'aware' of this always existing possibility that is most its own.

In *Being and Time*, the subject of mourning is not elaborately touched upon by Heidegger, although it probably is experienced by everyday Dasein just as everything else: through the 'they'. 'One dies' and 'one mourns' become empty expressions and have little to do with an authentic awareness of Dasein's own death through someone else's:

Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is experienced by those who remain. In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man 'suffers'. (Heidegger 282)

The Being-with-death that is described does not exclude "for those left behind to be still

with the deceased – in tending their grave, for example” (Gorner 121). Although rituals are not excluded by Heidegger, they don't contribute to a 'realer' (closer to Dasein's own, true death experience) experience of the other's death. Mourning is never the same feeling as Dasein would have in relation to its own demise, and therefore it is not very interesting for Heidegger, who is mostly interested in the reflection of Dasein on itself. But what about the actual experiencing of the death of the Other? How does Dasein react to it? Is there a difference between experiencing one's own death and the death of another human being? Wherein does this difference lie? Because of the unrepeatable individual experience that death is, according to Heidegger, it is an experience unknowable to human beings. However, the death of somebody else is something that actually can be experienced, and thus perhaps could take the place of the authentic experience of one's own death:

When Dasein reaches its wholeness in death, it simultaneously loses the Being of its “there”. By its transition to no-longer-Dasein [Nichtmehrdasein], it gets lifted right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced. Surely this sort of thing is denied to any particular Dasein in relation to itself. But this makes the death of Others more impressive. In this way a termination [Beendigung] of Dasein becomes 'Objectively' accessible. (Heidegger 281)

When Dasein dies, its ultimate possibility is fulfilled, and thereby its Being no longer 'is'. The fulfilling of its ownmost possibility means that Dasein is finished in death and can therefore not experience anything anymore (including its own death). Truly experiencing death would thus mean that one is not really dying, which would in turn mean that one is not truly experiencing 'death' at all (which would be the case in near-death experiences). The only possibility that is left for Dasein to experience some form of dying is that moment when someone else dies. This is the only event in which Dasein gets a taste of what dying is really like. It is the closest thing to experiencing death “objectively” (from a distant, as an object). In this way, the Other is given a very important place in the theory about death in *Being and Time*. The Other becomes Dasein's only reference that can teach Dasein how to deal with its own death.

The importance that the Other has in this theory again seems to go directly against Heidegger's statement that death is non-relational. Why does he still believe that death is non-relational when Dasein can only experience it through others? And what do we experience when confronted with someone else's death? The most important aspect of the dying Other is the transition of Being in the Other:

In the dying of the Other we can experience that remarkable phenomenon of Being which may be defined as **the change-over of an entity from Dasein's kind of Being (or life) to no-longer Dasein**. The end of the entity qua Dasein is the beginning of the same entity qua something present-at-hand. (Heidegger 281).

Dasein does not experience the literal death of the other, but he does experience the change of entity of the Other when he/she dies. The Other changes from a living human Being to something “present-at-hand”, a non-living entity. In this sense, Dasein does not “genuinely experience the death of others” (282), it is just there “alongside” (282) and notices the change from being to not-being in the Other: “But even if we can speak of a switch of being, experiencing such a switch is not the same as experiencing the other's death; for to experience this would to experience the other's loss of being” (Gorner 121). There is thus no such thing as a real substitution of the experience of death, because death remains Dasein's ownmost possibility. The dying Other is as close as Dasein could ever get to death. The experience that Dasein derives from the dying Other is thus that of the disappearance of Being, an important aspect to be aware of for the living Dasein. The change-over in Being is what makes the difference between a corpse and Dasein. However, it is not something that prepares Dasein for its own death, because the change in Being happens after death: it is not something that happens in dying, and thus does not help in revealing the 'true' undergoing of dying.

The Death of the Other: Comparative Analysis

In comparison to the way Dasein experiences the Other's death, a Tibetan Buddhist seems to make much more 'use' of it. He/she is able to use the experience of the loss and transform it into spiritual practice, personal growth, merit and preparations for their own death, and they are able to help the dying/dead themselves. It is thus a reciprocal process, both are dependent on one another, which makes it a relational process by definition.

Another difference in the approach to the Other's death lies in the way both texts place importance (or non-importance) on the relations between the Self and the Other. Heidegger sees the event of death as a non-relational one, but does not exclude Dasein from all forms of inter-human relations:

[..]Dasein is not an isolated individual cut off from others by virtue of being an essentially private mind behind bodily appearance and behaviour. The being of Dasein is not just

being-in-the-world but being-with-the-world, being-with-one-another-in-the-world.
(Gorner 122)

Living Dasein is thus a social being, it acts and interacts with other Beings, and Heidegger's theory of Dasein's Being-with-others is important for it helps to understand the meaning of the death of the Other better. Every other (which is automatically a human being, non-humans are called 'presences-at-hand') is a Dasein in itself: it "has the same kind of Being as Dasein" (Heidegger 162). The 'others' are thus the same as Dasein:

The entity which is 'other' has itself the same kind of Being as Dasein. In Being with and towards Others, there is thus a relationship of Being [Seinsverhältnis] from Dasein to Dasein. [...]The relationship-of-Being which one has towards Others would then become a Projection of one's own Being-towards-oneself 'into something else'. The Other would be a duplicate of the Self. [...]This relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is. (Heidegger 162)

This means that because of Dasein's Being-in-the-world (because Dasein exists as Dasein), it automatically also means that Dasein shares this world with others (who share the same kind of Being). Dasein and these others have, according to Heidegger, no balanced relationship: the 'everyday Dasein' (that constantly interacts and 'is' with others) is actually dependent on these others and their opinions:

It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them.
(Heidegger 164)

The Others or, as Heidegger more often calls them, the "they" have a big influence on Dasein as they determine what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. Naturally, the dependency on the opinions of the "they" that Dasein experiences has consequences when someone from the 'they' dies. Since it matters how the "they" think about anything, it matters how they deal with death, so much even that the everyday Dasein is often guided by the "they" when confronted with the Other's death. This results in an inauthentic way ('one dies, one is sad because someone has died' etcetera) of dealing with the Other's death. The Other's death can thus never truly be a substitute for

experiencing Dasein's own death, just because the existence of an inauthentic, dependent relation between Dasein and the Other. Why not break free out of this vicious circle? Because Dasein helps constitute the “they” (or the Other) himself. Because every other is also a Dasein, the role of the 'they' is constantly invoked, repeated and affirmed: “One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power” (Heidegger 164). There is no way out for Dasein, and as discussed, this has consequences for the way it deals with the dying Other. The attitude of 'one dies' “conceals it as a possibility of my being” (Gorner 127) and is also visible in the way the everyday Dasein behaves itself around dying Others:

They are not going to die and will soon return to the familiar world of their concern. In thus seeking to console the dying person we are helping them to conceal from themselves the possibility of being that is most their own. And in helping to conceal death from the dying person we are also seeking to conceal it from ourselves. (128)

Dasein thus 'uses' the Other to comfort himself. He uses the reassuring, depersonalized techniques of the 'they' to reassure himself and the other.

One notable similarity between the dying Dasein and the dying Tibetan Buddhist is that in Tibetan Buddhism attachment of the dying person to the survivors (and any other earthly attachment) is actively discouraged:

Alas, now the intermediate state of the time of death rises before me,
Renouncing all attachment, yearning and subjective apprehension in every respect,
I must undistractedly enter the path, on which the oral teachings are clearly understood,
And eject my own awareness into the uncreated expanse of space.
Immediately upon separation from this compounded body of flesh and blood,
I must know this body to be like a transient illusion.
(*Bardo Thodol* 33)

Even though Dasein is not encouraged or discouraged in renouncing all relations during dying, Heidegger considers death very non-relational: in death all relations are severed, because death is the fulfilling of the potentiality of the living human being and in this event there is no room for others that stand in the way, for it is a highly individual event or process. But in Tibetan Buddhism the mourners can still influence the journey of the dying, and even though the dying self

is actively encouraged to cut all relations to his/her survivors, at the same time he/she stays dependent on the mourners to help him fulfil his best possible journey. So at the same time that the dying severs all relations, the survivors stay attached in order to stimulate the best spiritual path possible.

The relationships to death both traditions display are thus very much defined by the picture they have of the death of the Other: for one the picture is very clear and prepares the Tibetans for their own future death, whereas Dasein is dependent on the experience of the death of the other to come closer to its own death and at the same time is not able to experience its own death by definition. Herein lies a fundamental difference between the *Bardo Thodol* and *Being and Time*, for the *Bardo Thodol* 'claims' to know the death process step-by-step, and for Dasein death is fundamentally unknowable.

Conclusion.

Since about fifty years or so, the Tibetan Book of the Dead has been speaking to the western imagination quite a lot. Exotic, different, a concrete book on how to deal with death? It just sounds as the solution to all our problems. The Book of the Dead has therefore been incorporated as an intertextual reference in many a western 'text'. It has been turned into an opera (performed in June 1996 at the American Musical Theatre Festival in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), a staged play⁵ and has even functioned as a title for an episode of the British cult TV show Millennium.⁶ Although this all confirms that the *Bardo Thodol* is very popular in the west, it also shows that the incorporation and usage of the book is often made on the assumption that it is a text that is very alien to our own culture on death. This image of the book leads to the expectation of a totally different vision on death than our own western vision. The research done in the previously two chapters shows that these prejudices on the exotic nature of the text are in complete opposition to the actual many similarities between the *Bardo* and Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

This does not mean, however, that the existence of these similarities is any form of proof of the existence of some sort of a universalistic view on death or mourning. Rather, it shows that through the means of a text, many issues surrounding death can be treated in the same framework and can help eradicate many prejudices about 'otherness'. Both texts clearly serve a different purpose. Heidegger has written the theory on Being-towards-death in relation to his theory on the whole of Being, and has done so because dying is the most important fact of Dasein's life. In *Being and Time*, he creates his own how-to guide for Dasein without truly becoming dogmatic. Heidegger does not even go as far as really enacting death in his theory, because he is only concerned with the natural fact of a physical demise and how to deal with that during lifetime, not with how this death would and could look like. Death is the starting point of Heidegger's theory, while it is at the same time also the end point. The *Bardo Thodol*, however, goes much further than this by not only clearly framing death, but also by enacting it through the constant repetition and recreation of this image of death. Death, in the Tibetan culture, has become exactly that what the *Bardo Thodol* has made it out to be. This is not by definition a negative phenomenon, because it can actually help the readers of the text in their process of living with the always impending possibility of death. The *Bardo* installs

⁵ See for both references: <http://www.vanitalie.com/plays/tibet.html>

⁶ http://millennium-thisiswhoweare.net/cmeacg/episode.php?mlm_code=317

a sense of security amongst the students of the text, by taking death 'back' from the claws of abstractness and making it a studyable aspect of life.

As Aries and Noys have already proven, death in western societies is a very abstract and distant phenomenon that can install a certain amount of fear in many people because of its insurmountable characteristics. Heidegger's theory on how to live with this knowledge about death does not really help to overcome the fear of death at all, since it is very hard to be aware of an impending death and be able to live with it, without knowing what exactly that death entails. How can Heidegger's text come closer to deal with death in a more concrete, relaxed way, such as the *Bardo Thodol* seems to be able to do? Wherein lie the most important differences between the two texts?

In the *Bardo* death is seen as a mental state to which the body will eventually subdue itself. In *Being and Time*, death is only seen as a physical demise (seen as an event, not so much a long process) of the body, to which the mind can learn to adapt itself during lifetime to prevent itself from becoming too fearful of it. Both texts thus contradict each other on the cause of dying, but at the same time both texts do underline the necessity to learn how to mentally prepare oneself for such a big event.

The differences between the ways in which both texts discuss the afterlife are very big, because Heidegger is not interested in the post-death period and only concentrates on the way Dasein should behave towards death. Consequently, this means that there is not much overlap between the two texts in the way they deal with the presence of an afterlife. The Tibetans see death as the beginning of a journey that will take them to a higher level of consciousness:

O, Alas! Alas! Fortunate Child of Buddha Nature,
Do not be oppressed by the forces of ignorance and delusion!
But rise up now with resolve and courage!
Entranced by ignorance, from beginningless time until now,
You have had [more than] enough time to sleep.
So do not slumber any longer, but strive after virtue with body, speech and mind!
(*Bardo Thodol* 8)

The words used in the quote above emphasize the image that the Bardo creates of earthly life: a calm, peaceful school. It is death that will wake the Buddhists up again. For Dasein, death is also an event that could be potentially a wake-up call, but only in advance. The death of the Other

could make Dasein realize what death entails: the transition into a presence-at-hand. If Dasein becomes aware of death as the ultimate possibility, and a possibility that is always impending, he is able to make more conscious decisions during his life-time. The wake-up call that death can be for Dasein, only serves to help him live a true to the self (not distracted by the “they”) –life.

The awareness-state in the dying person that is required for a good death is in both texts very similar: it liberates the person (whether it be Dasein or a Tibetan Buddhist) throughout his life and makes an aware or more 'useful' life possible. Also, in both texts the awareness actually changes the death process or -event itself. In Tibetan Buddhism, death is seen as an 'active process' on which the dying person has a lot of influence. In Heidegger, there is no such thing as a direct influence on Dasein's own death, but there is the fact that awareness of an impending death does create an authentic mindset and consequently an authentic death.

Interestingly, the *Bardo* is completely different than *Being and Time* when it comes to the relationality of death. Heidegger emphasizes that death is a non-relational event that severs all of Dasein's relations to the outside world. Meanwhile, as has been described in chapter two, the Tibetans see death as a reciprocal process, in which the dying and the survivors each give and take spiritual lessons from each other. Mourning is given a 'useful' function for the dead in Tibetan Buddhism, instead of in our culture where it is a one-sided emotion. In this way, the *Bardo Thodol* is nothing like *Being and Time*, but perhaps *Being and Time* is not a good representative of the western culture on this issue. Ariès has written about the medicalization of death in our contemporary western societies, and noted that the dying are being kept 'out of sight', just as mourning is kept private and hidden. Freud has written extensively on mourning and melancholia, indicating that there actually is some form of relationality surrounding death in our societies. It maybe is not as reciprocal as in Tibetan Buddhism, but there is more to it than Heidegger states.

In the spirit of relationality, the death of the Other is experienced in a very different way in the two texts. For Dasein, it is the only way of ever coming close to experiencing its own death and at the same time it can never experience the death of the other as something that comes remotely close to its own death. Tibetans have a very different view on the dying other, probably coming from their views on relational death. They see the death of the other as a school for their own death, and because their death paths are knowable and understandable, they are able to study someone else's death to help their own spiritual preparations. In Heidegger, death is completely and by definition unknowable, hence the death of the other teaches Dasein almost nothing about his own death. This (un)knowability of death is a very fundamental difference between the two texts, and together with the presence of the afterlife and rebirth prevents the *Bardo Thodol* from being almost the same to western notions of death and dying.

Both texts emphasize the letting-go of 'distractions'. The interpretation of 'distractions' is slightly different, but both encourage the reader or Dasein to renounce everything that keeps them clinging to their 'inauthentic' or wrong way of living. The *Bardo Thodol* is not so different from western cultures in listing all its practices and rituals for ensuring a 'good death'. Heidegger lists some conditions for Dasein being able to reach an authentic lifestyle and in the *ars moriendi* all sorts of rituals and practices are listed to ensure the dying a good and beautiful death.

The western tradition that is concerned with death and the living-towards-death can learn from *Bardo Thodol* that to face death in a concrete way, the text should pay a lot of attention to the careful description of the process of dying. The *Bardo* shows that in order to lessen the abstract concept of death, no detail can be left out and students of the texts should be overwhelmed with the idea that what is being described is in fact the actual death experience. Heidegger's theory is flawed in its focus on the individuality of death. To overcome the fear of death and to incorporate it easier into life, death has to be more of a social event, as it is in Tibet. The social aspect of dying makes it less abstract: it creates a reciprocal relation between the dying and its survivors and thereby spreads out the responsibility for dying a 'good' death. The *Bardo* also demonstrates that the direct influence of its readers on their own and someone other's death process takes away a big part of the abstractness of death. If the west should wish to have more control over their concept of death it should not look at medical science. It should take its lessons from the *Bardo Thodol*.

Bibliography.

Aries, Philippe. *The Hour of our Death*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981.

Becker, Carl B. *Breaking the Circle: Death and the Afterlife in Buddhism*.
Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993.

Davies, Douglas J. *Death, Ritual and Belief: The Rhetoric of Funerary Rites*.
London: Continuum, 2002.

Freud, Sigmund. "Mourning and Melancholia." In: *On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia*.
London: Penguin, 2005. 201-218.

Gorner, Paul. *Heidegger's Being and Time. An Introduction*.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Goss, Robert. "Tibetan Buddhism and the resolution of grief: The Bardo-Thodol for the dying and the grieving". *Death Studies*. Vol. 21, Nr. 4 Juli/August, 1997. 377-395.

Harrison, Robert Pogue. , "The Afterlife of the Image." In: *The Dominion of the Dead*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 142-159.

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.

Inwood, Michael. "Dasein" & "Time, Death, and Conscience." In: *Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 20-30 & 64-86.

Mulhall, Stephen. *Heidegger and Being and Time (A Routledge Philosophy Guidebook)*.
London: Routledge, 1996.

Noys, Benjamin. "Politicising Death." *The Culture of Death*. Oxford: Berg, 2005. 53-75.

Padmasambhava. *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*. Red. Graham Coleman and
Thupten Jinpa. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.

Umehara, Takeshi. "Heidegger and Buddhism". *Philosophy East and West*. Vol. 20:3. July 1970, 271-281.

WEBSITES

http://millennium-thisiswhoweare.net/cmeacg/episode.php?mlm_code=317

<http://www.vanitallie.com/plays/tibet.html>

<http://www.beyng.com/hlinks/hasia.html>

<http://www.amazon.com/Top-25-Philosophy-Books-Historyy/lm/1ATT3WNMZ0WY2>

<http://www.bpl.org/research/AdultBooklists/influential.html>

http://old.nationalreview.com/100best/100_books.html