

Who wants to be Coordinated and Who dares to Collaborate?

Supply Chain Management in Humanitarian Interventions

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“Amateurs think tactics [first], professionals put logistics and command and control first.”

*General Sir David Richards, Chief of the General Staff,
British Army¹*

¹ NATO website, viewed on 30 June 2010
<http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/ComprehensiveApproach_SAGIssueBrief.PDF>

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Introduction

The air strikes in 1999 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked the (unauthorized) humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Since 1989 the tensions heightened in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when the Serbian government rescinded Kosovo's autonomous provincial status. Serb and Kosovar Albanian tensions rose. The conflict became violent and the Serbian government was condemned by the Security Council (SC) for the use of excessive force and the SC called for the restoration of Kosovo's autonomous status. In 1998 violence by the Yugoslav forces continued. After the rejection of a compromise agreement by Yugoslavia NATO launched air strikes to bring an end to the human rights atrocities that were being committed and to bring a halt to Milosevic, president of the Yugoslav government.

The primary goals of humanitarian interventions are to deliver emergency aid, save lives and end grave human rights violations. There is, however, also a paradox when a humanitarian intervention occurs. Humanitarian aid organizations abide by the values of impartiality, humanity and neutrality, while the military might not strictly adhere to these values.² The conflict can get politicized when the military steps in and intervenes. During the intervention period supply chain management is extremely important. Provision of goods, experts and the rebuilding of infrastructure all have to be taken care of in order to be able to intervene and support the mission successfully. This has to occur in an often unfamiliar and rapidly changing environment. Furthermore, speed is often required in order to save lives, while access is difficult in remote and/or unsafe areas. Coordination between the various civil and military organizations is vital for swift and effective action.

This thesis will look at the logistical aspects that are involved in humanitarian interventions. How can these civil and military organizations work effectively together during a humanitarian intervention? It investigates the theoretical, as well as practical constraints and successes of civil-military cooperation in humanitarian intervention. Overall, this research aims to investigate the supply chain management

² Slim (1997). Slim, H (1997a) Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in War in *Disasters* Vol. 21 No 3.

Slim, H (November 1997b) Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity in *Development in Practice*, Oxfam.

Matthew S. Parry (2002). Phyrrie Victories and the Collapse of Humanitarian Principles <<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a094.htm>> viewed on 30 July 2010.

Minear and Weiss (1995). *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community*, Boulder: Westview Press.

successes and/or failures in humanitarian interventions by analyzing various organizations by drawing on various examples. The humanitarian intervention in Kosovo will be the focus throughout this thesis. The research question, therefore, is *how are the supply chain (logistics) coordination and collaboration between various organizations in a humanitarian intervention arranged?*

The first chapter will outline the theoretical aspects of humanitarian intervention. There will be a focus on the practical, ethical, moral and legal debates of humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, there will be a discussion on conflict cycles and the humanitarian principles. The second chapter will focus on humanitarian supply chain management. The third chapter will address the role of the United Nations in humanitarian interventions and focus on the political aspects that are involved in a humanitarian intervention. The fourth chapter will describe NATO's role in humanitarian intervention as a regional organization. This chapter will look at the operational implications of an intervention and the outsourcing of military tasks to private companies. The fifth chapter will investigate the role of other agencies such as non government organizations (NGOs), the International Community of the Red Cross (IFRC) and the role of the European Union. The last chapter will provide conclusions on how the supply chain coordination and collaboration is arranged among the various organizations.

Chapter 1: Humanitarian Intervention

1.1 Humanitarian intervention: ethics, morals and law

The NATO bombing in Kosovo has been regarded to be controversial by many people. On the one hand, when the air strikes by Operation Allied Force started there was no prior authorization by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. In this sense it was an unauthorized act as Article 2(4) was being violated. On the other hand, the NATO's illegal act was to prevent a Balkan genocide and the UN members did adopt Resolution 1244 after the NATO air strike.³ The international community has an obligation to act in the case of genocide as outlined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.⁴ In the case of Kosovo the international community feared that the ethnic cleansing could lead to genocide and NATO decided to act.

Nevertheless, the air strike brings about various questions. Is it the duty of the international community to intervene? Is there a legal right to do so? What political barriers are in place? To what extent can you prevent genocide? Humanitarian interventions are widely debated and can be extremely controversial. Just as humanitarian interventions that do *not* occur are highly controversial. Sudan, Burma, North Korea are some few examples where extreme suffering occurred and people have tried to persuade the international community to act. It seems that the criteria for a humanitarian intervention differ in each situation and none are clear cut. Then what is a humanitarian intervention? Or better yet, when is it not a humanitarian intervention but an act of war from one state or a group of states to another state?

As the book by J.L. Holzgrefe and R. O. Keohane suggest there are various ethical, legal and political dilemmas for the international community. Holzgrefe provides the following definition of humanitarian intervention "the threat or use of force by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own

³ Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane R. O. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, p 226.

⁴ More information can be found <<http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm>>. Hereby it is important to note that the UN "Convention defines genocide as any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied" ⁵

The main debate regarding humanitarian interventions often concerns the right of a state, or a group of states, to enter the territory of another state and use force. It poses questions as to the importance of sovereignty. Furthermore, people can become (unintended) victims of violence during a military intervention. This begs the question as to how 'humanitarian' an intervention is when the military is involved. Who decides that grave violations are occurring and how much force can be used? There are various human rights treaties and common understanding of human rights violations; nevertheless, these do not explicitly dictate what the most effective military intervention is in a conflict. For example in the case of Kosovo NATO decided to conduct air strikes. In other interventions ground troops have been used. There have also been various debates on a military intervention being 'too soft' and not being able to make a difference versus an intervention being 'too hard' by using too much force.

One example of such a dilemma can relate to which objects can be targeted by the military. During NATO's air strike the killing of 16 civilian employees of the Radio Television Serbia (RTS) in Belgrade led to heated discussion.⁶ The RTS was seen as a tool for mass media propaganda fomenting ethnic strifes and conflicts. The act of bombing could be justified on act-utilitarian grounds since this source of propaganda was prolonging the suffering of the war. This, however, goes against humanitarian law, which states that some harms (e.g. attacks on neutrals, torture, violence against prisoners) are forbidden without exception or qualification.⁷ "In particular, protected persons are the wounded, the sick, the shipwrecked, prisoners of war and other persons deprived of their freedom in relation to conflict, civilians and other persons not or no longer taking part in the fighting, medical and religious personnel, the staff of relief operations, the staff of civil defence organizations and mediators."⁸ Furthermore, cultural property also is protected in armed conflict by law: "Under the law of armed conflict, cultural property is protected against any act of

⁵ Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane R. O. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, p 18.

⁶ The bombing of the Headquarters Radio Television Serbia (RTS) in Belgrade by NATO was one of the most controversial military action in post World War II. As it was bombed intentionally. Opinions differ if it was a legitimate military object to target and on the proportionality of this attack. For more information: Fenrick, W. J. (2001) Targeting and Proportionality during NATO Bombing Campaign against Yugoslavia, in *EJIL* vol. 12, No 3. p. 489-502.

⁷ Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane R. O. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas p. 22.

⁸ ICRC website. http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_cultural_property. Viewed on 17 June 2010.

hostility (destruction, theft, requisition, confiscation, acts of reprisal, etc.). In addition, the use of cultural property in support of military action is prohibited (Article 53 of Additional Protocol I and Article 16 of Additional Protocol II).⁹ The bombing of the RTS by NATO stir up the debate and was condemned by various NGOs and the Red Cross community.

Holzgrefe and Keohane show that there are many moral and assumptions behind these disagreements.¹⁰ Legal dilemmas are surrounded by discussions of what are considered to be laws – or law making. According to article 38(I) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice international norms are legally binding if they are part of 1) international conventions 2) part of international custom.¹¹ It is often debated that the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 2(4) and 2(7)) do not provide legal grounds for humanitarian interventions, as well as, whether customary law is justification for humanitarian intervention. Furthermore debates often relate to the interpretation of the international conventions or the discussion on the establishment of customary law.

In the case of Kosovo, the NATO defense for carrying out Operation Allied Force is justified on “the grounds that it was “consistent with” Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203.”¹² The UN members later onwards accepted Resolution 1244 as the operation of NATO did meet several important qualifications to stop grave human rights violations. There was immediate need for action and extreme necessity as the report of the UN showed the increase of violence and more people being displaced. There was also a great resemblance to the ethnic cleansing that occurred in other parts of former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, NATO did not have a territorial design on Kosovo and the motive seemed to be purely out of humanitarian objectives. This shows that the context in which a humanitarian intervention occurs is of great importance “[...] the unlawfulness of the act was mitigated, to the point of exoneration, in the circumstances in which it occurred.”¹³

This thesis focuses on the various cases of humanitarian intervention. Hence, it is important to understand the ethical, moral and legal aspects as described above, but

⁹ ICRC website. Viewed on 17 June 2010.

<http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_cultural_property>

¹⁰ Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane R. O. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas p. 17.

¹¹ Evans M. D. (2003). Blackstone’s International Law Documents, 6th edition. p.32.

¹² Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane R. O. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas p. 48 and 49.

¹³ Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane R. O. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas p. 226.

of great importance are the political – or more practical/contextual - aspects of the humanitarian interventions that have occurred. Why did NATO decide to intervene in Kosovo, but not in a country such as Burma, or other countries where great atrocities were being committed? By simply comparing these various countries, it already shows the main difficulties involved for a humanitarian intervention to occur.

1.2 Difficulties for Humanitarian Interventions

It seems that the international community often deems a humanitarian intervention as necessary when it poses a direct threat to neighboring countries or region or in the case where ethnic cleansing is occurring or a genocide is about to occur. In the former republic of Yugoslavia wars and strife occurred after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. Wars occurred in –what are nowadays - Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. During these wars ethnic cleansing and genocide occurred.¹⁴ Hence, the Republic was on the radar of the various European countries and the USA not only because of its geographical location, but also because the ethnic cleansing that occurred prior. This probably ensured that there was a focus that there could be a probable threat of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo also.

Even then however, humanitarian interventions do not always occur. Sudan, for example, is still facing tremendous internal conflict and refugees flow into neighboring countries, but there seems no support for a large scale intervention at this point in time. Humanitarian interventions are often swift actions to deal with an imminent threat, but conflicts are often lurking in the background and this is why a successful humanitarian intervention should be followed up with successful peace building policies. When discussing the need of humanitarian intervention often time is of essence to prevent atrocities. The genocide that occurred in Rwanda is an example where the international community might have reacted too slowly. “Rwanda became the symbol of international indifference and callousness. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were slaughtered despite ample forewarning to the United Nations and the

¹⁴ For example, during the Bosnian war from 1991-1995 the town Srebrenica, of mainly Bosnian Muslims in Serb area, was declared a safe haven and under the control of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In July 1995 the town was captured by the Serbian army forces and approximately 8,000 Muslim Bosnian men were massacred by the Serb forces. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of justice have referred this to be a genocide. For further reference consult the ICTY website, <<http://www.icty.org/sid/10415>>

major powers of the genocide that was about to unfold; ignorance was not an alibi for inaction”¹⁵

Other actors can also greatly contribute to the perceived urgent need of a humanitarian intervention. They can focus the attention of the international community upon a conflict. In the case of the Kosovo conflict it is often stated that the media played a big role by reporting the great human rights violations that occurred. Other actors also have to be considered when discussing the possibility of a humanitarian intervention. NGOs, for example, report directly from a country and provide reports on conflicts boiling up. Nation states, where the conflict is occurring, can also greatly try to influence the situation in their favor by playing down the atrocities that are being committed. Besides this, there are various other actors, local governments, human rights organizations and other grass root organizations that can focus attention upon a conflict. All these various actors influence the international community and the decision making of humanitarian interventions. After it has been established that a humanitarian intervention is necessary, there are still other problems to solve in order for humanitarian interventions to be a success. The success of a humanitarian intervention greatly depends on the attainability of the set goals and the execution of the mission.

The goals of a humanitarian intervention are being drawn up in a mandate. The UN will not intervene unless a mandate is in place that has been approved by the United Nations Security Council. The humanitarian intervention will only be possible if the Security Council approved the resolution that justifies the mandate of the humanitarian intervention. NATO can also formulate a mandate, but this mandate should still be approved by the Security Council for the intervention to be legitimate.

As mentioned before, Kosovo is an exception since NATO started the air strike without prior approval of the Security Council. The approval was given later onwards by the UN with Resolution 1244 laying down various mandates. It is important that the decision making process and mandates are drawn up swiftly and effectively. The working definition the UN uses to describe a mandate is “a request or a direction for action by the UN Secretariat or other implementing entity, that derives from a resolution of the General Assembly or one of the other relevant organs.”¹⁶ A mandate determines what kind of action should be taken, but also describes the

¹⁵ Schnabel, Albrecht, and Ramesh Thakur (2000). *Kosovo and the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. United Nations University Press: Tokyo p. 2-3.

¹⁶ UN Mandate Review, <<http://webapps01.un.org/mandatereview/displayFAQ.do>>

intended function of the humanitarian intervention and the role troops can fulfill e.g. a peacekeeping mission, a peace building mission, a peace enforcing mission or a combination of these. The mandate should be relevant and provide the correct structure for a humanitarian intervention to be successful. Another difficulty relating to this is funding and the acquiring of resources that are needed to establish the intervention. Who will pay, in case of a UN mandate? This can be difficult, which nation states are willing to send their army and/or material to a far-away country?

Three other aspects are of vital importance: accessibility, cooperation and knowledge.¹⁷ In order to have a successful humanitarian intervention the state, or group of states, should be able to reach areas where there is considerable violence. Remote areas that lack the appropriate infrastructure can have a devastating effect on the success of a humanitarian intervention, for example, when troops and other support organizations cannot reach the area on time.

Besides the importance of accessibility, cooperation is important. Since there are often various actors involved in a humanitarian intervention, in order to have an efficient and an effective strategy, cooperation between the various parties is of great importance. Closely related to cooperation is the operational aspect of knowledge and information exchange. Often NGOs or other organizations that were active in the conflict area can provide good information of potential bottlenecks or background knowledge that is vital for the humanitarian intervention.

Lastly, it is important to mention that the success rate of an intervention is difficult to measure. It can not be measured on simply the profit or benefits that are accumulated; rather it is more about the impact. How many people will now not suffer because of this humanitarian intervention? How did this intervention impact on the peace process? This makes it difficult to rate the absolute success or failure of a humanitarian intervention.

It can be concluded that humanitarian intervention is closely linked with political processes, whereby various actors play a role, such as media, NGOs, local-national governments, other nation states, and the international community. Humanitarian organizations have to operate in such a highly politicized environment and thereby upholding the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Before looking at the three principles of humanitarian aid organizations, it is important to

¹⁷ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). Humanitarian Logistics. Palgrave MacMillan Insead chapters 2, 4 and 6.


have a closer look on how conflicts come into existence and under what conditions humanitarian interventions take shape.

1.3 Conflict Cycles and Kosovo’s humanitarian Intervention

How do conflicts spiral out of control and end up in war? When does a humanitarian intervention have a positive effect on the outcome of a certain conflict? These are just a few questions posed to understand how war or violence comes about and, more importantly, how to fix it.

There are various models available, but all in all, conflicts are messy. A conceptual exploration by Swanström and Weissmann shows the general three stages of a conflict process and types of conflict.

Graph 1 ¹⁸




The Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS) research project has outlined various conflicts in a conflict database. ¹⁹ Early warning signs and adequate action could perhaps ensure that a conflict does not spiral out of control completely and prevent massive violence in the future. This, however, was not the case in Kosovo. The extensive timeline drawn up by CEWS research project shows the phases and layers of one conflict.

¹⁸ Swanström, N. L. P. and Weissman M. S. (Summer 2005). Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration. Concept Paper. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center. <www.silkroadstudies.org> p 11.

¹⁹ <http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/html_pages/conflictdatabase.htm#graph>

Timeline²⁰



Looking at the timeline we can see the various key actors of the Kosovo conflict. The start of the conflict is marked with the death of Tito, the president of Yugoslavia. Then the conflict flares up as various regions of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, would like to negotiate autonomy. The Kosovo Albanians resist the Serbian government and call for autonomy by series of protests. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerges as a violent force and the main Albanian political organization, the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) starts its own non violent struggle. The conflict rises up further and the international community expresses their concerns. In 1998 when the number of displaced people and human rights violations increase, it is no longer perceived an internal matter by the international community. A ceasefire agreement was signed and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) did take position in the area, however, the ceasefire was only temporary. In the end, NATO air strikes occurred on selected targets to defeat the Serbian government and to end the human rights violations after the (peace) agreement with Rambouillet failed.

²⁰ <<http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/database/Kosovo/index.html>>

In this conflict it is difficult to determine on who is 'right' and 'wrong.' Atrocities were committed from all sides with various actors trying to influence the conflict. The Kosovo area had always been of great symbolic importance for both Serbs as Albanians both claiming the territory. After Tito's death, Slobodan Milosevic, from the Serbian Socialist Party, starts to play up the Serb nationalist sentiment. A speech rally by Milosevic in April 1987 is often seen as the divisive act for the break up of the Yugoslavia Federation. Milosevic strongly rallies against any privileges for Albanians in Kosovo or any other ethnic group. As one can imagine, humanitarian aid organizations operating in this environment face various dilemmas and this is why it is important to look more closely to the humanitarian principles most aid organizations try to uphold at all times.

1.4 Humanitarian Principles

Humanitarian aid organizations often operate in a highly politicized environment. This is even more evident during military interventions. This is why most humanitarian organizations have adopted strategies to ensure that their actions are still effective and will not be diluted by competing forces. The foundations of humanitarian organizations rest upon the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality. Interestingly to note is that these core principles have been taken from the Red Cross and Crescent movement's seven guiding principles, which were formalized in 1965.²¹ Nowadays NGOs and the UN also try to abide by these principles to define humanitarian assistance in the new world order (post Cold War). This, however, as Hugo Slim describes does not mean that there are clear cut definitions, rather NGOs and the UN use these terms ambiguously. "The confusion seems to arise because different agencies are using the same language to describe different positions or no positions"²² Various literatures are available on discussing the aims, relevance and the exact definitions of humanitarian principles. Unfortunately, to elaborate on all these discussions would be to multifaceted. One influential author in this area is Jean Pictet, who has written about the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and the principles, if interested in gaining more information this would be a recommended book to read.²³ It is, however, important to have a brief,

²¹ Slim, H. (November 1997). Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity in *Development in Practice*, Volume 7, Number 4 p 345.

²² Slim, H. (November 1997). Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity in *Development in Practice*, Volume 7, Number 4 p 345.

²³ Pictet, J. (1979). *The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross*, Henry Dunant Institute: Geneva.

closer look at the three main principles in order to understand the position and humanitarian space in which the various agencies can operate.

Humanity: “The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.”²⁴ This definition of humanity is often known as ‘classical’ and most relief aid agencies agree that the idea of humanity is important. Nevertheless aid agencies have turned away from this classical definition and rather speak of ‘humanitarian imperative.’ The definition of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement focuses on alleviating the human suffering wherever, even on battle fields, while the humanitarian imperative focuses less upon the need of negotiating a role in the conflict. “By implying that the rights are all on the side of the relief agencies and the victims of war, current interpretations of ‘the humanitarian imperative’ may optimistically (and even illegally) imply the automatic presence of relief agencies in war and undermine the very serious negotiation which needs to take place between warring leaders and humanitarians to ensure that humanitarian action is fair.”²⁵ Despite the discussion of this exact meaning, it is clear that the principle of humanity focuses on relieving human suffering, which is the core reason that humanitarian organizations are active. This is the first of the three main principles. The second humanitarian principle focuses on the possibility of getting trapped in the political agendas in a conflict area.

Neutrality: “In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.”²⁶ This is regarded as one of the most challenging principles in a conflict situation. Various actors might try to manipulate the relief work and there is always a risk of stepping in the trap of people’s political agendas. Often the question could be whether any organization can be completely neutral. Another negative aspect

²⁴ The Seven Fundamental Principles, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies < http://www.redcross.int/images/2009_2/poster_en.pdf > viewed on 14 March 2010.

²⁵ Slim, H. (November 1997). Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity *Development in Practice*, Volume 7, Number 4 p 346.

²⁶ The Seven Fundamental Principles, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies < http://www.redcross.int/images/2009_2/poster_en.pdf > viewed on 14 March 2010.

of neutrality is that some organizations view that this principle silences them too much. If you want to speak out on serious human rights violations, then an inevitable reserve is often required.²⁷ This is why certain humanitarian organizations sometimes disregard this principle and focus more on the principle of impartiality. Despite the above dilemmas, neutrality does not merely mean that humanitarian organizations should be silent or are not committed to certain ideals; rather it should be a guiding principle for operational action that is taking place to achieve their ideals. It refers to a pragmatic operational posture: “Far from being unprincipled or amoral, it allows them to implement their ideals, within the limits prescribed by inter-national humanitarian law.”²⁸ The important aspect of this principle is that humanitarian organizations might choose not to participate in some local issues if the risk to get trapped in political games is highly evident. The third humanitarian principle, impartiality, focuses on unbiased support of aid.

Impartiality: “It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.”²⁹ This principle shows that priority should be given to those who need it the most and that “in other words, the similarity of all people but the differences in their needs should at all times determine the judgements of the impartial humanitarian, in the light of the objective precepts of humanitarian law.”³⁰

Not every humanitarian organization places the same importance on all of the three principles. As mentioned before some organizations no longer even refer to neutrality or even want to disregard impartiality. A new principle such as ‘solidarity’ is gaining popularity. This principle, however, often suggests choosing a side in a conflict. This might be possible when there is a clear ‘right’ side and a ‘wrong side, such as supporting non violent protests or resistance movements. In conflicts it is often not easy to judge which side is right and which side is wrong, and therefore, this principle does not seem relevant in the case of most humanitarian interventions.³¹

²⁷ Slim, H. (November 1997). Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity *Development in Practice*, Volume 7, Number 4 p 348.

²⁸ Slim, H. (November 1997). Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity *Development in Practice*, Volume 7, Number 4 p 347.

²⁹ The Seven Fundamental Principles, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies < http://www.redcross.int/images/2009_2/poster_en.pdf > viewed on 14 March 2010.


³⁰ Gordon, D. S. and F.H. Toase (2001). *Aspects of Peacekeeping*. Frank Cass Publishers: London. p. 134.

³¹ Slim, H. (November 1997). Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity *Development in Practice*, Volume 7, Number 4 p 349-350.

1.5 Humanitarian Space

It is clear that humanitarian organizations will try to abide by the main principles as described above. These principles outline the space in which these various organisations operate; however, every situation can pose a challenge to any of the three principles. Below, graph 3, shows the triangular scheme of this humanitarian space as Tomasini and van Wassenhove illustrate in their book *Humanitarian Logistics*. This space is physical, as well as, virtual. Physical in humanitarian interventions, because it represents the zone where humanitarian organizations are protected from violence and can operate freely. This is often a difficult operational aspect in humanitarian interventions because the absence of an effective government can lead to significant security issues. The space, as shown in graph 2 is also virtual as it represents the interaction of all the various actors involved and how their actions can be executed according to the specific mandate. Most important is that the graph shows that the three principles are equally important and that there should be a balance that humanitarian organizations strive for. As Tomasini and van Wassenhove sum up “Any compromise on a principle would affect the size and shape of the triangle, affecting the outcome of the crisis and the agencies’ ability to operate.”³²

graph 2 ³³



There are various instances whereby the humanitarian principles cannot be upheld in a conflict zone since they do not necessarily provide the adequate practical choices on a daily basis. This is especially the case in humanitarian interventions. As mentioned previously, how human is humanitarian intervention, as soon as military forces are involved? Military interventions are political and this is not compatible with the

³² Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 27.

³³ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 27.

humanitarian principles as described above. The humanitarian space is greatly reduced in some instances and this leads to debates on how to uphold the three principles.

Chapter 2: Humanitarian Supply Chain Management

2.1 From Logistics to SCM

Logistics and supply chain management are often widely used terms and there seems to be little agreement on the exact definition in the academia, as well as, in practice. It is important, however, to define supply chain management before turning to the specific functions it fulfills in humanitarian interventions.

Simply described, logistics encompasses the activity to transport goods from A to B. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s integration of various functions have become important such as procurement, distribution, third party involvement, and the outsourcing of complete logistic activities. Whereas logistics seems to refer to the practical operational activities, it leaves out various aspects that are evident in today's globalized world. Integration of all various parties to bring one product to an end customer has intensified and companies have acknowledged that the overall effectiveness could be improved. This is why supply chain management has become a complex puzzle taking into account speed, quality, costs and variation to enable end-to-end SCM.³⁴ This does not only apply to commercial companies, but "like the private sector, the humanitarians have had to look beyond the basic logistics and use this supply chain management approach to coordinate the different players involved in a relief operation."³⁵

Nowadays management processes, practices and philosophies in the area of logistics revolve around the concept of supply chain management. Logistics is an important aspect of supply chain management (SCM), nevertheless, the discussion of this thesis greatly focuses upon the coordination of all different actors and therefore the term supply chain management will be used. There are many corporations that focus on SCM and each define their tasks in various ways. Literature on this topic is extensive and elaborate. According to the book *Supply Chain Management* by John T. Mentzer SCM definitions can be broadly categorized in three groups;

- 1) a management philosophy
- 2) implementation of a management philosophy
- 3) a set of management processes.³⁶

³⁴ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead.

³⁵ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead. p 2.

³⁶ Mentzer, John T. editor (2001). *Supply Chain Management*.

I would like to define SCM as a concept “whose primary objective is to integrate and manage the sourcing, flow, and control of materials using a total systems perspective across multiple functions and multiple tiers of suppliers.”³⁷ This definition includes the importance of integration and management to all various parties involved. Tomasini and van Wassenhove describe commercial SCM in terms of three main concepts:

1. Material (boxes); the actual physical product flow.
2. Information (bytes); the way how orders are placed and tracked to coordinate the physical flow.
3. Financial (bucks); all payment flows which includes the credit terms and consignment arrangements.

Commercial SCM main focus is to make profit. Measurements take place based on lead times, stock positions in warehouses, and overall customer service. Tomasini and van Wassenhove argue that in the case of humanitarian SCM, two other concepts should be taken into account, which might be less valid in the commercial SCM.

4. People (bodies); man power that is being deployed is an important aspect for humanitarian SCM.
5. Knowledge and skills (brains); since every humanitarian intervention differs. The right people with the right knowledge have to be deployed in order to have a successful SCM flow.³⁸

This introduction into logistics and supply chain management already shows that various authors view SCM differently and there are great distinctions between commercial models of SCM and humanitarian SCM. This begs the question of how humanitarian aid organizations use and focus on SCM. As Tomasini and van Wassenhove indicated, SCM might have a different shape than the commercial SCM. This is especially in the light of the specific humanitarian intervention, where there might be more limitations in place to effectively establish supply chain management, as a state might not be willing to cooperate.

³⁷ Quotation from Monczka et al. (1998). in Mentzer, John T. editor (2001). *Supply Chain Management*. p 8.

³⁸ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 4-7.

2.2 Commercial SCM vs. Humanitarian SCM

Before turning to a model for humanitarian supply chain management it is useful to differentiate between commercial and humanitarian SCM. Benita M. Beamon has drawn up the practical aspects that often differ in both SCM cases.

These main differences between commercial and humanitarian supply chain management have been illustrated in table 1. This table illustrates that humanitarian relief chain diverges especially due to the time and unpredictability of a humanitarian operation. Even in the case of a humanitarian intervention for which there is more time to develop an extensive plan, this is often not in comparison with commercial supply chains where there are fixed locations and often stable demands. Furthermore, Benita M. Beamon, in a similar fashion as Tomasini and van Wassenhove, describes the importance of people (field experts) and she does not only focus on supplies as is the case for commercial supply chains.

Table 1: *Summary: Commercial Supply Chains vs. Humanitarian Relief Chains*³⁹

	Commercial Supply Chain	Humanitarian Relief Chain
Demand Pattern	Relatively stable, predictable demand patterns. Demands occur from fixed locations in set quantities.	Demand is generated from random events that are unpredictable in terms of timing, location, type, and size. Demand requirements are estimated after they are needed, based on an assessment of disaster characteristics.
Lead Time	Lead time determined by the supplier-manufacturer-DC-retailer chain.	Approximately zero lead times requirements (zero time between the occurrence of the demand and the need for the demand), but the actual lead time is still determined by the chain of material flow.
Distribution Network Configuration	Well-defined methods for determining the number and locations of distribution centers.	Challenging due to the nature of the unknowns (locations, type and size of events, politics, and culture), and “last mile” considerations.
Inventory Control	Utilizes well-defined methods for determining inventory levels based on lead time, demand and target customer service levels.	Inventory control is challenging due to the high variations in lead times, demands, and demand locations.
Information System	Generally well-defined, using advanced technology.	Information is often unreliable, incomplete or non-existent.
Strategic Goals	Typically: to produce high quality products at low cost to maximize profitability and achieve high customer satisfaction.	Minimize loss of life and alleviate suffering. [Thomas (2003)]
Performance Measurement System	Traditionally: focused on resource performance measures, such as maximizing profit or minimizing costs.	Primary focus on output performance measures, such as the time required to respond to a disaster [Thomas (2002)] or ability to meet the needs of the disaster (customer satisfaction).
What is “Demand”?	Products.	Supplies and People.

³⁹ Benita M. Beamon, (2004). Humanitarian Relief Chains: Issues and Challenges. *Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Computers & Industrial Engineering*. November 14-16, San Francisco, CA p. 79

2.3 Supply Chain Models – Triple-A

There are many supply chain models available. These however, are often specifically designed for a specific company or sector of an industry. The models mostly relate to specific corporate businesses and not to supply chains of humanitarian aid organizations. Humanitarian supply chain management differs and has unique characteristics in comparison to commercial SCM. This is why a distinction can be made between commercial SMC and humanitarian SMC; however, it is important to first turn to a general idea of a good commercial SCM model.

Speed and cost efficiency are often the first two mentioned important indicators of a successful supply chain for commercial companies. This is logical, as you would like to make sure that all actors involved ensure that the product will arrive swiftly and in the cheapest way at the end customer. Nowadays, this is not merely the case. Hau Lee's research is often referred to when discussing SCM. Hau Lee, Thoma Professor of Operations, Information, and Technology at the Stanford Graduate School of Business (Stanford, California), explains why speed and cost efficiency are not enough to have a good SCM. It is regarded a "highly acclaimed" or ground breaking article.⁴⁰ Lee's main line of argument is that: "The best supply chains aren't just fast and cost-effective. They are also agile and adaptable, and they ensure that all their companies' interests stay aligned"⁴¹ Lee's article outlines three important qualities (agility, adaptability and alignment) that are needed for companies, if they want to give themselves an edge over the competitors. Successful companies such as Amazon, Dell and Wal-mart are examples of this.⁴² As Lau explains these companies are, firstly, agile, as "[..] they react speedily to sudden changes in demand or supply."⁴³ Meaning that the response time to external disruptions, such as natural disasters, epidemics and computer viruses, happens fast and cost efficiently.

Secondly, Lee's article continues, companies are adaptable "[..] over time as market structures and strategies evolve."⁴⁴ Economic prosperity or down turn, political changes, demographic trends and technological advances are all important factors that reshape markets and companies should be able to adapt to these changes as fast and effective as possible. Lastly, companies should ensure that "they align the interests of all the firms in the supply chain network so that all companies optimize

⁴⁰ Gattorna, John (November/December 2008). The Triple-A Supply Chain revisited. in *Supply Chain Asia*. p 38.

⁴¹ Lee, Hau (October 2004). Triple-A Supply Chain. *Harvard Business Review*. p 2.

⁴² Lee, Hau (October 2004). Triple-A Supply Chain. *Harvard Business Review*. p 2.

⁴³ Lee, Hau (October 2004). Triple-A Supply Chain. *Harvard Business Review*. p 3.

⁴⁴ Lee, Hau (October 2004). Triple-A Supply Chain. *Harvard Business Review*. p 3.

the chain's performance when they maximize their interests.”⁴⁵ Cooperation by mapping out the interests of all parties to ensure maximization of each participating company will benefit the overall supply chain.

Quite in a similar fashion as the triangular graph 2 on humanitarian principles making up the humanitarian space, Lee's article stresses the importance that companies should involve all three of these qualities, otherwise companies will not gain a competitive advantage and cannot be considered triple-A. Lau argues that creating a triple-A supply chain does not involve more investment; rather most companies have the infrastructure available to do so. Table 2 shows the practical thumb rules that are needed to implement a triple-A supply chain.

Table 2⁴⁶

Building a Triple-A Supply Chain

Agility	Adaptability	Alignment
Objectives: Respond to short-term changes in demand or quickly; handle external disruptions smoothly.	Objectives: Adjust supply chain's design to meet structural shifts in markets; modify supply network to strategies, products, and technologies.	Objective: Create incentives for better performance
Methods:	Methods:	Methods:
* Promote flow of information with suppliers and customers.	* Monitor economies all over the world to spot new supply bases and markets.	* Exchange information and knowledge freely with vendors and customers
* Develop collaborative relationships with suppliers.	* Use intermediaries to develop fresh suppliers and logistics infrastructure.	* Lay down roles, tasks, and responsibilities clearly for suppliers and customers.
* Design for postponement.	* Evaluate needs of ultimate consumers – not just immediate customers.	* Equitably share risks, costs, and gains of improvement initiatives.
* Build inventory buffers by maintaining a stockpile of inexpensive but key components.	* Create flexible product designs.	
* Have a dependable logistics system or partner.	* Determine where companies' products stand in terms of technology cycles and product life cycles.	
* Draw up contingency plans and develop crisis management teams.		

Nowadays, there is also criticism on Lee's article. Gattorna finds Lee's article ground breaking; however, Gattorna focuses more on cultural considerations making companies successful. As Lee focuses on reconfiguring and restructuring a company, Gattorna states that it often takes a long time to get strategies into the 'target market' of the company and to change prevailing internal culture. "In truth, the missing link in

⁴⁵ Lee, Hau (October 2004). Triple-A Supply Chain. *Harvard Business Review*. p 3.

⁴⁶ Lee, Hau (October 2004). Triple-A Supply Chain. *Harvard Business Review*. p 4.

Lee's article is a comprehensive explanation of how the internal culture of the firm plays such a pivotal role in executing these value propositions."⁴⁷

Nevertheless, Lau's idea of triple-A SCM is also highly relevant for humanitarian SCM especially in the case of a humanitarian intervention. First, agility is important as, in the case of a humanitarian intervention, many unforeseen external disruptions can occur. This could be from the inability to establish a certain safe area to an unforeseen sudden increase of violence. It is important that all parties involved have up to date information and that there are crisis management teams that are able to focus on specific issues that suddenly occur. Second, adaptability is important. This is almost self explanatory as a conflict cycle can decrease or increase in intensity, each time all parties should be able to adapt to the new situation. It is important to evaluate the most current needs for civilians and to be able to make swift use of different logistic equipment if a remote area cannot be reached. Third, alignment focuses upon the importance that all parties collaborating and searching for the best implementation to meet the peoples needs in a humanitarian intervention. One important aspect of this is information exchange to ensure that all parties are aware of the current risks, but also of the imminent needs. Tomasini and van Wassenhove have built further upon this idea of triple-A for humanitarian logistics by defining more important building blocks to establish a triple-A SCM.

2.4 From Triple A to a Humanitarian SCM Model

As mentioned in the introduction, Tomasini and van Wassenhove describe five key concepts, such as material, information, financial, people, knowledge/skills flows, that are important in the case of an effective SCM model for all parties involved. Tomasini and van Wassenhove elaborate on these flows when discussing the importance of preparedness in the case of humanitarian SCM. This is based on the recognition by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) that the humanitarian sector has to address logistics as an essential element. This is why they integrated logistics into their preparedness strategy together with the support of a consulting firm McKinsey & Company.⁴⁸


Preparedness is important, because a lot of organizations are only 'firefighting,' meaning that they rush from one crisis to the other crisis without

⁴⁷ Gattorna, John (November/December 2008). The Triple-A Supply Chain revisited. in *Supply Chain Asia*. p. 41.

⁴⁸ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 52.

completely fixing the problems. Measurement in humanitarian aid is not based on speed and profit; rather it is based on maximizing impact, not only for the short-term but also on the long term. The five ‘flows’ should be supported by the organization’s departments of Human Resources, Knowledge Management, Logistics, Financial Resources, and the Community relations.⁴⁹ This allows the development of a triple-A SCM model for humanitarian aid organizations that hereby avoid firefighting and maximize the impact.⁵⁰

This is illustrated in graph 3.⁵¹



The IFRC created a Logistics and Resource Mobilization Unit (RMU) and integrated this throughout various departments to get a more efficient supply chain whereby the focus was not merely on purchasing, but on combining funds, goods and people mobilized most efficient way. It is important to note that this model drawn up by Tomasini and van Wassenhove is focused on humanitarian logistics, hereby, not focusing specifically on humanitarian interventions, but on overall relief aid in natural disaster response.

Tomasini and van Wassenhove are not the only two authors that have researched and written extensively on this issue. For example, Oloruntoba and Gray have published an article on the importance of agility in humanitarian aid. They argue

⁴⁹ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 64.

⁵⁰ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 58.

⁵¹ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 53 and 59.

that “the humanitarian supply chain, through an effective information infrastructure and sensitive needs assessment mechanisms in the field level, would enhance supply chain agility by being very responsive to the changing needs of end users, and by being able to respond almost immediately to those changes.”⁵² They argue that, although there is growing literature on the practical aspects of humanitarian supply chain management, there are not many well-established concepts in the academic literature on humanitarian SCM. SCM is often short and unstable in its existence and there still appears to be too little linkage between emergency aid and long term development aid. Donors should also be willing to spend and invest money in logistics and information systems, not merely in raw goods as it is vital that particular items become available for people in need. This need for various products is continuously changing and this is why humanitarian SCM should focus on creating the alignment. Cooperation between donors, military, and NGOs becomes vital in order to assess and create an efficient and effective SCM.

2.5 The importance of cooperation

As described previously a conflict is often not clear cut, many actors from national, regional to international level are involved. This is why coordination in the case of a humanitarian intervention is complex. The more actors involved the more confusion and inefficient a humanitarian intervention can become. Tomasini and van Wassenhove, distinguish three levels where coordination takes place; 1) International level, 2) National level and 3) Field level. Each of these levels needs to be considered in case of a humanitarian intervention.⁵³

The international level is often extremely important in humanitarian interventions, as a state (or a group of states) has probably already put pressure and indicated the need for a humanitarian intervention to the UN. The United Nations has probably also pressured the state to stop the violations of human rights or improve their policies towards the need of the population by issuing various resolutions. Eventually the UN Security Council can decide on a humanitarian intervention by extending on previous resolutions under Chapter VII, such was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Congo, two resolutions, 1279 (1999) and 1291 (2000), were passed that led to the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping

⁵² Oloruntoba, Richard and Richard Gray, Humanitarian aid: an agile supply chain? *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal* 11/2. p 118.

⁵³ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 74.

force to monitor the peace process. Hereby, the UN Security Council does not need the approval of the state, while in other cases the UN can provide aid when invited by a state. This can occur for example when relief aid is needed after a natural disaster such as the Tsunami in 2004.

Overall Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter are highly important in the case of a humanitarian intervention with military operations. Chapter VII concerns the action of the UN with regard to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Article 39 until 51 clearly describe measures that can be implemented, without approval of the state that violates International Law, and that force can be used. For example, Article 42 states: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”⁵⁴

Chapter VIII of the Charter is important as it states that regional alliance, such as NATO, are able to interfere after the approval of the United Nations Security Council. As Article 53(1) states: “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article [..].”⁵⁵

As described earlier, the Kosovo intervention by NATO was illegal as the UN only later gave approval for the intervention. However, it should be mentioned that NATO does have the authorization to carry out humanitarian interventions as the United Nations direct involvement is not seen as feasible or appropriate. Furthermore, it is important to mention that on the international level, the potential donors (member states) need to support a humanitarian intervention. The United Nations does not have an army, but rather has to make an appeal to member states to provide resources.

On a national level there is often an unwilling or unable government to support coordination in the case of a Chapter VII resolution. In the case of Kosovo, the

⁵⁴ The UN Charter website, Chapter VII <<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>> viewed on 12 June 2010.

⁵⁵ The UN Charter website, Chapter VIII <<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml>> viewed on 12 June 2010.

Serbian army was deployed in the region and there was no willingness of Milosevic to cooperate and to withdraw his army. Besides the government or local governments, there are other actors such as civil society or NGOs that can be willing to support the intervention and could provide vital information. The inclusion of national actors is important though, as especially after a humanitarian intervention, the peace building process should occur.

The last level is the field level and vital for the success or failure of a humanitarian intervention. Since on the field level, people have to coordinate and cooperate in a specific framework as outlined in the mandate. Potential bottlenecks, problems in the pipeline or the intensification of violence are just a few issues that should be dealt with effectively on the field level.


Besides these various levels of coordination the level of cooperation varies during a conflict. As shown before there is a conflict curve, once the conflict has increased and gross violations of human rights occur, leading to a decision on a humanitarian intervention, coordination is expected to intensify. Antonio Donini, has described the life cycle of coordination during a conflict. He distinguishes three levels

- 1) Coordination by command. During the ramp up stage it is important that there is a centralized approach whereby all actors involved coordinate and work on a solution. Hereby task division is important as getting customer clearance or signing agreements with the military could hinder the aid.

- 2) Coordination by consensus. This refers to a consensus environment that should come into existence to make sure that all parties have acceptable coordination solutions. This can for example be done by having meetings and sharing information technology. The last stage is coordination by default.

- 3) Coordination by default. This is the exiting strategy stage, whereby organizations can learn from and give advice to each other. Tomasini and van Wassenhove have created the following graph based on the level of coordination.

Graph 4⁵⁶



It is important to mention that these levels, international, national and field, are not clear cut. There can be overlap between the various levels, for example the UN departments are international actors; however they can play an important role on the field level. As mentioned before one can envision various obstacles, while trying to effectively coordinate. As Tomasini and van Wassenhove elaborate: “Humanitarian agencies differ greatly in their management structures, cultures, and approach. UN agencies and NGOs lack a harmonized structure making inter-agency communication, decision -making, and basic coordination a trick, to say the least.”⁵⁷ The main obstacles that are identified will be discussed later onwards in detail in Chapter six.

Humanitarian organizations are often not able to manage a complex intervention easily due to various problems relating from practical aspects such as unforeseen security dangers to the unwillingness of parties to cooperate. The coordination of tasks becomes of vital importance for the success rate of a military intervention whereby all the organizations are able to work together efficiently and effectively. The next chapters will look at various organizations, the structure of their logistics and their role in various humanitarian interventions such as in the case of Kosovo.

Important to note is that a military intervention, as described previously, occurs in specific situations. No conflict is similar; however, the coordination between

⁵⁶ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 80.

⁵⁷ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 84.

civil-military organizations is usually evident. The Oslo Agreement and the IASC working paper illustrate the important divisions that have been mapped out for military and humanitarian organizations. This is why there first will be a focus on the Oslo Agreement and IASC working paper before discussing the role of various organizations in the following chapters.

2.6 Oslo Agreement and IASC Working Paper

The Oslo Agreement Guidelines were drawn up in January 1994 by the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, nowadays the OCHA, and the IFRC. These two organizations hosted a conference on the use of military involvement in humanitarian affairs.⁵⁸ This includes the following conditions: the military assets should be used for life-saving and life-supporting operations; they should integrate with and support existing disaster relief response; they should be, in principle, unarmed. Furthermore the IASC Working Paper drawn up on 24 June 2004 describes and recommends the areas where collaboration is allowed.

The IASC, in its own words, is “the primary mechanism for inter agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. It is a unique forum involving key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners.”⁵⁹ The IASC committee is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Sir John Holmes. The full members are the heads of the UN humanitarian agencies, standing invitees include The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), World Bank, International Organization for Migration (IOM), IFRC, Inter-Action, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (represented by World Vision International) and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (represented by Oxfam).

There is also criticism. Noticeably absent from these guidelines is any consideration of how humanitarian actors should relate to the military forces of affected states when they become engaged in humanitarian action. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)'s reference paper *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies* covers national militaries, as do guidelines produced by the ICRC on the use of armed protection for humanitarian assistance (IASC 2004, ICRC 1995). These,

⁵⁸ Gallagher, Dennis Michel Moussalli, David Bosco, (1998). *Development Assistance Committee Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation Report No. 1. Civilian and Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict – comparative Advantages and Costs –* OECD. p 25.

⁵⁹ Humanitarian Info website <<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/>> viewed on 12 June 2010.

however, focus on how humanitarian actors relate to militaries, rather than the role of militaries as providers of assistance.⁶⁰

There are interesting logistical developments that came out of the IASC meetings that will also be relevant for the upcoming chapters. This was mainly due to the so-called Cluster Approach that was endorsed by the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in September 2005. Nine Clusters were agreed upon with a lead agency for each. The World Food Programme (WFP) is the lead agency for Logistics Cluster. The global cluster leads are “accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator for system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies, and for ensuring greater predictability and more effective inter-agency responses in their particular sectors or areas of activity.”⁶¹ This entails the very important element of accountability and where necessary the lead agency becomes the provider of last resort.

The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (JLC) can be activated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee-Working Group. The JLC was established in 1996 due to the Eastern Zaire crisis that required intensive coordination between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF and the JLC has been institutionalized since March 2002. This centre “acts as an information sharing platform for the gathering, collating, analysis and dissemination of information required to assist all humanitarian actors in their decision-making.”⁶² This shows that the UN is trying to bridge the various departments and is fostering cooperation, although it is important to note that the WFP is providing the technical and administrative support for the core unit of the JLC as outlined above in the cluster approach.

The IASC and the Oslo Agreement show that there are considerable agreements and there is a focus on logistics at the UN, but in case of a humanitarian intervention the military is more prominent on the forefront especially in the case of a Chapter VII resolution by the Security Council. This could alter the coordination and cooperation for various organizations that participate and/or try to provide humanitarian aid especially as e.g. the JLC falls under the World Food Programme. The next chapters will investigate this further by drawing upon various case studies.

⁶⁰ Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane R. O. (2003). *Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*.

⁶¹ INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE (IASC) GUIDANCE NOTE ON USING THE CLUSTER APPROACH TO STRENGTHEN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE. 24 November 2006. <<http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/Resources%20&%20tools/IASCGUIDANCENOTECLUSTERAPPROACH.pdf>> viewed on 23 May 2010.

⁶² UNJLC website. <<http://www.unjlc.org/old-site/about/>> viewed on 12 May 2010.

Chapter 3: The United Nations

3.1 The UN and Humanitarian Interventions

The United Nations is the main organization involved in humanitarian interventions, or peacekeeping missions, as is often being referred to by the UN when focusing on the UN missions. Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda are just a few examples. There is plenty of literature available on every single mission describing the relative success, failure, as well as, the operational and organizational issues. Beside this literature, a variety of literature is focused on conflict resolution and questions of sovereignty.⁶³ As mentioned in chapter 1, there are various dilemmas regarding humanitarian interventions. The UN Charter does not mention humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping operations, but these operations have evolved ever since the Charter was drawn up in 1945. Nevertheless, the legal framework for the possibility of humanitarian interventions was already drawn up in 1945, as earlier mentioned, in the Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter.

The first generation of humanitarian interventions was during the Cold War with the traditional blue helmets, whereby the aim was to ‘refrigerate’ the environment which would pave the way for conflict resolution.⁶⁴ These first generation missions were based on consent, impartiality and the use of limited force, often also referred to as the ‘holy trinity.’⁶⁵ The Cold War ideology did not provide space for extensive interventions and the UN missions that were merely based on self defense and quite symbolic of nature.⁶⁶ It can be noted that there were two exceptions Korea and Congo, however, usually the UN would get involved after a ceasefire was abided by both parties and monitor the ceasefire and focus on conflict prevention. These conflict were often already frozen or in remission.⁶⁷

The second generation of interventions incorporated more military resources and focused on getting involved in a ‘hot conflict’ such as civil wars, rather than supportive interventions after a ceasefire was signed. This was outlined in 1992 by the

⁶³ Higate, Paul and Marsha Henry (2009). *insecure spaces peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*. Zed Books London and New York. p. 9.

⁶⁴ Paul Higate and Marsha Henry (2009). *insecure spaces peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*. Zed Books London and New York. p. 9.

⁶⁵ Bellamy, Williams, Griffin (2004) *Understanding Peacekeeping* Polity Press. p 131.

⁶⁶ Colonel Gianmarco Badialetti, NATO (13 April 2010). lecture on Peace-keeping and nation building. Spring School.

⁶⁷ Slim, Hugo (first published 22 September 1995). Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: An Agenda for Peace? *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*.

<<http://jha.ac/1995/09/22/military-humanitarianism-and-the-new-peacekeeping-an-agenda-for-peace/>> viewed on 13 April 2010.

new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He highlighted: “an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping” (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992).⁶⁸ *An Agenda for Peace* was drawn up which indicated a greater role of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building. The UN in Somalia (UNOSOM I), Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Angola are a few examples where the United Nations embarked on second generation of humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, in 1992, the post Cold War period, a surge of conflicts became evident and the department of peacekeeping operations was established (DPKO) which will be discussed later.

The United Nations involvement in Somalia can be seen to have led to more extensive use of military force, instead of using force only in the case of self defense. UNOSOM I was established for the purpose of humanitarian assistance, however the situation deteriorated and this led to UNOSOM II. It can be seen as the first intervention authorized by the Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter including an enforcement mandate. This is why UNOSOM II is often seen as the first third generation UN peacekeeping operations. “[..] second-generation peacekeeping, for those who used this term from a military perspective, meant a tougher approach to peacekeeping. It was, however, arguable that second-generation peacekeeping stretched the wider interpretation of self-defence to the limit. Third-generation peacekeeping, in contrast, envisages the use of military force beyond the principles of self-defence.”⁶⁹

As the missions by the UN continued some became framed as “quasi-enforcement operations.” These have provoked controversy. Firstly, because the UN forces were ‘going in too hard’ as Higate and Henry illustrate with the case of Haiti (1994). Secondly, because the missions could generate new forms of insecurity.⁷⁰ These controversies led to the Brahimi Report (August 2000) which focused on reformations of the UN peace operations highlighting the problems and possible solutions. This report, however, has been criticized for its over reliance on problem

⁶⁸ Slim, Hugo (first published 22 September 1995) Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: An Agenda for Peace? *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. <<http://jha.ac/1995/09/22/military-humanitarianism-and-the-new-peacekeeping-an-agenda-for-peace/>> viewed on 13 April 2010.

⁶⁹ Katayanagi, Mari (2002). *Human Right Functions of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 51 and 52.

⁷⁰ For more information check, Aoi, Chiyuki et al. (2007). *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*, United Nations University Press: New York.

solving, whereby it seeks establishing stability and effective humanitarian interventions within a liberal international society. Hereby it overlooks the systemic structural causes of conflict as the peace operations were not placed within international politics. Moreover, according to many critics the report was not far reaching enough and kept to the problem-solving paradigm, rather than a new paradigm of thinking about peace operations.⁷¹

Nowadays more criticism focuses on the underlying norms, values, and beliefs, like the concept of liberal democracy, on which the UN missions are based. According to these Critical Theorist the new peacekeeping missions reflect a new post Cold War balance of power, rather than a global humanitarian conscience. “This power has been, and continues to be, directed at fostering liberal subjectivities in the troubled populations of the anarchic borderlands, a process that has assumed a new urgency in the post 9/11 world where security and development have become increasingly intertwined (Duffield 2002).”⁷² Duffield is one of the main critics of the so-called new wars. Wars no longer concern territory, rather they are intrastate wars. The liberal capitalist system has triumphed when the Cold War ended and the United Nations have embraced and incorporated this. One other aspect closely related to these new wars is the focus on security. Security is an important aspect since 9/11 countries have put terrorism high on the political agendas.

Furthermore, the ideological motives are important to take into account when discussing the ethical dilemmas of humanitarian interventions as they are often being viewed as part of the current USA hegemony, the Washington Consensus or New York Orthodoxy. As Pugh describes the New York Orthodoxy “has been to police the liberal peace and the US conception of the world order.”⁷³ In the light of this, humanitarian interventions are sustaining the status quo. As Higate and Henry describe Pugh “argues that peace support operations and humanitarianism have come to reflect, legitimize, and reinforce the international order and promote globalization. For example, the discourse of humanitarianism was deployed during NATO’s involvement in Kosovo in such a way as to capture the moral high ground, to legitimize an action that was not authorized by the UN Security Council (it was vetoed by Russia and China) and, therefore, technically illegal. The discourse was used to gain and maintain public support by making ethical appeals as well as to cover

⁷¹ Higate, Henry (2009). *insecure spaces peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*. Zed Books London and New York p. 9.

⁷² Higate, Paul and Marsha Henry (2009). *insecure spaces peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*. Zed Books London and New York. p. 15-16.

⁷³ Pugh (2004). *Peacekeeping and Critical Theory*, *International Peacekeeping* 11 (1) p. 44

up inconsistencies in the NATO case.”⁷⁴ This Critical Theory on new wars and the focus on the ideological motives behind various organizations are important to keep in mind. In the chapter on NATO there will be further discussion on the Kosovo intervention. This chapter will now focus on the logistic organization in humanitarian interventions at the United Nations and this will be illustrated and investigated further by focusing on the role of the UN in various humanitarian interventions, such as Somalia and Kosovo.

3.2 The UN organization

As mentioned before the UN is often the primary organ to decide on a humanitarian intervention. The main UN department for the implementation of humanitarian interventions is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), nevertheless, this is by far not the only department involved. The main departments and their functions will be briefly discussed in this chapter as it provides an overview on the important various UN actors and how this could relate to other non UN actors.

At the headquarters of the United Nations are various departments that coordinate in the event of a humanitarian intervention. The main departments according to the United Nations Peace Operations Training Institute⁷⁵ are: DPKO, Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Public Information (DPI), Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), and the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). Furthermore there are various other departments involved such as the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women and Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD). Below there will be a short summary of the main departments, DPKO and OCHA, and their tasks and relations to one another. This not to disregard the importance of the other departments, but the DPKO and OCHA are important departments on a strategic and operational level during a humanitarian intervention and contribute greatly to the supply chain management of a humanitarian intervention.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

The DPKO is the primary department as stated by the UN: “DPKO retains managerial responsibility and operational oversight for all aspects of peacekeeping operations,

⁷⁴ Higate, Paul and Marsha Henry (2009). *insecure spaces peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*. Zed Books London and New York. p. 13.

⁷⁵ Baig Kamran (2002). course author of “*Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction*” Peace Operations Training Institute.

from planning through execution, and is therefore accountable for the delivery of public information activities in the field.”⁷⁶ The DPKO coordinates and integrates other UN departments, as well as, other actors that are involved in the intervention. Its function is to maintain contact with regional organizations, provide information to other actors relating to the operation, and draw up reports on the operation to the Security Council. Important to note is that for strategic planning OCHA is important for DPKO. As in a humanitarian intervention effective strategies need to take into account the specific community. In case of a humanitarian intervention the ‘humanitarian’ aspect is being mobilized and coordinated by the OCHA. The DPKO is closely linked to the OCHA as they mutually support each other in peacekeeping situations.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

In 1991 the United Nations resolution 46/182 was passed, which led to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The OCHA abides by the mandate as drawn up in the 1991 resolution to the international community’s effort to make emergency response more effective. The main principles drawn up relate to the acknowledgement of state sovereignty and the humanitarian principles as outlined before in chapter 1, as stated by the OCHA website:

- “Responsibility for people affected by emergency lies – first and foremost - with their respective states.
- States in need are expected to facilitate the work of responding organizations
- Humanitarian assistance must be linked to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality (the fourth principle of independence was added later).”⁷⁷

Interesting to note here is that the OCHA focuses on upholding the humanitarian principles and this will have consequences for the humanitarian space in which they can operate. They are closely related to the DPKO and are part of a framework that focuses on humanitarian interventions, often by military means, which can limit the humanitarian space and could even undermine the OCHA’s credibility. The training material of the UN mentions that “close cooperation between DPKO’s strategic planning and policy capacity and OCHA’s policy development branch on such issues as the separation of civilians and armed elements or the use of armed escorts is

⁷⁶ Baig Kamran (2002). course author of “*Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction*” Peace Operations Training Institute p. 4.

⁷⁷ OCHA website <<http://ochaonline.un.org/tabid/5838/language/en-US/Default.aspx> viewed on 09-05-2010.

important.”⁷⁸ This illustrates the importance of the humanitarian principles that are being upheld. Apart from the strategic and operational planning by the DPKO and OCHA, the supply chain management (logistics) of the humanitarian intervention is not part of one department, rather it involves many agencies and the logistics depends greatly on the size and the goal of the intervention. As the UN logistics manual describes: “Logistic support is tailored according to the task required, space and time considerations, manpower, material, environment, climate, onsite infrastructure and availability of resources. The support system may be mobile or static, civilian or military, have on-site warehousing or national resupply lines or, in most cases, is a combination of all of the above.”⁷⁹

3.3 UN Logistics

The UN first and foremost expects that the member states involved in a humanitarian intervention to be self sufficient for a period of time, usually 60-90 days, during this time the UN will organize all necessary needs such as a headquarters, on site UN logistical structure and contracts. After the 60-90 days the UN will start supplying all the basic needs from petrol to domestic consumables and accommodation. The continuation of support depends greatly on the UN finding a member state to form a Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) if the intervention is of considerable size. This member state then establishes contractual arrangements to support the mission in coordination with the Chief Logistics Officer at Mission Headquarters. Important to note though is that, even if there is a FLSG established member states are required to be self sufficient and have their own independent national lines of supply.⁸⁰ Overall, roughly four types of logistical support can be distinguished depending on the intervention.

- Smaller Missions: self reliance by the contributing member states only supported by a small team of the UN that focuses on the logistics links between the member states and the UN. Hereby one of the contributing state is often modern, has a civilian infrastructure and then self sufficiency can prove to be effective.

⁷⁸ Baig Kamran (2002). course author of “*Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction*” Peace Operations Training Institute p. 6.

⁷⁹ Baig Kamran (2002). course author of “*Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction*” Peace Operations Training Institute p. 22.

⁸⁰ Baig Kamran (2002). course author of “*Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction*” Peace Operations Training Institute p. 21-22.

- Lead Member State: in case of a medium size mission, one member state will assume all responsibility for logistic support and other participating member states would rely on the main member state for their administrative and logistics needs. Important though is that the logistics organization of the principal member state will also contain representatives of the other participating states to ensure all national interest are taken into account.
- The Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG): as mentioned before, when an intervention is large in size and considerable resources and transactions are required, a specialized group can be established. There will be a lead member state, but also incorporate specialized logistic units. Furthermore the UN main logistics planning bodies coordinate the implementation as this FLSG is already established during the planning stage before the intervention.
- Civilian Contract Support: the UN attempts to determine the base of logistic support as the intervention progresses. Decision making is coordinate by the force headquarters, but often include the civilian contract support. As the civilian support becomes possible and cost effective, the military logistics support could slowly phase out.⁸¹


One important department, not mentioned in the UN training manual on logistical support, is the earlier mentioned UN Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLC) in chapter 2. The training manual does mention the abbreviation of the UN Joint Logistics Operations Centre and does include the JLC in a chart; however, there is no extensive description or information in the manual. This is quite striking as the UNJLC website states that they have been involved in “Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Sudan, Indian Ocean Tsunami Response, Pakistan Earthquake Response, Lebanon and DRC. More recently, it has been involved in the Cluster approach by providing services to Mozambique, Pakistan, Uganda and Bangladesh floods responses.”⁸² As mentioned in Chapter 2 the goal of the UNJLC is to provide assistance with the coordination of all humanitarian logistic actors involved. The UNJLC aims to provide support for the interagency logistics coordination as long as it is required and requested by the Resident Coordinator and/or Humanitarian Coordinator. Nevertheless, UNJLC’s operations are envisaged as a temporary bolster during the response phase of an emergency. The UNJLC in organizational charts is shown to be

⁸¹ Baig Kamran (2002). course author of “*Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction*” Peace Operations Training Institute p. 22-23.

⁸² UNJLC <http://www.unjlc.org/old-site/about/> viewed on 16 May 2010.


part of the common services and sits right between the users of the operational framework of the UN and has great operational responsibility.

Chart 1⁸³



In the following chart (Chart 2) the UNJLC is more prominently at the foreground as it concerns the operational framework. Suggesting that UNJLC has less of a coordinating function, but rather mainly is an operational organization. That can provide a great amount of information.

Chart 2⁸⁴



⁸³ UNJLC <http://www.unjlc.org/old-site/about/> viewed on 16 May 2010.

⁸⁴ UNJLC website <<http://www.unjlc.org/old-site/about/>> viewed on 16 May 2010.

The United Nations is one organization, but it becomes clear that various departments and headquarters might have diverting interests. As the various charts already suggest, nothing is clear cut and simple. Hereby the supranational aspect of the UN should not be overlooked; the UN is an organization more than the sum of its members, the states. Member states are required to deliver resources; materials, troops and other means of support. Moreover member states give up some of their (sovereign) power. This might mean that a member state is primarily coordinated by the assigned head of mission, rather than taking orders of their national military headquarters. This can create problems during a mission.

Member states are still important political entities that try to have a significant influence on which humanitarian intervention will be embarked upon, as well as, state that deploy troops to an intervention usually still want these troop to report to the national headquarter and not just to the head of mission. One such an example is Sudan, whereby there are great violations of human rights, but the UN did not (yet) embark upon a humanitarian intervention. This indicates perhaps that member states still exert their sovereign power, rather than ‘giving up’ control in the case of humanitarian interventions. By labeling the conflict in Sudan a genocide, action will have to be taken regardless, however, it seems that there is not enough political will of (some) member states to do so. The remainder of this chapter will provide examples in the workings of the UN systems and the supply chain management, but also on the political aspects involved.

3.4 UN Logistic Lessons Learned

There are various lessons learned throughout every humanitarian intervention. Every intervention brings about new issues and the need for supply chain management improvements. Overall, one of the most important lessons mentioned is the *focus* on logistics. As Henry Anyidoho, former deputy force commander and chief staff of the UN Assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), describes: “Effective logistics support, as an essential element of UN peacekeeping operations, cannot be overstressed. Without it, contingents will always feel abandoned and unable to operate at their optimum. In this regard, the proposal for the pre-positioning of essential logistics items in the subregions of Africa is a step in the right direction.”⁸⁵ He highlights the problems that are evident for African peacekeepers, whereby one of the most ‘crucial

⁸⁵ Anyidoho, Henry (April 1997). Lessons Learned During Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. *Monograph* No 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding. <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No10/Anyidoho.html> viewed on 16 May 2010.

handicaps' is the lack of logistic support. There are two brief examples that are being highlighted by Henry Anyidoho. One is the case of Rwanda in 1994, where African contingents were deployed but even six months after their arrival they had not yet received their basic items, including tents, jackets, ambulances, and ballistic helmets. The other case mentioned is the intervention that was established in Liberia (ECOMOG) were six years after their presence there was still need of logistic support.

Anyidoho, furthermore, stresses the important point that logistics and money convert each other and vice versa. The UN, as mentioned earlier, relies on the resources of the member states; however, member states might be unwilling to contribute to peace support operations in Africa. Nevertheless by not providing any (logistic) support in the initial phase, a potential tragedy can unfold due to inadequate military support as was the case in Rwanda in 1994. Plenty of resources were made available, but it might have been more effective and efficient if support had been given earlier onwards. This continues to be a hot debate, although nowadays there are various early warning desks and rapid deployment forces created to hopefully prevent this in the future.

Anyidoho is by far not the only one to stress the importance of logistics in lessons learned in humanitarian interventions. Oliver A. K. Macdonald investigated the lessons learned in peacekeeping operations for the Irish army and also highlights the logistical aspect. He focuses on the importance of cooperation from an early stage onwards between the United Nations and the national logistics planning staffs. "It is important to be able to identify the logistics requirements, plans and resources at an early stage so that problems can be identified and solutions agreed as early as possible. It is also important to clearly identify what is expected of national contingents, to confirm the feasibility of these expectations or to make and confirm alternative arrangements as required in advance of deployment. As readiness enhancement is discussed in relation to peacekeeping, the logistics aspect such as stockpiling, strategic movement and mission-related systems should be included."⁸⁶ Furthermore he states that most logistical problems are often specific and can be solved during the mission, it is important though that the Force Commander has the budgetary authority to be able to undertake action.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ MacDonald, Oliver A.K. (Autumn 1997). *Peacekeeping Lessons Learned: An Irish Perspective in International Peacekeeping* Vol.4, No.3, Frank Cass: London p. 99 – 100.

⁸⁷ MacDonald, Oliver A.K. (Autumn 1997). *Peacekeeping Lessons Learned: An Irish Perspective in International Peacekeeping* Vol.4, No.3, Frank Cass: London p. 99 – 100.

As Macdonald illustrates clearly is that the supply chain management problems that are being encountered are often mission specific and are able to be solved as the mission continues. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that from an early stage onwards it is important to focus on supply chain management as it can prevent logistical problems in the future. In this sense planning and cooperation between agencies become of vital importance for the success of a humanitarian intervention.

Apart from the general focus on logistics and its importance during a humanitarian intervention, various reports have been drawn up to establish overall lessons learned. Especially Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica have been investigated in depth by e.g. the DPKO and by special commissions established by the General Assembly and the Security Council on what went wrong. In the cases of Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Srebrenica (UNPROFOR) the political will and the gap between the mandate and the means are highlighted as the main causes for the destructive outcome.⁸⁸ In Srebrenica, July 1995, 7,600 Bosnian Muslims were murdered in what was labeled being a 'safe area' by the Bosnian Serb Army. The failure to prevent and protect makes it now symbolize "the bankruptcy of 'wider peacekeeping,' the idea that there is a halfway house between peacekeeping and peace enforcement [..]"⁸⁹ This mainly due to the fact that the UNPROFOR, the Dutch battalion in particular, did not have the means to accomplish their objectives, as the UN report shows there was lack of political will on the part of the Security Council. The Rwanda case was similar in some respects as, "the major problem was a lack of political will and a gap between mandate and means that was exacerbated by a breakdown of communication between peacekeepers on the ground, the troop-contributing countries and the UN headquarters in New York. These factors encouraged 'a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict [which] contributed to false political assumptions and military assessments' (DPKO 1996: 3)."⁹⁰ Furthermore, the Rwanda intervention also illustrated that the DPKO did not have institutional strength to advise and make resources available to provide quick assessments to UNAMIR, as well as, to the Security Council.⁹¹ These reports have been widely published and led to the resignation of the Dutch government in April 2002.

⁸⁸ For more information check for example, Rohde, David (1998). *Endgame: the betrayal and fall of Srebrenica, Europe's worst massacre since World War II*, Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. Destexhe, Alain (Winter 1994-1995). The Third Genocide in *Foreign Policy*, No. 97. p. 3-17.

⁸⁹ Bellamy, Alex J. and all. (2004). *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity Press p. 168

⁹⁰ DPKO report 1996 in Bellamy, Alex J. and all. (2004). *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity Press p. 168

⁹¹ Bellamy, Alex J. and all. (2004). *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity Press p. 168

The reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica show the importance of an adequate mandate as it has direct influence on for the troops on the ground. The mandate and resolutions should not only provide a political message, but also include operational attainability. As otherwise there is a risk, as the Srebrenica example shows, that troops are unable to establish safe areas and protect the civilian population. The other report drawn up by the special commission of the UN on the intervention in Somalia though has not been as widely disseminated as was the case with the Rwandan and Srebrenica reports, while important lessons can be learned, especially in terms of supply chain management.

3.5 UNOSOM and UNITAF – SCM in Somalia

Somalia does not have an effective government since 1991 and various fractions (usually clan based) fight over the power and resources of the country. The United Nations started with a mission (UNOSOM I) after the civil war seemed to prolong and a famine that killed an estimated 350,000 Somalis in 1992 and left 70% of the population suffering of severe malnutrition.⁹² UNOSOM I was established from 1992 to 1993 to monitor the ceasefire and assist humanitarian relief. UNOSOM II was established from 1993 to 1995 mainly to secure an environment for humanitarian assistance. The intervention in Somalia cannot be seen as a great success and from a logistical view point various problems were encountered. As mentioned earlier, therefore, it is important to highlight the aspects where lessons can be learned for future interventions.

UNOSOM I was established under resolution 751 on the 24th of April 1992, the small force (approximately 3500 people) was unable to achieve the goals due to the ongoing violence and attempts to steal the humanitarian aid. This led to a new Resolution, 794, that laid down the basis for a greater intervention to improve the situation. This new intervention was active in Somalia from 5th of December 1992 until the 4th of May 1993, name Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The USA led UNITAF and the mission had around 38,000 troops of which approximately 25,000 troops were from the USA. It also provided the basis for Operation Restore Hope by UNITAF. The warlords focused their attention to UNITAF rather than targeting the aid agencies when troops arrived.

⁹² Clark, J. (1993). Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response, in L. F. Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press). p. 213-214. As well as, Clarke, W. and Herbst, J. (eds.) (1997). *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).

Problems arose when UNITAF and the Secretary General had diverging opinions on what 'a secure environment' was and how to disarm the various factions in and around the capital Mogadishu. The UNITAF mission ceased officially on the 4th of May 1993; however, many of the troops were absorbed into the new mission UNOSOM II, whereby the Secretary General recommended giving the right to use military force. UNOSOM II was placed under the command of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Somalia, American Admiral Jonathan Howe, until his resignation in February 1994. This was unlike UNITAF that had been under USA led (direct) control. The situation deteriorated when on the 5th of June twenty-three Pakistani soldiers were killed while trying to disarm a faction loyal to the Somali General Aidid. As a response the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837 that authorized the arrest and prosecution of those responsible for the attack on the Pakistani soldiers.

Overall there were two main problems UNOSOM II. Firstly, Howe had to deal with several national troops that persistently took their orders from their national command, rather than from the UNOSOM II Admiral himself. This has been highlighted with the example that the Italian troops paid the Somali factions not to attack them, while not being able to support other UNOSOM II troops that were under attack. Secondly, there were also forces in Somalia from UN member states that were not officially part of UNOSOM II. There were, for example, three different USA commands. One was led by Major-General William Garrison with the goal to capture General Aidid. On 3rd of October they started an operation that led to the death of 18 American soldiers. These problems clearly made it "very difficult for UNOSOM II to maintain cohesion and achieve its objectives."⁹³ The situation improved after Aidid's faction declared to stop the hostilities to UNOSOM II on the 9th of October. The USA, also due to the loss of 18 soldiers, decided to withdraw by 31st of March 1994. The other European governments followed soon and the last troops left in March 1995.

The report the special Commission was drawn up later onwards as established by the Security Council and General Assembly. This Commission made the following recommendations after investigating UNISOM II. "It argued that UNOSOM II failed principally because its different military components had no means of communicating with each other directly. A complex and slow process of decision-making was required for one contingent to request assistance from another (Commission of

⁹³ Bellamy, Alex J. and all. (2004). *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity Press p. 159.

Inquiry 1994: 40).”⁹⁴All in all, this shows that cooperation and coordination by means of communication between various agencies is highly important. Furthermore, the other important lesson learned according to the report is “that there was very little coordination at the UN headquarters level. The US component of UNOSOM distanced itself from UN elements, creating a situation where information was not shared and common operating procedures and rules of engagement were not established.”⁹⁵ The logistical problems that occurred during 1992-1995 missions in Somalia have also been described in detail by Yves J. Fontaine, Major General of the U.S. Army Sustainable Command (ASC) focusing on providing front-line logistics support to combat units.⁹⁶

Fontaine researched the operation Restore Hope in Somalia with a focus on the supply chain management issues of the relevant USA led military forces. Overall the operation did, in the end, succeed to improve the security and distribute food throughout much of the country. Nevertheless various problems were evident. After the decision on the Operation Restore Hope, the USA Central Command started up a joint task force to airlift food and supplies into the country and the 10th Mountain Division of the USA was deployed to serve as the headquarters for all the USA forces in Somalia. “During the planning phase, the 10th Mountain Division had to contact four different headquarters to determine required force strengths for deployment. Plans for the operation had been developed without input from tactical units, which caused significant problems because the strategic planners did not anticipate the large number of logistics personnel required to support “bare base” logistics operations, particularly at sea and air ports of debarkation.[20]”⁹⁷ Moreover, the transportation personnel that were trained to solve transit problems were not deployed early enough to deal with problems at the air terminal and seaports. This led to delays especially also because Somalia lacked basic infrastructure which was necessary for terminal operations. At the same time, the army units were also being deployed. The 10th Mountain Division logistics units faced multiple issues in a ‘logistical nightmare’ and “[.] had to be consolidated and reoriented to perform wholesale logistics functions for the entire theater of operations.[21]”⁹⁸ Furthermore, the system to track and plan all material, the Time Phased Force Deployment Database (TPFDD), lacked the

⁹⁴ Bellamy, Alex J. and all. (2004). *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity Press p. 167.

⁹⁵ Bellamy, Alex J. and all. (2004). *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Polity Press p. 167.

⁹⁶ <http://www.osc.army.mil/supportingdocs/MG%20Fontaine%20Bio.pdf> viewed on 26 May 2010.

⁹⁷ Fontaine, Y.J. Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces. *Parameters*, p. 42-59.
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/97winter/fontaine.htm>

⁹⁸ Fontaine, Y.J. Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces. *Parameters*, p. 42-59.
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/97winter/fontaine.htm>

flexibility which was mainly due the lack of a plan for organizing and deploying the forces to Somalia. For example, some cargo that was loaded to leave never left the port since it was no longer required in Somalia or one time the US army identified excess of equipment that the Marines were requesting due to shortage. “The lack of links among automation systems cause significant problems in asset visibility in Somalia. Unforecasted cargo and inaccurate date were as prevalent as in 1990 and 1991 in Saudi Arabia. The inability of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System and military standard transportation and movement procedures to exchange data electronically aggravated the loss in visibility, creating conditions in which items could be found only through physical checks of large numbers of containers.”⁹⁹ Six separate supply processes emerged according to Fontaine all relating to the lack of an adequate logistic infrastructure. Various units used different ways to get access to resources as they, for example, contacted colleagues at home, or used the UN system which was “slow to produce materiel of uncertain quality on unpredictable schedules.”¹⁰⁰ As Fontaine concludes “These systems got the job done, but it is obvious that the logistics ADP infrastructure did not perform as expected. [25] Without a senior logistician on the ground in the operational area with the requisite authority, there was no way to discipline the supply systems; temporary nonstandard systems proliferated. Without a centralized theater logistics management system, we not only lose visibility of materiel in the pipeline and in storage at either end of it, but lack the ability to “cross-level” supplies in the theater.”¹⁰¹

Fontaine’s in depth analysis highlights the point of Macdonald that problems are often mission specific and can be solved during the mission. Nevertheless, Fontaine does mention that the database to track and view the material and other resources is a returning problem especially when there is a lack of a clear coordinating body. As well as, logistical support should be a core focus in a humanitarian intervention, which was stressed by Anyidoho previously. Moreover, the case of Somalia shows the important lesson that can learned is that effective planning for deployment is highly important; otherwise you risk the need for firefighting. This can then lead to the loss of visibility and the waste of resources. Lastly, the focus of this thesis is on the humanitarian intervention, however, it can be seen that the resolutions

⁹⁹ Fontaine, Y.J. Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces. *Parameters*, p. 42-59.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/97winter/fontaine.htm>

¹⁰⁰ Fontaine, Y.J. Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces. *Parameters*, p. 42-59.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/97winter/fontaine.htm>

¹⁰¹ Fontaine, Y.J. Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces. *Parameters*, p. 42-59.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/97winter/fontaine.htm>

leading to UNOSOM I and II did not have a focus on peace building, rather it was focused on creating a safer environment for humanitarian agencies to distribute aid. Nowadays resolutions are more encompassing often the United Nations keeps in mind that one should avoid firefighting as the situation can deteriorate as soon as the troops leave. Nowadays Somalia's situation has not improved greatly and it is still a war torn country.

As stated earlier the United Nation mission ended in 1995, it is therefore interesting to turn to a more recent humanitarian intervention and see how the UN has implemented resolutions more effectively and took into account some of the lessons learned as described above. This is why there will be a focus on NATO's and the United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), whereby there was greater focus on the establishment self governing institutions after NATO's intervention in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Military actors in Humanitarian Interventions

4.1 Regional Military Resources in Humanitarian Interventions

In the case of a humanitarian intervention military operations occur to provide support to the targets set by, for example, the UN resolutions and mandates. The United Nations members, upon request, provide resources. This, however, does not mean that the UN is involved directly in all humanitarian interventions. Rather, regional alliances can be asked to provide support as they might be considered to be better equipped for the task. As mentioned in previous chapters the UN Charter Chapter VIII (together with various resolutions issued by the Security Council) provides the legal framework for regional agencies to cooperate and provide the resources for an intervention. Article 53 of Chapter VIII states that: “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” For example, the current mission in Afghanistan by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was mandated under Chapter VIII by the UN Security Council in 2001. The main focus of this mandate is peace enforcement. Since 2003 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a regional alliance, took over the command of ISAF in Afghanistan. At the same time there is a UN mission active, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which is being described by the UN website as a political mission supported by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) by focusing on development and humanitarian issues, as well as, political affairs.¹⁰² The example of Afghanistan shows that multiple missions and organizations can be involved in interventions.

It brings about various other questions of which one of the most important questions is; how effective is a (military) regional alliance? Is there consensus among the members to participate and, moreover, is there consensus on the operational aspects, such as supply chain management, during the intervention? Discussions on the appropriate use of force or the legal basis of such an intervention often occur. Is there a specific code of conduct in place on how military operations should be carried out? Do certain member states hire private military organizations and how are these bound by the regulations? Often political consultations are important to establish any military action at all. After the establishment of a mission the consensus has to be

¹⁰² UNAMA website < <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1748>> viewed on 12 June 2010.

maintained executing the operations. This chapter will focus on the military operational aspects of humanitarian interventions by focusing on the intervention of NATO in Kosovo and the lessons that can be learned from this mission.

4.2 NATO & air strikes: Operation Allied Force

The end of the Cold War did not only lead to an increase in intra state conflicts and UN's involvement in these conflicts, it also led to a new political environment in Europe whereby the NATO's "classical" collective defence task diminished, [and] the Alliance had to adapt from deterring a clearly defined threat to coping with what emerged to be an unpredictable and instable environment."¹⁰³ NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia came about after Boutros-Ghali requested NATO's support for future resolutions. NATO declared in December 1992 "We confirm the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peace-keeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security. We are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the UN Security-General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions."¹⁰⁴ Already from 1993 onwards NATO started to provide their resources and capabilities in former Yugoslavia to support the UN on various levels.

As mentioned before it should be noted that the 78 day air strikes, Operation Allied Force, by NATO in 1999 to stop the atrocities that were being committed in Kosovo and to halt Milosevic were not without criticism. The legitimacy to embark on this intervention was questionable as NATO did not have prior approval from the Security Council. There was, however, a common consensus of the NATO members to participate in the air strikes. Dana H. Allin, senior fellow for Transatlantic Affairs at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, provides the following explanation on why NATO was unified on the air strike: "The main answer is that the transatlantic allies had exhausted every plausible diplomatic means to contain a conflict whose expansion was rightly judged as intolerable to Europe's moral compact and internal order."¹⁰⁵ The problems with Milosevic and Kosovo were not of mere transatlantic

¹⁰³ Leurdijk, Dick (1994). The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia partners in international cooperation, Netherlands Atlantic Commission Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael,' The Hague. p 7.

¹⁰⁴ Leurdijk, Dick (1994). The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia partners in international cooperation, Netherlands Atlantic Commission Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael,' The Hague. p 9.

¹⁰⁵ Allin Dana H. (2002). NATO's Balkan Interventions. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press: New York. p. 48.

nature – “that is to say, a clash of old- and new-world values, interests and strategic perspectives. Instead NATO faced more universal dilemmas of intervention: of taking sides; marrying force and diplomacy; of establishing legitimacy for the use of military force; and of waging war by consensus among diverse democracies.”¹⁰⁶ Allin continues that NATO was not actually prepared to fight a war, rather the consensus of the NATO members was more of a coercive nature, to *threaten* with air strikes, that could be carried out if necessary. There was less focus on the effective military function and there was the hope that Milosevic would surrender after a few days of bombing. “Late on the night of March 24, NATO warplanes began what was expected to be a brief bombing campaign. The purpose of the campaign was to force Milosevic back to the negotiating table so that NATO could find a way short of independence to protect Kosovo’s Albanian population from Serb violence and political domination. This bombing campaign, it was emphatically states, was not a war, and none of the NATO leaders had any intention of waging one.”¹⁰⁷ Milosevic had no intention to surrender and authorized a blueprint of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanian population. This led to great numbers of refugees and internally displaced people in other regions. By the end of the war an estimated 850,000 refugees and 300,000 to 400,000 internally displaced people in other provinces. This was a serious escalation of the conflict and created a near panic condition at NATO. The objectives set by NATO had been to avoid a violent offensive to the citizens in Kosovo and to weaken the Serb army from harming people in Kosovo.¹⁰⁸ This led to the establishment of the second phase of the operation whereby the air strikes were extended. This, however, was not successful. The Alliance was limited by the Yugoslav air defense system which constrained the success of the air strikes. The NATO planes had to fly at 5000 meters to avoid being targeted by the well concealed Yugoslav air defenses. Furthermore, the mass movement continued and NATO could not prevent that 2 refugee convoys were attacked. On the 3rd of February NATO’s third phase of the operation was established, whereby the Yugoslav Interior ministry in Belgrade was targeted. This, however, was not authorized by the North Atlantic Council and one of NATO’s members, France, claimed it was not consulted. On the NATO summit of 23rd of April the USA did receive approval for extension of the operation and the

¹⁰⁶ Allin Dana H. (2002). NATO’s Balkan Interventions. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford University Press: New York. P 49.

¹⁰⁷ Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O’Hanlon (2000). Winning Ugly NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C. p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Buckley, M. and Cummings S. N. eds. (2001). Kosovo perceptions of war and its aftermath. Continuum: London. Chapter 1 War in Kosovo: History, Development and Aftermath by Roland Danreuther p. 23.

ability to target “sustainment targets” – such as electoral grids and command and control centers.¹⁰⁹ This did create anxiety among other NATO allies as the risk of civilian casualties increased and could diminish the public support for the operation. This was illustrated by the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on the 8th of May, there was a debate among the allies on the appropriate use of force, while the USA felt constrained by the political interference especially by France. Eventually after ten weeks of the operation the USA finally mentioned that other military options were also possible and evidence showed the preparation of ground troops, Milosevic agreed on a peace plan one week later on the 3rd of June.¹¹⁰

The limited success of the operation has led to the conclusion that not merely a military operation is decisive to stop the atrocities in Kosovo. As Daalder and O’Hanlon state: “Final victory required more than bombing. Two critical factors occurred on the political front: NATO’s demonstrated cohesion as an alliance and Russia’s growing willingness to cooperate in the pursuit of a diplomatic solution. On the military front, NATO’s talk of a possible ground war (which alliance leaders had unwisely ruled out when the bombing began) and the well-publicized decisions to augment allied troops strength in Macedonia and Albania proved to be crucial as well. Whereas the air war inflicted mounting damage, these other factors probably convinced Milosevic that no plausible escape remained. Once that became clear to him, capitulation became his best course, both to minimize further damage to Serbia and its military and to secure his position in power.”¹¹¹ Daalder and O’Hanlon hereby show that military capabilities are not the sole providers of stopping atrocities and creating an environment whereby there is a focus on peace building. It is a tool to bring about change that, with all the right diplomatic ingredients, can lead to peace. As outlined in the previous chapter the interventions in Somalia (UNOSOM II) were also not successful and the outcome was that all troops were pulled out eventually. There were short term problems and this ensured that on the longer term the political basis for the mission evaporated.

In Kosovo, after the eventually successful NATO mission, new missions were established by the UN (United Nations) and the European Union (the European Union

¹⁰⁹ Buckley, M. and Cummings S. N. eds. (2001). Kosovo perceptions of war and its aftermath. Continuum: London. Chapter 1 War in Kosovo: History, Development and Aftermath by Roland Danreuther p. 24.

¹¹⁰ Buckley, M. and Cummings S. N. eds. (2001). Kosovo perceptions of war and its aftermath. Continuum: London. Chapter 1 War in Kosovo: History, Development and Aftermath by Roland Danreuther p. 24.

¹¹¹ Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O’Hanlon (2000). Winning Ugly NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C. p. 5.

Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) to ensure a process of successful peace building. These missions are attempting to avoid the conflict to flare up again in the future. NATO also did stay active under the mission KFOR to support these missions of the UN and European Union. Furthermore, KFOR also support the border protection, the disarming of the Kosovo Liberation Army and to uphold the ceasefire. Hereby, not only NATO members participate but also non-NATO members such as Russia.

Kosovo status currently remains unclear as it is under the ruling of the UN, but is becoming more defined since July 2010. The Kosovo declaration of independence issued in February 2008 was not accepted by the Serbian government. Serbia, therefore, after approval from the United Nations Assembly in October 2008, requested the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion. The International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo's declaration of independence was not in violation of international law. "The Court has concluded [...] that the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework. Consequently the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law (V. General Conclusion, paragraph 122)."¹¹² This might give more clarity to Kosovo's status in the future. Important to note is that although the declaration is ruled not to be illegal; the issue of recognition by the UN member states is political. This ruling by the ICJ might lead to more member states to recognize Kosovo's independence, nevertheless, Serbia's president Tadic, has stated that Serbia will not accept the unilateral independence of Kosovo.

4.3 Operation Allied Force & Lessons Learned

Various literatures are available on the operation of NATO in Kosovo, previously mentioned books by Leurdijk, Allin, Daalder and O'Hanlon are examples of this. As described above NATO's involvement cannot merely be seen as a success story. It was difficult and as is the case in other humanitarian intervention lessons can be learned for future missions.

In the book Kosovo perceptions of war and its aftermath, Roland Danreuther sums up some of the strategic miscalculations by NATO. Firstly, "there was the mistake of allowing the Bosnian precedent dictate strategic thinking towards

¹¹² International Court of Justice (22 July 2010). Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo. General list No. 14.
<www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf?PHPSESSID=7a4981fc82d4735ba127a73438215b16>
viewed on 30 July 2010.

Kosovo.”¹¹³ The situation in Bosnia in 1995 was still in the minds of the Alliance, thereby not realizing that the Serb national interest in Kosovo was greater than they estimated, and that the Serb army was not under the threat of military defeat, as was the case in 1995. Secondly, the air strikes were limiting in nature and this, in combination with, the explicit exclusion of establishing ground troops led to a lack of the elements of surprise and credibility. Thirdly, NATO failed to predict and prepare for a refugee crisis. Milosevic’s move to escalate the crisis had its intended effect and caused great problems for NATO’s planners and the Western leadership. Lastly, it is important to mention that the initial failure of the air strike operation threatened the overall credibility of NATO. This eventually led to the consideration of the deployment of ground forces. In the long run this is one of the more important reasons why Milosevic’s eventually surrendered after it became clear that NATO did not plan to retreat as the Alliance could not afford to lose.¹¹⁴

Important lessons learned have been researched by, for example the RAND Corporation, to avoid internal NATO problems to occur in the future. RAND is a non profit institution (think tank) that researches and analyses various issues from health to business and environmental issues. It was established in 1946 by the USA Army Air Forces as Project RAND and became an independent non profit institute in 1948.¹¹⁵ In 2001 the organization researched the NATO operation Allied Force led by John E. Peters.¹¹⁶ There are four important lessons they highlight:

“1) Although Alliance and U.S. media news releases during the operation recognized the contributions of all participating air forces, the United States was responsible for a disproportionately large share of the effort.

2) Intra-Alliance politics made Operation Allied Force possible but also resulted in political and operational constraints that imposed limitations on warfare.

3) Despite years of multinational, cooperative planning within the Alliance, the allies found it difficult to agree on a common approach.

¹¹³ Buckley, M. and Cummings S. N. eds. (2001). Kosovo perceptions of war and its aftermath. Continuum: London. Chapter 1 War in Kosovo: History, Development and Aftermath by Roland Danreuther p. 24-25.

¹¹⁴ Buckley, M. and Cummings S. N. eds. (2001). Kosovo perceptions of war and its aftermath. Continuum: London. Chapter 1 War in Kosovo: History, Development and Aftermath by Roland Danreuther p. 24-25.

¹¹⁵ RAND < <http://www.rand.org/about/history/>>

¹¹⁶ Peters, John E., Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, and Traci Williams (2001). in *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*, [MR-1391-AF](#), 136 pp RAND research.

4) Operation Allied Force highlighted some key differences in the perspectives of the United States and the European countries.”¹¹⁷

The research conducted by RAND shows that a regional alliance, even though they have experience working together, still have to operate in a constraint political and operational environment which can potentially lead to destabilization of the alliance. This threat can also be seen in the current mission in Afghanistan (ISAF) whereby the USA provides a disproportional amount of troops and resources and political constraints can lead to member states backing out of the mission. This is illustrated by the collapse of the Dutch government on the decision to extend the mission in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the lessons learned drawn up by RAND do not include research on the experience of the Alliance with other civilian organizations. Lastly it is important to note that the participating member states are being seen as the direct supplier of troops, goods and other services; however, there is a rising tendency to hire private military and security companies (PMSCs) also known as private military firms (PFMs). This could potentially have made the mission even more complex. In the light of future conflicts it is important to discuss the increasingly important role of PMSCs, especially as they seem to be increasingly active in the area of supply chain management.

4.4. The Importance of PMSC's

The UN does not see private military and security companies as a viable option. The increased involvement of these PMSCs, however, shows that since the 1990s, UN member states may not be able to handle the increase in crises and conflicts. People argue that it might be the shortcomings of the UN and other organizations to respond to the growing amount of conflicts and crises that have put these private companies in business. These companies could be used where the UN and other organizations are unable or unwilling to intervene. PMSCs can offer solutions to the political, financial and institutional constraints that the UN faces.¹¹⁸ Moreover, PMSCs are willing to intervene and there is less of a public outcry when they are used as they serve a financial purpose rather than a political goal. Member states fear the potential political storm. “This trend became evident after the ill-fated intervention in Somalia in 1993

¹¹⁷ RAND research brief (2001). <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB72/index1.html> viewed on 17 June 2010.

¹¹⁸ Lilly, Damian (2000). The Privatization of peacekeeping : prospects and realities in Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction? Volume 3. p. 53.

and was displayed quite vividly again in Kosovo [...] when most allied countries were unwilling to provide ground troops to the NATO campaign.”¹¹⁹ Furthermore, they are more cost effective and it solves the lack of funding and personnel that occurs in the case of humanitarian interventions. Lastly, they can act quicker as they are not bound by bureaucratic institutions.¹²⁰

Services that these companies offer vary greatly from logistical support to actual combat activities and training. Their customers can range from dictators, to multinational corporations and even nonprofit organizations. At the moment, private military and security companies are rarely being used in military operations by providing personnel in the case of a military intervention by the UN or a regional alliance, rather they provide services such as logistics.

The USA did create a rare exception prior to the Kosovo operation Allied Force. “One of the rare examples occurred in October 1998 when the American government used a private firm, DynCorp, to provide the American military contingent in the OSCE’s mission to verify the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo prior to the NATO intervention.[...] The American government used the company because it did not want to send its own troops into a conflict situation unarmed; using a private firm served as a way of avoiding the political risks associated with such action.[...] Although DynCorp personnel were unarmed, it was the first time an American firm had been used in a combat area, which raised a number of eyebrows amongst analysts and commentators who felt that the United States was not taking its responsibilities seriously and distancing itself from the operation.[...]”¹²¹ There was not much public support in the USA for an intervention in the Balkans, making it difficult to do a reserve call-up. Especially when the situation worsened and a great number of people fled for the violence due to Milosevic ethnic cleansing campaign. Furthermore, ground troops had to be considered as the operation prolonged. A humanitarian crisis was also on the way due to the refugees and internally displaced people. The USA military then decided to hire a construction and engineering company Brown & Root Services based in Texas. “Not only would the firm construct a series of temporary facilities that would house and protect hundreds of thousands of Kosovars, but it would also run the supply system for U.S. forces in

¹¹⁹ Lilly, Damian (2000). The Privatization of peacekeeping : prospects and realities in *Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?* Volume 3. p. 54.

¹²⁰ Lilly, Damian (2000). The Privatization of peacekeeping : prospects and realities in *Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?* Volume 3. p. 53-55.

¹²¹ Lilly, Damian (2000). The Privatization of peacekeeping : prospects and realities in *Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?* Vol. 3. p. 53-62.

the region, feeding the troops, constructing their base camps, and maintaining their vehicles and weapons systems.”¹²² Singer clearly describes the importance of the private firm that was later even thanked by the General Dennis Reimer, the Chief of staff of the USA army, for playing a key role in the successful Kosovo operation.¹²³ Furthermore during the operation Allied Force, “besides the logistics and engineering support, private military firms also supplied much of the information warfare aspects of the operation.”¹²⁴ Even after the operation Allied Force under KFOR the Aerial intelligence gathering function was outsourced to Airscan, a company based in Florida.¹²⁵ On the opposite side Singer also describes that the Kosovo Liberation Army, general Ceku, received training from the firm Military Professional Resources (MPRI).¹²⁶

Since the late 1990s the popularity of these companies is on the decline or at best receiving a ‘lukewarm’ response. This is due to a few clear reasons according to Lilly. The UN and the international community have increased their focus on peacekeeping operations. The political will has increased, this trend has continued since 9/11. Hereby the UN also gets more support from regional or even sub-regional alliances, which makes PMSCs abundant. Furthermore, many shortcomings are associated with the PMSCs. Firstly; they are too small to be involved significantly humanitarian interventions, in particular when it concerns large peacekeeping operations. However, they are suited to be active in humanitarian interventions such as support after a natural disaster. Secondly, political obstacles are evident. The UN is the primary organ that can authorize a peacekeeping mission. This mechanism is still in place and it is unlikely that the DPKO would be willing or would recommend member states to outsource this. The PMSCs would probably also not be able to be a permanent standing force as member states, such as Russia and the USA, would disagree. Thirdly, PMSCs risk to be seen as mercenaries as they are involved in foreign conflicts for political gain. There is even an international convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. It would be contrary to support these PMSCs, until there is more clarity on how these companies differ.

¹²² Singer, Peter Warren (2003). *Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. Cornell University Press: New York p. 6.

¹²³ Singer, Peter Warren (2003). *Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. Cornell University Press: New York p. 6.

¹²⁴ Singer, Peter Warren (2003). *Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. Cornell University Press: New York p. 16.

¹²⁵ Singer, Peter Warren (2003). *Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. Cornell University Press: New York p. 16.

¹²⁶ Singer, Peter Warren (2003). *Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. Cornell University Press: New York p. 11.

Lastly, there are serious concerns about the accountability of PMSCs. If something goes wrong, now member states are liable, but what happens when PMSCs are involved? The UN should create a regulatory body to monitor these PMSCs.

These issues show that with PMSCs there are many issues involved with the acceptance of them in humanitarian interventions, especially when involved in military operations for a peacekeeping mission. At the moment PMSCs are active in mainly logistical and support services. Nevertheless, the privatization is evident. For example, some NGOs use these companies to protect themselves. This is why it is interesting to see the possibility of another actor in humanitarian interventions.

4.5 NATO in the future

This chapter has greatly focused on NATO's involvement as regional alliance in a humanitarian intervention. As stated earlier lessons should have been learned in the operation in Kosovo, but it still seems to be difficult to establish consensus in the operational and political environment. A regional alliance should be able to cope with various agencies. These are ranging from the UN, the other member states, public opinion, NGOs or even PMSCs that might be hired by member states.

Currently NATO is implementing new policies that should provide the strategic direction into the future. In February 2010 there was a NATO Atlantic Council Summit whereby the new strategies were discussed on how to transform to meet the global threats and challenges to come. A report was drawn up, STRATCON 2010: An Alliance for Global Security, by the Atlantic Council's Strategic Advisors Group. The report clearly states that NATO should renew the sense of solidarity and political will; being a transatlantic security forum combining political and military power.¹²⁷ Hereby, also mentioning the need for a recommitment to success in Afghanistan. Important in this respect is the Comprehensive Approach, or political-military cooperation. In the 'issue brief' on the Comprehensive Approach, apart from the focus on Afghanistan, there is great focus on civil military and political military cooperation, whereby creating synergies is important for European member states and Canada.¹²⁸ According to the former Supreme Allied Commander and Atlantic Council chairman Jim Jones stated that "NATO must be more lean, agile, and flexible to effectively address the security challenges before it. NATO must move beyond its

¹²⁷ <<http://www.acus.org/publication/stratcon-2010-alliance-global-century>> and the full report can be found: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/STRATCON%202010%20REPORT_FINAL.pdf

¹²⁸ <<http://www.acus.org/publication/operationalizing-comprehensive-approach>> and the issue brief for further details: <http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/ComprehensiveApproach_SAGIssueBrief.PDF>

doctrine of static defense of the 20th Century to become a more proactive Alliance for the modern era.”¹²⁹

This chapter mainly focused on military operations, but as the earlier mentioned quotation from Daalder and O’Hanlon shows, often the success of an intervention is not merely by achieving military victory, but often include political aspects to ensure that a peace plan is being implemented. Humanitarian interventions can be complex and often relate to humanitarian, political and developmental issues. These various issues need to be considered during an humanitarian intervention in order to attain a successful long term strategy. As described in previous chapters you would like to avoid ‘firefighting’ and attempt to solve conflicts as much as possible. The next chapter will focus on other actors that are often involved in a humanitarian intervention and on how these (civil) actors work together with the military.

¹²⁹ <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/jones-nato-must-be-lean-agile-and-flexible>

Chapter 5: Other Agencies in Humanitarian Interventions

5.1 Cooperation & Coordination

Humanitarian interventions have been described as new wars. The era whereby the classical role of the military, to conquer territory and defeat the enemy and humanitarian organizations cleaned up the mess afterwards, is no longer the case. Many humanitarian organizations were established in war times. For example the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) was established in the 19th century after the battle of Solferino, whilst World War I and World War II led to the establishment of Save the Children Fund, Oxfam and CARE. These new wars are wars that concern intrastate violence whereby there is greater focus on cooperation and coordination.

Nowadays, as described earlier, rather than fighting a war against one specific party, the military operations try to come between the conflicting parties and solve the conflict. Hereby taking into account the humanitarian principles as described in chapter 1. This has led to a wide array of cooperation and coordination among various actors, whereby the use of force is an option, but not necessarily a determinant of a humanitarian intervention.¹³⁰ As described in Chapter 2, the levels of coordination can be on an international level, national level and field level between various actors. The level of coordination and cooperation also depends on the specific humanitarian intervention as these interventions differ greatly in shape and size. Nevertheless the focus on coordination and cooperation is becoming of greater importance as the humanitarian interventions become of larger scale and are more complex. NATO, the EU and the UN have put civil military relations on their agendas recently. NATO is focusing on re-writing their ideas on Civil-Military cooperation (CIMIC) and the EU has established committees that focus on civilian and military action in crisis management. The UN is also investigating how to incorporate recommendations in the Brahimi Report that focus on establishing a more comprehensive approach that takes into account the humanitarian aspects.¹³¹

This chapter will focus on other actors that are involved in humanitarian interventions and how they collaborate. First there will be a discussion on civil-military cooperation as this is one of the key areas of collaboration in the case of a humanitarian intervention. After this, there will be a focus on some of the main

¹³⁰ Gourlay, Catriona (2000). Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in *Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?* Vol 3. p. 33-44.

¹³¹ Studer, Meinrad (June 2001). The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflicts. *IRRC*, vol. 83. no 842. p.368-369.

humanitarian organizations that are active in humanitarian interventions. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will first be discussed, followed by a discussion of some of the challenges that non governmental organizations (NGOs) currently face. Furthermore there will be a discussion on new evolving partnerships and relations, namely the corporate (profit) sector and the European Union, as a new multilateral organization.

5.2 Civil –Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

There are various meanings and definitions regarding CIMIC. It is, for example, important to distinguish between civil-military relations in the case of a humanitarian intervention, whereby military operations take place or when a host nation is requesting support of both the military and civilian organizations, e.g. in the case of natural disasters. It would be interesting to focus on the latter too, but this thesis focuses on the relationship whereby military operations take place in the case of a humanitarian intervention. In order to have a clear working definition, the NATO definition of CIMIC will be applicable in this case: “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies (NATO, 2000: §102)”¹³² Here the main focus will be on the relationship between the military and the humanitarian organizations.

Usually CIMIC is formed at the field level when a conflict has spiraled out control to such a degree that a military operation occurs. Military deployment for the purpose of humanitarian actions has not always led to an improved collaboration or successful action; nevertheless, shared interest is what brings them together in the field.¹³³ There are, however, various differences. Gourlay describes that it is important to note that both the military as the humanitarian organizations have different working methods.¹³⁴

Pugh also emphasizes that civil-military relations are not merely defined by the different roles they fulfill, but also by the divergent philosophies and allegiances and that this often gives the military an advantage in configuring the relations. “They

¹³² Pugh, M. (2001). The Challenge of Civil-military Relations in International Peace Operations, in *Disasters*. Vol 25. No. 4. p. 345-357.

¹³³ Gourlay, C. (2000). Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in *Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?* Vol 3. p. 34.

¹³⁴ Gourlay, C. (2000). Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in *Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?* Vol 3. p. 36.

boast a hierarchical structure, relatively regular funding, logistics capabilities, a pool of labour and the backing of the state that sent them.”¹³⁵ NGOs are much more diffuse and less hierarchal.

Since the humanitarian interventions in Somalia and the Balkans CIMIC has become institutionalized, but it is manifested in a hegemonic approach whereby the military necessity subordinates the humanitarian action. Moreover, during the Kosovo crisis of refugees, many partners tried to define the blurred boundaries and the limits of humanitarian action in a highly political and military environment which were outside their mandates. Hence, Pugh states that “maximizing benefits through partnership has laced the relationship with a degree of confusion over identity and roles.”¹³⁶ The field level cooperation that takes place is being seen as an added value for both parties, although the two sectors cannot merge and the differences and challenges remain.

At the moment, ad hoc CIMIC projects tend to take place. This is logical as there is mainly a focus on knowledge exchange on an operational level during a crisis. Nevertheless, the long term differences between the military and civil organizations will remain. This is why Gourlay concludes that “There is no single solution to managing civil-military relations at this [operational] level either, yet if humanitarian operations are to improve, we need to structure and learn from each operational experience more systematically.”¹³⁷

The ICRC also describes the new CIMIC structure and security dialogue in the NATO led troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) and also in Kosovo and their role in this relationship. “As one of the organizations referred to in the Dayton accords, the ICRC was invited to take part in these forums of civil-military coordination. The ICRC took part as an observer in the exchange of information on humanitarian issues. It also attended the regular security updates provided by IFOR and SFOR. It proved important for the ICRC to convey to NATO that participation in these sessions did not amount to being bound by security decisions taken within them. The reason for this was the need not to be seen as a subordinate to NATO.”¹³⁸ The above quotation

¹³⁵ Pugh, M. (2001). The Challenge of Civil-military Relations in International Peace Operations, in *Disasters*. Vol 25. No. 4. p. 349.

¹³⁶ Pugh, M. (2001). The Challenge of Civil-military Relations in International Peace Operations, in *Disasters*. Vol 25. No. 4. p. 346.

¹³⁷ Gourlay, C. (2000) Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in *Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?* Vol 3. p. 44.

¹³⁸ Kellenberger, Jakob (2001). Humanitarian Aspects of International Peace Support Operations: The Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross (chapter 7) in *Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives* Spillmann, Bernauer, Gabriel, Wenger (eds.) International Relations and Security Network: Bern, Zurich. 157-171.

already shows the fear that some humanitarian organizations might have with participating with the military. This is why it is important to look more specifically at the humanitarian organizations and the challenges and fears they face when they collaborate with the military or other agencies.

5.3. International Committee of the Red Cross

The ICRC is permanently active in over 60 countries and conducts operations in more than 80 countries. The ICRC has a specific mandate from the international community to help victims of conflicts, as well as, in internal conflicts, whoever the victims are. This mandate is based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 that outlines the ICRC's tasks to visiting prisoners, organizing relief operations, uniting family that have been separated, and providing similar support in the case of armed conflict. Other sources are the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which encourage similar tasks as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but also in situations of *internal conflicts*.¹³⁹ There is a strong focus on the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, as well as, creating a humanitarian space for the humanitarian activities. This is being emphasized especially in light of military involvement and cooperation.

The ICRC would like to keep its own identity, but there is willingness to cooperate with, not “being coordinated by” or “subordinated to.”¹⁴⁰ There should be a distinction between the political action of the military organizations and the humanitarian action – the civil actors that focus on alleviating the suffering of people in a conflict. As Meinrad Studer, diplomatic adviser to and member of the ICRC's International Organizations Division, states: “The ICRC believes that the simultaneous presence of humanitarian organizations in situations of armed conflict or internal violence and internationally mandated peace-keeping or peace-enforcement forces requires a complementary, two-pronged approach: on the one hand, a contribution to the political resolution of the conflict that takes into account its underlying causes, and on the other, the alleviation of the civilian population's suffering due to the crisis.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ ICRC website, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_mandate?OpenDocument viewed on 26 June 2010.

¹⁴⁰ Kellenberger, Jakob (2001). Humanitarian Aspects of International Peace Support Operations: The Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross (chapter 7) in *Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives* Spillmann, Bernauer, Gabriel, Wenger (eds.) International Relations and Security Network: Bern, Zurich. p 167.

¹⁴¹ Studer, Meinrad (June 2001). The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflicts. *IRRC*, vol. 83. no 842. p. 368.

M. Studer describes how the ICRC has focused on the danger of humanitarian organizations becoming intertwined with political aims since the first generation UN missions took place. After a couple of largely unsuccessful interventions by the UN, such as Somalia and the massacre in Srebrenica (Bosnia), member states support for humanitarian interventions decreased. The current, third generation, interventions, such as KFOR and UNMIK, “more closely resemble the original peace-keeping missions (in the sense that they enjoy the parties’ overall consent), but also add something new in that they actively contribute to the rebuilding of State and social structures.”¹⁴² The main concern often mentioned is the risk that the military forces become part of the conflict or even just being perceived as part of the conflict. The ICRC is not alone in its hesitation of ‘military humanitarianism,’ and the case of Kosovo illustrates that how extreme politicization can alter the neutrality of humanitarian activities that NGOs are concerned with. The extensive research paper by Minear, van Baarda and Sommers show that almost all humanitarian organizations pulled out of the battlefield when NATO started the air strikes. When NATO’s bombing finished the humanitarian activities were subject to political considerations by hosts, as well as, the donors.¹⁴³ The humanitarian organizations also were not successful, most of the time, to distance themselves from the NATO air strikes that had taken place. NGOs like Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) did not accept funding from NATO and others tried to work with all parties involved in the conflict. “Yet, despite their efforts, these agencies did not receive a greater welcome by the Serbian authorities whose attempts to frustrate humanitarian access were seen to be evidence of political backlash.”¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, M. Studer points out that NATO’s air strikes led to a great number of refugees that fled to Macedonia and Albania. Logistical support by the military was welcomed when this occurred; however, it also caused unease about the militarization of this humanitarian aid. As well as this, humanitarian organizations feared that governments, who allocate the resources, would favor the military, at the expense of them and other civilian channels.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² Studer, Meinrad (June 2001). The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflicts. *IRRC*, vol. 83, no 842. p. 373.

¹⁴³ Minear, L. T van Baarda, M. Sommers (2000). NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis, Occasional Paper #36. Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Studies, Brown University p. 55.

¹⁴⁴ Gourlay, C. (2000). Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions in *Peacekeeping evolution of extinction?* Vol. 3. p 34-44.

¹⁴⁵ Studer, Meinrad (June 2001). The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflicts. *IRRC*, vol. 83, no 842. p. 375.

This, however, does not mean that there is only tension evident between the military and humanitarian organizations, as C. Gourlay mentions further in her article “Rather than being perceived solely as an area of tension in their relationship, both parties might usefully co-operate in the framing of joint policy aimed at maintaining and nurturing consent while preparing for different levels of operational association in response to changing levels of consent.”¹⁴⁶

The ICRC also clearly shows that it is an active participant in meetings with organizations such as with OCHA of the UN. The tasks of coordination are usually carried out by the IASC, but these regular meetings are important platform where information can be exchanged and operational experience is being shared.¹⁴⁷ The ICRC is even occasionally involved in military training exercises that focus on the humanitarian-military aspects. The main purpose for the ICRC is to spread the knowledge of international humanitarian law.¹⁴⁸

5.4 Non Governmental Organizations

There are numerous non governmental organizations (NGOs) that operate around the world in conflict areas that all differ greatly in their size and organizational structures. This was already mentioned in chapter 2 of this thesis as Tomasini and van Wassenhove elaborate: “Humanitarian agencies differ greatly in their management structures, cultures, and approach. UN agencies and NGOs lack a harmonized structure making inter-agency communication, decision -making, and basic coordination a trick, to say the least.”¹⁴⁹ The main obstacles that they identify are:

- Funding: as there are limited resources, NGOs often compete over donors. These earmarked donations are challenging for coordination as they focus on a specific organization, programme or purpose that thereby can overlook sustainable investment in a (general) area such as supply chain management. Donors, nowadays, increasingly focus on inter-agency coordination, but this is still challenging. Donors are used to support one NGO due to its specific position, capacity and, to some extent, branding (see below).

¹⁴⁶ Gourlay, C. (2000). Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions in *Peacekeeping: evolution of extinction?* Vol. 3. p 36.

¹⁴⁷ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 68

¹⁴⁸ Studer, Meinrad (June 2001). The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflicts. *IRRC*, vol. 83. no 842. p. 390.

¹⁴⁹ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 84.

- Cost: coordination is expensive for the coordinators and the parties that are being coordinated. Direct costs are evident such as travel costs, salaries, and time, but also indirect costs are evident such as joint reports. This can have a negative financial impact as donors and the resulting costs will not be approved. Furthermore, there is the risk that the joint effort was not worth it, in time and money, as it proves to have been project that could have been done by one organization. It should be noted though, that a well coordinated operation can save a lot of money too.
- Branding: NGOs, like any other organization, want to avoid damage to their brand and ensure that there will be no misconceptions on their humanitarian principles. Coordination can be a risk, especially in conflict areas, where NGOs do not want to receive support from ‘unwanted’ donors, such as the US government in Afghanistan or Iraq. By coordinating with these parties, this might result in a perceived idea that these NGOs do receive support.
- Leadership: A strong person is needed, with the right qualities and resources, who can engage the various organizations and who can foster coordination, as well as, collaboration.¹⁵⁰

These are not the only obstacles. With supply chain management, NGOs are facing serious challenges. Lars Gustavsson, director for emergency response and disaster mitigation at World Vision International, mentions three main reasons of the challenges in logistics.

- 1) There is a lack of depth in knowledge. Humanitarian logistics contains much organizational components, such as inventory control, procurement, bidding and accountability. Just as in the corporate sector, humanitarian logistics should become more knowledgeable on these topics. Furthermore, the humanitarian community as a whole should undertake capacity building, because one out of three field staff quit due to a burnout.

The importance of knowledge management is also being stressed by Tomasini and van Wassenhove, “knowledge management is one of the key elements in making supply chain management a core function of the organization. Increasingly we see organizations investing in this area as they become more aware of their shortcomings, resulting in redesigning of their

¹⁵⁰ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 84-86.

processes, and preparing for the retirement of their most experienced and senior staff.”¹⁵¹

- 2) Funding is biased, as it favors short term responses. Many NGOs hop from grant to grant that only supports direct projects and programs for a specific time period. There should be a better long term corporate strategy to develop planning, as well as, funding cycles. Furthermore, these short term grants do not favor long-term beneficial investments in an area such as supply chain management.
- 3) There is lack in investment in technology and communication. “Most NGOs lack ‘system capacity’ in just about any category.”¹⁵² Great sums of money can be saved if NGOs can work more efficiently. As Tomasini and van Wassenhove also state “Without proper information it is extremely difficult for humanitarians in the field to prepare for what is coming to the disaster site. [...] visibility allows organizations to identify what needs to be appealed, what has been committed, what is in the pipeline, and what is in storage.”¹⁵³

Gustavsson also puts forward good recommendations to improve these three challenges. One example to enhance the knowledge is that logisticians in the field should enhance their knowledge by professional training and that new employees should perhaps have a corporate logistic background, or should be students from supply chain management and logistic schools. He presses that collaboration is necessary to improve the standard of supply chain management by the whole humanitarian sector. Regarding the lack of funds, he states that donors should take ownership of the problems that NGOs face especially by investing in Information Technology (IT), Management Information System (MIS) and logistic management. Furthermore, he brings to the attention that the corporate sector sometimes has excess inventory which could be put to good use by NGOs. On the issue of lack of technology and communications, he mentions that NGOs must put logistics and supply chain management high on their agendas as great savings can be made. Moreover, he believes that the NGOs and the corporate sector should collaborate and even draw on each other’s resources, expertise, and licensing.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 129.

¹⁵² Gustavsson, L. (September 2003). Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges. in *Forced Migration Review* Vol 18. Refugee Study Centre: Oxford p 7.

¹⁵³ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p. 114.

¹⁵⁴ Gustavsson, L. (September 2003). Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges. in *Forced Migration Review* Vol 18. Refugee Study Centre: Oxford p 8.

Overall, Gustavsson favors a stronger relationship between the corporate sector and the humanitarian sector: “In today’s world of modern technology, greatly improved approaches to logistics and supply chain management and greater access to know-how and information, it is critical for NGOs to learn from the corporate and for-profit sector and incorporate emerging best practices.”¹⁵⁵ Tomasini and van Wassenhove also mention that successful partnerships should be considered to improve NGOs performances. This is why it is important to look at the corporate-humanitarian relations and their exchange of information.¹⁵⁶

5.5 Corporate Sector-Humanitarian Sector Relationships

‘Corporate social responsibility’ and other opportunities for the corporate sector have given rise to more relationships between the two sectors. Companies for a long time have supported humanitarian activities through commercial contracts and philanthropic programs, but this mainly took place in their home countries. In today’s globalized world the corporate sector focuses on worldwide activities that it can support. The humanitarian sector, as described above, can use the resources and expertise, but also the corporate sector is realizing that they might learn due to the partnership e.g. how to be more adaptable and agile, which is one of the main strengths of humanitarian organizations.¹⁵⁷

The situation in case of a humanitarian intervention is different from a crisis such as a natural disaster. Nevertheless, NGOs that have created a good partnership with a company can respond quicker to the aftermath of the military operations. As Gustavsson summed up after the immediate post NATO air strikes: “Hundreds of truck had to be mobilized to bring goods to Kosovo and then several thousand trucks, farm tractors with trailers or other light vehicles were needed in the country to take these goods to final destination points. The roads had not been built for such heavy traffic; adequate supplies of fuel were not available; storage and transfer facilities had been destroyed or looted; utilities had not yet been repaired; security was still a concern; and trace and tracking systems were often manual. Local staff had to be trained in most of the relevant aspects of supply chain management.”¹⁵⁸ Corporations

¹⁵⁵ Gustavsson, L. (September 2003). Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges. in *Forced Migration Review* Vol 18. Refugee Study Centre: Oxford p 6-8.

¹⁵⁶ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 130.

¹⁵⁷ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 131-133.

¹⁵⁸ Gustavsson, L. (September 2003). Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges. in *Forced Migration Review* Vol 18. Refugee Study Centre: Oxford p 6.

might have been able to support many of these functions. There are various logistic companies who have matched their competencies and activities with humanitarian aid organizations that specialize in emergency relief. For example, TNT, DHL, UPS, FedEx, and Agility are some of these logistic companies that have aligned themselves with various humanitarian organizations.¹⁵⁹

Creating a successful partnership does require to take into account the different cultural differences between the sectors. This is why a study of 2005 revealed the following challenges: 1) Lack of mutual understanding 2) Lack of transparency and accountability 3) Level of commitment 4) Roles and responsibilities 5) Relationship management.¹⁶⁰

One example of successful partnerships the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the establishment of a specialized unit, the Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITE), which is “specifically tasked with addressing logistical preparedness as well as providing key operational support during emergencies. This includes developing logistics capacity assessments, rapid response equipment, standby arrangements, civil military cooperation guidance and inter-agency work on the UN Joint Logistics concept.”¹⁶¹ In this combination WFP receives support from (private) companies, such as TPG (formerly known as TNT Post Group) an international mail, express and logistics company. TPG identified three short term logistical issues whereby it could assist WFP. As well as this, TPG is a supporting number of other smaller projects such as the global warehouse infrastructure and determining key logistics performance indicators (KPIs).¹⁶² This is one example whereby the longer term supply chain management of humanitarian agencies can be improved.

5.6 A New Actor: the European Union

Apart from the UN, regional military alliances, NGOs and corporate businesses there is one regional actor that has taken the foreground to foster peace and prevent conflicts. Often mentioned is that the Europe’s integration is first and foremost a

¹⁵⁹ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 134.

¹⁶⁰ Tomasini, R. and van Wassenhove, L (2009). *Humanitarian Logistics*. Palgrave MacMillan Insead p 139.

¹⁶¹ Scott-Bowden, P. (2003). The World Food Programme: augmenting logistics in *FMR*, Vol. 18. p. 17-19.

¹⁶² Scott-Bowden, P. (2003). The World Food Programme: augmenting logistics in *FMR*, Vol. 18. p. 18.

peace project.¹⁶³ Apart from attaining and maintaining internal peace, since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) started to focus on conflict prevention. The end of the Cold War led to conflicts in the Western Balkans and in African states. The devastating conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) and the Horn of Africa gave direct incentives to the international community, including the EU, to undertake action. Europe's direction on conflict prevention has been outlined in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹⁶⁴

The CFSP evolved out of the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in February 1992. This treaty entered into force in November 1993. “[...] the creation of the CFSP and its reinforcement in the amendments brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam that entered into force in May 1999, paved the way for the progressive transfer from the Western European Union (WEU) of the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ to the EU, i.e., humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks to combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”¹⁶⁵ In the Treaty on the European Union the CFSP is described to safeguard “the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.”¹⁶⁶

When discussing the EU's role in conflict prevention NATO is often simultaneously mentioned. The CFSP sees NATO responsible for the territorial defense and Europe as ‘peace maker.’ Mentioned on the EU website the CFSP aim is to maintain peace and international security that is compatible and coordinated with NATO.¹⁶⁷ Meaning that the EU is not focused on creating its own army, however, at the Helsinki summit in December 1999 the EU announced: ““determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” At Helsinki, the EU decided to establish an institutional decision-making framework for ESDP and a 60,000-strong “Headline Goal” rapid

¹⁶³ The view that institutionalized cooperation can lead to greater international security is a view expressed by e.g. liberal institutionalists and is widely shared among Western statespeople. There are plenty of diverting opinions such as structural realists. For more information the book by Baylis, J., Smith, S., Owens, P.eds. (2008). *The Globalization of World Politics an introduction to international relations* 4th edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford. chapter 5, chapter 7 and chapter 13.

¹⁶⁴ CFSP is used in this thesis, but also the term European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is widely used in the literature.

¹⁶⁵ Kronenberger, V. and Wouters, J. eds. (2004). *The European Union and Conflict Prevention Policy and Legal Aspects*. T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague p. XXI

¹⁶⁶ Kronenberger, V. and Wouters, J. eds. (2004). *The European Union and Conflict Prevention Policy and Legal Aspects*. T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague p. 384.

¹⁶⁷ EU website <http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_policy_en.htm> viewed on 30 July 2010.

reaction force to be fully operational by 2003. This force would be deployable within 60 days for at least a year and capable of undertaking the full range of “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement), but it would not be a standing “EU army.”¹⁶⁸ Rather, troops and assets at appropriate readiness levels would be identified from existing national forces for use by the EU.”¹⁶⁹ This has brought the European Union to the foreground as actor in humanitarian interventions as it can act independent of NATO.

Looking at the Kosovo intervention and the role of the EU has been substantial. “When the Kosovo crisis flared up, the EU’s attempts to prevent an escalation and to contain it again essentially followed the dual track of diplomatic pressure and the use of the European Union Monitoring Mission (previously the European Community Monitoring Mission) to prevent a spillover, with, in addition, humanitarian relief by the European Community’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO). Furthermore, before and during the conflict, the EU, together with other international organizations, especially the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, made considerable efforts to prevent the Kosovo conflict from spreading to Albania and FYROM [Macedonia]. After the conflict ended, the international community adopted a similar approach to that in Bosnia, consisting of a complex international presence in Kosovo to stabilize it and to prevent a recurrence of the conflict. The EU again plays a major role in this multi-organisation effort, focusing once again mainly on economic reconstruction and humanitarian aid.”¹⁷⁰ This quotation from Kronenberger and Wouters’s book on the EU and conflict prevention shows that the EU’s strength, humanitarian aid, combined with NATO’s military capabilities, could lead to successful long term conflict prevention. It should be noted though that in the case of Kosovo the conflict did spiral out of control and Albania and Macedonia were burdened with refugees.

Since the 1st of December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. Even though the basic powers of the EU in foreign policy remain unchanged, there has been more focus on coherence and visibility. This has led to the establishment of a High Representative of the Union with a new European External Action Service.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, the EU website states that: “Progress in European Security and Defence

¹⁶⁸ Although there have been discussions and even a first steps toward the creation of the Synchronized Armed Forces Europe (SAFE), a European led army.

¹⁶⁹ Archick, K. and Gallis, P. (4 January 2005). CRS Report for Congress Nato and the European Union in *Congressional Research Service – The Library of Congress* p. 14

¹⁷⁰ Kronenberger, V. and Wouters, J. eds. (2004). *The European Union and Conflict Prevention Policy and Legal Aspects*. T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague p. 43-44.

¹⁷¹ EU website on Lisbon Treaty <http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm> viewed on 30 July 2010.

Policy will preserve special decision-making arrangements but also pave the way towards reinforced cooperation amongst a smaller group of Member States.” This could lead to more efficient conflict prevention, but at the same time the EU should carefully balance its actions with NATO, NGOs and other regional alliances and organizations. Coordination and collaboration seem vital in order to ensure effective humanitarian interventions, but also long term strategies to prevent conflicts and swift action such as the EU rapid deployment force are to be considered in current interventions.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

This thesis investigates the logistical aspects that are evident in the case of humanitarian interventions. Hereby looking at the theoretical, as well as, practical constraints that are evident in the case of a humanitarian intervention. In this final chapter the research question will be addressed by summarizing the key issues that have been described in the previous chapters.

First it is important to note that since the post Cold War environment humanitarian interventions have increased. The nature of conflicts has changed and the amount of intrastate violence has increased. This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a humanitarian intervention cannot be controversial. The NATO's decision on Operation Allied Force was highly controversial as no prior explicit approval was given by the UN Security Council. Holzgrefe and Keohane's book provides a detailed account on the ethical, legal and political dilemmas involved and critics, such as Duffield argue that humanitarian interventions are 'new wars' (wars no longer concern territory). The liberal capitalist system has triumphed when the Cold War ended and the United Nations have embraced and incorporated the liberal underlying norms, values, and beliefs.

Furthermore, the humanitarian principles and the idea of humanitarian space has been explained. For humanitarian agencies it is important to adhere to these humanitarian principles, such as humanity, impartiality and neutrality. In a conflict situation humanitarian agencies will try to operate in a humanitarian space and will try to avoid getting part of a conflict and, thereby, not adhering to the principles. This is an important discussion, especially because the humanitarian sector does not want politicized or militarized aid as that can have negative consequences. This could be seen in the Kosovo conflict, after the NATO air strike, where the humanitarian agencies were largely unsuccessful to ensure that they were viewed as neutral parties in the conflict. This hampered the aid support in the former republic of Yugoslavia.

After the discussion on such theoretical matters, definitions and theories on supply chain management (logistics) in the humanitarian intervention have been described. Commercial and humanitarian supply chain management differences have been distinguished. Furthermore, there has been a focus on the importance of triple-A supply chain management. Overall, most authors on the supply chain management (logistics) in the humanitarian sector find that there should be greater focus on supply chain management and long term strategies. Money can be saved if investment in

Information Technology (IT), Management Information System (MIS) and logistic management will take place. The enhancement of knowledge of humanitarian staff in this field could also lead to a more agile, adaptable and aligned supply chain. After these two chapters, there has been a focus on the main agencies that are often involved in a humanitarian intervention, the UN, NATO, as well as, other agencies such as ICRC, NGOs and the EU.

This leads to the following conclusions of the main research question: *how are the supply chain (logistics) coordination and collaboration between various organizations in a humanitarian intervention arranged?* Overall it can be seen that in the area of coordination and collaboration, the United Nations is the primary organ to decide on a humanitarian intervention by the UN Security Council. For the operational execution it requests resources from the member states. The UN can also appoint a member state or put a regional alliance, such NATO, in charge. Coordination by the UN for logistics can be different in each situation, but what can be seen is that the IASC and the UNJLC are at the foreground.

Problems can be encountered during the operations due to various reasons. The humanitarian interventions in Somalia (UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II) shows various coordination and collaboration problems. For example, UNITAF and the Secretary General had diverging opinions on what ‘a secure environment’ was and how to disarm the various factions in and around the capital Mogadishu. During UNISOM II several national troops persistently took their orders from their national command, rather than from the UNOSOM II Admiral. As well as, there were also forces in Somalia from UN member states that were not officially part of UNOSOM II. Apart from this, there were various problems with the supply chain management. There was a lack of logistic experts to establish the mission, which resulted in a logistical nightmare. Furthermore, The Time Phased Force Deployment Database (TPFDD) lacked flexibility which was mainly due the lack of a plan for organizing and deploying the forces to Somalia. This all led various army units to use different ways to get access to resources, which blurred the pipeline and accountability. Many of these issues could have been avoided if the supply chain had been planned more extensively in advance.

The humanitarian interventions in Somalia also show the political problems that can be evident. The mandate drawn up should be relevant, but also political will and a long-term strategy are necessary for a successful intervention as otherwise the conflict will linger on and/or explode later onwards. Underlying causes should be

addressed as otherwise humanitarian interventions are only 'firefighting' rather than addressing the core of the conflict.

The humanitarian intervention in Kosovo also shows that military operations are not necessarily the primary solution for a conflict. The air strikes by NATO, Operation Allied Force, was supposed to be swift, but proved to be largely unsuccessful. It led to a refugee crisis that was unexpected and this in turn led to various problems, not in the least, it wrecked the economy greatly and constraint the neighboring countries Macedonia and Albania. In the end the serious consideration by NATO to deploy ground troops made Milosevic decide to sign a peace agreement and retreat his forces out of Kosovo.

Coordination and collaboration of humanitarian interventions might become more complex in the future. This is why NATO, for example, is revising their CIMIC strategy. There is a need for a more systemic approach to learn from each other, rather than on an ad hoc basis. The main issue for CIMIC is that both sectors have diverting working methods. This also makes it difficult to manage the civil-military relations on an operational level. It would be interesting to conduct further research on this issue and the current humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan, as it has been stated that CIMIC relations have increased greatly according to Colonel Gianmarco Badialetti from NATO.¹⁷²

New agencies are also coming onto the foreground. PMCSs in military operations and partnerships between humanitarian agencies and the corporate sector. Furthermore, a new multilateral organization, the EU, also tries to exert influence. This is why it is important to have clearly defined who is responsible for the specific tasks. Foremost, this would have to be the UN. The UN should elaborate on the Brahimi report and incorporate the new agencies and focus on the underlying factors of violent conflicts. Furthermore, knowledge should be enhanced and information knowledge should increase between all parties involved, especially before military operations start. In the area of supply chain management many improvements can be made if there will be more focus on the importance of supply chain management systems. Humanitarian organizations should invest and thus convince their donors that short term projects are not beatific, rather long term strategies would lead to better results.

¹⁷² Colonel Gianmarco Badialetti, NATO (13 April 2010). lecture on Peace-keeping and nation building. Spring School.

Between all these various agencies the questions remain not only who will keep on coordinating but who dares to collaborate in the future. More importantly, who has the right qualifications to solve conflicts situations in the long run and is able to respond early enough to even avoid conflicts from spiraling out of control. Prevention is better than to cure. Effective action in the early cycle of the conflict would be most beneficial.

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