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Title To be hired or not to be hired, the employer decides: relative chances of

unemployed job-seekers on the Dutch labor market

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CONTENTS

	SUMMARY	9
1.	INTRODUCTION	13
2.	QUESTIONS ON THE DUTCH LABOR MARKET	17
2.1	Introduction	17
2.2	(Non)-participation in the Netherlands	17
2.2.1	Problem groups	19
2.2.2	Vacancies	25
2.3	Labor market policies	27
2.3.1	Regulation	27
2.3.2	Active labor market policy in the Netherlands	30
2.4	Concluding remarks	. 32
3.	LABOR MARKET THEORY	35
3.1	Introduction	35
3.2	Marginal productivity theory	36
3.3	Theories of unemployment	38
3.4	Discrimination in the labor market	39
3.4.1	Defining discrimination	39
3.4.2	Economic theories of discrimination	41
3.4.3	Empirical investigations into the nature of discrimination	47
3.4.4	Hypotheses regarding the selection of employees	50
3.5	Labor market segmentation	52
3.6	Summary	54
4.	RESEARCH METHOD, SURVEY AND DATA	57
4.1	Introduction	57
4.2	Conjoint methods of measuring	58
4.3	Analyzing conjoint data	61
4.4	Preliminary studies	63
4.4.1	Phase 1: Group conversation	64
4.4.2	Phase 2: Single interviews	68
4.4.3	Phase 3: Pilot survey	72
4.5	The questionnaire	73
4.6	Respondents and vacancies	76
5.	PREFERENCE	81
5.1	Introduction	81
5.2	'Self-explicative' questions	81
5.3	Revealed preference	85
5.3.1	Model variables	85
5.3.2	Estimation results for explanatory variables	88
5.4	Combining characteristics	93
5.4.1	Five applicants	94
5.4.2	Extreme profiles	96
5.5	Conclusion	98

6. 6.1 6.2 6.3	FROM PREFERENCE TO HIRING BEHAVIOR Introduction Acceptability Simulations	101 101 102 106
6.4	Concluding remarks	113
7.	IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY	115
7.1	Introduction	115
7.2	Hypotheses tested	115
7.2.1	Cost-efficient selection behavior?	116
7.2.2	Discriminatory tastes?	120
7.2.3	Concluding remarks	122
7.3	Implications for policy	122
7.3.1	Current labor market policies	123
7.3.2	Policies regarding ethnic minorities	125
7.3.3	Policies regarding female job-seekers	128
7.3.4	Policies regarding older job-seekers	129
7.3.5	Policies regarding job-seekers with a slightly increased probability of sick	
	leave	130
7.3.6	Hiring policies of firms	131
7.4	Conclusion	132
APPE	NDIX A AUXILIARY PARAMETERS AND SIGNIFICANCE TESTS	133
A.1	Heteroscedasticity	133
A.2	Order of supply	135
A.3	Tests of significance	137
APPE	NDIX B SIMULATION INPUTS	139
B.1	Artificial data base of applicants	139
B.2	Inflow of new job-seekers into the data base	143
B.3	Firm-characteristics	145
D .5	I IIII VIIII WALLAND I	
APPE	NDIX C REFERENCE SITUATION FOR TABLE 6.2	147
APPE	NDIX D THE QUESTIONNAIRE	149
REFE	RENCES	169
INDE	X	175
ΔΙΙΤΙ	HOR INDEX	177
AUII	TOK HADDA	111
SUM	SUMMARY IN DUTCH	
AROI	IT THE ALITHOR	185