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## 7. The Big World Experiment

The sketches of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin that are presented in the previous two chapters relied on formal, archival data (the registers of the Chamber of Commerce and the *Vereinsregister*) and self-reporting (interviews with the representatives of organizations in the two cities). These two data sources have provided insight into the social capital that the organizations have at their disposal. Yet, the actual *working* of social capital is not revealed thereby. The aim of the current research was not just to see what the communities' networks look like, but to instead examine how they function. The contact network has only lifted a corner of the veil, since it provided an interpretation of the network from a more in-depth perspective when compared to the cold facts of the network of interlocking directorates. The organizations were revealed to be more involved and interconnected in real life than they are on paper. But then again, that is what we were *told*, and attitudes and behavior are known to not always go hand in hand. Furthermore, the contact network shows us the full pool of resources that the organizations can fish in, but not all of the connections are as relevant in all circumstances. I, therefore, wanted to discover how the Turkish communities in both Berlin and Amsterdam function when they are triggered to activate their social capital: actions speak louder than words.

In light of social capital theory, and in particular the gaps in it regarding the utilization of social capital itself, shifting the focus from retrospective to behavioral data may seem an obvious step. Finding the most appropriate method of doing this, however, is much less so. Many sociologists will initially think of participant observation (a common tool) as being the most suitable approach. Indeed, it is a regularly used measurement instrument in research into social networks, for example in the well-known study of Italian slums by William F. Whyte (1993 [1943]). However, the method also has several drawbacks which made me decide against using it. (I will come back to these disadvantages below.) I prefer the role of the observer over that of the participant. Before I discuss how the method I used herein, i.e. experimentation, allowed me to operate in my preferred role, I will expand upon what it means when social capital is put into operation. In other words, how can a community become mobilized? What is mobilization?

The entire third section of this book (Chapters 7, 8, and 9) is, consequently, focused on the mobilization of the Turkish community. The current chapter discusses both what I consider to be mobilization and how I used an experiment to study this in the two communities. Chapter 8 contains the results from Amsterdam, while Chapter 9 deals with mobilization in Berlin.

## 7.1 Defining mobilization at its narrowest: welcome to the jungle

The aim here is to capture how the social capital of the Turkish communities within Amsterdam and Berlin that is presented in the previous chapters works. In other words, the goal is to discover how this social capital is mobilized. The mere word 'mobilized' is more problematic than it seems. In an attempt to define the term in a way that suits my research and research method, I became lost in what I would like to call: the Jungle of Social Movements. Since the introduction of the concept in 1850 by the German sociologist Lorenz von Stein, a vast amount of literature has been published on social movements. From collective action (e.g. Olson, 1965) to resource mobilization (e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1977) to new-social movement theories (e.g. Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995), mobilization is discussed in the context of social movements. Although these theories emphasize different factors in their attempts to explain the rise and fall of various social movements (for instance, social inequality and the political opportunity structure), their general ideas of what a social movement involves usually comes down to the definition by Sydney Tarrow (1994): 'Collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities' (p.3-4). I suppose that for most theorists the interconnection between mobilization and social movements is so obvious that most of them do not explicitly define mobilization at all. One of the exceptions is Morrison (1987), who in his book *Black Political Mobilization* defined it as 'the collective activation and application of community or group resources toward the acquisition of social and political goods. (...) The fact of mobilization suggests that the collectivity in question is isolated from such goods' (p.3). The goods that Morrison refers to, roughly correspond to the common purposes in Tarrow's definition. If people want to achieve these common ends and challenge their opponents, they have to mobilize group members and their resources. Essentially, I do not disagree with these views on mobilization, but I do think that this way of defining it is charged with notions of emancipation, collective identity, social change and claims that are too intense to suit my objectives. I want to use a 'lighter' definition of mobilization that is not as connected to societal issues and interest articulation, but more to the mere activity of 'reaching out'. In other words, I am interested in a more common-or-garden understanding of mobilization. The general definition of the term in the Oxford English Dictionary 'the action or process of assembling, organizing, and utilizing resources etc. for a particular purposes', comes close to what I mean. It concerns the successive contacting of actors – in this particular case: organizations - in order to activate them in the desired way and convince them to perform a desired action<sup>65</sup>.

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<sup>65</sup> Therefore, I regard the terms 'to mobilize' and 'to activate' as interchangeable. This will enhance the readability of this book.

Thus, mobilization herein does not refer to the all-inclusive construction of actors and collective actions within a particular ideological paradigm, such as the women's, gay rights and American civil rights movements. The mobilization that I am discussing is very specific. It is place, time, group and subject bound. It occurs within the borders of Amsterdam and Berlin; happens in a predetermined period of two months; concerns the Turkish and, possibly, the related non-Turkish organizations within the two cities; and it refers to a predetermined action, in particular the spread of a piece of information.

## **7.2 Mobilizing the collective?**

In my quest for a suitable definition of mobilization, I started by looking at the literature on the activation of ethnic communities. I found that scholars in this particular field, such as Hooghe (2005) and Bousetta (2000), also regarded mobilization within the framework of social movements. Studies deal with the way in which migrants are able to articulate their interests concerning, for example, political affairs and discrimination. As Hooghe commented, one of the problems when it comes to the collective mobilization of an ethnic community is that it is often hard to find a common identity. Indeed, the discussion of the social capital of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin in Chapters 5 and 6 has shown that they are ideologically divided. Thus, regarding these, or any other migrant community, as a collectively acting group is not self-evident. This is another reason why the definition of mobilization in terms of social movements is unsuitable for the current study. Social movements concern groups of individuals, and organizations with a collective identity (e.g. Melucci, 1985; Kriesi et al., 1995) and a common purpose. These are characteristics that do not directly apply to the Turkish groups that I encountered.

Whether one regards the Turkish community as a collective or not, determines the way in which the mobilization of it is analyzed. A focus on the community as a whole, and the eventual course of the mobilization of it, is illustrative of how it works as a complete entity. Such a network centric approach reveals how organizations are mutually connected, who activates whom and which organizations fulfill a crucial role in this mobilization process. On the other hand, if we regard the 'community' as being comprised of separate actors, namely the organizations, we can also take an 'egocentric' approach in the analysis. Studying an organization and the alters it has mobilized (i.e. individual mobilization) reveals the strategies that individual organizations have applied during the mobilization process. Particularly in relation to social capital, a focus on individual mobilization lays bare how this potential relates to what happens when organizations are stimulated to address their contacts. When the insights into the individual strategies are taken together, how the community 'works' is further revealed,

since associations with a different status will probably employ different strategies. The definition of mobilization, as I have formulated it above, leaves room for the examination of such a process from a network centric as well as an ego-centric approach.

### **7.3 Kinds of mobilization**

The definition of mobilization that I will adhere to herein may be narrow, but it can still refer to a variety of matters. A community can be mobilized on a number of different topics, which may trigger different mobilization patterns. When the community is mobilizing on a political theme, for example, it may address channels that are unlike those that it activates when it is raising funds for a natural disaster, which is also a form of mobilization. I will now discuss different kinds of activation in order to demonstrate how they are all relevant to the functioning of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin. However, reasons of a methodological nature have been decisive when it came to the final choice of the type of mobilization to study. Ultimately, I will reveal that mobilization in the form of information distribution turned out to be most suitable approach, and an experiment is the best way of actually demonstrating the utilization of social capital.

#### **7.3.1 Political mobilization**

Political mobilization refers to those instances in which the community is activated in relation to a political topic. For example, at election times, politicians try to convince people to vote. In Amsterdam, for instance, migrants are an important target group in the local elections as they make up almost half of the city's population, and many of them have been granted voting rights at the local level. Migrant organizations are often deployed to reach these immigrant groups; in other words, they are tasked with mobilizing the community. Several interviewees said that their respective organizations have 'political nights' around the time of elections. On such occasions, politicians of different political persuasions are invited to talk about their electoral programs. A wide range of organizations, from social to sports' clubs, held such meetings at election times. This means that their nature is not determinative of their involvement in political events.

Another example of political mobilization is when people are rounded up to join a demonstration. Around the time I was in Berlin, the federal government was implementing controversial policy reforms known as *Hartz-IV* (the final in a series of four stages of reform proposed by a committee set up by the federal government, and presided over by Peter Hartz) which concerned the labor market. The objective of the

reforms was to substantially reduce the unemployment figures within a period of four years (which they failed to do). In short, *Hartz-IV* involved a drastic cutback in the expenditure on unemployment and social security benefits. The result of these measures was that migrants in particular could find themselves in a precarious situation because, for example, many of them were no longer sure of their residence permit. This, obviously, led to much social upheaval, and the migrant communities started to mobilize their members to take to the streets. The migrant organizations played an important role in the mobilizing process.

In the Netherlands, the changing social climate experienced by both migrants and natives after the murder of party leader Pim Fortuyn, just before the elections in 2002, led a group of organizations to found the Platform Keer het Tij. This body arranged several protests, such as demonstrations and conferences, and within only a few years had managed to get over 500 organizations to commit to it. Together, they were able to mobilize large numbers of people to join in with their activities.

The disadvantage of a study on political mobilization is that it is difficult to trigger a realistic mobilization in a controlled manner. Obviously, it is not feasible for a researcher to organize a demonstration, for example. Furthermore, a political mobilization usually involves only part of a community, for instance the opponents of a particular bill take to the streets to protest against it. Although it may be telling that only some members of the community are involved, I wanted to perform a more politically neutral mobilization which would not exclude part of the community in advance.

### **7.3.2 Economic mobilization**

Economic mobilization refers to the activation of the community with respect to financial means. For example, in 1999, Turkey was hit by a major earthquake. People from all over the world held benefit events and raised money for the victims. Interviewees in Berlin, as well as in Amsterdam, told me that they had been part of the fund raising activities that had been going on in their respective cities. Ali Savaşer from the *Türkisch Deutsche Gesellschaft* TDG was proud to tell me about the leading role that he and his organization (at the time he was also a board member of the Berliner Gesellschaft türkischer Mediziner) took. Savaşer initially saw how opposing groups (mainly led by the TBB and the TGB) were all raising money on their own and were unwilling to collaborate. He then decided to take the lead and coordinate the whole community. The TDG had good connections to several highly placed German officials, and Savaşer was convinced that this had led to the success that they had had (i.e. they raised a lot of money). In Amsterdam, the Turkish organizations played a significant role in the fundraising as well. The mosques were important as they were able to reach a large audience and people were already used to donating money in this environment.

Indeed, some associations, such as the IHHA<sup>66</sup>, were founded for fundraising ends. Other organizations had more a coordinating function, such as the educational association STOC, which dealt with the collection of teaching materials. Remarkably, another educational organization, Stichting Yunus Emre, said that they had also collected money at the time, and they sent it to Turkey through the agency of the municipality. The mobilization process that took place is worthy of a study in itself. The disadvantage is that, again, one has to rely on self-reported, retrospective data that almost by definition involves distorted memories and does not, therefore, provide a realistic picture of the mobilization of a community. The probability of actors naming not all, or any other, acquainted organizations other than those they actually did address, or were addressed by, is considerable. Accordingly, this topic was not suitable for the current study. It would not reveal the actual process of mobilization but an idealized version of it.

### 7.3.3 Resource mobilization

Although all types of mobilization are concerned with people's or organizations' resources (money, votes, support, information etc.), *resource mobilization* is to me a distinct type of action. Here, the term *resource* refers to both the concrete goods that people or organizations have in their possession, and the specific operations that actors own that others do not have or do not own. Through mobilization, the actor looking for help is subsequently able to use these goods or operations. For example, when I was interviewing the political organization HTDB in Amsterdam, a young man from the ATKB (an Alevi organization) returned a stereo that his organization had used during a prayer meeting. In Berlin, the women's organization TIO said that they had some kind of agreement with another women's association, SUSI. For example, TIO wanted to publish a new brochure, but the respondent said she had no idea how the suitable computer programs operate. She, therefore, asked her colleague from SUSI to help. Likewise, SUSI sought assistance with their book keeping from TIO.

Resource mobilization becomes more difficult as the distance between the organization looking for the resource and the provider thereof grows. For example, imagine two organizations that have six intermediaries in the contact network. Perhaps the actor at one end needs something that the other possesses. In order to obtain this resource, the former has to convince a friend of a friend to finally reach the latter. In these circumstances, all of the intermediaries need to be willing and able to contribute to a request that they themselves will not, necessarily, benefit from. This makes resource mobilization on a larger scale a hazardous undertaking and the chances of failure are significant.

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<sup>66</sup> *Internationale Humanitaire Hulp Organisatie*, a Milli Görüş organization in Amsterdam.

Although the investigation of resource mobilization would yield interesting insights into how ego-centric networks work, especially when it is studied while matters are proceeding, it has two disadvantages. One is that because of the vulnerability of long distance resource mobilization, a study of it will, almost by definition, entail only the mobilization of ego-networks and not that of the entire community, the latter being what I am interested in. The second downside is that resource mobilization is very much dependent on the circumstances. It requires a lot of time and luck to encounter the right situations that involve enough organizations, because it is not an everyday matter. Furthermore, the interviews I held contained several questions about examples of resource mobilization, but these were not always well understood or applicable.

### 7.3.4 Social mobilization

Social mobilization refers to the mobilization of organizations in respect of social affairs and the activation of people. For example, for new organizations it is vital to find and hold on to enough (new) members. It can, therefore, be a useful strategy to mobilize other associations which can, in turn, encourage people to become a member of the new organization. Needless to say, it is important that the new organization addresses those that are in a different field, as similar associations would obviously refuse to let (potential) members be taken away.

Every now and then, major community events take place. For example, in Amsterdam there is the yearly 'Car Free Sunday'. On this particular day, the city is closed to any incoming motorized traffic. The municipality enables citizens and, in particular, voluntary organizations to arrange neighborhood activities in the streets, such as sports' tournaments for children, a barbecue or a boat race. Usually, only a few organizations actually get to the point of setting up such an event, so to make sure that they will have enough participants they may well address/ mobilize their social capital, i.e. other organizations they know.

In Berlin, I witnessed the '*türkischer Tag*' ('*Türk Günü*'; Turkish day). It was a rather nationalistic event (many left-wing organizations I spoke to were, therefore, explicitly opposed to and distanced themselves from it) in the Tiergarten Park, with many Turkish flags and shows by Turkish artists. It was initiated by the TGB, but several other Turkish organizations were mobilized to support the event and make sure it received many visitors.

Although social mobilization may well be the most common type of activation, I nevertheless decided not to investigate it. The decisive factor was not so much the disadvantages attached to it, as the points in favor of another type of mobilization (which I will discuss next). Social activation can preeminently elicit a comprehensive community mobilization. Often, it has a neutral content (save for political events) which means that ideologically different groups are likely to cooperate and, therefore, a large

part of the community will participate. Another advantage is that when the researcher's focus is on the recruitment of visitors for a social event, and this event is attractive to these people (in other words, they will gain something positive from it), the willingness to participate will be high. Furthermore, such a mobilization will probably not only include the organizations, but also their members and perhaps even non-members if they are informed about the event as well. The comprehensiveness of this type of study is perhaps the only disadvantage of it; it includes so many actors that it may put a lot of strain on the researchers. Nevertheless, it is surely worth taking this risk in future research because it will enable several areas of the black box (as discussed in Chapter 1) to be revealed simultaneously.

### 7.3.5 Information dissemination as mobilization

The notion of information dissemination as mobilization in fact refers to the sharing of information. The aim of this type of activation is to receive or spread a piece of valuable knowledge. An actor may *need* information and, therefore, mobilizes the community so that he can get it. On the other hand, an organization may also *have* information that it spreads throughout its network. The network that is created based on information dissemination is a reflection of the patterns of communication between organizations: who tells whom what?

Information dissemination is not only a separate kind of mobilization, but it is what precedes any other type of activation. Before anyone will be prepared to take action, they need to know what action actually needs to be taken. In other words, people need to become informed and only then can they decide what to *do* with the information. A similar idea is found in the 'critical mass models' of collective action (Granovetter, 1978; Marwell, Oliver, & Ralph, 1988; Macy, 1990, 1991; Kitts, 2000). These state that whether or not people take the risk of participating in a collective action depends on their knowledge about the willingness of others to do so. For many, it is only when they know that there is a 'critical mass', i.e. enough people who have said they will participate, that they will then agree to take part in the mobilization themselves. In line with this, there are relationships between information dissemination on the one hand, and social, resource, political, and economical mobilization on the other. Firstly, the word that action is required has to be spread (e.g. there are activities that people can attend, or discarded, restorable chairs are needed to furnish a new children's home, or a demonstration is being organized, or subsidies are available for collaborating migrant organizations), to enable people to decide whether or not they will take part.

I present two examples of information dissemination amongst organizations. For instance, I posed a hypothetical question during the interviews for this research to which the respondent would tell me who he/she would inform in case he/she would hear that there were new subsidies available for migrant organizations. Financial

support is vital for many migrant organizations, and it was telling to see what they would do with this (hypothetical) knowledge. Some said they would keep the information to themselves, as there would probably be only small sums of money available, so the more organizations that know about it, the less money there would be. Others did intend to share their knowledge; some with only one organization, others with several. It was interesting to find so much variation and realize that the dissemination of information within a community is not self-evident.

Another example of knowledge mobilization is a situation in which there is an incident concerning the unjust treatment of a member of the Turkish community, for instance a young boy might be the victim of a racist attack. This piece of information would spread quickly through the community, and, as a way of making their voices heard, Turkish associations would probably arrange a gathering to commemorate the boy. The news about this assembly would, once again, spread throughout the community like wildfire. Furthermore, these organizations would not only spread the information, but they would also mobilize their grassroots, which again shows how the dissemination of information precedes political or social mobilization. As a matter of fact, one could argue that some kind of information sharing, by definition, has to take place first, before any other kind can occur.

This brings me back to the theory of social capital. In order for any form of mobilization to pass off well, it is important that all three of the elements that are distinguished within the concept of social capital (i.e. networks, trust and shared norms and values) are present and well-developed. As I explained in Chapter 2, I regard the network element as the most crucial, although I do not neglect the roles that trust and shared norms and values play. Especially when it comes to the development of social capital (after all, social capital is something one has to invest in to make it grow and ensure it is maintained; it is not 'just' there (see also Bourdieu, 1986)), it is important to get to know (new) actors and to learn to trust them. In this early phase, it is probably more difficult to mobilize one's ego-network or, indeed, the full network around any topic, as described in the preceding paragraphs. This is because organizations are perhaps still distrustful. A good way of learning whether one can trust others is to test them through knowledge sharing. If you receive trustworthy and valuable information from a particular actor, it is easy to start trusting this person (or organization), and, eventually, join forces with him or it. This is not necessarily a conscious strategy; it is usually a natural process to first exchange information before collaborating.

In summary, information dissemination as a form of mobilization is very important, and I, therefore, decided to use this approach to study the workings of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin. The additional advantage of this type of mobilization is that it is relatively easily performed; the organizations involved only need to spread a piece of information, which does not take much time or effort.

The remainder of this chapter concerns the development of an appropriate measurement instrument with which to track information dissemination. To that end, I

will now introduce the Big World Experiment (BWE), its design, the analyses I have performed and, in closing, some factual information about the findings in Berlin and Amsterdam.

## **7.4 Testing mobilization: why an experiment is the best way to do the job**

The question now is how can the idea of monitoring the mobilization of organizational networks be translated into a feasible research method? In his excellent review of network data and measurement, Marsden (1990) sets out different ways of gathering social network data. He names surveys and questionnaires as the most frequently used tools, but also mentions the more alternative methods: archival sources, diaries, electronic traces, observation (possibly by informants), and experiments. Each of these has its merits and demerits, in particular with respect to what is of relevance here, namely the mapping of mobilization. I will now demonstrate that because of preset choices by the researcher and the shortcomings of these different methods, only the latter tool- experimentation - is eligible herein.

### **7.4.1 Retrospective data**

A key choice that I made in this study was to study mobilization during the process and not in retrospect. This condition ruled out the use of questionnaires, as they are implemented only after the object of interest has passed: "Could you tell me who told you about this event?" The main reason for choosing a real-time method over a retrospective one is that retrospective data-gathering is always subject to memory loss or self over or underestimation by the respondents<sup>67</sup> (e.g. Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 1984; Killworth, Johnsen, Bernard, Shelley, & McCarthy, 1990; Brewer & Webster, 1999; Brewer, 2000). The discrepancy between what respondents recall and what their actual behavior was even led Bernard, Killworth and Sailer (1979/80) to reach the conclusion that 'cognitive data may not be used for drawing any conclusions about behavioral social structure'. Although many things can be said in favor of the use of questionnaires (in fact, the first part of this study is based on questionnaires for good reason), it is not suitable for the study of mobilization because of its retrospective nature.

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<sup>67</sup> See also Chapter 4 on the forgetting of friends.

## 7.4.2 Participant observation

In anthropology, and even in social network analysis, participant observation is a commonly used instrument. W.F. Whyte (1993 [1943]) and Jeremy Boissevain (1974) carried out pioneering social network studies into life in 'an Italian slum' and village life on the island of Malta, respectively. Participant observation essentially allows the researcher to be on top of his subject, which in the current case is the mobilization process. However, to study mobilization by participation, it is best if the researcher knows the actors involved. Participant observation is, after all, highly trust-based. The initial obscurity of the sample one has to work with, thus, poses a problem. After all, at the start of the mobilization process, it is unknown which actors will become involved in it. Effectively, this means that using participant observation with respect to information dissemination would only be possible if the researcher travels 'alongside' the message. To that end, the researcher needs to be familiar with the first actor (in this case organization) who starts the mobilization and, as the message is passed on, the researcher should then be introduced to every alter along the way. Each alter needs to accept the researcher's presence and is expected to do so because of the reputation of the first actor: your friend is my friend. In this way, the information dissemination can be monitored in real time by means of this observational method. Then again, this technique assumes a high degree of trust between the actors in the mobilization and, more importantly, it may even influence the course of it because actors can become more choosy about who they pass information on to. High trust relationships may be preferred over lower trust ones only for that reason, which implies bias in the data. Furthermore, the advantage of the dissemination of a piece of information is that it is an easy task and requires little effort. If an individual is needed to accompany the message, this complicates matters tremendously. Another, related, drawback is that the mobilization of a community is likely to take place at different locations therein simultaneously. A single researcher, this single researcher, would, therefore, not be able to keep track of all of the strands of mobilized actors at the same time. The biggest problem of participant observation, however, is that the researcher is fully dependent on the circumstances: is there a mobilization at the time of the study, and how can he/she find out about this in advance? It is, therefore, best if the researcher stimulates the mobilization process.

A final drawback of this method is more fundamental, and is not only related to the current research aims. Participant observation is, in general, not very precise, or at least not objectively so. This hampers a systematic acquisition of data and, more importantly, hinders a systematic comparison between two cases. The interaction between researcher and subjects in the case of participant observation is hard, if not impossible, to standardize, which easily allows the researcher to (unconsciously) influence the subject into being more or less active during the mobilization process. If there is more than one researcher, this becomes even more problematic. The most appropriate

method, therefore, is the one that can be standardized the most. This leads us onto experimenting.

### **7.4.3 Experimenting**

If the researcher is the initiator of the mobilization, he/she is taking control and is, in fact, implementing an experiment. Experiments are characterized by a controlled environment and manipulation of the independent variable(s) by the investigator (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991). The condition of a controlled environment is best met in the laboratory. However, it is impossible to transfer the community of Turkish organizations into such a setting. Furthermore, to discover how the social capital of organizations is used and works, it was of the utmost importance that they were mobilized in a natural way; they had to be involved in a kind of mobilization that may have taken place even if there was no study ongoing. A field experiment which is implemented in the 'real world', therefore, suits the aims of this study better. Of course, in a natural, as opposed to a laboratory, setting there are always factors that are beyond the control of the researcher. This may influence the course of the mobilization in an unanticipated way. On the other hand, in the current situation, the need for the naturalness of the mobilization outweighs the disadvantage of not being able to control the entire setting.

Experimentation is rather unusual in the political and social sciences, other than psychology (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 2006), but, as I will show, it can yield very interesting results<sup>68</sup>. The primary reason for using the experimental method is that it is the most appropriate tool for studying mobilization. At the same time, I want to make a case for a more frequent use of 'unorthodox' research methods, using this study as evidence of the value of such approaches.

## **7.5 The Big World Experiment**

The leading question that the experiment needed to answer was if, and if so which and how, organizations address their social capital when they are urged to do so. Accordingly, selected organizations were provided with a piece of valuable information, and the experiment is designed to show how this was forwarded throughout the community. An analogy for the experiment that I designed is that of an electric shock which runs through an electrical circuit. Think of a switchboard with a large number of

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<sup>68</sup> Examples of the rare field experiments in political science are those in which the way in which people are most encouraged to vote during elections is tested (Gerber & Green, 2000; Gerber, Green, & Shachar, 2003; Ramírez, 2005; Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008), and they also include examinations of whether citizens are able to get in touch with their political representatives (Erickson & Kringas, 1975). Erickson and Kringas' study is, for that matter, an adapted Small World Experiment (see below).

serially connected lights, but it is unclear initially which ones are linked. Then, at one location at the edge of the switchboard, the electricity is turned on and, one after another, the lights light up, thus exposing the connections between them. In a similar vein, one could activate a particular organization in a community of organizations and subsequently follow which others are addressed thereby, and then which other organizations are contacted thereafter. Since one 'electric shock' may not be enough to illuminate the mobilization of an entire community, they can be initiated at different points on the 'switchboard'. In other words, to ensure that there are several shocks simultaneously, a set of organizations can initially be approached.

The experiment herein is aimed at revealing how the dissemination of information occurs. Is the whole community reached after a certain period of time has passed? Does every organization receive the valuable information? If so, are these only Turkish organizations, or are non-Turkish associations also mobilized? How many organizations are mobilized? How far does the mobilization extend?

How big is the world of the Turkish organizations?

Given the nature of this question, I have named the experiment that I have created the 'Big World Experiment' (BWE), but its design is also thanks to another scholar, the sociologist Stanley Milgram, and his Small World Experiment in the 1960s.

## 7.6 Back to the roots: the Small World Experiment

Milgram (1967) developed the Small World Experiment (SWE) after being inspired by the work of Ithiel de Sola Pool and Manfred Kochen which was presented in their article '*Contacts and Influence*' (1978 [1958]). Pool and Kochen discussed what they termed the 'small world phenomenon', referring to the, probably familiar, situation of two strangers who meet somewhere and start talking, trying to find some common ground. Suddenly, it transpires that they know the same people, and the phrase: "It's a small world after all!" is then often heard. The question that Pool and Kochen posed was: '*what does the structure of social connections look like that makes these things possible*'? Milgram took this as the starting point of his SWE, because he thought that "*only in action can you fully realize the forces operative in social behavior.*"<sup>69</sup> The 'Small World problem' was thus challenged empirically instead of theoretically.

Through the SWE, Milgram tried to tackle the question of how many acquaintance links are needed before two randomly selected people can be connected. The experiment was comprised of a group of participants who the researcher asked to

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<sup>69</sup> [www.stanleymilgram.com/quotes](http://www.stanleymilgram.com/quotes), last entry on June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

forward a parcel to a specific target person who was living at the other end of the country. The accompanying instruction stated that the participant was to hand the parcel directly to the target, and if he/she did not know this person on a first name basis, the package should be passed on to a friend who the participant thought was more likely to. If the participant passed the parcel on to a friend, this friend was asked the same question, thus creating a chain from the initial subject to, hopefully and eventually, the target individual.

The results of this experiment were amazing. Most people estimate that it takes about 100 intermediates to link two randomly selected individuals. However, in Milgram's Small World Experiment it took, on average, only five. This finding became known under the title of 'six degrees of separation' since five intermediates corresponds to six steps from the initial participant to the target. These results confirmed the commonplace experience that *'it's a small world after all'*.

That the SWE can be related to the use of social capital becomes clear in the work of Lin<sup>70</sup>, Dayton and Greenwald (1983) who studied the *'instrumental use of relations[hips]'* by way of a Small World Experiment. The researchers used the instrument to show how people employ their contacts, with the emphasis being on the prestige of the social actors involved. Thus, they were in fact studying how people apply their social capital. One of their findings was that those in successful chains (i.e. that reached the intended target) had more contacts than those in unsuccessful ones. Furthermore, the successful chains consisted of people who were 'weakly linked' (i.e. bridging social capital). This was in contrast to the unsuccessful chains, and is a confirmation of Granovetter's notion of 'the strength of weak ties' (see also Chapter 2). Moreover, people who were part of successful chains usually sought out those who they thought had many acquaintances, thus revealing a greater awareness of their personal networks.

The Small World Experiment has thus been applied in a study on social capital in operation, albeit this was not the wording that Lin et al. used at the time. However, the design of the SWE is too limiting for the ends I am pursuing here. The difference is clear in the titles of the two experiments: as Milgram and others tried to demonstrate how small people's social worlds are, I want to show how big they can be. The SWE has a 'closed' ending, as its target is specified beforehand. The idea of my Big World Experiment, however, is not that a single target is reached or mobilized, but that as many as possible or necessary are. Thus, the BWE is 'open-ended'. This clearly required the original experiment to be adapted, which I did on the basis of my own insights and the specificity of the circumstances, although the changes can be substantiated with the findings of other scholars who conducted Small World Experiments.

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<sup>70</sup> Nan Lin later developed a theory on social capital. See also Chapter 2.

## 7.7 Design of the Big World Experiment

An invitation to a lecture on ‘The Art of Networking’ was the experimental trigger that set off the intended information dissemination. The lecture, which was delivered by the researcher, encompassed the presentation of the results of the first part of the study, dealt with the importance of networking and gave tips about how to enhance one’s networking skills. The group of organizations that initially received the invitation was comprised of those that had been interviewed the year before the lecture was held.

The invitation to the lecture was initially conveyed by telephone. This followed Guiot’s recommendation (1976). Unlike Milgram, who sent his respondents a letter containing a request for participation, Guiot approached them by telephone. He argued that: *“because of the immediacy of this two-way communication means, the telephone seems particularly adequate for securing participation”* (p.504). The result of the researcher taking control was that the response rates increased tremendously, rising from around 30% in the original versions of the experiment (e.g. Milgram, 1967; Bochner, Duncan, Kennedy, & Orr, 1976; Lin et al., 1983), to almost 85% in Guiot’s study. An important finding was that there was no effect on the length of the chains (in this study they were also an average of 6 steps), which led Guiot to conclude that *“the high drop-out rates [that were] characteristic of the earlier studies using the mail procedure, stemmed primarily from [a] lack of motivation rather than [an] inability to select an efficient path”* (Guiot, 1976, p.506). Weimann (1983) achieved similarly high response rates by using the telephone method, which convinced me to also utilize this approach.

During the phone call, the caller<sup>71</sup> kept to a call protocol. This contained all of the information that she was supposed to convey to the respondents, as well as the questions that had to be asked. The protocol also prescribed the order in which these matters should be addressed<sup>72</sup>.

(Most of) the organizations that were selected to be part of the experiment had been interviewed in the earlier data collection phase, and so the callers initially tried to get in touch with the individual who had been spoken to at that time. After identifying the addressee as the person who had been interviewed, he or she was invited to attend the lecture in which the preliminary results of the research project would be presented. In cases where the original interviewee was no longer on the board of the relevant organization, his/her successor was invited.

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<sup>71</sup> The author and her assistants conducted the phone calls. I want to thank Fien Peters and Wiebke Schulz for their help and excellent work.

<sup>72</sup> It turned out that this protocol was sometimes too strict and it was not possible to follow the instructions exactly as prescribed. In those cases it at least provided guidelines as to what should come up during the phone calls.

Immediately after receiving the invitation, the respondents were asked whether they could think of any other organization (or individual) that they thought would be interested in attending the lecture as well. Each respondent could name as many people and organizations as he/she wanted. It is at this point that the BWE deviates most from the Small World Experiment, since the respondents in the latter were asked to connect to only one alter, whereas the number of alters in this study are (theoretically) infinite.

The request for the names of alters was justified by the intention of the researcher to invite as many organizations as possible to the lecture and the wish to convey the invitation personally to all invitees. This was understood and accepted most of the time. Only in some instances did the person we spoke to tell us that he knew that we (the researchers) had a full list of Turkish organizations and we should check that list if we wanted to invite others. Luckily, this did not happen very often.

If any organization (or individual) was mentioned, the caller explicitly asked for the telephone number thereof. At times this was difficult, since respondents often said that they would “pass the message on” when they met up with the other organizations. The caller tried to convince the participants to provide names and numbers by saying that we really wanted to invite everybody personally, and we needed to know how many people would actually be attending the lecture because of the reception that would be taking place afterwards. The main reason why the respondents were pointedly asked for these telephone numbers or other contact information was that it served as a way of verifying that the organization actually had direct contact with the new group that was mentioned. Sometimes we would call back at a later, agreed, time so that people had time to think of names and/or numbers, but most of the time this did not lead to any additional responses.

The telephone conversation was concluded by asking the respondent whether he/she would appreciate receiving an invitation by e-mail or mail and whether he/she would be able to attend the lecture.

### **7.7.1 The course of the mobilization: continuing the chains**

All of the names that were mentioned by the initial invitees were registered, and the organizations (individuals) in question were approached using the same procedure and protocol. Only the introductory information at the start of the telephone conversation differed slightly. Instead of referring directly to the research that would be presented during the lecture (and with that the immediate recognition by the respondents of the researchers), the caller referred to the person and organization that had provided us with the intermediary’s contact information<sup>73</sup>. The caller then explained that the ‘number provider’ had given us the telephone number because he/she thought that the

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<sup>73</sup> In some cases we only received an e-mail address instead of a telephone number. Then we would either look up the telephone number or approach the respective organization by e-mail.

addressee might be interested in the lecture. An advantage of this form of introduction was that the addressees were not suspicious about our motives for getting in touch with them. Indeed, it may even have given them a feeling of importance and made them more willing to cooperate.

The remainder of the telephone conversations with the alters proceeded along similar lines to those with the initial invitees. The contact was asked whether there were any other organizations we could invite, what their contact information was and, lastly, whether the addressee would be coming to the lecture.

Any organizations that were named were again approached using the same procedure. This was repeated until the end of the experiment, which was defined by the day upon which the lecture was held.

### 7.7.2 Possible incorporated bias

Every research method has its drawbacks, and all measures contain systematic and random errors: the influence on the 'true score' of the construct under study (Judd et al., 1991). As long as one is aware of both the fact that each method is, to some extent, biased and what the source of this bias is, this factor is inconvenient but not necessarily problematic; the Big World Experiment and the responses it elicited may have been influenced by several factors.

Firstly, the topic of the lecture might have influenced the participants' thoughts about which actors they wanted to mobilize and even whether they wanted to mobilize at all. The lecture was about the 'art of networking' and the results of the first part of the study. Accordingly, actors who are not interested in networking may not feel like forwarding an invitation to a lecture about this topic to others, because they would not want to bother them. However, those that were approached first were part of the study that would be discussed. As most people like to talk or hear about themselves (personal experience) this would probably cancel out the lack of interest in networking. Each of the actors approached later in the mobilization process had the silent recommendation of those who had mobilized them that the lecture was worth attending; why would they have received the invitation otherwise?

The fact that the lecture was partly about the Turkish community could trigger actors to name Turkish organizations more often than their non-Turkish counterparts. The neutral title of the lecture was chosen to anticipate this bias. Moreover, the lecture contained information that would be interesting to all organizations, not only Turkish ones<sup>74</sup>. There is a possibility that this was not enough to circumvent the bias caused by

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<sup>74</sup> That networking is a relevant topic for (migrant) organizations becomes clear from books like *EigenWijs Participeren; een wegwijzer voor zelforganisaties (A guide for self-organizations)* (Jansen & Putten, 2002), which contains information for migrants who are active in these associations about how to run voluntary organizations, develop successful projects, and participate in society.

the topic of the lecture. However, even if the actors were indeed more inclined to mobilize Turkish organizations, this is not a particularly significant problem. After all, I am mapping the working of social capital in the Turkish community.

The second source of possible bias is the fact that the *researcher* was the one who actually performed the mobilization, not the organizations themselves. The researcher or an assistant made the phone calls and conveyed the invitations. This intervention could have influenced the choices made by the initial invitees, as well as the interpretation of the invitation by the successive receivers thereof. I consider prestige to be the main factor of influence in these circumstances; in order to impress the researcher, the sender may want to demonstrate which important organizations he/she is acquainted with, even though these may not be contacts that this association would normally involve in a mobilization. In other words, the potentially disturbing effect of prestige is that participants may display a tendency to over emphasize their weak ties over the strong ones. However, even if this is the case, it is not problematic when it comes to the interpretation of the network. In fact, it would even produce a more interesting result, because the mobilization could then be regarded as an extreme scenario which reveals the maximal connections between organizations within the community.

The prestige of the actors may also affect the receiver of the invitation, but in a positive way. The caller explicitly referred to the actor who had provided the telephone number of the organization approached. The receiver thus heard that it was recommended by the sender, which may have increased the willingness to, in turn, forward the invitation. This indeed turned out to be the case, as the dropout rates decreased as the chains proceeded.

A final factor that has to be taken into consideration is that the mobilization networks which depict mobilizations reflect how they were explicitly reported to the researcher. Whether or not they named others, what people actually did with the invitation, which they always received by mail or e-mail, is unknown: they might have forwarded it on without our knowledge. Moreover, whether organizations discussed the lecture with each other and whether they would or would not attend was beyond the knowledge of the researcher.

Overall, I do not expect the bias to be severe enough to devalue the experiment. As I said at the beginning of this paragraph, it is, however, important to recognize the possible sources thereof and take them into account in the analysis.

## **7.8 Analyzing the BWE data**

The mobilization networks resulting from the BWE were first analyzed by means of (some of) the network measures introduced in Chapter 4. The results from the analyses

can be found in Appendices 6 and 7. The in and out-degree of all actors is taken into account. The mobilization network is directed<sup>75</sup>, so a more precise description of the relationships with the alters is possible compared to what the general ‘degree’ measure allows. In the mobilization network, the in-degree refers to the number of times an organization is named by others as being a future invitee. The out-degree refers to the number of organizations that an actor named, or in other words, the number of organizations that an actor has mobilized. Associations that have more incoming than outgoing ties, for instance, are thought to be popular and have a strong position in the network. The out-degree figures also provide insight into the strategies followed by the actors, for example, some choose to mobilize many alters, while others confine themselves to only one, perhaps crucial, organization.

The betweenness and closeness measures that were applied in the contact network are problematic in the mobilization network. Firstly, of all these measures are only applicable in an *undirected* network, which the mobilization network is not. It is only if the network can be assumed to be undirected that the measures can be meaningfully calculated. This might indeed be the case in the current network (although this remains more speculation than certainty). Organization A refers to organization B, but this does not mean that B would also refer to A. This can be due to the fact that there is a hierarchical relationship between the two organizations. In general, it is assumed that in a hierarchical dyad the receiving actor is hierarchically more highly placed. This also means that actor B is probably less inclined to involve actor A. On the other hand, in the current circumstances, it will be difficult to distinguish this principle of hierarchy from the simple fact that actors were likely to be less inclined to mention the organizations that had already mentioned their name. The caller explicitly stated: “organization A gave us your name”. This must have dissuaded many actors from reciprocating a certain tie, and it therefore cannot be automatically assumed that a directed tie in this case equates to a hierarchical relationship.

The other characteristic of the betweenness and closeness measures that poses a bigger problem is the fact that they are only applicable in connected networks (i.e. networks that consist of only one component). As I will show, the mobilization network in Amsterdam is not connected, and the betweenness and closeness measures were, therefore, not used in relation thereto.

The different components and the cut points within them do, of course, deserve and receive ample attention. By means of the E-I index and the IQV, the components are qualitatively interpreted.

Two additional concepts are important in relation to the data from the Big World Experiment, namely those of ‘chain’ and ‘chain length’. If mobilization is thought of as an

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<sup>75</sup> An undirected network consists of bilateral relationships between actors (A is related to B in a similar way to how B is related to A and the ‘direction’ of the relationship is not relevant). A directed network consists of one-way relationships (e.g. A relates only to B, but B does not relate to A and the direction of the relationship is thus very relevant).

ever growing tree, a chain is a branch thereof, which is formed by organizations that subsequently mobilize the next one in the chain. Chain length then refers to the number of actors that make up this branch.

In the discussion of the mobilization networks, I also make use of a few other basic concepts which I have not yet introduced. The organizations that were addressed first are named the '*starters*'. The actors which mentioned other organizations (starters or not) are termed as '*senders*', since they sent the invitation to others, even though the researcher was the one who actually conveyed it. The alters to whom the invitations were addressed are known as '*receivers*'. '*Closers*', meanwhile, are the organizations that are mentioned but which do not have a Turkish background and/or are located outside of Amsterdam. In this study, they were regarded as the end points of the chains and were therefore not asked to forward the invitation to others, but they were, of course, invited to attend the lecture. The closers form the edges of the mobilization network, just as the non-Turkish and non-Amsterdam organizations made up the borders of the contact networks and networks of interlocking directorates. Organizations that were contacted but were unwilling or unable to provide the names of acquainted organizations are referred to as '*sinks*'.

## **7.9 Dates of the experiments in Amsterdam and Berlin**

The experiments took place in 2006. In Amsterdam, the first phone calls were made on Monday April 3<sup>rd</sup> and the experiment ended on Thursday April 27<sup>th</sup>, the day the lecture was held. The BWE in Berlin took place six months later, between Monday 16<sup>th</sup> of October and November 18<sup>th</sup>, with the lecture taking place on November 30<sup>th</sup>. For logistical reasons, and unlike in Amsterdam, the lecture in Berlin could not take place on the final day of the mobilization period. The activation in Berlin was, therefore, ended after a month to ensure that the circumstances in terms of the period within which the mobilization took place were as equal as possible in the two cities.

The fact that the mobilizations in both cities took place in a predetermined time-frame meant that, in some cases, it was terminated before this would have happened 'naturally'. In other words, in principle, organizations were approached as often as necessary in order to invite them to the lecture. Sometimes this meant that we called them ten times. In many cases we would get in touch with them eventually, but this was not always the case. The organizations concerned are treated as sinks, even though we might have reached and would have been able to mobilize them had the experiment lasted longer.

## 7.10 Samples in Berlin and Amsterdam

The initial samples consisted of the organizations that I had interviewed the year before. The reasons for using the same organizations were fourfold. First of all, the lecture served as a gesture to the participants in the study. In this way they got the chance to hear about and make comments on the research that they were a part of. Secondly, as the lecture concerned the invitees themselves, their enthusiasm or motivation to join in with the experiment and to mobilize appropriate others would be greater than for organizations that had no prior knowledge of the study. Any subsequent actors in the mobilization to whom this ‘interest’ argument does not apply had the extra stimulus of being referred to by a well-known partner organization, which could have persuaded them to participate due to feelings of honor or obligation. The third reason for using the interviewed organizations was that these samples (again, in both Amsterdam and Berlin) had already been revealed to contain organizations with very diverse positions and characteristics. In other words, the mobilization would really start at different ‘ends’ of the community and would be able to show if those with more or less social capital use it differently or in a similar way. This latter argument is important, since Milgram and other Small World Experiment researchers were criticized for using self-selected samples. Milgram’s starting sample, for example, was compiled of people who volunteered after an appeal in a local newspaper. The criticism maintained that only people with a significant number of acquaintances and a high social economic status (SES) would participate, as they are more confident than those with a low SES. In the current research, the random sampling method avoided this problem. Fourthly, using this sample enabled the comparison to be made between social capital (the contact network and network of interlocking directorates) and social capital in operation (the mobilization network), which is a crucial element in the current study.

This strategy meant that in Amsterdam I began by addressing 38 organizations. Using the same line of reasoning, the initial sample in Berlin was 27. However, to optimize the comparisons between the two cities, I decided to add ten organizations to this latter group to make sure that the starting samples were the same size. The additional organizations were deliberately selected, and in the main involved those I had planned to interview but could not because of the schedules of the intended interviewees. Three other organizations were selected by the same sampling procedure that was used to obtain the initial sample (described in Chapter 4). The aim was to fill categories that were possibly under-represented<sup>76</sup>.

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<sup>76</sup> These are the sports organization 1. SV Galatasaray Berlin, TÜDESB (educational organization), Türkische Sozialdemokraten in Berlin e.V. (political organization).

### 7.11 Missing data and non-response in Amsterdam and Berlin: chains versus actors

In the original Small World Experiments, response rates are equated with the percentage of completed chains (i.e. the chains that reached the target) as opposed to those that did not reach the intended target. Using this percentage basis, the response rates in SWE studies varied from 1.6% in the work by Dodds et al. (2003) to 84.6% in Guiot's research (1976). The overall mean percentage of completed chains is 40.4% (as revealed by a meta-analysis). However, if the number of chains that were *initially started* is used as the percentage base, this mean drops by over eight percentage points, to 32.1%. This is important, because in the current study there is no such thing as a completed chain, and nor is the success of a chain revealed from any target reached. The BWE does not involve a target, and it is therefore not possible to report the response rates using the normal definition. Instead, in this study the *non-response* rate is calculated. This is not simply the opposite of the response rate as it is calculated in former studies. In fact, I abandon the idea that the (non-) response rate is based on the total number of *chains*, and instead base it on the number of *actors* involved in them. Hence, the non-response rate reported here refers to the number of organizations that were unreachable or did not provide any names, compared to the total number of organizations<sup>77</sup> included in the experiment. In fact, this is the understanding of response rates that is common in the social sciences.

### 7.12 Non-response and non-contact

The percentage of non-responses in Amsterdam and Berlin are respectively 44.7 and 50.7%. In other words, half of the organizations approached did not participate in the mobilization. How this should be interpreted depends upon why these associations did not get involved. Was it because they have objections in principle to the intended purpose, or simply because they were not there at the time the experiment was implemented? In order to gain more insight into these non-responses, I therefore distinguish between two types, or components, of non-response (following Stoop, 2005): non-response due to non-contact and non-response due to reluctance to cooperate.

The non-response due to non-contact refers to situations in which the intended respondent simply could not be reached. The BWE relies on the telephone method, as

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<sup>77</sup> Also, sometimes people instead of associations were mentioned. Further investigation into their backgrounds demonstrated that in nearly all cases they were prominent members of the Turkish community who could be associated with associations as former board members, or with governmental institutions as politicians. These individuals are therefore included in all of the analyses.

recommended by Guiot, because it yields much higher response rates. Of course, when using the telephone method, one also comes across organizations that do not pick up the phone. In these cases, we tried to reach them by e-mail<sup>78</sup>. No-one, however, responded to this method of approach. As can be seen in Table 7.1, 16.6% of the non-responses in Amsterdam and 18.3 % of those in Berlin were due to unreachable organizations.

	Non-contact	Non-cooperation	Total
Amsterdam (n=96)	16.6	28.1	44.7
Berlin (n=71)	18.3	32.4	50.7

**Table 7.1 Non-response in percentages**

The second type of non-response (non-response due to reluctance to cooperate) concerns the organizations that were contacted but were not willing or able to provide the names of acquainted associations ('sinks'). In Amsterdam, 28.1% of organizations refused their cooperation compared to 32.4% of those in Berlin. This type of non-response is particularly relevant for the interpretation of the course of the mobilization. Not only did the organizations that did participate show, by their involvement, how the mobilization of a community took place, but those that excluded themselves also provided valuable insights, yet it is difficult to find the reasons for this non-participation. Was it the participants' lack of social capital (i.e. they did not *know* who to name), an unwillingness to participate, or yet another reason? The first explanation seems to be the least plausible, since the interviews revealed that all of the organizations have at least some contacts. On the other hand, it could mean that even though they *said* they had connections, these are not valuable. Or, and this is something that several organizations said, they do not *regard* their connections as being valuable. A frequently heard comment was that "*I cannot think of any names at the moment*". Given the fact that it is known that every organization has at least some connections, this shows that they do not value their social capital as useful. Only one organization in Berlin actually stated that it would not mobilize any other organization because it was '*always working on its own*'. The second reason for non-cooperation (a total unwillingness to participate) was encountered several times as well. We heard comments such as: "*I cannot see the point in naming anyone*", "*It is too much effort to mention anyone*" or "*Everybody is so busy, I wouldn't want to bother them*". Some starters said "*You have a full list of organizations<sup>79</sup>, so I'm sure you can find them yourselves*". Finally, several organizations promised to let us know who they wanted to invite, but never did.

<sup>78</sup> Only if we were able to identify the organization's e-mail address via the Internet.

<sup>79</sup> He referred to the name recognition list that was provided during the interviews.

It is worth noting that the majority of the organizations that refused to mobilize any others, both in Berlin and Amsterdam, were *starters*. Indeed, they refused their participation more than organizations further along the chains. Or, putting it another way, organizations further along the chains were more willing to play a part in the mobilization. This is an unexpected finding; it was thought that the starters would have more interest in the lecture topic because it was partly about them and the research they had participated in. On this basis it was thought that they would, therefore, be more willing to invite other associations along. Although I did not pose any questions about why an organization agreed to take part in the mobilization process<sup>80</sup>, I suspect that the actors further along the chains, on the one hand, felt special because they heard the caller tell them that some other organization(s) had thought of them in particular and, on the other, they felt obliged to join in, again because they had been referred by a third party. The starters had no such indebtedness to other organizations, and only perhaps to the researcher. It is possible that this obligation was not as strongly felt, thus leading to lower response rates. The non-response figures per remove in the chains are presented in columns two and three of the table in Appendix 8. This table also contains other information about the number of organizations that were involved in each step of the mobilization.

In the next chapter I will present the results of the mobilization in Amsterdam. I will also consider them in light of the social capital described in Chapter 5. Chapter 9 contains a similar analysis of the results of the experiment in Berlin and a comparison with the social capital as presented in Chapter 6.

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<sup>80</sup> Nor on why the organization approached had chosen the organizations it had chosen. I refrained from such questions so as to not disturb the authenticity of the experiment.